זבחים צ״ח ב:ו׳-ק״ו א:ח׳
Zevachim 98b:6-106a:8
Hebrew
דַּם חַטָּאת לְמַטָּה וְדַם עוֹלָה לְמַעְלָה, טָעוּן כִּיבּוּס.,בָּעֵי רָבָא: דַּם עוֹלָה לְמַטָּה וְדַם חַטָּאת לְמַעְלָה, מַהוּ? מִשּׁוּם נוֹגֵעַ הוּא – וְהָא נוֹגֵעַ; אוֹ דִלְמָא מִשּׁוּם בָּלוּעַ הוּא – וְהָא לָא בָּלַע (הוּא)? הֲדַר פַּשְׁטַהּ, דְּאֵין טְעוּנִין כִּיבּוּס.,אָמַר רָבָא: פְּשִׁיטָא לִי, דָּם עַל בִּגְדּוֹ – חוֹצֵץ, וְאִם טַבָּח הוּא – אֵינוֹ חוֹצֵץ. רְבָב עַל בִּגְדּוֹ – חוֹצֵץ, וְאִם מוֹכֵר רְבָב הוּא – אֵינוֹ חוֹצֵץ. בָּעֵי רָבָא: דָּם וּרְבָב עַל בִּגְדּוֹ, מַהוּ?,אִם טַבָּח הוּא, תִּיפּוֹק לִי מִשּׁוּם רְבָב! וְאִי מוֹכֵר רְבָב הוּא, תִּיפּוֹק לִי מִשּׁוּם דָּם! לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּעָבֵיד הָא וְהָא. אַחֲדָא לָא קָפֵיד, אַתַּרְתֵּי קָפֵיד; אוֹ דִּלְמָא אַתַּרְתֵּי נָמֵי לָא קָפֵיד? תֵּיקוּ.,הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ דַּם חַטָּאת,מַתְנִי׳ טְבוּל יוֹם וּמְחוּסַּר כִּיפּוּרִים – אֵינָן חוֹלְקִין בַּקֳּדָשִׁים לֶאֱכוֹל לָעֶרֶב.,אוֹנֵן – (אֵינוֹ) נוֹגֵעַ וְאֵינוֹ מַקְרִיב, וְאֵינוֹ חוֹלֵק לֶאֱכוֹל לָעֶרֶב.,בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין, בֵּין בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין עוֹבְרִין בֵּין בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין קְבוּעִין – חוֹלְקִין וְאוֹכְלִין, אֲבָל לֹא מַקְרִיבִין.,כֹּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ רָאוּי לַעֲבוֹדָה – אֵינוֹ חוֹלֵק בַּבָּשָׂר. וְכֹל שֶׁאֵין לוֹ בַּבָּשָׂר – אֵין לוֹ בָּעוֹרוֹת.,אֲפִילּוּ טָמֵא בִּשְׁעַת זְרִיקַת דָּמִים, וְטָהוֹר בִּשְׁעַת הֶקְטֵר חֲלָבִים – אֵינוֹ חוֹלֵק בַּבָּשָׂר; שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״הַמַּקְרִיב אֶת דַּם הַשְּׁלָמִים [וְאֶת הַחֵלֶב מִבְּנֵי אַהֲרֹן] – לוֹ (יִהְיֶה) [תִהְיֶה שׁוֹק הַיָּמִין לְמָנָה]״. גְּמָ׳ מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״הַכֹּהֵן הַמְחַטֵּא אֹתָהּ יֹאכְלֶנָּה״ – כֹּהֵן הַמְחַטֵּא יֹאכַל, שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְחַטֵּא אֵינוֹ אוֹכֵל.,וּכְלָלָא הוּא?! וַהֲרֵי מִשְׁמָרָה כּוּלָּהּ – דְּאֵין מְחַטְּאִין, וְאוֹכְלִין! רָאוּי לְחִיטּוּי קָאָמְרִינַן.,הֲרֵי קָטָן – דְּאֵינוֹ רָאוּי לְחִיטּוּי, וְאוֹכֵל! אֶלָּא מַאי ״יֹאכְלֶנָּה״ – יְחַלְּקֶנָּה. רָאוּי לְחִיטּוּי – חוֹלֵק, שֶׁאֵינוֹ רָאוּי לְחִיטּוּי – אֵינוֹ חוֹלֵק.,הֲרֵי בַּעַל מוּם – דְּאֵינוֹ רָאוּי לְחִיטּוּי, וְחוֹלֵק! בַּעַל מוּם רַחֲמָנָא רַבְּיֵיהּ: ״כׇּל זָכָר בַּכֹּהֲנִים״ – לְרַבּוֹת בַּעַל מוּם.,וְאֵימָא: ״כׇּל זָכָר״ – לְרַבּוֹת טְבוּל יוֹם! מִסְתַּבְּרָא בַּעַל מוּם הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְרַבּוֹיֵי, שֶׁכֵּן אוֹכֵל.,אַדְּרַבָּה – טְבוּל יוֹם הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְרַבּוֹיֵי, דִּלְאוּרְתָּא מִיחְזָא חֲזֵי! הַשְׁתָּא מִיהָא הָא לָא חֲזֵי.,רַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר: מִכְּדֵי מַאי ״יֹאכְלֶנָּה״ – יְחַלְּקֶנָּה; לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא ״יְחַלְּקֶנָּה״! מַאי ״יֹאכְלֶנָּה״? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: רָאוּי לַאֲכִילָה – חוֹלֵק, שֶׁאֵינוֹ רָאוּי לַאֲכִילָה – אֵינוֹ חוֹלֵק.,בָּעֵי רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: בַּעַל מוּם וְהוּא טָמֵא, מַהוּ שֶׁיַּחְלְקוּ לוֹ? כֵּיוָן דְּלָא חֲזֵי וְרַחֲמָנָא רַבְּיֵיהּ – לָא שְׁנָא, מָה לִי טָמֵא מָה לִי בַּעַל מוּם; אוֹ דִלְמָא, רָאוּי לַאֲכִילָה חוֹלֵק, שֶׁאֵינוֹ רָאוּי לַאֲכִילָה אֵינוֹ חוֹלֵק?,אָמַר רַבָּה, תָּא שְׁמַע: כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל מַקְרִיב אוֹנֵן, וְאֵינוֹ אוֹכֵל, וְאֵינוֹ חוֹלֵק לֶאֱכוֹל לָעֶרֶב. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: רָאוּי לַאֲכִילָה בָּעֵינַן! שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.,בָּעֵי רַב אוֹשַׁעְיָא: טָמֵא בְּקׇרְבְּנוֹת צִיבּוּר, מַהוּ שֶׁיַּחְלְקוּ לוֹ? מִי אָמְרִינַן: ״הַמְחַטֵּא״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא – וְהַאי נָמֵי מֵחֵטְא הוּא; אוֹ דִלְמָא, רָאוּי לַאֲכִילָה חוֹלֵק, שֶׁאֵין רָאוּי לַאֲכִילָה אֵינוֹ חוֹלֵק?,אָמַר רָבִינָא, תָּא שְׁמַע: כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל מַקְרִיב אוֹנֵן, וְאֵינוֹ אוֹכֵל, וְאֵינוֹ חוֹלֵק לֶאֱכוֹל לָעֶרֶב. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: רָאוּי לַאֲכִילָה בָּעֵינַן! שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.,אוֹנֵן נוֹגֵעַ וְאֵינוֹ מַקְרִיב כּוּ׳. אוֹנֵן נוֹגֵעַ?! וּרְמִינְהִי: אוֹנֵן וּמְחוּסַּר כִּיפּוּרִים – צְרִיכִין טְבִילָה לַקּוֹדֶשׁ!,אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לָא קַשְׁיָא; כָּאן בְּשֶׁטָּבַל, כָּאן בְּשֶׁלֹּא טָבַל.,וְכִי טָבַל מַאי הָוֵי? הָא הָדְרָא עֲלֵיהּ אֲנִינוּת; דְּאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא: אוֹנֵן שֶׁטָּבַל – אֲנִינוּתוֹ חוֹזֶרֶת עָלָיו!,לָא קַשְׁיָא; הָא דְּאַסַּח דַּעְתֵּיהּ, הָא דְּלָא אַסַּח דַּעְתֵּיהּ.,הֶיסַּח הַדַּעַת – שְׁלִישִׁי וּשְׁבִיעִי בָּעֵי; דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסְטַאי בְּרַבִּי מָתוּן אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הֶיסַּח הַדַּעַת – צָרִיךְ הַזָּאָה שְׁלִישִׁי וּשְׁבִיעִי!,לָא קַשְׁיָא; הָא דְּאַסַּח דַּעְתֵּיהּ מִטְּמֵא מֵת, הָא דְּאַסַּח דַּעְתֵּיהּ מִטְּמֵא שֶׁרֶץ.,טְמֵא שֶׁרֶץ – טָמֵא מְעַלְּיָיא הוּא, הֶעֱרֵב שֶׁמֶשׁ בָּעֵי! וְעוֹד, אֲפִילּוּ תְּרוּמָה נָמֵי!,אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: בְּאוֹמֵר נִשְׁמַרְתִּי מִדָּבָר הַמְטַמְּאֵנִי, וְלֹא נִשְׁמַרְתִּי מִדָּבָר הַפּוֹסְלֵנִי.,וּמִי אִיכָּא נְטִירוּתָא לְפַלְגָא?! אִין; וְהָתַנְיָא: עוֹדֵהוּ הַסַּל עַל רֹאשׁוֹ וּמַגְרֵיפָה בְּתוֹכוֹ, וְאָמַר: ״לִבִּי עַל הַסַּל וְאֵין לִבִּי עַל הַמַּגְרֵיפָה״ – הַסַּל טָהוֹר וְהַמַּגְרֵיפָה טְמֵאָה.,וּתְטַמֵּא מַגְרֵיפָה לְסַל! אֵין כְּלִי מְטַמֵּא כְּלִי. וּתְטַמֵּא מַה שֶּׁבְּתוֹכוֹ! אָמַר רָבָא: בְּאוֹמֵר שְׁמַרְתִּיהָ מִדָּבָר הַמְטַמְּאָהּ, וְלֹא שְׁמַרְתִּיהָ מִדָּבָר הַפּוֹסְלָהּ.,אִיגַּלְגַּל מִילְּתָא, וּמְטַאי לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַבָּא בַּר מֶמֶל. אֲמַר לְהוּ, לָא שְׁמִיעַ לְהוּ הָא דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר רַבִּי: הָאוֹכֵל שְׁלִישִׁי שֶׁל תְּרוּמָה – אָסוּר לֶאֱכוֹל וּמוּתָּר לִיגַּע?,אַלְמָא בַּאֲכִילָה עֲבוּד רַבָּנַן מַעֲלָה, בִּנְגִיעָה לָא עֲבוּד רַבָּנַן מַעֲלָה!,וְאֵינוֹ חוֹלֵק לֶאֱכוֹל כּוּ׳. מִיפְלָג הוּא דְּלָא פְּלִיג, וְכִי מְזַמְּנִי לֵיהּ – אָכֵיל;,וּרְמִינְהִי: אוֹנֵן (וּמְחוּסַּר כִּיפּוּרִים) – טוֹבֵל וְאוֹכֵל אֶת פִּסְחוֹ לָעֶרֶב, אֲבָל לֹא בְּקָדָשִׁים!,אָמַר רַב יִרְמְיָה מִדִּיפְתִּי: לָא קַשְׁיָא; כָּאן בְּפֶסַח, כָּאן בִּשְׁאָר יְמוֹת הַשָּׁנָה.,בְּפֶסַח – אַיְּידֵי דְּאָכֵיל פֶּסַח, אָכֵיל נָמֵי קָדָשִׁים. בִּשְׁאָר יְמוֹת הַשָּׁנָה – דְּלָא חֲזֵי, לָא חֲזֵי. וּמַאי ״אֲבָל לֹא בְּקָדָשִׁים״? אֲבָל לֹא בְּקָדָשִׁים שֶׁל כׇּל הַשָּׁנָה.,רַב אַסִּי אָמַר: לָא קַשְׁיָא; כָּאן שֶׁמֵּת לוֹ מֵת בְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר וּקְבָרוֹ בְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר, כָּאן שֶׁמֵּת לוֹ מֵת בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה עָשָׂר וּקְבָרוֹ בְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר; יוֹם קְבוּרָה לָא תָּפֵיס לֵילוֹ מִדְּרַבָּנַן.,מַאן תַּנָּא אֲנִינוּת לַיְלָה מִדְּרַבָּנַן? רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא. דְּתַנְיָא: אֲנִינוּת לַיְלָה מִדִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אוֹנֵן אֵינוֹ מִדִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה, אֶלָּא מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים. תֵּדַע – שֶׁהֲרֵי אָמְרוּ: אוֹנֵן טוֹבֵל וְאוֹכֵל אֶת פִּסְחוֹ לָעֶרֶב, אֲבָל לֹא בַּקֳּדָשִׁים.,וְסָבַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אֲנִינוּת לַיְלָה מִדְּרַבָּנַן?! וְהָתַנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אוֹנֵן אֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּחַ קׇרְבְּנוֹתָיו. מַאי, לָאו וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּפֶסַח? לָא; לְבַר מִפֶּסַח.,וְהָתַנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: ״שְׁלָמִים״ – כְּשֶׁהוּא שָׁלֵם מֵבִיא, וְאֵינוֹ מֵבִיא כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹנֵן. מִנַּיִן לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַתּוֹדָה? מְרַבֶּה אֲנִי אֶת הַתּוֹדָה, שֶׁכֵּן נֶאֱכֶלֶת בְּשִׂמְחָה כִּשְׁלָמִים.,מִנַּיִן לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הָעוֹלָה? מְרַבֶּה אֲנִי אֶת הָעוֹלָה, שֶׁכֵּן בָּאָה בְּנֶדֶר וּבִנְדָבָה כִּשְׁלָמִים. מִנַּיִן לְרַבּוֹת בְּכוֹר וּמַעֲשֵׂר וָפֶסַח? מְרַבֶּה אֲנִי בְּכוֹר וּמַעֲשֵׂר וָפֶסַח, שֶׁכֵּן אֵינָן בָּאִין עַל חֵטְא. מִנַּיִן לְרַבּוֹת חַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״זֶבַח״.,מִנַּיִן לְרַבּוֹת הָעוֹפוֹת וְהַמְּנָחוֹת וְהַיַּיִן וְהָעֵצִים וְהַלְּבוֹנָה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״שְׁלָמִים קׇרְבָּנוֹ״; כׇּל קׇרְבְּנוֹת שֶׁהוּא מֵבִיא – כְּשֶׁהוּא שָׁלֵם מֵבִיא, וְאֵינוֹ מֵבִיא כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹנֵן.,קָתָנֵי מִיהָא פֶּסַח!,אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: פֶּסַח – כְּדִי נַסְבֵיהּ.,רַב שֵׁשֶׁת אָמַר: מַאי פֶּסַח – שַׁלְמֵי פֶסַח. אִי הָכִי, הַיְינוּ שְׁלָמִים! תְּנָא שְׁלָמִים הַבָּאִין מֵחֲמַת פֶּסַח, וּתְנָא שְׁלָמִים הַבָּאִין מֵחֲמַת עַצְמָן.,דְּאִי לָא תְּנָא שְׁלָמִים הַבָּאִין מֵחֲמַת פֶּסַח, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וּמֵחֲמַת פֶּסַח אָתֵי – כְּגוּפֵיהּ דְּפֶסַח דָּמֵי; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.,רַב מָרִי אָמַר: לָא קַשְׁיָא; כָּאן שֶׁמֵּת לוֹ מֵת בְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר וּקְבָרוֹ בְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר, כָּאן שֶׁמֵּת לוֹ מֵת בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה עָשָׂר וּקְבָרוֹ בְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר.,מֵת לוֹ מֵת בְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר וּקְבָרוֹ בְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר – יוֹם מִיתָה תּוֹפֵס לֵילוֹ מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא. מֵת לוֹ מֵת בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה עָשָׂר וּקְבָרוֹ בְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר – יוֹם קְבוּרָה מִדְּרַבָּנַן, אֵינוֹ תּוֹפֵס לֵילוֹ אֶלָּא מִדְּרַבָּנַן.,אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְרַב מָרִי: וְאֶלָּא הָא דְּקָתָנֵי, אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: תֵּדַע, שֶׁהֲרֵי אָמְרוּ: אוֹנֵן טוֹבֵל וְאוֹכֵל אֶת פִּסְחוֹ אֲבָל לֹא בַּקֳּדָשִׁים; נֵימָא לֵיהּ: קָאָמֵינָא לָךְ אֲנָא יוֹם מִיתָה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, וְאָמְרַתְּ לִי אֶת יוֹם קְבוּרָה דְּרַבָּנַן?! קַשְׁיָא.,אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: לָא קַשְׁיָא; כָּאן שֶׁמֵּת קוֹדֶם חֲצוֹת, כָּאן שֶׁמֵּת לְאַחַר חֲצוֹת. קוֹדֶם חֲצוֹת, דְּלָא אִיחֲזִי לְפֶסַח – חָיְילָא עֲלֵיהּ אֲנִינוּת. אַחַר חֲצוֹת, דְּאִחֲזִי לְפֶסַח – לָא חָיְילָא עֲלֵיהּ אֲנִינוּת.,וּמְנָא תֵּימְרָא דְּשָׁנֵי לֵיהּ בֵּין קוֹדֶם חֲצוֹת בֵּין לְאַחַר חֲצוֹת? דְּתַנְיָא: ״לָהּ יִטַּמָּא״ – מִצְוָה. לֹא רָצָה – מְטַמְּאִין אוֹתוֹ עַל כׇּרְחוֹ. וּמַעֲשֶׂה בְּיוֹסֵף הַכֹּהֵן שֶׁמֵּתָה אִשְׁתּוֹ בְּעֶרֶב הַפֶּסַח, וְלֹא רָצָה לִיטַּמֵּא, וְנִמְנוּ אֶחָיו הַכֹּהֲנִים וְטִימְּאוּהוּ בְּעַל כׇּרְחוֹ.,וּרְמִינְהִי: ״וְלַאֲחוֹתוֹ״ מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר? הֲרֵי שֶׁהָלַךְ לִשְׁחוֹט אֶת פִּסְחוֹ וְלָמוּל אֶת בְּנוֹ, וְשָׁמַע שֶׁמֵּת לוֹ מֵת – יָכוֹל יִטַּמֵּא? אָמַרְתָּ לֹא יִטַּמֵּא.,יָכוֹל כְּשֵׁם שֶׁלֹּא יִטַּמֵּא לַאֲחוֹתוֹ, כָּךְ אֵין מִטַּמֵּא לְמֵת מִצְוָה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְלַאֲחוֹתוֹ״ – לַאֲחוֹתוֹ הוּא דְּאֵינוֹ מִטַּמֵּא, אֲבָל מִטַּמֵּא הוּא לְמֵת מִצְוָה.,לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: כָּאן קוֹדֶם חֲצוֹת, כָּאן לְאַחַר חֲצוֹת?,מִמַּאי? דִּילְמָא לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לְךָ: אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי אַחַר חֲצוֹת; וְהָא רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל וְהָא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. דְּתַנְיָא: ״לָהּ יִטַּמָּא״ – רְשׁוּת. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: חוֹבָה.,לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ; דְּרֵישָׁא דְּהָהִיא – רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא קָתָנֵי לַהּ. דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: ״נֶפֶשׁ״ – אֵלּוּ הַקְּרוֹבִים, ״מֵת״ – אֵלּוּ הָרְחוֹקִים.,״לְאָבִיו״ אֵינוֹ מִטַּמֵּא, אֲבָל מִטַּמֵּא הוּא לְמֵת מִצְוָה. ״לְאִמּוֹ״ – הָיָה כֹּהֵן וְהוּא נָזִיר, לְאִמּוֹ הוּא דְּאֵינוֹ מִטַּמֵּא, אֲבָל מִטַּמֵּא הוּא לְמֵת מִצְוָה. ״לְאָחִיו״ – שֶׁאִם הָיָה כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל וְהוּא נָזִיר, לְאָחִיו הוּא דְּאֵינוֹ מִטַּמֵּא, אֲבָל מִטַּמֵּא הוּא לְמֵת מִצְוָה.,״וְלַאֲחוֹתוֹ״ מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר? הֲרֵי שֶׁהָלַךְ לִשְׁחוֹט אֶת פִּסְחוֹ וְלָמוּל אֶת בְּנוֹ, וְשָׁמַע שֶׁמֵּת לוֹ מֵת – יָכוֹל יִטַּמֵּא? אָמַרְתָּ: לֹא יִטַּמֵּא. יָכוֹל כְּשֵׁם שֶׁאֵין מִטַּמֵּא לַאֲחוֹתוֹ, כָּךְ אֵינוֹ מִטַּמֵּא לְמֵת מִצְוָה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְלַאֲחוֹתוֹ״ – לַאֲחוֹתוֹ לֹא יִטַּמֵּא, אֲבָל מִטַּמֵּא הוּא לְמֵת מִצְוָה. רָבָא אָמַר: אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי אַחַר חֲצוֹת, וְלָא קַשְׁיָא; כָּאן קוֹדֶם שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ וְזָרְקוּ עָלָיו, כָּאן לְאַחַר שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ וְזָרְקוּ עָלָיו.,אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַדָּא בַּר מַתְנָה לְרָבָא: אַחַר שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ וְזָרְקוּ אֶת דָּמוֹ – מָה דַּהֲוָה הֲוָה! אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא: אֲכִילַת פְּסָחִים מְעַכְּבָא, מִדְּרַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: צָיֵית מַאי דְּקָאָמַר לָךְ רַבָּךְ.,מַאי דְּרַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא? דְּתַנְיָא: יוֹם שְׁמוּעָה כְּיוֹם קְבוּרָה לְמִצְוַת שִׁבְעָה וּשְׁלֹשִׁים; וְלַאֲכִילַת פְּסָחִים – כְּיוֹם לִיקּוּט עֲצָמוֹת. אֶחָד זֶה וְאֶחָד זֶה – טוֹבֵל וְאוֹכֵל בַּקֳּדָשִׁים לָעֶרֶב.,הָא גּוּפַהּ קַשְׁיָא! אָמְרַתְּ יוֹם שְׁמוּעָה כְּיוֹם קְבוּרָה לְמִצְוַת שִׁבְעָה וּשְׁלֹשִׁים, וְלַאֲכִילַת פְּסָחִים כְּיוֹם לִיקּוּט עֲצָמוֹת – מִכְּלָל דְּיוֹם קְבוּרָה אֲפִילּוּ לָעֶרֶב נָמֵי לָא אָכֵיל; וַהֲדַר תָּנֵי: אֶחָד זֶה וְאֶחָד זֶה טוֹבֵל וְאוֹכֵל בַּקֳּדָשִׁים לָעֶרֶב!,אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: תַּנָּאֵי הִיא.,רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר: לָא קַשְׁיָא; כָּאן שֶׁשָּׁמַע שְׁמוּעָה עַל מֵתוֹ סָמוּךְ לִשְׁקִיעַת הַחַמָּה, וְכֵן שֶׁלִּיקְּטוּ לוֹ עֲצָמוֹת סָמוּךְ לִשְׁקִיעַת הַחַמָּה, וְכֵן שֶׁמֵּת לוֹ מֵת וּקְבָרוֹ סָמוּךְ לִשְׁקִיעַת הַחַמָּה; וְכָאן לְאַחַר שְׁקִיעַת הַחַמָּה.,לְאַחַר שְׁקִיעַת הַחַמָּה – מַאי דַהֲוָה הֲוָה! אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: אֲכִילַת פְּסָחִים מְעַכְּבָא.,רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: מַאי אֶחָד זֶה וְאֶחָד זֶה? הָכִי קָאָמַר: אֶחָד יוֹם שְׁמוּעָה וְאֶחָד יוֹם לִיקּוּט – טוֹבֵל וְאוֹכֵל בַּקֳּדָשִׁים לָעֶרֶב.,וְהָא דְּרַב אָשֵׁי בְּדוּתָא הִיא; מִכְּדֵי עֲלַהּ קָאֵי, ״זֶה וָזֶה״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ בְּדוּתָא הִיא.,וּמַאי תַּנָּאֵי? דְּתַנְיָא: עַד מָתַי מִתְאוֹנֵן עָלָיו? כׇּל הַיּוֹם. רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: כׇּל זְמַן שֶׁלֹּא נִקְבַּר.,בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? אִילֵימָא בְּיוֹם מִיתָה – מִי אִיכָּא דְּלֵית לֵיהּ דְּיוֹם מִיתָה דְּתָפֵיס לֵילוֹ מִדְּרַבָּנַן?!,וְתוּ, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: כׇּל זְמַן שֶׁלֹּא נִקְבַּר. הָא קְבָרוֹ – אִישְׁתְּרִי לֵיהּ; וּמִי אִיכָּא דְּלֵית לֵיהּ ״וְאַחֲרִיתָהּ כְּיוֹם מָר״?!,אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: אַיּוֹם קְבוּרָה קָאֵי.,מַתְקֵיף רַב יוֹסֵף, אֶלָּא הָא דְּקָתָנֵי: הַשּׁוֹמֵעַ עַל מֵתוֹ – כִּמְלַקֵּט עֲצָמוֹת, טוֹבֵל וְאוֹכֵל בַּקֳּדָשִׁים לָעֶרֶב; מִכְּלָל דְּיוֹם קְבוּרָה – אֲפִילּוּ לָעֶרֶב נָמֵי לָא אָכֵיל; הָא מַנִּי? אֶלָּא תָּרֵיץ: עַד מָתַי מִתְאוֹנְנִין עָלָיו? כׇּל אוֹתוֹ הַיּוֹם וְלֵילוֹ. רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: כׇּל זְמַן שֶׁלֹּא נִקְבַּר; [אֲבָל נִקְבַּר] – בְּלֹא לֵילוֹ.,אַמְרוּהָ קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יִרְמְיָה, אָמַר: גַּבְרָא רַבָּה כְּרַב יוֹסֵף לֵימָא הָכִי?! לֵימָא דְּרַבִּי לְקוּלָּא?! וְהָתַנְיָא: עַד מָתַי מִתְאוֹנֵן עָלָיו? כׇּל זְמַן שֶׁאֵינוֹ נִקְבָּר, אֲפִילּוּ מִכָּאן וְעַד עֲשָׂרָה יָמִים. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵין מִתְאוֹנֵן עָלָיו אֶלָּא אוֹתוֹ הַיּוֹם בִּלְבַד!,אֶלָּא תָּרֵיץ הָכִי: עַד מָתַי הוּא מִתְאוֹנֵן עָלָיו? כׇּל אוֹתוֹ הַיּוֹם בְּלֹא לֵילוֹ. רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: כׇּל זְמַן שֶׁלֹּא נִקְבַּר. וְאִם נִקְבַּר – תּוֹפֵס לֵילוֹ.,אַמְרוּהָ קַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא; מִדְּקָאָמַר רַבִּי: יוֹם קְבוּרָה תּוֹפֵס לֵילוֹ מִדְּרַבָּנַן – מִכְּלָל דְּיוֹם מִיתָה תּוֹפֵס לֵילוֹ מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא;,וְסָבַר רַבִּי אֲנִינוּת לַיְלָה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא?! וְהָתַנְיָא: ״הֵן הַיּוֹם״ – אֲנִי הַיּוֹם אָסוּר וְלַיְלָה מוּתָּר, וּלְדוֹרוֹת בֵּין בַּיּוֹם וּבֵין בַּלַּיְלָה אָסוּר. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: אֲנִינוּת לַיְלָה אֵינָהּ מִדִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה, אֶלָּא מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים!,לְעוֹלָם דְּרַבָּנַן הִיא, וַחֲכָמִים עָשׂוּ חִיזּוּק לְדִבְרֵיהֶם יוֹתֵר מִשֶּׁל תּוֹרָה.,תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״כִּי כֵן צֻוֵּיתִי״, ״כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוֵּיתִי״, ״כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה׳״; ״כִּי כֵן צֻוֵּיתִי״ – בַּאֲנִינוּת יֹאכְלוּהָ, ״כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוֵּיתִי״ – בִּשְׁעַת מַעֲשֶׂה אָמַר לָהֶן, ״כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה׳״ – לֹא מֵאֵלַיי אֲנִי אוֹמֵר.,וּרְמִינְהִי: מִפְּנֵי אֲנִינוּת נִשְׂרְפָה, לְכָךְ נֶאֱמַר: ״כָּאֵלֶּה״!,אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לָא קַשְׁיָא; הָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, הָא רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה.,דְּתַנְיָא: מִפְּנֵי אֲנִינוּת שְׂרָפוּהָ, לְכָךְ נֶאֱמַר: ״כָּאֵלֶּה״. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמְרִים: מִפְּנֵי טוּמְאָה נִשְׂרְפָה. שֶׁאִם אַתָּה אוֹמֵר מִפְּנֵי אֲנִינוּת נִשְׂרְפָה – (הָיוּ) [הָיָה] לִשְׁלׇשְׁתָּן שֶׁיִּשָּׂרְפוּ. דָּבָר אַחֵר: (הָיוּ) [הָיָה] רָאוּי לְאוֹכְלָן לָעֶרֶב. דָּבָר אַחֵר: וַהֲלֹא פִּינְחָס הָיָה עִמָּהֶן!,רָבָא אָמַר: אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה, וְלָא קַשְׁיָא; כָּאן בְּקׇדְשֵׁי שָׁעָה, כָּאן בְּקׇדְשֵׁי דוֹרוֹת.,רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה הֵיכִי מְתָרֵיץ לְהָנֵי קְרָאֵי, וְרַבָּנַן הֵיכִי מְתָרְצִי לְהוּ לְהָנֵי קְרָאֵי?,רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה מְתָרֵיץ לְהוּ הָכִי: ״מַדּוּעַ לֹא אֲכַלְתֶּם״ – אָמַר לוֹ מֹשֶׁה לְאַהֲרֹן: שֶׁמָּא נִכְנַס דָּמָהּ לִפְנַי וְלִפְנִים? אָמַר לוֹ: ״הֵן לֹא הוּבָא אֶת דָּמָהּ״. שֶׁמָּא חוּץ לִמְחִיצָתָהּ יָצָאת? אָמַר לוֹ: בַּקֹּדֶשׁ הָיְתָה.,וְדִלְמָא בַּאֲנִינוּת אַקְרֵיבְתּוּהָ וּפְסַלְתּוּהָ? אָמַר לוֹ: מֹשֶׁה, וְכִי הֵם הִקְרִיבוּ?! אֲנִי הִקְרַבְתִּי! וְאָמַר לוֹ: ״הֵן לֹא הוּבָא אֶת דָּמָהּ״ וּבַקֹּדֶשׁ הָיָתָה – ״אָכוֹל תֹּאכְלוּ אוֹתָהּ כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוֵּיתִי״, בַּאֲנִינוּת יֹאכְלוּהָ.,אָמַר לוֹ: ״וַתִּקְרֶאנָה אֹתִי כָּאֵלֶּה וְאָכַלְתִּי חַטָּאת הַיּוֹם, הַיִּיטַב בְּעֵינֵי ה׳״ – שֶׁמָּא לֹא שָׁמַעְתָּ אֶלָּא בְּקׇדְשֵׁי שָׁעָה?,דְּאִי בְּקׇדְשֵׁי דוֹרוֹת, קַל וְחוֹמֶר מִמַּעֲשֵׂר הַקַּל: וּמָה מַעֲשֵׂר הַקַּל, אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה: ״לֹא אָכַלְתִּי בְאֹנִי מִמֶּנּוּ״; בְּקׇדְשֵׁי דוֹרוֹת לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?!,מִיָּד ״וַיִּשְׁמַע מֹשֶׁה וַיִּיטַב בְּעֵינָיו״ – הוֹדָה וְלֹא בּוֹשׁ מֹשֶׁה לוֹמַר ״לֹא שָׁמַעְתִּי״, אֶלָּא אָמַר: ״שָׁמַעְתִּי וְשָׁכַחְתִּי״.,וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הֵיכִי מְתָרְצִי לְהוּ? הָכִי מְתָרְצִי לְהוּ: ״מַדּוּעַ לֹא אֲכַלְתֶּם אֶת הַחַטָּאת בִּמְקוֹם [הַקֹּדֶשׁ]״ – שֶׁמָּא נִכְנַס דָּמָהּ לִפְנַי וְלִפְנִים? אָמַר לוֹ: ״הֵן לֹא הוּבָא אֶת דָּמָהּ אֶל הַקֹּדֶשׁ פְּנִימָה״.,שֶׁמָּא חוּץ לִמְחִיצָתָהּ יָצָאת? אָמַר לוֹ: הֵן בַּקּוֹדֶשׁ הָיְתָה. וְדִילְמָא בַּאֲנִינוּת אַקְרֵיבְתּוּהָ וּפְסַלְתּוּהָ? אָמַר לוֹ: מֹשֶׁה, הֵן הִקְרִיבוּהָ – דְּפָסְלָה בְּהוּ אֲנִינוּת?! אֲנִי הִקְרַבְתִּיהָ!,וְדִילְמָא אַגַּב מְרָרַיְיכוּ פְּשַׁעְתּוּ בַּהּ וְאִיטַּמַּאי? אָמַר לוֹ: מֹשֶׁה, כָּךְ אֲנִי בְּעֵינֶיךָ, שֶׁאֲנִי מְבַזֶּה קׇדְשֵׁי שָׁמַיִם?! ״וַתִּקְרֶאנָה אֹתִי כָּאֵלֶּה״; וַאֲפִילּוּ אֵלֶּה וְכָאֵלֶּה – אֵין אֲנִי מְבַזֶּה קׇדְשֵׁי שָׁמַיִם!,אָמַר לוֹ: וְאִי ״הֵן לֹא הוּבָא אֶת דָּמָהּ״, וּבַקּוֹדֶשׁ הָיְתָה – ״אָכוֹל תֹּאכְלוּ אֹתָהּ בַּקּוֹדֶשׁ כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוֵּיתִי״, בַּאֲנִינוּת יֹאכְלוּהָ!,אָמַר לוֹ: שֶׁמָּא לֹא שָׁמַעְתָּ אֶלָּא בַּלַּיְלָה; דְּאִי בַּיּוֹם – קַל וָחוֹמֶר מִמַּעֲשֵׂר הַקַּל: וּמָה מַעֲשֵׂר הַקַּל, אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה: ״לֹא אָכַלְתִּי בְאֹנִי מִמֶּנּוּ״; קוֹדֶשׁ חָמוּר – לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?!,מִיָּד ״וַיִּשְׁמַע מֹשֶׁה וַיִּיטַב בְּעֵינָיו״ – לֹא בּוֹשׁ מֹשֶׁה לוֹמַר ״לֹא שָׁמַעְתִּי״, אֶלָּא ״שָׁמַעְתִּי וְשָׁכַחְתִּי״.,אִיבְּעִי לְהוּ לְשַׁהוֹיַיהּ, וּלְמֵיכְלַהּ בְּאוּרְתָּא! טוּמְאָה בְּאוֹנֶס בָּאתָה.,בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבָּנַן, הַיְינוּ דִּכְתִיב: ״הַיּוֹם״; אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה, מַאי ״הַיּוֹם״? חוֹבַת הַיּוֹם.,בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה, הַיְינוּ דִּכְתִיב ״הֵן הַיּוֹם״; אֶלָּא לְרַבָּנַן, מַאי ״הֵן הַיּוֹם״? הָכִי קָאָמַר: הֵן הִקְרִיבוּ?! אֲנִי הִקְרַבְתִּי!,אָמַר מָר: (הָיוּ) [הָיָה] לִשְׁלׇשְׁתָּן שֶׁיִּשָּׂרְפוּ. מַאי שְׁלָשְׁתָּן?,דְּתַנְיָא: ״וְאֵת שְׂעִיר הַחַטָּאת דָּרֹשׁ דָּרַשׁ מֹשֶׁה״; ״שְׂעִיר״ – זוֹ שָׂעִיר נַחְשׁוֹן, ״חַטָּאת״ – זוֹ חַטַּאת שְׁמִינִי, ״דָּרַשׁ״ – שָׂעִיר שֶׁל רֹאשׁ חוֹדֶשׁ.,יָכוֹל שְׁלָשְׁתָּן נִשְׂרְפוּ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְהִנֵּה שֹׂרָף״ – אֶחָד נִשְׂרַף וְלֹא שְׁלָשְׁתָּן נִשְׂרְפוּ. ״דָּרֹשׁ דָּרַשׁ״ – שְׁתֵּי דְרִישׁוֹת לָמָּה? אֲמַר לְהוּ: מִפְּנֵי מָה חַטָּאת זוֹ נִשְׂרְפָה, וְאֵלּוּ מוּנָּחוֹת? וְאֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ אֵיזֶהוּ; כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״וְאֹתָהּ נָתַן לָכֶם לָשֵׂאת אֶת עֲוֹן הָעֵדָה״, הֱוֵי אוֹמֵר זֶה שָׂעִיר שֶׁל רֹאשׁ חוֹדֶשׁ.,שַׁפִּיר קָאָמְרִי לֵיהּ! רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר: קׇדְשֵׁי שָׁעָה לָא פָּסְלָה בְּהוּ אֲנִינוּת.,אָמַר מָר: הָיָה לוֹ לְאׇכְלָהּ לָעֶרֶב. שַׁפִּיר קָאָמְרִי לֵיהּ! קָסָבַר: אֲנִינוּת לַיְלָה – דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא.,דָּבָר אַחֵר: וַהֲלֹא פִּינְחָס הָיָה עִמָּהֶן. שַׁפִּיר קָאָמְרִי לֵיהּ! סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: לֹא נִתְכַּהֵן פִּינְחָס עַד שֶׁהֲרָגוֹ לְזִמְרִי, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְהָיְתָה לּוֹ וּלְזַרְעוֹ אַחֲרָיו בְּרִית כְּהֻנַּת עוֹלָם״.,רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: עַד שֶׁשָּׂם שָׁלוֹם בֵּין הַשְּׁבָטִים, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וַיִּשְׁמַע פִּינְחָס הַכֹּהֵן וּנְשִׂיאֵי הָעֵדָה וְרָאשֵׁי אַלְפֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְגוֹ׳״.,וְאִידַּךְ נָמֵי, וְהָכְתִיב: ״וְהָיְתָה לּוֹ וּלְזַרְעוֹ אַחֲרָיו״! כִּי כְתִיב הָהוּא, בִּבְרָכָה הוּא דִּכְתִיב.,וְאִידַּךְ נָמֵי, הָא כְּתִיב: ״וַיִּשְׁמַע פִּינְחָס הַכֹּהֵן״! הָהוּא לְיַחֵס זַרְעוֹ אַחֲרָיו.,אָמַר רַב: מֹשֶׁה רַבֵּינוּ – כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל וְחוֹלֵק בְּקׇדְשֵׁי שָׁמַיִם הָיָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״מֵאֵיל הַמִּלֻּאִים לְמֹשֶׁה הָיָה לְמָנָה״.,מֵיתִיבִי: וַהֲלֹא פִּינְחָס הָיָה עִמָּהֶן. וְאִם אִיתָא, לֵימָא: וַהֲלֹא מֹשֶׁה רַבֵּינוּ הָיָה עִמָּהֶן! דִּילְמָא שָׁאנֵי מֹשֶׁה, דִּטְרִיד בִּשְׁכִינָה; דְּאָמַר מָר: מֹשֶׁה בְּהַשְׁכָּמָה עָלָה וּבְהַשְׁכָּמָה יָרַד.,מֵיתִיבִי: ״לֶחֶם אֱלֹהָיו מִקׇּדְשֵׁי הַקֳּדָשִׁים וּמִן הַקֳּדָשִׁים יֹאכֵל״ – אִם נֶאֶמְרוּ קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים, לָמָּה (נאמר) [נֶאֶמְרוּ] קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים? וְאִם נֶאֶמְרוּ קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים, לָמָּה (נאמר) [נֶאֶמְרוּ] קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים?,אִילּוּ לֹא (נאמר) [נֶאֶמְרוּ] קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים, הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר: קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים הוּא דְּאוֹכֵל, שֶׁהֲרֵי הוּתְּרוּ לְזָר וְלָהֶן; קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים – לֹא יֹאכַל. וְאִילּוּ לֹא נֶאֶמְרוּ קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים, הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר: בְּקָדָשִׁים קַלִּים יְהֵא אוֹכֵל, שֶׁהֵן קַלִּים; בְּקׇדְשֵׁי קֳדָשִׁים – לֹא יְהֵא אוֹכֵל. לְכָךְ נֶאֶמְרוּ קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים, וּלְכָךְ (נאמר) [נֶאֶמְרוּ] קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים.,קָתָנֵי מִיהָא: שֶׁהֲרֵי הוּתְּרוּ לְזָר וְלָהֶן. לָאו מֹשֶׁה? אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: לָא; בְּבָמָה לְזָר, וּכְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹמֵר: יֵשׁ מִנְחָה בְּבָמָה.,מֵיתִיבִי: מִרְיָם מִי הִסְגִּירָהּ? אִם תֹּאמַר מֹשֶׁה הִסְגִּירָהּ – מֹשֶׁה זָר הוּא, וְאֵין זָר רוֹאֶה אֶת הַנְּגָעִים! וְאִם תֹּאמַר אַהֲרֹן הִסְגִּירָהּ – אַהֲרֹן קָרוֹב הוּא, וְאֵין קָרוֹב רוֹאֶה אֶת הַנְּגָעִים! אֶלָּא כָּבוֹד גָּדוֹל חָלַק לָהּ הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא לְמִרְיָם אוֹתָהּ שָׁעָה: אֲנִי כֹּהֵן וַאֲנִי מַסְגִּירָהּ, אֲנִי חוֹלְטָהּ וַאֲנִי פּוֹטְרָהּ.,קָתָנֵי מִיהַת: מֹשֶׁה זָר, וְאֵין זָר רוֹאֶה אֶת הַנְּגָעִים!,אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: שָׁאנֵי מַרְאוֹת נְגָעִים, דְּאַהֲרֹן וּבָנָיו כְּתוּבִין בַּפָּרָשָׁה.,מֵיתִיבִי: חָמֵשׁ שְׂמָחוֹת הָיְתָה אֱלִישֶׁבַע יְתֵירָה עַל בְּנוֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל – יְבָמָהּ מֶלֶךְ, אִישָׁהּ כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל, בְּנָהּ סְגָן, בֶּן בְּנָהּ מְשׁוּחַ מִלְחָמָה, וְאָחִיהָ נְשִׂיא שֵׁבֶט; וַאֲבֵילָה עַל שְׁנֵי בָּנֶיהָ.,קָתָנֵי מִיהַת: יְבָמָהּ מֶלֶךְ – מֶלֶךְ אִין, כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל לָא! אֵימָא: אַף מֶלֶךְ.,כְּתַנָּאֵי: ״וַיִּחַר אַף ה׳ בְּמֹשֶׁה״ – רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה אוֹמֵר: כׇּל חֲרוֹן אַף שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה נֶאֱמַר בּוֹ רוֹשֶׁם, וְזֶה לֹא נֶאֱמַר בּוֹ רוֹשֶׁם.,רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹחַי אוֹמֵר: אַף זֶה נֶאֱמַר בּוֹ רוֹשֶׁם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״הֲלֹא אַהֲרֹן אָחִיךָ הַלֵּוִי״ – וַהֲלֹא כֹּהֵן הוּא! הָכִי קָאָמַר: אֲנִי אָמַרְתִּי אַתָּה כֹּהֵן וְהוּא לֵוִי, עַכְשָׁיו הוּא כֹּהֵן וְאַתָּה לֵוִי.,וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: לֹא נִתְכַּהֵן מֹשֶׁה, אֶלָּא שִׁבְעַת יְמֵי הַמִּלּוּאִים בִּלְבַד. וְיֵשׁ אוֹמְרִים: לֹא פָּסְקָה כְּהוּנָּה אֶלָּא מִזַּרְעוֹ שֶׁל מֹשֶׁה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וּמֹשֶׁה אִישׁ הָאֱלֹהִים בָּנָיו יִקָּרְאוּ עַל שֵׁבֶט הַלֵּוִי״, וְאוֹמֵר: ״מֹשֶׁה וְאַהֲרֹן בְּכֹהֲנָיו וּשְׁמוּאֵל בְּקֹרְאֵי שְׁמוֹ״.,מַאי וְאוֹמֵר? וְכִי תֵּימָא לְדוֹרוֹת הוּא דִּכְתִיב, וְאוֹמֵר: ״מֹשֶׁה וְאַהֲרֹן בְּכֹהֲנָיו״.,וְכׇל חֲרוֹן אַף שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה נֶאֱמַר בּוֹ רוֹשֶׁם?! וְהָכְתִיב: ״וַיֵּצֵא מֹשֶׁה מֵעִם פַּרְעֹה בׇּחֳרִי אָף״, וְלָא אֲמַר לֵיהּ וְלָא מִידֵּי! אֲמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: סְטָרוֹ וְיָצָא.,וּמִי אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ הָכִי?! וְהָכְתִיב: ״וְנִצַּבְתָּ לִקְרָאתוֹ עַל שְׂפַת הַיְאֹר״, וְאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: מֶלֶךְ הוּא וְהַסְבֵּיר לוֹ פָּנִים, וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: רָשָׁע הוּא וְהָעֵיז פָּנֶיךָ בּוֹ! אֵיפוֹךְ.,אָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי: לְעוֹלָם תְּהֵא אֵימַת מַלְכוּת עָלֶיךָ; דִּכְתִיב: ״וְיָרְדוּ כׇל עֲבָדֶיךָ אֵלֶּה אֵלַי״ – וְאִילּוּ לְדִידֵיהּ לָא קָאָמַר לֵיהּ.,רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר מֵהָכָא: ״וְיַד ה׳ הָיְתָה אֶל אֵלִיָּהוּ, וַיְשַׁנֵּס מׇתְנָיו וַיָּרׇץ לִפְנֵי אַחְאָב״.,אָמַר עוּלָּא: בִּקֵּשׁ מֹשֶׁה מַלְכוּת, וְלֹא נָתְנוּ לוֹ; דִּכְתִיב: ״אַל תִּקְרַב הֲלֹם״, וְאֵין ״הֲלוֹם״ אֶלָּא מַלְכוּת – שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״מִי אָנֹכִי ה׳ אֱלֹהִים [וְגוֹ׳] כִּי הֲבִיאֹתַנִי עַד הֲלֹם״.,מֵתִיב רָבָא, רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר: יְבָמָהּ מֶלֶךְ! אָמַר רָבָא: לוֹ וּלְזַרְעוֹ קָאָמַר.,וְכֹל הֵיכָא דִּכְתִיב ״הֲלוֹם״ – לְדוֹרוֹת הוּא?! וְהָא גַּבֵּי שָׁאוּל דִּכְתִיב: ״הֲבָא עוֹד הֲלֹם אִישׁ״ – הוּא אִין, זַרְעוֹ לָא!,אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הָא הֲוָה אִישׁ בּשֶׁת, וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: שָׁאנֵי שָׁאוּל – דַּאֲפִילּוּ בְּגַוֵּיהּ לָא קָאֵים;,כִּדְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁפּוֹסְקִים גְּדוּלָּה לָאָדָם – פּוֹסְקִים לוֹ וּלְזַרְעוֹ עַד סוֹף כׇּל הַדּוֹרוֹת, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לֹא יִגְרַע מִצַּדִּיק עֵינָיו וְאֶת מְלָכִים לַכִּסֵּא וְגוֹ׳״. וְאִם הֵגֵיס דַּעְתּוֹ – הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא מַשְׁפִּילוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְאִם אֲסוּרִים בַּזִּקִּים יִלָּכְדוּן בְּחַבְלֵי עֹנִי״.,בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין, בֵּין בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין כּוּ׳. מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״כׇּל זָכָר״ – לְרַבּוֹת בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין.,לְמַאי? אִי לַאֲכִילָה – הֲרֵי כְּבָר נֶאֱמַר: ״לֶחֶם אֱלֹהָיו מִקׇּדְשֵׁי הַקֳּדָשִׁים יֹאכֵל״! אֶלָּא לַחֲלוּקָּה.,תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ: ״כׇּל זָכָר״ – לְרַבּוֹת בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין. לְמַאי? אִי לַאֲכִילָה – הֲרֵי כְּבָר אָמוּר! אִי לַחֲלוּקָּה – הֲרֵי כְּבָר אָמוּר! שֶׁיָּכוֹל אֵין לִי אֶלָּא תָּם וְנַעֲשָׂה בַּעַל מוּם, בַּעַל מוּם מֵעִיקָּרוֹ מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כׇּל זָכָר״.,תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ: ״כׇּל זָכָר״ – לְרַבּוֹת בַּעַל מוּם. לְמַאי? אִי לַאֲכִילָה – הֲרֵי כְּבָר אָמוּר! וְאִי לַחֲלוּקָּה – הֲרֵי כְּבָר אָמוּר! וְאִי לְבַעַל מוּם מֵעִיקָּרוֹ – הֲרֵי כְּבָר אָמוּר! שֶׁיָּכוֹל אֵין לִי אֶלָּא בַּעַל מוּם קָבוּעַ, בַּעַל מוּם עוֹבֵר מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כׇּל זָכָר״.,כְּלַפֵּי לְיָיא? אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: אֵיפוֹךְ.,רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם לָא תֵּיפוֹךְ; וְאִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: כִּי טָמֵא; מָה טָמֵא – כַּמָּה דְּלָא טָהוֹר לָא אָכֵיל, אַף הַאי נָמֵי – כַּמָּה דְּלָא מִתְּקַן לָא אָכֵיל; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.,כֹּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ רָאוּי וְכוּ׳. וְלָא?! וַהֲרֵי בַּעַל מוּם, דְּלֹא רָאוּי לָעֲבוֹדָה, וְחוֹלֵק! וְתוּ, הָא רָאוּי לָעֲבוֹדָה חוֹלֵק?! הֲרֵי טָמֵא בְּקׇרְבְּנוֹת צִיבּוּר, דְּרָאוּי לָעֲבוֹדָה, וְאֵינוֹ חוֹלֵק!,רָאוּי לַאֲכִילָה קָאָמַר.,וַהֲרֵי קָטָן, דְּרָאוּי לַאֲכִילָה, וְאֵינוֹ חוֹלֵק! הָא לָא קָתָנֵי.,הַשְׁתָּא דְּאָתֵית לְהָכִי, לְעוֹלָם (כדקאמר) [כִּדְקָאָמְרַתְּ] מֵעִיקָּרָא; אִי מִשּׁוּם טָמֵא – טָמֵא לָא קָתָנֵי, וְאִי מִשּׁוּם בַּעַל מוּם – רַחֲמָנָא רַבְּיֵיהּ.,אֲפִילּוּ טָמֵא בִּשְׁעַת זְרִיקַת דָּמִים, וְטָהוֹר בִּשְׁעַת הֶקְטֵר חֲלָבִים – אֵינוֹ חוֹלֵק. הָא טָהוֹר בִּשְׁעַת זְרִיקַת דָּמִים, וְטָמֵא בִּשְׁעַת הֶקְטֵר חֲלָבִים – חוֹלֵק;,מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּאַבָּא שָׁאוּל. דְּתַנְיָא, אַבָּא שָׁאוּל אוֹמֵר: לְעוֹלָם אֵינוֹ אוֹכֵל, עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא טָהוֹר מִשְּׁעַת זְרִיקָה עַד שְׁעַת הֶקְטֵר חֲלָבִים; דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״הַמַּקְרִיב אֶת דַּם הַשְּׁלָמִים וְאֶת הַחֵלֶב״ – דַּאֲפִילּוּ הֶקְטֵר חֲלָבִים נָמֵי בָּעֵי.,בָּעֵי רַב אָשֵׁי: נִטְמָא בֵּינְתַיִים מַהוּ? בִּשְׁעַת זְרִיקָה וּבִשְׁעַת הַקְטָרָה בָּעֵינַן, וְהָאִיכָּא; אוֹ דִּלְמָא עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא טָהוֹר מִשְּׁעַת זְרִיקָה וְעַד שְׁעַת הֶקְטֵר חֲלָבִים? תֵּיקוּ.,אָמַר רָבָא: הַאי דִּינָא – מֵרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן גְּמִירְנָא, דְּאָמַר בְּבֵית הַכִּסֵּא דַּנְתָּהּ – בָּא טְבוּל יוֹם וְאָמַר: תֵּן לִי מִמִּנְחָה וְאוֹכַל.,אָמַר לוֹ: וּמָה אִם בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁיִּפָּה כֹּחֲךָ – בְּחַטָּאתֶךָ, דְּחִיתִיךְ מֵחַטַּאת יִשְׂרָאֵל; מְקוֹם שֶׁהוֹרַע כֹּחֲךָ – בְּמִנְחָתֶךָ, אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁאֶדְחֲךָ מִמִּנְחַת יִשְׂרָאֵל?!,וּמָה אִם דְּחִיתַנִי מֵחַטַּאת יִשְׂרָאֵל – שֶׁכְּשֵׁם שֶׁיִּפָּה כֹּחִי כָּךְ יִפָּה כֹּחֶךָ; תִּדְחֵינִי (מִמִּנְחָה) [מִמִּנְחַת יִשְׂרָאֵל], שֶׁכְּשֵׁם שֶׁהוֹרַע כֹּחִי כָּךְ הוֹרַע כֹּחֶךָ!,הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״לַכֹּהֵן הַמַּקְרִיב אֹתָהּ לוֹ תִהְיֶה״ – בֹּא הַקְרֵב וֶאֱכוֹל.,תֵּן לִי מֵחַטַּאת יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאוֹכַל –,אָמַר לוֹ: וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁהוֹרַע כֹּחִי – בְּמִנְחָתִי, דְּחִיתִיךְ מִמִּנְחַת יִשְׂרָאֵל; מְקוֹם שֶׁיִּפָּה כֹּחִי – בְּחַטָּאתִי, אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁאֶדְחֲךָ מֵחַטַּאת יִשְׂרָאֵל?!,אָמַר לוֹ: וּמָה אִם שֶׁדְּחִיתַנִי מִמִּנְחַת יִשְׂרָאֵל – שֶׁכְּשֵׁם שֶׁהוֹרַע כֹּחֶךָ כָּךְ הוֹרַע כֹּחִי; תִּדְחֵינִי מֵחַטַּאת יִשְׂרָאֵל – שֶׁכְּשֵׁם שֶׁיִּפָּה כֹּחֶךָ כָּךְ יִפָּה כֹּחִי?!,הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״הַכֹּהֵן הַמְחַטֵּא אֹתָהּ יֹאכְלֶנָּה״ – בֹּא חַטֵּא וֶאֱכוֹל.,אָמַר לוֹ: תֵּן לִי מֵחָזֶה וָשׁוֹק וְאוֹכַל –,אָמַר לוֹ: וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁיִּפָּה כֹּחֲךָ – בְּחַטָּאתֶךָ, דְּחִיתִיךְ [מֵחַטַּאת יִשְׂרָאֵל] (מֵחָזֶה וָשׁוֹק); מְקוֹם שֶׁהוֹרַע כֹּחֲךָ – בִּשְׁלָמִים, שֶׁאֵין לָךְ בָּהֶן אֶלָּא חָזֶה וָשׁוֹק, אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁאֶדְחֲךָ?!,מָה אִם דְּחִיתַנִי מֵחַטָּאת – שֶׁכֵּן הוֹרַע כֹּחִי אֵצֶל נָשַׁיי וַעֲבָדַיי; תִּדְחֵינִי מֵחָזֶה וָשׁוֹק – שֶׁכֵּן יִפָּה כֹּחִי אֵצֶל נָשַׁיי וַעֲבָדַי?!,הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״לַכֹּהֵן הַזּוֹרֵק אֶת דַּם הַשְּׁלָמִים לוֹ יִהְיֶה״ – בֹּא זְרוֹק וֶאֱכוֹל.,יָצָא טְבוּל יוֹם קוּלָּיו וַחֲמוּרָיו עַל רֹאשׁוֹ, אוֹנֵן מִימִינוֹ, מְחוּסַּר כַּפָּרָה מִשְּׂמֹאלוֹ.,פָּרֵיךְ רַב אַחַאי, לֵימָא לֵיהּ: תֵּן לִי מִבְּכוֹר וְאוֹכַל!,מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁהוֹרַע כֹּחִי – בְּחַטָּאת, אֵצֶל נָשַׁיי וַעֲבָדַיי, דְּחִיתִיךְ מֵחַטַּאת יִשְׂרָאֵל; מְקוֹם שֶׁיִּפָּה כֹּחִי – בִּבְכוֹר, דְּכוּלֵּיהּ דִּילִי הִיא – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁאֶדְחֲךָ מִמֶּנּוּ?,וּמָה אִם דְּחִיתַנִי מֵחַטָּאת – שֶׁכְּשֵׁם שֶׁהוֹרַע כֹּחֲךָ כָּךְ הוֹרַע כֹּחִי; תִּדְחֵינִי מִבְּכוֹר – שֶׁכְּשֵׁם שֶׁיִּפָּה כֹּחֲךָ כָּךְ יִפָּה כֹּחִי?!,הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״אֶת דָּמָם תִּזְרֹק עַל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ וְאֶת חֶלְבָּם תַּקְטִיר... וּבְשָׂרָם יִהְיֶה לְךָ״ – בֹּא זְרוֹק וֶאֱכוֹל.,וְאִידַּךְ פָּרֵיךְ: מִי כְּתִיב ״וּבְשָׂרָם לַכֹּהֵן הַזּוֹרֵק״?! ״וּבְשָׂרָם יִהְיֶה לָךְ״ כְּתִיב – אֲפִילּוּ לְכֹהֵן אַחֵר.,וְהֵיכִי עָבֵיד הָכִי? וְהָאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בְּכׇל מְקוֹם מוּתָּר לְהַרְהֵר, חוּץ מִמֶּרְחָץ וּמִבֵּית הַכִּסֵּא! לְאוֹנְסוֹ שָׁאנֵי. מַתְנִי׳ כׇּל שֶׁלֹּא זָכָה הַמִּזְבֵּחַ בִּבְשָׂרָהּ – לֹא זָכוּ כֹּהֲנִים בְּעוֹרָהּ; שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״עֹלַת אִישׁ״ – עוֹלָה שֶׁעָלְתָה לָאִישׁ.,עוֹלָה שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטָה שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא עָלְתָה לַבְּעָלִים, עוֹרָהּ לַכֹּהֲנִים. אֶחָד עוֹלַת הָאִישׁ וְאֶחָד עוֹלַת הָאִשָּׁה, עוֹרוֹתֵיהֶן לְכֹהֲנִים.,עוֹרוֹת קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים לִבְעָלִים, עוֹרוֹת קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים לְכֹהֲנִים. קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה אִם עוֹלָה, שֶׁלֹּא זָכוּ בִּבְשָׂרָהּ – זָכוּ בְּעוֹרָהּ; קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים, שֶׁזָּכוּ בִּבְשָׂרָהּ – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיִּזְכּוּ בְּעוֹרָהּ?! אֵין מִזְבֵּחַ יוֹכִיחַ – שֶׁאֵין לוֹ עוֹר בְּכׇל מָקוֹם.,גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״עֹלַת אִישׁ״ – פְּרָט לְעוֹלַת הֶקְדֵּשׁ. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: פְּרָט לְעוֹלַת גֵּרִים.,מַאי פְּרָט לְעוֹלַת הֶקְדֵּשׁ? אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר יוֹסֵף: פְּרָט לְעוֹלָה הֲבָאָה מִן הַמּוֹתָרוֹת.,הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: מוֹתָרוֹת לְנִדְבַת צִיבּוּר אָזְלִי; אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: מוֹתָרוֹת לְנִדְבַת יָחִיד אָזְלִי – מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?,כִּדְאָמַר רָבָא: ״הָעֹלָה״ – עוֹלָה רִאשׁוֹנָה; הָכָא נָמֵי, ״הָעֹלָה״ – עוֹלָה רִאשׁוֹנָה.,רַבִּי אַיְיבוּ אָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי: פְּרָט לְמַתְפִּיס עוֹלָה לְבֶדֶק הַבַּיִת.,לָא מִיבַּעְיָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: קׇדְשֵׁי בֶּדֶק הַבַּיִת תָּפְסִי מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא; אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר לָא תָּפְסִי – הָנֵי מִילֵּי בָּשָׂר, אֲבָל עוֹר תָּפֵיס.,וְכֵן אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: פְּרָט לְעוֹלָה הֲבָאָה מִן הַמּוֹתָרוֹת.,אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב הַמְנוּנָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: כְּמַאן, כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה?! הָא הֲדַר בֵּיהּ! דְּתַנְיָא: שִׁשָּׁה לִנְדָבָה – לְעוֹלָה הֲבָאָה מִן הַמּוֹתָרוֹת, שֶׁלֹּא יְהוּ כֹּהֲנִים זַכָּאִין בְּעוֹרָהּ. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה.,אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: אִם כֵּן, בִּיטַּלְתָּ מִדְרָשׁוֹ שֶׁל יְהוֹיָדָע הַכֹּהֵן! דְּתַנְיָא, זֶה מִדְרָשׁ דָּרַשׁ יְהוֹיָדָע הַכֹּהֵן: ״אָשָׁם הוּא אָשֹׁם אָשַׁם לַה׳״ – כׇּל שֶׁבָּא מִשּׁוּם חַטָּאת וּמִשּׁוּם אָשָׁם, יִלָּקַח בּוֹ עוֹלוֹת; הַבָּשָׂר לַשֵּׁם, עוֹרָהּ לַכֹּהֲנִים.,אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֶלָּא מָר בְּמַאי מוֹקֵים לַהּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מוֹקֵמְינָא לֵיהּ בְּמַקְדִּישׁ נְכָסָיו.,וְכִדְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ; דִּתְנַן: הַמַּקְדִּישׁ נְכָסָיו וְהָיוּ בָּהֶן בְּהֵמוֹת הָרְאוּיוֹת לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ, זְכָרִים וּנְקֵבוֹת – רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: זְכָרִים יִמָּכְרוּ לְצוֹרְכֵי עוֹלוֹת, נְקֵבוֹת יִמָּכְרוּ לְצוֹרְכֵי זִבְחֵי שְׁלָמִים, וּדְמֵיהֶן יִפְּלוּ עִם שְׁאָר נְכָסִים לְבֶדֶק הַבַּיִת.,רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: זְכָרִים עַצְמָם יִקָּרְבוּ עוֹלוֹת, וּנְקֵבוֹת יִמָּכְרוּ לְצוֹרְכֵי שְׁלָמִים וְיָבִיא בִּדְמֵיהֶן עוֹלוֹת, וּשְׁאָר נְכָסִים יִפְּלוּ לְבֶדֶק הַבַּיִת.,וַאֲפִילּוּ לְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ דְּאָמַר אָדָם חוֹלֵק הֶקְדֵּישׁוֹ – הָנֵי מִילֵּי בָּשָׂר, אֲבָל עוֹר תָּפֵיס.,רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: פְּרָט לְעוֹלַת גָּרֵים. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב סִימַאי בַּר חִילְקַאי לְרָבִינָא: אַטּוּ גֵּר לָאו אִישׁ הוּא?! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: פְּרָט לְגֵר שֶׁמֵּת וְאֵין לוֹ יוֹרְשִׁים.,תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״עֹלַת אִישׁ״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא עוֹלַת אִישׁ; עוֹלַת גֵּרִים נָשִׁים וַעֲבָדִים מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״עוֹר הָעֹלָה״ – רִיבָּה.,וְאִם כֵּן, מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״עֹלַת אִישׁ״? עוֹלָה שֶׁעָלְתָה לְאִישׁ; פְּרָט לְשֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטָה חוּץ לִזְמַנָּהּ וְחוּץ לִמְקוֹמָהּ, שֶׁלֹּא יְהוּ הַכֹּהֲנִים זַכָּאִין בְּעוֹרָהּ.,יָכוֹל שֶׁאֲנִי מְרַבֶּה שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטָה שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – הוֹאִיל וְלֹא עָלְתָה לַבְּעָלִים, לֹא יְהוּ כֹּהֲנִים זַכָּאִין בְּעוֹרָהּ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״עוֹר הָעֹלָה״ מִכׇּל מָקוֹם.,״עוֹר הָעֹלָה״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא עוֹר הָעוֹלָה, עוֹרוֹת קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״עוֹר הָעֹלָה אֲשֶׁר הִקְרִיב״. יָכוֹל שֶׁאֲנִי מְרַבֶּה אַף קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״עֹלָה״ – מָה עוֹלָה קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים, אַף כֹּל קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים.,רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר: ״עוֹר הָעֹלָה״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא הָעוֹלָה, עוֹרוֹת קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים מִנַּיִן? וְדִין הוּא: וּמָה עוֹלָה, שֶׁלֹּא זָכוּ בִּבְשָׂרָהּ – זָכוּ בְּעוֹרָהּ; קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים, שֶׁזָּכוּ בִּבְשָׂרָן – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁזָּכוּ בְּעוֹרָן?!,מִזְבֵּחַ יוֹכִיחַ – שֶׁזָּכָה בְּבָשָׂר וְלֹא זָכָה בְּעוֹר! מָה לְמִזְבֵּחַ – שֶׁכֵּן לֹא זָכָה בְּמִקְצָת; תֹּאמַר בַּכֹּהֲנִים – שֶׁזָּכוּ בְּמִקְצָת?! הוֹאִיל וְזָכוּ בְּמִקְצָת, זָכוּ בְּכוּלֵּיהּ.,רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: כׇּל עַצְמוֹ לֹא הוּצְרַכְנוּ אֶלָּא לְעוֹר הָעוֹלָה בִּלְבַד. שֶׁבְּכׇל מָקוֹם הָעוֹר מְהַלֵּךְ אַחַר הַבָּשָׂר.,פָּרִים הַנִּשְׂרָפִין וּשְׂעִירִים הַנִּשְׂרָפִין – הֵן וְעוֹרוֹתֵיהֶן נִשְׂרָפִין עִמָּהֶן. חַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם וְזִבְחֵי שַׁלְמֵי צִיבּוּר – מַתָּנָה לַכֹּהֵן; רָצוּ – מַפְשִׁיטִין אוֹתָן, לֹא רָצוּ – אוֹכְלִין אוֹתָן עַל גַּבֵּי עוֹרָן. קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים – לַבְּעָלִים; רָצוּ – מַפְשִׁיטִין אוֹתָן, רָצוּ – אוֹכְלִין אוֹתָן עַל גַּב עוֹרָן.,אֲבָל עוֹלָה נֶאֱמַר בָהּ: ״וְהִפְשִׁיט אֶת הָעֹלָה וְנִתַּח אֹתָהּ לִנְתָחֶיהָ״. יָכוֹל לֹא יְהוּ הַכֹּהֲנִים זַכָּאִין בְּעוֹרָהּ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״עוֹר הָעֹלָה אֲשֶׁר הִקְרִיב״.,״לוֹ יִהְיֶה״ – פְּרָט לִטְבוּל יוֹם וּמְחוּסַּר כִּיפּוּרִים וְאוֹנֵן. שֶׁיָּכוֹל לֹא יִזְכּוּ בְּבָשָׂר – שֶׁהוּא לַאֲכִילָה, יִזְכּוּ בְּעוֹר – שֶׁאֵינוֹ לַאֲכִילָה; תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לוֹ יִהְיֶה״ – פְּרָט לִמְחוּסַּר כִּיפּוּרִים וּטְבוּל יוֹם וְאוֹנֵן.,וְתַנָּא קַמָּא נָמֵי תִּיפּוֹק לִי מִדִּינָא! מִילְּתָא דְּאָתְיָא בְּקַל וְחוֹמֶר, טָרַח וְכָתַב לַהּ קְרָא.,וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, הַאי ״אֲשֶׁר הִקְרִיב״ מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? פְּרָט לִטְבוּל יוֹם וּמְחוּסַּר כִּיפּוּרִים וְאוֹנֵן.,וְתִיפּוֹק לֵיהּ מִ״לוֹ יִהְיֶה״! רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: נֶאֱמַר בְּעוֹלֶה ״לוֹ יִהְיֶה״, וְנֶאֱמַר בְּאָשַׁם ״לוֹ יִהְיֶה״; מָה לְהַלָּן עַצְמוֹתָיו מוּתָּרִין, אַף כָּאן עַצְמוֹתָיו מוּתָּרִין.,מוּפְנֵי; דְּאִי לָא מוּפְנֵי, אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לְאָשָׁם שֶׁכֵּן בְּשָׂרוֹ מוּתָּר לוֹ; ״יִהְיֶה״ – קְרָא יַתִּירָא הוּא.,מַתְנִי׳ כׇּל הַקֳּדָשִׁים שֶׁאֵירַע בָּהֶן פְּסוּל קוֹדֶם לְהֶפְשֵׁיטָן – אֵין עוֹרוֹתֵיהֶן לַכֹּהֲנִים. לְאַחַר הֶפְשֵׁיטָן – עוֹרוֹתֵיהֶן לְכֹהֲנִים. אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא סְגַן הַכֹּהֲנִים: מִיָּמַי לֹא רָאִיתִי עוֹר שֶׁיּוֹצֵא לְבֵית הַשְּׂרֵיפָה.,אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: מִדְּבָרָיו לָמַדְנוּ, שֶׁהַמַּפְשִׁיט אֶת הַבְּכוֹר וְנִמְצָא טְרֵיפָה – שֶׁיֵּאוֹתוּ הַכֹּהֲנִים בְּעוֹרוֹ. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵין ״לֹא רָאִינוּ״ רְאָיָה, אֶלָּא יֵצֵא לְבֵית הַשְּׂרֵיפָה.,גְּמָ׳ כׇּל שֶׁלֹּא זָכָה הַמִּזְבֵּחַ בִּבְשָׂרָהּ – לֹא זָכוּ הַכֹּהֲנִים בְּעוֹרָהּ, וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּאַפְּשָׁטֵיהּ לְעוֹר קוֹדֶם זְרִיקָה. מַנִּי? רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא, דְּאָמַר: אֵין הַדָּם מְרַצֶּה עַל הָעוֹר בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ.,אֵימָא סֵיפָא: כׇּל הַקֳּדָשִׁים שֶׁאֵירַע בָּהֶן פְּסוּל קוֹדֶם הֶפְשֵׁיטָן – אֵין עוֹרוֹתֵיהֶן לְכֹהֲנִים. לְאַחַר הֶפְשֵׁיטָן – עוֹרוֹתֵיהֶן לְכֹהֲנִים. אֲתָאן לְרַבִּי, דְּאָמַר: ״הַדָּם מְרַצֶּה עַל הָעוֹר בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ״. רֵישָׁא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, סֵיפָא רַבִּי?!,אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מִדְּסֵיפָא רַבִּי הִיא, רֵישָׁא נָמֵי רַבִּי הִיא; וּמוֹדֶה רַבִּי שֶׁאֵין הֶפְשֵׁט קוֹדֶם זְרִיקָה.,רָבָא אָמַר: מִדְּרֵישָׁא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, סֵיפָא נָמֵי רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן; מַאי קוֹדֶם הֶפְשֵׁט וּמַאי אַחֵר הֶפְשֵׁט – קוֹדֶם שֶׁנִּרְאוּ לְהֶפְשֵׁט, אַחַר שֶׁנִּרְאוּ לְהֶפְשֵׁט.,מַאי רַבִּי וּמַאי רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: הַדָּם מְרַצֶּה עַל הָעוֹר בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ. וּכְשֶׁהוּא עִם הַבָּשָׂר, נוֹלַד בּוֹ פְּסוּל בֵּין קוֹדֶם זְרִיקָה בֵּין לְאַחַר זְרִיקָה – הֲרֵי הוּא כְּיוֹצֵא בּוֹ.,רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אֵין הַדָּם מְרַצֶּה עַל הָעוֹר בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ. וּכְשֶׁהוּא עִם הַבָּשָׂר – נוֹלַד בּוֹ פְּסוּל קוֹדֶם זְרִיקָה, הֲרֵי הוּא כְּיוֹצֵא בּוֹ. אַחַר זְרִיקָה, הוּרְצָה בָּשָׂר שָׁעָה אַחַת; יַפְשִׁיטֶנּוּ, וְעוֹרוֹ לַכֹּהֲנִים.,לֵימָא בִּדְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ קָמִיפַּלְגִי? ״וְעָשִׂיתָ עֹלֹתֶיךָ הַבָּשָׂר וְהַדָּם״ – רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: אִם אֵין דָּם אֵין בָּשָׂר, אִם אֵין בָּשָׂר אֵין דָּם.,רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: דָּם – אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין בָּשָׂר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְדַם זְבָחֶיךָ יִשָּׁפֵךְ״. אִם כֵּן, מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְעָשִׂיתָ עֹלֹתֶיךָ הַבָּשָׂר וְהַדָּם״? לוֹמַר לְךָ: מָה דָּם בִּזְרִיקָה, אַף בָּשָׂר בִּזְרִיקָה. הָא לָמַדְתָּ שֶׁרֶיוַח יֵשׁ בֵּין כֶּבֶשׁ לַמִּזְבֵּחַ.,לֵימָא מַאן דְּאָמַר הוּרְצָה – כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, וּמַאן דְּאָמַר לֹא הוּרְצָה – כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ?,אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר – כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי; כִּי פְּלִיגִי אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ.,מַאן דְּאָמַר לֹא הוּרְצָה – כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ. מַאן דְּאָמַר הוּרְצָה אָמַר לָךְ: עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ הָתָם – אֶלָּא בְּבָשָׂר, דְּלֵיכָּא פְּסֵידָא לַכֹּהֲנִים; אֲבָל עוֹר, דְּאִיכָּא פְּסֵידָא לַכֹּהֲנִים – אֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ מוֹדֶה.,מִידֵי דְּהָוֵה אַדִּיעֲבַד; דִּתְנַן: נִטְמָא בָּשָׂר אוֹ נִפְסַל, אוֹ שֶׁיָּצָא חוּץ לַקְּלָעִים – רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר יִזְרוֹק, רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר לֹא יִזְרוֹק. וּמוֹדֶה רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ שֶׁאִם זָרַק – הוּרְצָה.,אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא סְגַן הַכֹּהֲנִים כּוּ׳. וְלֹא?! הֲרֵי פָּרִים הַנִּשְׂרָפִים וּשְׂעִירִים הַנִּשְׂרָפִים!,לְמִצְוָתָן לָא קָאָמְרִינַן.,הֲרֵי קוֹדֶם הֶפְשֵׁט וְקוֹדֶם זְרִיקָה! חָלוּץ קָאָמְרִינַן.,וְהָאִיכָּא אַחַר הֶפְשֵׁט וְקוֹדֶם זְרִיקָה לְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דְּאָמַר: אֵין הַדָּם מְרַצֶּה עַל הָעוֹר בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ!,רַבִּי חֲנִינָא כְּרַבִּי סְבִירָא לֵיהּ. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: אֲפִילּוּ תּוֹקְמַהּ כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן – מוֹדֶה רַבִּי שֶׁאֵין הֶפְשֵׁט קוֹדֶם זְרִיקָה.,וְהָאִיכָּא נִמְצֵאת טְרֵיפָה בִּבְנֵי מֵעַיִים!,קָסָבַר: נִמְצֵאת טְרֵיפָה בִּבְנֵי מֵעַיִים – מְרַצֶּה. דַּיְקָא נָמֵי – דְּקָתָנֵי, אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: מִדְּבָרָיו לָמַדְנוּ, שֶׁהַמַּפְשִׁיט אֶת הַבְּכוֹר וְנִמְצָא טְרֵיפָה – שֶׁיֵּאוֹתוּ הַכֹּהֲנִים בְּעוֹרוֹ! שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.,וְאֶלָּא מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא? הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: אֲפִילּוּ בִּגְבוּלִין.,אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. וְאַף רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לֹא אָמַר אֶלָּא כְּשֶׁהִתִּירוֹ מוּמְחֶה, אֲבָל לֹא הִתִּירוֹ מוּמְחֶה – לֹא.,וְהִלְכְתָא כְּדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים; בָּשָׂר בִּקְבוּרָה, וְהָעוֹר בִּשְׂרֵיפָה.,מַתְנִי׳ פָּרִים הַנִּשְׂרָפִים וּשְׂעִירִים הַנִּשְׂרָפִים, בִּזְמַן שֶׁהֵן נִשְׂרָפִין כְּמִצְוָתָן – נִשְׂרָפִים בְּבֵית הַדֶּשֶׁן וּמְטַמְּאִין בְּגָדִים, וְאִם אֵינָן נִשְׂרָפִין כְּמִצְוָתָן – נִשְׂרָפִין בְּבֵית הַבִּירָה וְאֵינָן מְטַמְּאִין בְּגָדִים. הָיוּ סוֹבְלִין אוֹתוֹ בְּמוֹטוֹת. יָצְאוּ הָרִאשׁוֹנִים חוּץ לְחוֹמַת הָעֲזָרָה וְהָאַחֲרוֹנִים לֹא יָצְאוּ – הָרִאשׁוֹנִים מְטַמְּאִין בְּגָדִים, וְהָאַחֲרוֹנִים אֵינָן מְטַמְּאִין בְּגָדִים עַד שֶׁיָּצְאוּ. יָצְאוּ אֵלּוּ וָאֵלּוּ – מְטַמְּאִין בְּגָדִים. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אֵינָן מְטַמְּאִין עַד שֶׁיּוּצַּת הָאוּר בְּרוּבָּן. נִיתַּךְ הַבָּשָׂר – אֵין הַשּׂוֹרֵף מְטַמֵּא בְּגָדִים.,גְּמָ׳ מַאי בִּירָה? אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מָקוֹם יֵשׁ בְּהַר הַבַּיִת, וּ״בִירָה״ שְׁמוֹ. וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: כׇּל הַבַּיִת כּוּלּוֹ קָרוּי ״בִּירָה״, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״(וְאֶל) הַבִּירָה אֲשֶׁר הֲכִינוֹתִי״.,אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ, שְׁלֹשָׁה בֵּית הַדְּשָׁנִין הֵן: בֵּית הַדֶּשֶׁן גָּדוֹל הָיָה בַּעֲזָרָה – שֶׁשָּׁם שׂוֹרְפִין פְּסוּלֵי קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים, וְאֵימוּרֵי קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים, וּפָרִים הַנִּשְׂרָפִין, וּשְׂעִירִים הַנִּשְׂרָפִין שֶׁאֵירַע בָּהֶן פְּסוּל קוֹדֶם זְרִיקָה.,וּבֵית הַדֶּשֶׁן אַחֵר הָיָה בְּהַר הַבַּיִת – שֶׁשָּׁם שׂוֹרְפִין פָּרִים הַנִּשְׂרָפִים וּשְׂעִירִים הַנִּשְׂרָפִים שֶׁאֵירַע בָּהֶן פְּסוּל אַחַר זְרִיקָה. וּכְמִצְוָתָן, חוּץ לְשָׁלֹשׁ מַחֲנוֹת.,תָּנֵי לֵוִי: שְׁלֹשָׁה בֵּית הַדְּשָׁנִין הֵן: בֵּית הַדֶּשֶׁן גָּדוֹל הָיָה בָּעֲזָרָה – שֶׁשָּׁם שׂוֹרְפִין פְּסוּלֵי קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים, וְאֵימוּרֵי קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים, וּפָרִים הַנִּשְׂרָפִים וּשְׂעִירִים הַנִּשְׂרָפִים שֶׁאֵירַע בָּהֶן פְּסוּל, בֵּין קוֹדֶם זְרִיקָה בֵּין לְאַחַר זְרִיקָה. וּבֵית הַדֶּשֶׁן אַחֵר הָיָה בְּהַר הַבַּיִת, שֶׁשָּׁם שׂוֹרְפִין פָּרִים הַנִּשְׂרָפִין וּשְׂעִירִים הַנִּשְׂרָפִין שֶׁאֵירַע בָּהֶן פְּסוּל בִּיצִיאָתָן. וּכְמִצְוָתָן, חוּץ לְשָׁלֹשׁ מַחֲנוֹת.,בָּעֵי רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: לִינָה מַהוּ שֶׁתּוֹעִיל בְּפָרִים הַנִּשְׂרָפִים וּבִשְׂעִירִים הַנִּשְׂרָפִים? מִי אָמְרִינַן: כִּי מַהְנְיָא לִינָה – בְּבָשָׂר דְּבַר אֲכִילָה, אֲבָל הָנֵי דְּלָאו בְּנֵי אֲכִילָה נִינְהוּ – לָא; אוֹ דִלְמָא לָא שְׁנָא?,אָמַר רָבָא: הָא מִילְּתָא אִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ לְאַבָּיֵי, וּפְשַׁטְנָא לֵיהּ מֵהָא: וְשָׁוִין שֶׁאִם חִישֵּׁב בַּאֲכִילַת פָּרִים וּבִשְׂרֵיפָתָן – שֶׁלֹּא עָשָׂה כְּלוּם. מַאי, לָאו מִדְּמַחְשָׁבָה לָא פָּסְלָה – לִינָה נָמֵי לָא פָּסְלָה?,וְדִלְמָא מַחְשָׁבָה הוּא דְּלָא פָּסְלָה, אֲבָל לִינָה פָּסְלָה!,תָּא שְׁמַע: פָּרִים הַנִּשְׂרָפִים וּשְׂעִירִים הַנִּשְׂרָפִין – מוֹעֲלִין בָּהֶן מִשֶּׁהוּקְדְּשׁוּ. נִשְׁחֲטוּ – הוּכְשְׁרוּ לִיפָּסֵל בִּטְבוּל יוֹם וּבִמְחוּסַּר כִּיפּוּרִים וּבְלִינָה. מַאי, לָאו לִינַת בָּשָׂר?,לָא, לִינַת אֵימוּרִין.,וְהָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: כּוּלָּן מוֹעֲלִין בָּהֶן בְּבֵית הַדֶּשֶׁן עַד שֶׁיּוּתַּךְ הַבָּשָׂר – מִדְּסֵיפָא בָּשָׂר, רֵישָׁא נָמֵי בָּשָׂר! מִידֵּי אִירְיָא?! סֵיפָא בָּשָׂר, רֵישָׁא אֵימוּרִין!,תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּתָנֵי לֵוִי: שֶׁאֵירַע בָּהֶן פְּסוּל בִּיצִיאָתָן. מַאי, לָאו לִינָה? לָא, פְּסוּל טוּמְאָה וּפְסוּל יְצִיאָה.,בָּעֵי רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: יְצִיאָה, מַהוּ שֶׁתּוֹעִיל בְּפָרִים הַנִּשְׂרָפִים וּשְׂעִירִים הַנִּשְׂרָפִים?,מַאי קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ? אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה בַּר אַבָּא: אַלִּיבָּא דְּמַאן דְּאָמַר עֲדַיִין לֹא הִגִּיעַ זְמַנּוֹ לָצֵאת.,מִי אָמְרִינַן: הָנֵי מִילֵּי בָּשָׂר – דְּאֵין סוֹפוֹ לָצֵאת חוֹבָה, אֲבָל הָנֵי דְּסוֹפָן לָצֵאת חוֹבָה – לָא; אוֹ דִלְמָא, הָכָא נָמֵי לֹא הִגִּיעַ זְמַנּוֹ לָצֵאת?,תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּתָנֵי לֵוִי: שֶׁאֵירַע בּוֹ פְּסוּל בִּיצִיאָתוֹ. מַאי, לָאו פָּסוּל יְצִיאָה? לָא; פְּסוּל טוּמְאָה וּפְסוּל לִינָה.,בָּעֵי רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: פָּרִים הַנִּשְׂרָפִים וּשְׂעִירִים הַנִּשְׂרָפִים, שֶׁיָּצָא (רוּבּוֹ) [רוּבָּן] בְּמִיעוּט אֵבֶר – מַהוּ? הָךְ מִיעוּטָא דְּאֵבֶר בָּתַר רוּבָּא שָׁדֵינַן לֵיהּ – וְהָא לָא נָפְקָא לֵיהּ; אוֹ דִלְמָא, בָּתַר רוּבָּא דִּבְהֵמָה שָׁדֵינַן?,פְּשִׁיטָא דְּלָא שָׁבְקִינַן רוּבָּא דִּבְהֵמָה וְאָזְלִינַן בָּתַר רוּבָּא דְּאֵבָרִים! אֶלָּא שֶׁיָּצָא חֶצְיוֹ בְּרוֹב אֵבֶר – הַאי מִיעוּטָא דְּאֵבֶר בָּתַר רוֹב אֵבֶר שָׁדֵינַן לֵיהּ, וְהָא נְפַק לֵיהּ; אוֹ דִלְמָא בָּתַר בְּהֵמָה שָׁדֵינַן לֵיהּ? תֵּיקוּ.,רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא מַתְנֵי לַהּ בְּגַבְרֵי, בְּמִתְעַסְּקִין בּוֹ חֲמִשָּׁה בְּנֵי אָדָם, וּנְפַקוּ תְּלָתָא וּפָשׁוּ לְהוּ תְּרֵי – מַאי? בָּתַר רוֹב מִתְעַסְּקִין אָזְלִינַן, אוֹ בָתַר בְּהֵמָה אָזְלִינַן? תֵּיקוּ.,בָּעֵי רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: פָּרִים וּשְׂעִירִים הַנִּשְׂרָפִים שֶׁיָּצְאוּ וְחָזְרוּ, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן: כֵּיוָן דְּנָפְקִי לְהוּ – אִיטַּמּוֹ לְהוּ; אוֹ דִלְמָא, כֵּיוָן דַּהֲדוּר הֲדוּר?,אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא בַּר מֶמֶל, תָּא שְׁמַע: הָיוּ סוֹבְלִין אוֹתָן בְּמוֹטוֹת, הָרִאשׁוֹנִים יָצְאוּ חוּץ לְחוֹמַת הָעֲזָרָה וְהָאַחֲרוֹנִים לֹא יָצְאוּ – הָרִאשׁוֹנִים שֶׁיָּצְאוּ חוּץ לְחוֹמַת הָעֲזָרָה מְטַמְּאִין בְּגָדִים, וְהָאַחֲרוֹנִים אֵין מְטַמְּאִין בְּגָדִים עַד שֶׁיָּצְאוּ. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ כֵּיוָן דְּנָפְקִי לְהוּ אִיטַּמּוֹ – הָנָךְ דְּאִיכָּא גַּוַּאי (לִיטָּמֵא) [לִיטַּמּוֹ]!,אָמַר רָבִינָא: וְתִסְבְּרָא?! הָא בָּעֵינָא ״וְאַחַר יָבֹא אֶל הַמַּחֲנֶה״, וְלֵיכָּא!,אֶלָּא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הֵיכִי בָּעֵי לַהּ? כְּגוֹן דִּנְקִיטִי לַהּ בְּבָקוּלְסֵי.,תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: פָּרִים וּפָרָה וְשָׂעִיר הַמִּשְׁתַּלֵּחַ – הַמְשַׁלֵּחַ, הַשּׂוֹרְפָן וְהַמּוֹצִיאָן מְטַמֵּא בְּגָדִים; וְהֵן עַצְמָן אֵין מְטַמְּאִין בְּגָדִים, אֲבָל מְטַמְּאִין אֳוכָלִין וּמַשְׁקִין. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: פָּרָה וּפָרִים מְטַמְּאִין אֳוכָלִין וּמַשְׁקִין, שָׂעִיר הַמִּשְׁתַּלֵּחַ אֵינוֹ מְטַמֵּא. שֶׁהוּא חַי, וְהַחַי אֵינוֹ מְטַמֵּא אֳוכָלִין וּמַשְׁקִין.,בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר – כִּדְתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל; דְּתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: ״עַל כׇּל זֶרַע זֵרוּעַ״ –,מָה זְרָעִים – שֶׁאֵין סוֹפָן לְיטַמֵּא טוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה, וּצְרִיכִין הֶכְשֵׁר; אַף כֹּל שֶׁאֵין סוֹפָן לְיטַמֵּא טוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה, צְרִיכִין הֶכְשֵׁר. יָצְתָה נִבְלַת עוֹף טָהוֹר – שֶׁסּוֹפָהּ לְיטַמֵּא טוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה, וְאֵין צְרִיכָה הֶכְשֵׁר.,אֶלָּא לְרַבָּנַן – אִי אִית לְהוּ דְּתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, אֲפִילּוּ שָׂעִיר הַמִּשְׁתַּלֵּחַ! אִי לֵית לֵיהּ, אֲפִילּוּ פָּרָה וּפָרִים מְנָלַן?,כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי אֲמַר, אָמְרִי בְּמַעְרְבָא: צְרִיכִין הֶכְשֵׁר טוּמְאָה מִמָּקוֹם אַחֵר.,בָּעֵי רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: פָּרִים וּשְׂעִירִים הַנִּשְׂרָפִים, מַהוּ שֶׁיְּטַמְּאוּ אֳוכָלִין וּמַשְׁקִין בִּפְנִים כְּבַחוּץ? מְחוּסַּר יְצִיאָה כִּמְחוּסַּר מַעֲשֶׂה דָּמֵי, אוֹ לָא?,בָּתַר דְּבַעְיַאּ הֲדַר פַּשְׁטַהּ: מְחוּסַּר יְצִיאָה כִּמְחוּסַּר מַעֲשֶׂה דָּמֵי.,בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי אַבָּא בַּר שְׁמוּאֵל מֵרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא: נִבְלַת עוֹף טָהוֹר, לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, מַהוּ שֶׁתְּטַמֵּא בִּכְזַיִת?,דְּמַחֲתָא לְאַרְעָא – לָא תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ; דְּנָקֵיט בְּפוּמֵּיהּ – לָא תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ; כִּי תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ – דְּנָקֵיט לֵיהּ בִּידֵיהּ: מְחוּסַּר קְרִיבָה כִּמְחוּסַּר מַעֲשֶׂה דָּמֵי, אוֹ לָא?,בָּתַר דְּבַעְיַאּ הֲדַר פַּשְׁטַהּ: מְחוּסָּר קְרִיבָה לָאו כִּמְחוּסַּר מַעֲשֶׂה דָּמֵי.,אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: שְׁלֹשָׁה עָשָׂר דְּבָרִים נֶאֶמְרוּ בְּנִבְלַת עוֹף טָהוֹר, וְזֶה אֶחָד מֵהֶן: צְרִיכָה מַחְשָׁבָה, וְאֵין צְרִיכָה הֶכְשֵׁר, וּמְטַמֵּא טוּמְאַת אֳוכָלִין בִּכְבֵיצָה. מַאי, לָאו רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא?,לָא, רַבָּנַן הִיא.,וְהָא קָתָנֵי רֵישָׁא: צְרִיכָה מַחְשָׁבָה וְאֵין צְרִיכָה הֶכְשֵׁר; וּמַאן שָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ הַאי סְבָרָא – רַבִּי מֵאִיר; וּמִדְּרֵישָׁא רַבִּי מֵאִיר, סֵיפָא נָמֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר!,מִידֵּי אִירְיָא?! הָא כִּדְאִיתָא וְהָא כִּדְאִיתָא.,וְהָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: שְׁחִיטָתָהּ וּמְלִיקָתָהּ מְטַהֶרֶת טְרֵיפָתָהּ מִטּוּמְאָתָהּ; מַאן שָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ הַאי סְבָרָא – רַבִּי מֵאִיר; רֵישָׁא וְסֵיפָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר, וּמְצִיעֲתָא רַבָּנַן?!,אִין; רֵישָׁא וְסֵיפָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר, וּמְצִיעֲתָא רַבָּנַן.,אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב הַמְנוּנָא לְרַבִּי זֵירָא: לָא תִּיתֵּיב אַכַּרְעָךְ עַד דְּאָמְרַתְּ לִי הָא מִילְּתָא: נִבְלַת עוֹף טָהוֹר – לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, מוֹנִין לָהּ רִאשׁוֹן וְשֵׁנִי, אוֹ אֵין מוֹנִין רִאשׁוֹן וְשֵׁנִי?,אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כֹּל הֵיכָא דִּמְטַמֵּא אָדָם בְּמַגָּע – מוֹנִין בּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן וְשֵׁנִי, כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאֵין מְטַמֵּא אָדָם בְּמַגָּע – אֵין מוֹנִין בּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן וְשֵׁנִי.,בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא מֵרַבִּי אַמֵּי בַּר חִיָּיא, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ מֵרַבִּי אָבִין בַּר כָּהֲנָא, הָא דִּתְנַן: חִיבּוּרֵי אוֹכְלִין עַל יְדֵי מַשְׁקִין – חִיבּוּר לְטוּמְאָה קַלָּה, וְאֵין חִיבּוּר לְטוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה;,מוֹנִין בּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן וְשֵׁנִי, אוֹ אֵין מוֹנִין בּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן וְשֵׁנִי?,אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כֹּל הֵיכָא דִּמְטַמֵּא אָדָם – מוֹנִין בּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן וְשֵׁנִי, אֵין מְטַמֵּא אָדָם – אֵין מוֹנִין בּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן וְשֵׁנִי.,יָצְאוּ אֵלּוּ וָאֵלּוּ. מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: לְהַלָּן הוּא אוֹמֵר – חוּץ לְשָׁלֹשׁ מַחֲנוֹת, כָּאן – לְמַחֲנֶה אַחַת; לוֹמַר לָךְ: כֵּיוָן שֶׁיָּצָא חוּץ לְמַחֲנֶה אַחַת – מְטַמֵּא בְּגָדִים.,וְהִיא גּוּפַהּ מְנָלַן? דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״וְהוֹצִיא אֶת כׇּל הַפָּר אֶל מִחוּץ לַמַּחֲנֶה״ – חוּץ לְשָׁלֹשׁ מַחֲנוֹת. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר חוּץ לְשָׁלֹשׁ מַחֲנוֹת; אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא מַחֲנֶה אַחַת?,כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר בְּפַר הָעֵדָה: ״מִחוּץ לַמַּחֲנֶה״ – שֶׁאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר, שֶׁהֲרֵי כְּבָר נֶאֱמַר: ״כַּאֲשֶׁר שָׂרַף אֵת הַפָּר הָרִאשׁוֹן״; לִיתֵּן לוֹ מַחֲנֶה שְׁנִיָּה.,כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר ״מִחוּץ לַמַּחֲנֶה״ בַּדֶּשֶׁן – שֶׁאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר, שֶׁהֲרֵי כְּבָר נֶאֱמַר: ״עַל שֶׁפֶךְ הַדֶּשֶׁן יִשָּׂרֵף״; לִיתֵּן לוֹ מַחֲנֶה שְׁלִישִׁית.,וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן – הַאי ״מִחוּץ לְמַחֲנֶה״ מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״חוּץ לַמַּחֲנֶה״, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״חוּץ לַמַּחֲנֶה״; מָה לְהַלָּן – חוּץ לְשָׁלֹשׁ מַחֲנוֹת, אַף כָּאן – חוּץ לְשָׁלֹשׁ מַחֲנוֹת. וּמָה לְהַלָּן – לְמִזְרָחָהּ שֶׁל יְרוּשָׁלַיִם, אַף כָּאן – לְמִזְרָחָהּ שֶׁל יְרוּשָׁלַיִם.,אֶלָּא לְרַבָּנַן הֵיכָא שָׂרֵיף לְהוּ? כִּדְתַנְיָא: הֵיכָן נִשְׂרָפִין? לִצְפוֹן יְרוּשָׁלַיִם, חוּץ לְשָׁלֹשׁ מַחֲנוֹת. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: אַבֵּית הַדֶּשֶׁן נִשְׂרָפִין.,אָמַר רָבָא: מַאן תַּנָּא דִּפְלִיג עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: ״עַל שֶׁפֶךְ הַדֶּשֶׁן יִשָּׂרֵף״ – שֶׁיְּהֵא שָׁם דֶּשֶׁן (שֶׁיַּקְדִּים לְשָׁם דֶּשֶׁן). רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: שֶׁיְּהֵא מְקוֹמוֹ מְשׁוּפָּךְ.,אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: דִּילְמָא בִּמְקוֹמוֹ מְשׁוּפָּךְ פְּלִיגִי.,תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַשּׂוֹרֵף מְטַמֵּא בְּגָדִים, וְלֹא הַמַּצִּית אֶת הָאוּר מְטַמֵּא בְּגָדִים, וְלֹא הַמְסַדֵּר אֶת הַמַּעֲרָכָה מְטַמֵּא בְּגָדִים. וְאֵיזֶהוּ הַשּׂוֹרֵף? הַמְסַיֵּיעַ בִּשְׁעַת שְׂרֵיפָה.,יָכוֹל אַף מִשֶּׁנַּעֲשׂוּ אֵפֶר מְטַמֵּא בְּגָדִים? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אוֹתָם״ – אוֹתָם מְטַמְּאִין בְּגָדִים, וּמִשֶּׁנַּעֲשִׂין אֵפֶר אֵין מְטַמְּאִין בְּגָדִים. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אוֹתָם מְטַמְּאִין בְּגָדִים, נִיתַּךְ הַבָּשָׂר אֵין מְטַמְּאִין בְּגָדִים.,מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אָמַר רָבָא: אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ דְּשַׁוְּיֵיהּ חָרוֹכָא.,הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ טְבוּל יוֹם,מַתְנִי׳ הַשּׁוֹחֵט וְהַמַּעֲלֶה בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב עַל הַשְּׁחִיטָה, וְחַיָּיב עַל הַעֲלָאָה.,רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: שָׁחַט בִּפְנִים וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ. שָׁחַט בַּחוּץ וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – פָּטוּר, שֶׁלֹּא הֶעֱלָה אֶלָּא דָּבָר פָּסוּל. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אַף הַשּׁוֹחֵט בִּפְנִים וּמַעֲלֶה בַּחוּץ, כֵּיוָן שֶׁהוֹצִיאוֹ – פְּסָלוֹ.,הַטָּמֵא שֶׁאָכַל בֵּין קֹדֶשׁ טָמֵא בֵּין קֹדֶשׁ טָהוֹר – חַיָּיב. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: טָמֵא שֶׁאָכַל טָהוֹר – חַיָּיב, וְטָמֵא שֶׁאָכַל טָמֵא – פָּטוּר, שֶׁלֹּא אָכַל אֶלָּא דָּבָר טָמֵא. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אַף טָמֵא שֶׁאָכַל אֶת הַטָּהוֹר, כֵּיוָן שֶׁנָּגַע בּוֹ – טִמְּאוֹהוּ.,וְטָהוֹר שֶׁאָכַל טָמֵא – פָּטוּר, שֶׁאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא עַל טוּמְאַת הַגּוּף.,גְּמָ׳ בִּשְׁלָמָא הֶעֱלָה – כְּתִיב עוֹנֶשׁ וּכְתִיב אַזְהָרָה. עוֹנֶשׁ – דִּכְתִיב: ״וְאֶל פֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד לֹא הֱבִיאוֹ״. אַזְהָרָה – דִּכְתִיב: ״הִשָּׁמֶר לְךָ פֶּן תַּעֲלֶה עוֹלוֹתֶיךָ״; וְכִי הָא דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אָבִין אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״הִשָּׁמֶר״, ״פֶּן״ וְ״אַל״ – אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה.,אֶלָּא שְׁחִיטָה – בִּשְׁלָמָא עוֹנֶשׁ, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְאֶל פֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד לֹא הֱבִיאוֹ״; אֶלָּא אַזְהָרָה מְנָלַן? אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְלֹא יִזְבְּחוּ עוֹד״.,הַאי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר! דְּאָמַר: מִנַּיִן לַזּוֹבֵחַ בְּהֵמָה לְמַרְקוּלִיס שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב? דִּכְתִיב: ״וְלֹא יִזְבְּחוּ עוֹד אֶת זִבְחֵיהֶם״ – אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לִכְדַרְכָּהּ, דִּכְתִיב: ״אֵיכָה יַעַבְדוּ״; תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְשֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ.,אָמַר רַבָּה: קְרִי בֵּיהּ ״וְלֹא יִזְבְּחוּ״, וּקְרִי בֵּיהּ ״וְלֹא עוֹד״.,אַכַּתִּי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: עַד כָּאן הוּא מְדַבֵּר בְּקָדָשִׁים שֶׁהִקְדִּישָׁן בִּשְׁעַת אִיסּוּר הַבָּמוֹת וְהִקְרִיבָן בִּשְׁעַת אִיסּוּר הַבָּמוֹת –
English Translation
when the blood of a sin offering is below and the blood of a burnt offering is above, in a case in which the blood of a burnt offering is sprayed as a second layer on top of the blood of a sin offering that has already been sprayed and absorbed into a garment, the garment requires laundering.,Rava asks: When the blood of a burnt offering is below and the blood of a sin offering is above, what is the halakha? Is one required to launder a garment to remove the blood of a sin offering because the blood touches his garment, and in this case, this blood is touching the garment? Or perhaps is one required to launder it because of the absorption of the blood into the garment, and, in this case, since the garment has already absorbed the other blood, this garment did not absorb the blood? Rava then resolves his dilemma, ruling that such garments do not require laundering.,§ In a similar manner, with regard to the immersion of a garment that has become impure, Rava said: It is obvious to me that if there is blood on one’s garment, it interposes between the water of immersion and the garment, such that the immersion is ineffective. But if he is a butcher, used to having blood on his garments, a bloodstain does not interpose, and the immersion is effective, since a substance is not considered an interposition if the one immersing is not particular about it. Similarly, if there is a stain of fat [revav] on one’s garment, it interposes. But if he is a fat seller, such a stain does not interpose. Rava asks: If there is both blood and fat on one’s garment when he immerses it, what is the halakha?,The Gemara challenges the question: If he is a butcher, let me derive that the stain interposes due to the fat that he is not used to having on his garments; and conversely, if he is a fat seller, let me derive that the stain interposes due to the stain of blood that he is not used to having on his garments. The Gemara explains: No, this question is not superfluous; it is necessary with regard to a person who works both as this, a butcher, and as that, a fat seller. In such a case, the question is: Is it that he is not particular with regard to one stain, but he is particular with regard to two stains, so that the immersion is ineffective? Or, perhaps, is it that he is not particular even with regard to two stains, as neither is unusual for him? The Gemara provides no answer, and the question shall stand unresolved.,,MISHNA: A priest who was ritually impure who immersed that day and is waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed, and a priest who has not yet brought an atonement offering to complete the purification process, e.g., a zav and a leper who did not bring their requisite atonement offerings, who are not yet permitted to partake of sacrificial meat, do not receive a share of sacrificial meat along with the other members of the patrilineal priestly family serving in the Temple that day, in order to partake of it in the evening after the offerings were sacrificed, even though after nightfall he would be permitted to partake of the offerings.,A priest who is an acute mourner, i.e., if one of his relatives for whom he is obligated to mourn died that day, is permitted to touch sacrificial meat, as he is not ritually impure. But he may not sacrifice offerings, and he does not receive a share of sacrificial meat in order to partake of it in the evening.,Blemished priests, whether they are temporarily blemished or whether they are permanently blemished, receive a share and partake of the offerings with their priestly brethren, but do not sacrifice the offerings.,The principle is: Any priest who is unfit for the service that specific day does not receive a share of the sacrificial meat, and anyone who has no share of the meat has no share in the hides of the animals, to which the priests are entitled as well.,Even if the priest was ritually impure only at the time of the sprinkling of the blood of the offering and he was pure at the time of the burning of the fats of that offering, he still does not receive a share of the meat, as it is stated: “He that sacrifices the blood of the peace offerings and the fat, from among the sons of Aaron, shall have the right thigh for a portion” (Leviticus 7:33). One who cannot sprinkle the blood does not receive a share in the meat. GEMARA: The mishna teaches that a priest who is unfit for the Temple service does not receive a share of the sacrificial meat. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Reish Lakish said: It is derived from a verse, as the verse states about a sin offering: “The priest who effects atonement shall eat it; in a sacred place shall it be eaten, in the court of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 6:19). This teaches that only a priest who effects atonement by performing the rites of the offering shall partake of its meat, but a priest who does not effect atonement does not partake of its meat.,The Gemara challenges: And is this an established principle? But there are all the priests of the priestly watch of that week in the Temple, who do not effect atonement for that offering, because the blood of a specific sin offering is presented by just one priest, and yet they all partake of its meat. The Gemara explains: We mean to say that any priest who is fit for effecting atonement may partake of it, even one who did not participate in the service.,The Gemara objects: But there is the case of a minor, who is unfit for effecting atonement, and who nevertheless partakes of sacrificial meat. The Gemara explains: Rather, what is meant by the term: “Shall eat it”? It means that he shall receive a share of it. The halakha is therefore that a priest who is fit for effecting atonement receives a share of the meat, but a priest who is unfit for effecting atonement does not receive a share of the meat. Minors do not receive a share, though they may partake of meat given to them by others.,The Gemara objects: But there is a blemished priest, who is unfit for effecting atonement, and yet he receives a share of its meat. The Gemara replies: The Merciful One included a blemished priest as an exception, as the verse that states: “Every male among the priests shall eat it” (Leviticus 6:22), serves to include a blemished priest.,The Gemara suggests: But say that the phrase “every male” serves to include one who immersed that day, teaching that he may also receive a share in the sacrificial meat. Why should it be understood as referring specifically to a blemished priest? The Gemara replies: It stands to reason that the Torah should include a blemished priest for receiving his own share of the meat, because he may partake of sacrificial meat in any event. By contrast, one who immersed that day is impure and may not touch or partake of sacrificial meat.,The Gemara rejects this: On the contrary, the Torah should include one who immersed that day, because, unlike a blemished priest, in the evening he will be fit to perform the service. The Gemara replies: Now, in any event, the one who immersed himself is not fit.,Rav Yosef said another explanation: Now what is meant by the term: “Shall eat it”? It means: He shall receive a share of it. But if so, let the Merciful One write: Shall receive a share of it. What is the reason for writing: “Shall eat it”? Learn from it that only a priest who is fit for partaking of sacrificial meat, which includes a blemished priest, receives a share in the meat; but a priest who is not fit for partaking of sacrificial meat, e.g., one who immersed that day, does not receive a share in the meat.,§ Reish Lakish raises a dilemma: If a priest is blemished and he is impure, what is the halakha? Must the other priests give him a share of the meat? Perhaps we say that since he is not fit to perform the rite as a blemished priest and nevertheless the Merciful One included him to receive a share in the meat, there is no difference: What is the difference to me if he is impure, and what is the difference to me if he is only blemished? In any event he is not fit, yet the Torah allows him to receive a share in the meat. Or perhaps he may not receive a share in the meat, because only a priest who is fit for partaking of sacrificial meat receives a share of the meat, but a priest who is not fit for partaking of sacrificial meat does not receive a share of the meat.,Rabba said: Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from a baraita: If a High Priest is serving in the Temple and one of his immediate relatives dies, he sacrifices offerings even as an acute mourner. But he does not partake of sacrificial meat, and he does not receive a share to partake of it in the evening. Conclude from the baraita that in order for the priest to receive a share in sacrificial meat, we require that he be fit for partaking of it, and accordingly, a blemished priest who is impure does not receive a share. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from the baraita that this is so.,§ Rav Oshaya raises a dilemma: If a priest is impure, then in a case of communal offerings, which may be offered by an impure priest, what is the halakha? Do the other priests give him a share of the meat, so that he may partake of it in the evening when he becomes pure? Do we say that the Merciful One states: “The priest who effects atonement,” and therefore any priest who is fit for effecting atonement receives a share, as derived earlier, and this priest is also one who may effect atonement, since this is a communal offering? Or perhaps he may not, due to the principle that only a priest who is fit for partaking of sacrificial meat receives a share of the meat, but a priest who is unfit for partaking of sacrificial meat does not receive a share.,Ravina said: Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from a baraita: If a High Priest is serving in the Temple and one of his relatives dies, he sacrifices offerings even as an acute mourner, but he does not partake of sacrificial meat and he does not receive a share of it to partake in the evening. Conclude from the baraita that in order for a priest to receive a share in sacrificial meat, we require that he be fit for partaking of it at the time of the service, without regard to whether he can perform the service. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from the baraita that this is so.,§ The mishna teaches: A priest who is an acute mourner is permitted to touch sacrificial meat, but he may not sacrifice offerings. The Gemara asks: Is it in fact permitted for an acute mourner to touch sacrificial meat? And the Gemara raises a contradiction from another mishna (Ḥagiga 21a): An acute mourner and one who has not yet brought an atonement offering, even after their respective disqualifications have expired, require immersion in order to eat sacrificial food. According to that mishna, an acute mourner who did not immerse may not touch sacrificial meat.,Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is not difficult. Here, the ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to a case where the mourner immersed during his day of acute mourning. This is why he is permitted to touch the sacrificial meat. There, the ruling of the mishna in tractate Ḥagiga is stated with regard to a case where the mourner did not immerse.,The Gemara asks: And even if he immersed, what of it? But doesn’t his acute mourning return to him? As Rabba, son of Rav Huna, says: In a case of an acute mourner who immersed during his day of his acute mourning, his acute mourning returns to him.,The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. That case, in tractate Ḥagiga, is one where he was distracted from safeguarding his state of purity, so he may not touch sacrificial meat in the event that he is impure. This case, in the mishna here, is one where he was not distracted.,The Gemara counters: If the mishna in tractate Ḥagiga is discussing a case of distraction, then his status is like that of one who contracted ritual impurity imparted by a corpse, who requires sprinkling with water of purification on the third and seventh days of his impurity. As Rabbi Yustai, son of Rabbi Matun, says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One who experienced a distraction requires sprinkling with water of purification on the third and seventh days.,The Gemara responds: This is not difficult. That statement, that he requires sprinkling, is discussing a case where he was distracted and careless about contracting impurity imparted by a corpse. This mishna in tractate Ḥagiga, stating that he requires immersion but not sprinkling, is discussing a case where he was distracted and careless about contracting impurity imparted by the carcass of a creeping animal.,The Gemara counters: One who was careless about becoming impure due to the carcass of a creeping animal is fully impure, and so he requires not only immersion to become pure, but he also requires sunset. And furthermore, if the mishna in tractate Ḥagiga is discussing this case, the mourner should be prohibited from touching even teruma, not just sacrificial meat. Why does the mishna mention only the latter?,Rabbi Yirmeya said: The mishna is discussing a case where he says: I safeguarded myself from anything that would render me impure, so I am certain that I did not contract impurity that requires waiting until sunset; but I did not safeguard myself from anything that would render me unfit for touching sacrificial meat.,The Gemara asks: But is there such a concept of partial care, that one can claim to have safeguarded himself from one form of impurity but not another? The Gemara answers: Yes, and it is taught in a baraita: If one was carrying a basket, and the basket was still on his head, and a shovel was in the basket, and he said: I am minding the basket, that it not become impure, but I am not minding the shovel, then the basket is pure, and the shovel is impure.,The Gemara challenges the ruling of the baraita: But wouldn’t the shovel render the basket impure? The Gemara answers: There is a principle that a vessel does not render another vessel ritually impure. The Gemara challenges: But wouldn’t the shovel render that which is in the basket, e.g., figs, impure? Rava said: The case is where he says: I safeguarded it, the shovel, from anything that would allow it to render another item impure, but I did not safeguard it from anything that would render it itself unfit, i.e., impure.,The Gemara returns to discuss the contradiction between the mishna, which permits an acute mourner to touch sacrificial meat, and the mishna in tractate Ḥagiga, which requires him to immerse. The Gemara relates: The matter circulated and came before Rabbi Abba bar Memel. He said to the Sages before him: Have they not heard that which Rabbi Yoḥanan says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One who partakes of teruma that has third-degree impurity, i.e., teruma disqualified through contact with an item with second-degree impurity, is prohibited from partaking of teruma, but permitted to touch teruma.,Rabbi Abba bar Memel continued: Apparently, in a case of partaking, the Sages imposed a higher standard, whereas in a case of touching, the Sages did not impose a higher standard. Similarly, in a case of an acute mourner, the Sages require him to immerse before he may partake of sacrificial meat, as taught in tractate Ḥagiga, but they do not impose this standard for touching the meat, as taught in the mishna here.,§ The mishna teaches with regard to an acute mourner: And he does not receive a share of sacrificial meat in order to partake of it in the evening. The Gemara comments: The mishna indicates only that he may not receive a share of the meat, but when other priests invite him to join in their portions, he may partake of them in the evening.,And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (Pesaḥim 91b): An acute mourner immerses and partakes of his Paschal offering in the evening, but he may not partake of other sacrificial meat.,Rav Yirmeya of Difti said: This is not difficult. Here, the ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to the first night of Passover, whereas there, in tractate Pesaḥim, the ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to the rest of the days of the year.,What is the reason for the distinction between the two? On the first night of Passover, since he partakes of the Paschal offering, he may also partake of other sacrificial meat. But on the rest of the days of the year, when he is unfit to partake of sacrificial meat, he is unfit. And what does the mishna in Pesaḥim mean when it states: But he may not partake of other sacrificial meat? It means: But he may not partake of sacrificial meat of all of the rest of the year, other than the first night of Passover.,Rav Asi said there is a different resolution to the contradiction between the mishnayot: This is not difficult. Here, in the ruling of the mishna in tractate Pesaḥim, which prohibits an acute mourner from partaking of sacrificial meat, it is referring to a case where his relative died on the fourteenth day of Nisan, and he buried him on the fourteenth itself, in which case he is still considered an acute mourner by rabbinic law that evening. There, in the ruling of the mishna in this chapter, it is referring to a case where his relative died on the thirteenth of Nisan, and he buried him on the fourteenth of Nisan. The reason the mourner may partake is that since the day of burial is not the day of death, it does not take hold of its following night by rabbinic law.,The Gemara clarifies: Who is the tanna who taught that acute mourning the following night is by rabbinic law, as opposed to by Torah law? This is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught in a baraita: Acute mourning at night is by Torah law; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: His status as an acute mourner at night is not by Torah law, but by rabbinic law. Know that this so, as the Sages said: An acute mourner immerses and partakes of his Paschal offering in the evening, but he may still not partake of other sacrificial meat. If acute mourning at night were by Torah law, he would not be permitted to partake of the Paschal offering.,The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Shimon hold that acute mourning at night is by rabbinic law and that consequently an acute mourner partakes of his Paschal offering in the evening? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says: An acute mourner does not send his offerings to the Temple to be sacrificed? What, is it not referring even to a Paschal offering? The Gemara rejects this: No, the baraita is referring to all offerings other than a Paschal offering.,The Gemara counters: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to the verse: “And if his offering be a sacrifice of peace offerings [shelamim]” (Leviticus 3:1), Rabbi Shimon says: The offering is called shelamim to teach that when a person is whole [shalem], i.e., in a state of contentment, he brings his offering, but he does not bring it when he is an acute mourner. From where is it derived to include that an acute mourner does not bring even a thanks offering? I include the thanks offering because it is consumed in a state of joy, like a peace offering.,From where is it derived that the verse also serves to include a burnt offering? I include the burnt offering because it comes as a vow offering and as a gift offering, like a peace offering. From where is it derived that the verse also serves to include a firstborn offering, and an animal tithe offering, and a Paschal offering, which are not brought voluntarily? I include a firstborn offering, and an animal tithe offering, and a Paschal offering, because they too, like a peace offering, do not come to atone for a sin. From where is it derived to include a sin offering and a guilt offering, which atone for sins? The verse states: “And if his offering be a sacrifice [zevaḥ] of peace offerings,” which teaches that an acute mourner may not sacrifice any slaughtered offering [zevaḥ].,From where is it derived to include even the bird offerings, and the meal offerings, and the wine, and the wood, and the frankincense brought for the Temple service? The verse states: “And if his offering be a sacrifice of peace offerings [shelamim korbano],” teaching that for all offerings [korbanot] that a person brings, he brings them when he is whole [shalem], but he does not bring them when he is an acute mourner.,The Gemara explains: In any event, Rabbi Shimon teaches that it is prohibited for an acute mourner to bring a Paschal offering, even though he will cease to be an acute mourner that night; this contradicts the first baraita.,Rav Ḥisda said: The latter baraita mentions a Paschal offering for no purpose. In other words, the halakha that an acute mourner does not bring an offering does not actually apply to a Paschal offering, and the baraita mentions it only out of habit, since a firstborn-animal offering, the animal tithe offering, and a Paschal offering are frequently mentioned together.,Rav Sheshet said: What is meant in this baraita by the term: Paschal offering? It is referring to the peace offerings of Passover, i.e., the peace offering that is sacrificed along with the Paschal offering. The Gemara objects: If so, that is the same as a peace offering, which Rabbi Shimon already mentioned. The Gemara answers: He taught the halakha with regard to peace offerings that come on account of the Paschal offering, and he taught separately the halakha with regard to peace offerings that come on their own account.,The Gemara explains: Rabbi Shimon needed to teach both cases explicitly, because if he did not teach the halakha with regard to peace offerings that come on account of the Paschal offering, it would enter your mind to say: Since they come on account of the Paschal offering, they are considered like the Paschal offering itself, and the acute mourner offers them as well. Therefore, Rabbi Shimon teaches us that these peace offerings are also forbidden to an acute mourner.,Rav Mari said a different resolution to the contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon: It is not difficult. Here, in the baraita where Rabbi Shimon holds an acute mourner may not send a Paschal offering, since acute mourning at night is by Torah law, it is referring to a case where his relative died on the fourteenth day of Nisan and he buried him on the fourteenth itself. There, the ruling in the mishna in tractate Pesaḥim, which teaches that an acute mourner immerses and partakes of the Paschal offering in the evening, since acute mourning at night is by rabbinic law, is referring to a case where his relative died on the thirteenth day of Nisan and he buried him on the fourteenth of Nisan.,Rav Mari explains: In a case where his relative died on the fourteenth day of Nisan and he buried him on the fourteenth itself, his acute mourning is due to the day of death and is therefore by Torah law. Consequently, it takes hold of its following night by Torah law, and the mitzva of the Paschal offering does not override it. By contrast, in a case where his relative died on the thirteenth day of Nisan and he buried him on the fourteenth of Nisan, the fourteenth is only the day of burial, and his acute mourning is therefore by rabbinic law. Consequently, it takes hold of its following night only by rabbinic law, and the mitzva of the Paschal offering overrides it.,Rav Ashi said to Rav Mari: But if so, it is difficult to understand that which the baraita teaches: Rabbi Shimon said to Rabbi Yehuda: Know that this so, as the Sages said: An acute mourner immerses on the fourteenth of Nisan and partakes of his Paschal offering in the evening, but he may not partake of other sacrificial meat. According to your explanation of this statement, let Rabbi Yehuda say to Rabbi Shimon that this is no proof: I am telling you a halakha about the day of death, when acute mourning is by Torah law, and you tell me that you have a proof from a mishna that deals with the day of burial, when acute mourning is by rabbinic law. The Gemara concludes: This indeed poses a difficulty for Rav Mari.,Abaye said a different resolution to the contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon: It is not difficult. Here, in the baraita where Rabbi Shimon holds that an acute mourner may not send a Paschal offering, it is referring to a case where his relative died before midday on the fourteenth of Nisan. There, the ruling in the mishna in tractate Pesaḥim, which teaches that an acute mourner immerses and partakes of the Paschal offering in the evening, it is a case where his relative died after midday on the fourteenth of Nisan. When his relative died before midday, in which case he was not ever fit for bringing a Paschal offering since the obligation begins at midday, the status of acute mourning applies to him, and it is prohibited for him to bring a Paschal offering. But if his relative dies after midday, when he is already fit for bringing a Paschal offering, the status of acute mourning does not apply to him with regard to this matter, so he may immerse and partake of the Paschal offering in the evening.,The Gemara explains: And from where do you say that the halakha is different depending on whether his relative died before midday on the fourteenth of Nisan or whether he died after midday? As it is taught in a baraita: The Torah states with regard to a priest: “And for his sister a virgin, that is near unto him, that has had no husband, for her may he become impure” (Leviticus 21:3). From here it is derived that it is a mitzva for a priest to become impure in order to bury his deceased relatives, and if he did not want to do so, others must render him impure against his will. And an incident occurred involving Yosef the priest, where his wife died on Passover eve, and he did not want to become impure, as he wanted to offer the Paschal offering; and his brethren the priests voted and rendered him impure against his will.,And the Sages raise a contradiction from another baraita: What is the meaning when the verse states with regard to a nazirite: “He shall not become impure for his father, or for his mother, for his brother, or for his sister when they die; because his consecration unto God is upon his head” (Numbers 6:7)? If a nazirite went to slaughter his Paschal offering or to circumcise his son, mitzvot for which failure to fulfill them is punishable by karet, and he heard that a relative of his died, one might have thought that he should become impure in order to bury his relative even if this will result in his not bringing the Paschal offering. You rather say, based on this verse, that “he shall not become impure.”,One might have thought that just as he may not become impure to bury his sister, so too he may not become impure to bury a corpse with no one to bury it [met mitzva]. The verse states: “Or for his sister,” teaching that it is only to bury his sister that he may not become impure, but he does become impure to bury a met mitzva.,In the first baraita, contracting impurity from a dead relative is obligatory, and in the second baraita it is forbidden. Do you not learn from this contradiction that there must be a distinction between the cases? Here, in the first baraita concerning a priest, it must be referring to a case where the relative died before midday, so he was obligated to become impure before the obligation for the Paschal offering took effect. There, in the second baraita concerning a nazirite, it must be referring to a case where the relative died after midday. This distinction, between death before and after midday, also applies to acute mourning.,The Gemara rejects this explanation: From where do you infer that this is the resolution to the contradiction? Actually, perhaps I will say to you: Both this baraita and that baraita are discussing deaths that occurred after midday. And this baraita, about a nazirite, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and that baraita, about Yosef the priest, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. As it is taught in a baraita: The Torah states with regard to a priest: “And for his sister a virgin, that is near unto him, that has had no husband, for her may he become impure” (Leviticus 21:3). This is optional, i.e., a priest is not obligated to become impure to bury his sister; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: It is mandatory.,The Gemara responds: This should not enter your mind, because it is Rabbi Akiva who teaches the first clause of the baraita about a nazirite. As it is taught in the full version of that baraita: The Torah states: “All the days that he consecrates himself unto the Lord he shall not come near to a dead body. He shall not become impure for his father, or for his mother, for his brother, or for his sister when they die; because his consecration unto God is upon his head” (Numbers 6:7). Rabbi Akiva says: The term “body [nefesh]” is referring to relatives. The term “dead [met]” is referring to non-relatives.,The verse specifies: “For his father,” even though his father is included among his relatives, to teach that he may not become impure to bury his father, but he does become impure to bury a met mitzva. The verse states: “For his mother,” to teach that even if he was a priest and he was a nazirite, and therefore doubly prohibited from becoming impure, nevertheless, he may not become impure to bury his mother but he does become impure to bury a met mitzva. The verse states: “For his brother,” to teach that even if he was a High Priest, who may not become impure even for his relatives, and he was also a nazirite, nevertheless, he may not become impure to bury his brother but he does become impure to bury a met mitzva.,What is the meaning when the verse states: “Or for his sister”? If a nazirite went to slaughter his Paschal offering or to circumcise his son, and he heard that a relative of his died, one might have thought that he should become impure. You rather say that he may not become impure. One might have thought that just as he may not become impure to bury his sister, so too he may not become impure to bury a met mitzva. The verse states: “Or for his sister,” to teach that he may not become impure to bury his sister but he does become impure to bury a met mitzva. Consequently, the statement of the baraita concerning a nazirite represents the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Rava said there is a different resolution to the contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon. Both this baraita and that baraita are discussing cases where the relative died after midday on the fourteenth of Nisan, and still it is not difficult. Here, his relative died before the priests would have slaughtered the Paschal offering and sprinkled its blood on his account, and he may not send the offering. There, the relative died after the priests slaughtered the Paschal offering and sprinkled its blood on his account. Since acute mourning at night is by rabbinic law, it is suspended to allow him to consume an offering that was already sacrificed.,Rav Adda bar Mattana said to Rava: In a case where one’s relative died after the priests slaughtered the Paschal offering and sprinkled its blood, why should he be permitted to partake of the Paschal offering? What was, was, and although the offering was sacrificed, isn’t he still an acute mourner by rabbinic law? Ravina said to Rav Adda bar Mattana: Partaking of the Paschal offering is indispensable for the mitzva, as is seen from that which Rabba bar Rav Huna taught, as the Gemara will explain. Therefore, the Sages did not prohibit the acute mourner from partaking of the Paschal offering as they do for other offerings, for which consumption of the meat is dispensable. Rava said to Rav Adda bar Mattana: Listen to what your master, Ravina, told you, as his explanation is correct.,What is the statement of Rabba bar Rav Huna that teaches that partaking of the Paschal offering is indispensable? As it is taught in a baraita: The day that a person receives tidings that his relative died is considered as if it were the day of burial with regard to the mitzva of the seven-day mourning period, when he may not bathe or wear shoes, and with regard to the thirty-day period when he may not wear ironed garments. And with regard to partaking of the Paschal offering, the day he receives the tidings is like the day of the gathering of the bones of the deceased after the flesh decomposed (see Pesaḥim 92a). In both this and that case, he immerses and partakes of sacrificial meat in the evening.,The Gemara challenges: This baraita itself is difficult. At first you say: The day of tidings is considered as if it were the day of burial for the mitzva of the seven-day and thirty-day mourning periods; and with regard to partaking of the Paschal offering, it is like the day of the gathering of bones, when one may immerse and partake of sacrificial meat in the evening. By inference, one concludes that on the day of burial, he may not partake of the Paschal offering even in the evening, and all the more so other sacrificial meat. And then it is taught: In both this and that case, i.e., on both the day of burial and the day of the gathering of bones, he immerses and partakes of sacrificial meat in the evening.,Rav Ḥisda said: Whether it is permitted to partake of sacrificial meat the night after the day of burial is a dispute between tanna’im, as the Gemara will explain.,Rabba bar Rav Huna said: This is not difficult. Here, in the latter clause, where the baraita teaches that on both the day of burial and the day of the gathering of bones he immerses and partakes of sacrificial meat in the evening, it is referring to a case where he heard tidings of his dead relative just before sunset, and likewise a case where they gathered the bones for him just before sunset, and likewise a case where his relative died and he buried him just before sunset. But there, in the first clause, from which it is inferred that he may not consume any sacrificial meat the night after the day of burial, the burial occurred after sunset, i.e., on the night of the fifteenth of Nisan itself.,The Gemara objects: If so, why not say that even if he gathered bones after sunset, then what was, was? Why did the Sages permit him to partake of the Paschal offering, as opposed to other sacrificial meat? Rather, learn from this baraita that partaking of the Paschal offering is indispensable to fulfilling the obligation, and due to the severity of the mitzva, the Sages suspended their decree prohibiting one from partaking of it.,Rav Ashi said there is another resolution to this question: What is meant by the latter clause in the baraita: In both this and that case? It does not mean both the day of burial and the day of the gathering of bones. Rather, this is what the baraita is saying: Both on the day of tidings and on the day of the gathering of bones, the mourner immerses and partakes of sacrificial meat in the evening. But after the day of burial, he may not partake of the Paschal offering, and all the more so of other sacrificial meat, as indicated in the first clause in the baraita.,The Gemara notes: And this resolution of Rav Ashi is a mistake, since the tanna is already discussing those two cases and equating them. According to Rav Ashi’s resolution, it is extraneous to say: In both this and that case; the tanna should have simply said: In this and that case. Rather, learn from the language of the baraita that Rav Ashi’s resolution is a mistake.,The Gemara returns to discuss Rav Ḥisda’s resolution: And what is the dispute between tanna’im with regard to the night following the day of burial? As it is taught in a baraita: Until when does a person mourn acutely for his relative, such that he is prohibited to partake of sacrificial meat? The entire day. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: As long as his relative has not been buried.,The Gemara asks: What are we dealing with? If we say we are dealing with the day of death, is there a tanna who does not hold that the day of death takes hold of its following night, at least by rabbinic law? In accordance with whose opinion is the statement of the first tanna, who says that the acute mourning is only during the day, and not at night?,And furthermore, if we are dealing with the day of death, then when Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: As long as his relative has not been buried, it indicates that consequently, once he has buried him, it becomes permitted for him to partake of sacrificial meat, even on the day of death itself. But is there a tanna who does not hold that acute mourning extends for the entire day of death, even after burial? The verse states: “And I will turn your feasts into mourning, and all your songs into lamentation; and I will bring up sackcloth upon all loins, and baldness upon every head; and I will make it as the mourning for an only son, and the end thereof as a bitter day” (Amos 8:10).,Rav Sheshet said: The tanna of this baraita is discussing the day of burial when it is not the day of death. The tanna’im disagree whether the acute mourning lasts only until the burial, or until the end of the day of burial.,Rav Yosef objects to this: But there is that which is taught in a baraita: One who hears tidings of his dead relative is considered as one who gathers his relative’s bones, in that he may immerse and partake of sacrificial meat in the evening. By inference, on the day of burial he may not partake even in the evening. In accordance with whose opinion is this? This is the opinion of neither the first tanna nor Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rather, one must answer that the baraita means: Until when does a person mourn acutely for his relative? That entire day of burial and its following night. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He continues into the night only as long as his relative has not been buried; but once he is buried, the acute mourning lasts only for the rest of the day, without its night.,The Sages said this statement of Rav Yosef before Rabbi Yirmeya. Rabbi Yirmeya said in surprise: Would a great man like Rav Yosef say this? Would he say that the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is the more lenient of the two? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Until when does a person mourn acutely for his relative? As long as his relative has not been buried, even if he remains unburied from now until ten days from now. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Sages say: He mourns acutely for his relative only on that same day. The opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is more stringent than that of the Sages.,Rather, answer like this: Until when does a person mourn acutely for his relative? That entire day of burial, without its night. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The acute mourning continues as long as his relative has not been buried, even for ten days, and once he is buried, that day takes hold of its night. This is the dispute to which Rav Ḥisda referred.,The Sages said this statement before Rava. Rava said: Since Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that the day of burial, when acute mourning is by rabbinic law, takes hold of its night by rabbinic law, by inference, he must hold that the day of death, when acute mourning is by Torah law, takes hold of its night by Torah law. The Sages would not be more stringent with their ordinance than the parallel law of the Torah.,The Gemara objects: And does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi hold that acute mourning at night is by Torah law? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: On the last day of the inauguration of the Tabernacle, after two of Aaron’s sons died, Aaron said to Moses: “Behold, today…there have befallen me such things as these; and if I had consumed the sin offering today, would it have been good in the eyes of the Lord?” (Leviticus 10:19). The word “today” teaches that Aaron is saying: I am prohibited from partaking today but permitted to partake at night; but for future generations, an acute mourner is prohibited from partaking of sacrificial meat whether during the day or at night. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: For future generations, acute mourning at night is not by Torah law, but rather by rabbinic law.,The Gemara answers: Actually, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that acute mourning on the night after death is by rabbinic law, not Torah law. And the same holds for the night after the day of burial, even though the acute mourning of that day itself is by rabbinic law, because the Sages reinforced their pronouncements with greater severity than Torah law.,§ The Sages taught in a baraita: On the eighth day of the inauguration of the Tabernacle, on which two of Aaron’s sons died, Moses spoke to Aaron and his sons using three different forms of the word command: “For so I am commanded [tzuveiti]” (Leviticus 10:13), “as I commanded [tziveiti]” (Leviticus 10:18), and “as the Lord has commanded [tziva]” (Leviticus 10:15). Moses said to Aaron: “And you shall eat it…for so I am commanded,” to teach that Aaron and his remaining sons shall partake of the offerings even in acute mourning. The statement: “You should certainly have eaten it…as I commanded,” Moses said to them at the time of the incident, when Aaron and his sons burned the sin offering for the New Moon. Moses said: “As the Lord has commanded,” to emphasize that it is not of my own initiative that I say this, but it is from the word of God.,And the Sages raise a contradiction from another baraita: The sin offering was burned due to the acute mourning of Aaron and his sons, since they felt they could not partake of it. Therefore, it is stated in Aaron’s explanation: “There have befallen me such things as these; and if I had consumed the sin offering today, would it have been good in the eyes of the Lord?” (Leviticus 10:19). Moses conceded to Aaron that he was correct (see Leviticus 10:20), indicating that it was not permitted for Aaron to partake of the sin offering in acute mourning.,Shmuel said: This is not difficult. This first baraita, according to which Moses commanded Aaron and his sons to consume the sacrificial meat in acute mourning, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda; and that baraita, according to which they acted properly in refraining from eating it, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya.,This is as it is taught in a baraita: Aaron and his sons burned the sin offering due to their acute mourning. Therefore, it is stated: “As these”; this is the statement of Rabbi Neḥemya. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon say: The sin offering was burned due to ritual impurity. As, if you say that it was burned due to acute mourning, they should have burned all three of the sin offerings offered that day. Alternatively, if it was burned due to acute mourning, they would have been fit to partake of the sin offerings in the evening, and there would have been no need to burn them. Alternatively, if it was burned due to acute mourning, wasn’t Pinehas, son of Elazar the priest, with them? He was not in mourning, and he could have partaken of the sin offering.,Rava said: Both this baraita and that baraita are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, who holds that the sin offering was burned due to acute mourning. And this is not difficult. Here, the baraita according to which Moses commanded that Aaron and his sons partake of the offering as acute mourners is referring to the offerings of a particular time, i.e., the meal offering, which was unique to the inauguration ceremony. There, the baraita according to which they rightly burned the sin offering, due to acute mourning, is referring to the offerings of all future generations. That sin offering was brought for the New Moon of Nisan, and such an offering would be brought at every New Moon from that day onward. Moses conceded that such offerings should not be consumed by acute mourners.,The Gemara asks: How would Rabbi Neḥemya reconcile these apparently contradictory verses about the sin offering, and how would the Sages reconcile these verses (see Leviticus 10:17–20)?,Rabbi Neḥemya would reconcile them like this: When Moses asked: “Why have you not eaten the sin offering?” (Leviticus 10:17), this is what Moses said to Aaron: Perhaps the blood of this sin offering entered the innermost sanctum, thereby disqualifying it (see Leviticus 6:23). Is this why you burned it? Aaron said to him: “Behold, the blood of it was not brought into the Sanctuary within” (Leviticus 10:18). Moses then asked: Perhaps it went outside its partition, i.e., it exited the courtyard of the Tabernacle, and was thereby disqualified? Aaron said to him: It was inside the sacred area at all times.,Moses then suggested: But perhaps you sacrificed it in acute mourning, which is prohibited for ordinary priests, and disqualified it. Aaron said to him: Moses, was it they, i.e., my sons, who sacrificed the offering? I sacrificed the offering, and as High Priest, I may serve even as an acute mourner (see Leviticus 21:10–12). And Moses said to him: “Behold, the blood of it was not brought into the Sanctuary within,” and it was inside the sacred area at all times; therefore: “You should certainly have consumed it in the sacred area, as I commanded” (Leviticus 10:18), i.e., just as I commanded that the priests should consume today’s meal offering in acute mourning.,Aaron said to him: “Behold, today have they sacrificed their sin offering and their burnt offering before the Lord, and there have befallen me such things as these; and if I had consumed the sin offering today, would it have been good in the eyes of the Lord?” (Leviticus 10:19). Perhaps you heard the command to consume the offering only with regard to offerings of a particular time, i.e., the meal offering, which was unique to that day.,As, if you claim that it also applies to the offerings of all generations, then one can prove this is not so via an a fortiori inference from the second tithe, for which the halakha is more lenient than for sacrificial meat: Just as with regard to the second tithe, for which the halakha is more lenient, the Torah stated: “I have not eaten thereof in my mourning [ve’oni]” (Deuteronomy 26:14), teaching that an acute mourner [onen] is prohibited from partaking of it, all the more so is it not clear that with regard to the offerings of all generations, an acute mourner is prohibited from partaking of them?,Moses immediately conceded to Aaron, as the verse states: “And Moses heard, and it was good in his eyes” (Leviticus 10:20). And Moses was not embarrassed and did not attempt to justify himself by saying: I did not hear of this halakha until now. Rather, he said: I heard it, and I forgot it, as the verse indicates by stating: “Moses heard.”,The Gemara continues: And how would Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, who hold that the sin offering was burned due to ritual impurity, reconcile those verses? They would reconcile them like this: When Moses said to Aaron and his sons: “Why have you not eaten the sin offering in the place of the Sanctuary?” (Leviticus 10:17), he meant: Perhaps its blood entered the innermost sanctum, disqualifying the offering. Aaron said to him in response: “Behold, the blood of it was not brought into the Sanctuary within” (Leviticus 10:18).,Moses then asked: Perhaps it went outside its partition, i.e., the courtyard of the Tabernacle, and was thereby disqualified? Aaron said to him: It was inside the sacred area at all times. Moses then asked: But perhaps you sacrificed it in acute mourning and disqualified it? Aaron said to him: Moses, was it my sons who sacrificed the offering, that their acute mourning would disqualify the offering? I, the High Priest, sacrificed the offering, and I may serve even in acute mourning.,Moses then asked: Or perhaps, due to your bitterness in mourning, were you neglectful of the offering and it became impure? Aaron said to him: Moses, am I in your eyes such a person, that I would treat an offering consecrated to Heaven with contempt? “There have befallen me such things as these” (Leviticus 10:19), i.e., even if these tragedies and more such as them should befall me, I would not treat an offering consecrated to Heaven with contempt.,Moses said to him: If so, and if, as you say: “Behold, the blood of it was not brought into the Sanctuary within,” and it was inside the sacred area at all times, then: “You should certainly have eaten it in the sacred area, as I commanded,” i.e., as I commanded that the priests should consume the meal offering even in acute mourning.,Aaron said to him: Perhaps you heard the command to consume the offering only with regard to the night following the day of acute mourning, but during the day itself the prohibition stands. As, if you claim that it may be consumed during the day itself, I can prove that this is not so via an a fortiori inference from the second tithe, for which the halakha is more lenient than for sacrificial meat: Just as with regard to the second tithe, for which the halakha is more lenient, the Torah stated: I have not eaten thereof in my mourning, all the more so is it not clear that in the stringent case of sacrificial meat, an acute mourner is prohibited from partaking of it?,Moses immediately conceded to Aaron, as the verse states: “And Moses heard, and it was good in his eyes” (Leviticus 10:20). Moses was not embarrassed and did not attempt to justify himself by saying: I did not hear this halakha until now. Rather, he said: I heard it, and I forgot it.,The Gemara asks: According to this opinion, why was the sin offering burned? They should have delayed its consumption and consumed it that night. The Gemara answers: Ritual impurity came upon this sin offering due to circumstances beyond the priests’ control, and they were forced to burn it.,The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the Rabbis, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, this is as it is written: “And if I had consumed the sin offering today, would it have been good in the eyes of the Lord”? The verse indicates that Aaron could have eaten it at night. But according to Rabbi Neḥemya, who holds that Aaron distinguished between the offerings of that particular time and the offerings of all later generations, what did Aaron mean by the word “today”? The Gemara answers: He meant: And if I had eaten the sin offering of the New Moon, which is today’s obligation, would it have been good in the eyes of the Lord?,The Gemara asks: Granted, according to Rabbi Neḥemya, this is as it is written: “Behold, today have they sacrificed their sin offering and their burnt offering before the Lord,” i.e., they offered it as the obligation of the day. But according to the Rabbis, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, what did Aaron mean by the phrase “behold [hen], today”? The Gemara answers: This is what Aaron is saying: Did they [hen], my sons, sacrifice the offering today, which would have been prohibited to them in acute mourning? No, I sacrificed the offering, and as High Priest, I may perform the service in acute mourning.,§ The Gemara continues to analyze the baraita. The Master says: If the sin offering was burned due to acute mourning, then the priests should have burned all three of the sin offerings offered that day. The Gemara asks: What is meant by: All three of the sin offerings?,The Gemara responds: As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And Moses diligently inquired for the goat of the sin offering, and behold, it was burned” (Leviticus 10:16). When the verse states: “The goat,” this is referring to the goat of Nahshon, son of Amminadav, the prince of the tribe of Judah, who brought the offering on the first day of the Tabernacle’s inauguration (see Numbers 7:12). When the verse states: “The sin offering,” this is referring to the sin offering that the people brought on the eighth day of the inauguration (see Leviticus 9:13). The term “inquired” is referring to the goat sacrificed at every New Moon (see Numbers 28:15). The Tabernacle was erected on the New Moon of Nisan (see Exodus 40:17). These are the three goats that were sacrificed that day.,One might have thought that all three of them were burned. Therefore, the verse states: “And Moses diligently inquired for the goat of the sin offering, and, behold, it was burned,” to teach that one of the offerings was burned, but not all three of them were burned. The verse states: “And Moses diligently inquired [darosh darash].” Why were there two inquiries? Moses said to them: For what reason is this sin offering burned, and secondly, for what reason are those left unburned? The baraita comments: Still, I do not know which of them was burned. When it states with regard to the burned goat: “And He has given it to you to bear the iniquity of the congregation” (Leviticus 10:17), you must say: This is the goat of the New Moon, which atones for impurity in the Temple.,The Gemara comments: Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon say well to Rabbi Neḥemya; if the sin offering was burned due to acute mourning, then all three goats should have been burned. How would Rabbi Neḥemya respond? The Gemara explains: Rabbi Neḥemya conforms to his line of reasoning, as he says: Acute mourning does not disqualify offerings of a particular time. Therefore, they burned only the New Moon sin offering, which applies to future generations as well.,The Master says in the baraita: If the sin offering was burned due to acute mourning, why was it burned at all? He should have eaten it in the evening. The Gemara comments: Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon say well to Rabbi Neḥemya in posing this difficulty. How would he respond? The Gemara explains: He holds that acute mourning in the evening is by Torah law, and therefore the priests were not permitted to eat it even then.,Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon also stated: Alternatively, wasn’t Pinehas, son of Elazar the priest, with them? He was not an acute mourner. The Gemara comments: Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon say well to Rabbi Neḥemya. The Gemara explains: He holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. As Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Ḥanina says: Pinehas did not become a priest until he killed Zimri, who had engaged in intercourse with a Midianite woman (see Numbers 25:6–8). As it is written only after that incident concerning Pinehas: “And it shall be unto him and to his seed after him the covenant of an everlasting priesthood” (Numbers 25:13). Before that incident, at the time of the inauguration of the Tabernacle, the only priests were Aaron and his sons.,Rav Ashi said: Pinehas did not become a priest until he made peace among the tribes at the time of the conquest of Eretz Yisrael, when the tribes east of the Jordan River built their own altar and nearly provoked a civil war. Before this, Pinehas was always referred to as: Son of Elazar the priest, but during this incident he is himself referred to as a priest for the first time, as it is stated: “And Pinehas the priest, and the princes of the congregation, and the heads of the thousands of Israel that were with him, heard the words that the children of Reuben and the children of Gad and the children of Manasseh spoke, and it pleased them well” (Joshua 22:30).,The Gemara asks: And for the other Sage, Rav Ashi, as well, isn’t it written: “And it shall be unto him, and to his seed after him, the covenant of an everlasting priesthood”? Apparently, Pinehas became a priest after he killed Zimri. The Gemara responds: When that verse is written, it is with regard to the blessing that it is written, that his descendants would always be priests. It did not indicate that Pinehas became a priest immediately.,The Gemara asks: And for the other Sages as well, who hold that Pinehas became a priest immediately after he killed Zimri, isn’t it written: “And Pinehas the priest…heard”? Apparently he became a priest only after the conquest of Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara answers: That verse serves to entitle his descendants after him, that they would continue as High Priests through his merit.,§ Rav says: Moses, our teacher, was a High Priest and would receive a share of offerings consecrated to Heaven, as it is stated: “And Moses took the breast, and waved it for a wave offering before the Lord; it was Moses’ portion of the ram of inauguration, as the Lord commanded Moses” (Leviticus 8:29).,The Gemara raises an objection: In the baraita, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon claim that acute mourning was not the reason the sin offering was burned by asking: Wasn’t Pinehas with them? And if it is so that Moses could partake of sacrificial meat, let them say: Wasn’t Moses, our teacher, with them? The Gemara responds: Perhaps Moses is different, since as a prophet, he was preoccupied with the Divine Presence, and was not available. As the Master says: Moses ascended Mount Sinai early in the morning, and he descended early in the morning.,The Gemara raises an objection to Rav’s statement from another baraita: The verse states with regard to a blemished priest: “He may eat the bread of his God, both of the most sacred, and of the sacred” (Leviticus 21:22). If offerings of the most sacred order are stated, that a blemished priest may eat them, then why are offerings of lesser sanctity also stated? And if offerings of lesser sanctity are stated, why are offerings of the most sacred order stated?,The baraita answers: Had offerings of lesser sanctity not been stated, I would have said: It is only offerings of the most sacred order that a blemished priest may eat, as they were permitted both to a non-priest and to the priests, but a blemished priest may not eat offerings of lesser sanctity, which were not permitted to non-priests. And had offerings of the most sacred order not been stated, I would have said: A blemished priest may eat offerings of lesser sanctity, as they are of lesser sanctity, but he may not eat of offerings of the most sacred order, as they are of higher sanctity. Therefore, offerings of the most sacred order are stated, and therefore, offerings of lesser sanctity are stated.,The Gemara explains the objection: In any event, the baraita teaches: As they were permitted both to a non-priest and to the priests. What non-priest is permitted to eat offerings of the most sacred order? Is this not referring to Moses? This indicates that Moses was not considered a High Priest, contrary to Rav’s statement. Rav Sheshet said: No, this is referring to a non-priest sacrificing on a private altar. Once the Jewish people entered Eretz Yisrael, it was permitted for a time for them to build private altars, on which even non-priests could serve. And although only offerings of lesser sanctity were offered on private altars, this baraita is in accordance with the statement of the Sage who says: There is a meal offering that may be offered on a private altar. Meal offerings are of the most sacred order.,The Gemara raises an objection to Rav’s statement: When Miriam became a leper (see Numbers 12:10), who diagnosed and quarantined her? If you say that Moses quarantined her, that is difficult, as Moses was a non-priest, and a non-priest may not inspect the shades of leprous marks to diagnose them. And if you say that Aaron quarantined her, that is difficult, as Aaron was a relative, Miriam’s brother, and a relative may not inspect the shades of leprous marks. Rather, the Holy One, Blessed be He, bestowed a great honor on Miriam at that time, and said: I Myself am a priest, and I will quarantine her for seven days to see if the shades of leprous marks persist, and I will declare her a leper if she is impure, and I will exempt her if she is not impure.,In any event, the midrash teaches: Moses was a non-priest, and a non-priest may not inspect the shades of leprous marks, which contradicts the statement of Rav that Moses was a priest.,Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The halakhot of the examination of shades of leprous marks are different, because specifically Aaron and his sons, and not Moses, are written in the passage that discusses them: “Then he shall be brought unto Aaron the priest, or unto one of his sons the priests” (Leviticus 13:2). Therefore, there is no proof from this baraita that Moses was not a priest.,The Gemara raises an objection to Rav’s statement from a baraita: Elisheva, the daughter of Amminadav and the wife of Aaron, had five more reasons for joy than the other daughters of Israel on the day the Tabernacle was dedicated: Her brother-in-law, Moses, was a king; her husband, Aaron, was the High Priest; her son, Elazar, was the deputy High Priest; her son’s son, Pinehas, was the priest anointed for war, who would lead the army out to battle; and her brother, Nahshon, son of Amminadav, was the prince of the tribe of Judah, who brought his offering on that day, as the first of all the princes. But on that same day of joy she was in mourning for her two sons, Nadav and Avihu, who died on that day.,In any event, the baraita teaches: Her brother-in-law, Moses, was a king. From this one can infer that yes, he was a king, but he was not a High Priest, contrary to Rav’s statement. The Gemara responds: Say that the baraita means: Moses was a king as well, in addition to being a High Priest.,The Gemara comments: The question of whether Moses was a High Priest is subject to a dispute among tanna’im, as is taught in a baraita: When Moses was at the burning bush and expressed hesitation to deliver God’s message to Pharaoh, the verse states: “And the anger of the Lord burned against Moses, and He said: Is there not Aaron your brother the Levite? I know that he can speak well. And also, behold, he comes forth to meet you, and when he sees you, he will be glad in his heart” (Exodus 4:14). Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: For every burning anger that is stated in the Torah, its effect is also stated, i.e., the Torah records an action or pronouncement as a consequence of that anger, but in this case no effect of the anger is stated.,Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: Even in this case the anger’s effect is stated, as it is stated there: “Is there not Aaron your brother the Levite? I know that he can speak well.” But isn’t Aaron a priest? Why is he referred to as a Levite? This is what God is saying to Moses: I initially said that you would be the priest and he would be the Levite; now he will be the priest and you will be the Levite.,And the Rabbis say: Moses became a priest for the seven days of inauguration alone, and after that his priesthood expired. And some say: The priesthood expired only for the descendants of Moses, but Moses himself remained a priest, as it is stated: “But as for Moses the man of God, his sons are named among the tribe of Levi” (I Chronicles 23:14). This verse indicates that it was his sons who were Levites, but he himself remained a priest. And so too the verse states: “Moses and Aaron among His priests, and Samuel among them that call upon His name, did call upon the Lord, and He answered them” (Psalms 99:6).,The Gemara asks: What is meant by: And so too the verse states? Why did the tanna need to cite a second proof? The Gemara explains: And if you would say the first verse is written only for future generations, to include Moses’ descendants in the tribe of Levi but not to exclude him, then there is a second proof: And so too, the verse states: “Moses and Aaron among His priests.” The statement of Rav that Moses was a High Priest is in accordance with the opinion in this baraita.,The Gemara challenges the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa: And is it true that for every burning anger that is stated in the Torah, its effect is also stated? But isn’t it written with regard to Moses: “And he went out from Pharaoh in hot anger” (Exodus 11:8)? And Moses did not say anything to Pharaoh. Reish Lakish said: Moses slapped him and left.,The Gemara challenges: And does Reish Lakish actually say this? But isn’t it written: “Go unto Pharaoh in the morning; lo, he goes out unto the water; and you shall stand by the river’s brink to meet him, and the rod which was turned to a serpent shall you take in your hand” (Exodus 7:15); and Reish Lakish says: God meant: Pharaoh is a king, and so you should be amiable toward him, and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: God meant: Pharaoh is wicked, and so you should be insolent toward him. If according to Reish Lakish Moses was commanded to greet Pharaoh with respect, how could he say that Moses slapped Pharaoh? The Gemara answers: Reverse the names of the Sages in this dispute; it is Reish Lakish who says that Moses was commanded to be insolent.,With regard to the respect accorded to a king, Rabbi Yannai says: Fear of the kingship should always be upon you, even when the king does not deserve respect, as it is written that Moses said to Pharaoh: “And all these your servants shall come down unto me and bow down unto me, saying: Get you out, and all the people that follow you, and after that I will go out” (Exodus 11:8). He mentioned Pharaoh’s servants, but he did not say this of Pharaoh himself, even though this was the eventual outcome. Rather, he spoke to Pharaoh with the respect due to a king.,Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Derive the principle from here: “And the hand of the Lord was on Elijah, and he girded up his loins and ran before Ahab to the entrance of Jezreel” (I Kings 18:46). Elijah the prophet ran before the evil king Ahab out of respect.,The Gemara continues to discuss the roles of Moses: Ulla says: Moses requested that he be given the kingship, but it was not given to him, as it is written: “Do not draw hither” (Exodus 3:5); and the word “hither” refers to nothing other than kingship, as it is stated: “Then David the king went in and sat before the Lord, and he said: Who am I, O Lord God, and what is my house, that You have brought me hither”? (II Samuel 7:18).,Rava raises an objection from the baraita cited earlier: Rabbi Yishmael says: Elisheva’s brother-in-law, Moses, was a king. This teaches that Moses was in fact granted kingship. Rava said: Ulla is saying that Moses did not receive kingship for himself and for his descendants, i.e., it was not bequeathed to his sons.,The Gemara counters: And is it so that anywhere that it is written “hither” the verse is referring to kingship for future generations as well? But isn’t it written about the kingship of Saul: “They asked of the Lord further: Is there yet a man who comes hither” (I Samuel 10:22), and Saul was indeed a king, but his descendants were not.,The Gemara responds: If you wish, say: There was Ish-Bosheth, Saul’s son, who was a king (see II Samuel 2:10), indicating that Saul’s kingship did pass to his son. And if you wish, say instead: Saul is different, because the kingship did not stand even for himself, and this is why it did not pass on to his descendants.,The second response is in accordance with that which Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Ḥanina says: When greatness is apportioned to a person in Heaven, it is apportioned to him and to his descendants until the end of all generations, as it is stated: “He withdraws not His eyes from the righteous; but with kings upon the throne He sets them forever, and they are exalted” (Job 36:7). But if he then became arrogant, the Holy One, Blessed be He, humiliates him, as is stated in the next verse: “And if they be bound in fetters, and be held in cords of affliction” (Job 36:8). This was the case with Saul.,§ The mishna teaches: Blemished priests, whether they are temporarily blemished or permanently blemished, receive a share and partake of offerings, but do not sacrifice them. The Gemara explains: From where are these matters derived? As the Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the meal offering: “Every male among the sons of Aaron shall eat it” (Leviticus 6:11). The phrase “every male” serves to include blemished priests.,The Gemara clarifies: For what matter is this derivation necessary? If one suggests it is for the matter of consumption, it is already stated explicitly: “Any man of the seed of Aaron the priest who has a blemish…He may eat the bread of his God, of the most sacred, and of the sacred” (Leviticus 21:21–22). Rather, Leviticus 6:11 is necessary for the matter of receiving a share, teaching that blemished priests may do so along with the other priests. This is the source for the mishna’s statement.,It is taught in another baraita: The verse states with regard to the sin offering: “Every male among the priests may eat thereof” (Leviticus 6:22). The phrase “every male” serves to include blemished priests. The Gemara explains: For what matter is this derivation necessary? If one suggests it is for the matter of consumption, isn’t that already stated in Leviticus, chapter 21? If one suggests it is for the matter of receiving a share, isn’t that already stated in verse 6:11? Rather, the verse is necessary because one might have thought that I have derived only the halakha with regard to a priest who was at first unblemished and later became blemished. From where is it derived that one blemished from birth also receives a share? The verse states here: “Every male.”,It is taught in another baraita: The verse states with regard to the guilt offering: “Every male among the priests may eat thereof” (Leviticus 7:6). The phrase “every male” serves to include a blemished priest. The Gemara explains: For what matter is this derivation necessary? If one suggests it is for the matter of eating, isn’t that already stated? And if one suggests it is for the matter of receiving a share, isn’t that already stated? And if one suggests it is for a priest blemished from birth, isn’t that already stated? Rather, the verse is necessary because one might have thought that I have derived only the halakha with regard to a permanently blemished priest. From where is it derived that a temporarily blemished priest also receives a share? The verse states here: “Every male.”,The Gemara objects: Isn’t it the opposite [kelapei layya]? Wouldn’t I have thought that a priest with a permanent blemish would be treated more stringently than one with a temporary blemish? Rav Sheshet said: Reverse the wording as follows: One might have thought that I have derived only the halakha with regard to a priest with a temporary blemish; from where is it derived that one with a permanent blemish also receives a share?,Rav Ashi said: Actually, do not reverse the wording, and this is not difficult. It was necessary to teach that even a priest with a temporary blemish receives a share, because it might enter your mind to say that the halakha of this priest is like that of a ritually impure priest: Just as an impure priest may not partake as long as he is not pure, so too, this priest with a temporary blemish may not partake as long as he does not become fit. The verse therefore teaches us that he may receive a share even before his blemish heals.,§ The mishna teaches: The principle is: Any priest who is unfit for the service that day does not receive a share of the sacrificial meat. The Gemara objects: But doesn’t he? Isn’t there a blemished priest, who is not fit for the service and who nevertheless receives a share of the meat, as the mishna itself teaches? And furthermore, this principle indicates that only priests unfit for the service do not receive a share, but any priest who is fit for the service does receive a share. But isn’t there an impure priest, who, with regard to offerings of the community, is fit for the service, and who nevertheless does not receive a share?,The Gemara answers: The mishna is saying that any priest who is not fit for partaking of sacrificial meat does not receive a share. Blemished priests may partake of sacrificial meat, and impure priests may not.,The Gemara objects: This indicates that any priest who is fit to partake may receive a share. But isn’t there a minor, who is fit for partaking and who does not receive a share? The Gemara answers: This inverse principle, that any priest who is fit to partake may receive a share, is not taught. The mishna means to teach only that any priest who is unfit does not receive a share.,The Gemara notes: Now that you have arrived at this conclusion, that the mishna’s statement only teaches what it says explicitly, one can say that the mishna actually means what the Gemara said at the outset, that no priest unfit for the service receives a share. If one raises an objection with regard to an impure priest, who is fit for the service of communal offerings but does not receive a share, answer that the mishna does not teach that every fit priest, even an impure one, receives a share, only the inverse. And if you raise an objection with regard to a blemished priest, who is unfit for the service but nevertheless receives a share, answer that the Merciful One included him as an exception by the phrase: Every male, as derived above (102a).,§ The mishna teaches: Even if the priest was ritually impure only at the time of the sprinkling of the blood of the offering, and he was pure at the time of the burning of the fats, he still does not receive a share of the meat. The Gemara notes: Consequently, one can infer that a priest who was pure at the time of the sprinkling of the blood, even one who was impure at the time of the burning of the fats, does receive a share.,The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul, as it is taught in a baraita: Abba Shaul says: A priest never partakes, i.e., receives a share, of sacrificial meat, unless he is pure from the time of sprinkling until the time of the burning of the fats, as the verse states: “He among the sons of Aaron who sacrifices the blood of the peace offerings and the fat shall have the right thigh for a portion” (Leviticus 7:33). The verse requires that the priest be pure even at the time of the burning of the fats.,Rav Ashi raises a dilemma: According to the opinion of Abba Shaul, in a case where the priest became impure between the sprinkling of the blood and the burning of the fats but became pure again before the latter, what is the halakha? Do we require only that he be pure both at the time of sprinkling and at the time of the burning of the fats, and there is purity at these times? Or perhaps Abba Shaul meant that the priest may not receive a share in the meat unless he is pure from the time of sprinkling until the time of the burning of the fats, without interruption. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.,§ The mishna teaches that an impure priest who immersed that day, such that he will not be pure until sunset, and likewise an acute mourner and one who has not yet brought an atonement offering, do not receive a share of sacrificial meat in order to partake of it in the evening. Rava says: I learned this halakha from Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who said in the bathroom: You can contend by way of a story: A priest who immersed that day came and said to a pure priest of the same patrilineal priestly family serving in the Temple that day, who was apportioning the sacrificial food: Give me a share of a meal offering, and I will partake of it in the evening.,The pure priest said an a fortiori inference to him: Just as with regard to a matter where your right is superior, i.e., in the case of your own sin offering, to which you have a right even when your family is not serving in the Temple, I can nevertheless deny you a share of the sin offering of an Israelite because you immersed today; is it not logical that with regard to a matter where your right is inferior, i.e., in the case of your own meal offering, as the meal offering of a priest is not eaten at all, that I can deny you a share of the meal offering of an Israelite?,The priest who immersed that day responded: But even if you can deny me a share of the sin offering of an Israelite on the day I immersed, perhaps this is since just as my right is superior in the case of my own sin offering, so too, your right is superior in the case of your own sin offering. If so, is it necessarily so that you can refuse me a share of the meal offering of an Israelite, where just as my right is inferior, so your right is inferior, as neither of us may eat from our own meal offerings?,The pure priest responded: The verse states: “And every meal offering that is baked in the oven, and all that is dressed in the stewing pan, and on the griddle, shall be the priest’s that offers it” (Leviticus 7:9). If you wish to receive a share of a meal offering, come sacrifice and partake of one. Since you cannot sacrifice a meal offering, having immersed only today, neither can you receive a share.,The priest who immersed that day made another demand: Give me a share of the sin offering of an Israelite, and I will partake of it in the evening when I am pure.,The pure priest said to him: Just as with regard to a matter where my right is inferior, i.e., in the case of my own meal offering, which is not eaten, I can deny you a share of the meal offering of an Israelite, as I explained; so too, is it not logical that with regard to a matter where my right is superior, i.e., in the case of my own sin offering, to which I have a right even when my family is not serving in the Temple, I can deny you a share of the sin offering of an Israelite?,The priest who immersed that day said to him: But if you can deny me a share of the meal offering of an Israelite, where just as your right is inferior, so too my right is inferior, is it necessarily so that you can deny me a share of the sin offering of an Israelite, where just as your right is superior in the case of your own sin offering, so too my right is superior in the case of my own sin offering?,The pure priest responded: The verse states with regard to the sin offering: “The priest who effects atonement shall eat it” (Leviticus 6:19). If you wish to receive a share of a sin offering, come effect atonement and partake of one. Since you cannot perform the service of a sin offering, having immersed only today, you cannot receive a share in its meat either.,The priest who immersed that day made another demand, and said to him: Give me a share of the breast and thigh, the portions that priests receive of peace offerings, and I will partake of it in the evening when I am pure.,The pure priest said to him: Just as with regard to a matter where your right is superior, i.e., in the case of your own sin offering, to which you have a right to its meat in its entirety, I can deny you a share of the sin offering of an Israelite, as I explained, so too is it not logical that with regard to a matter where your right is inferior, i.e., in the case of a peace offering, of which you have only the right to a share of the breast and thigh, I can deny you a share?,The priest who immersed that day responded: But if you can deny me a share of a sin offering, where my right is inferior with regard to my wives and my slaves, as a sin offering can be consumed only by male priests, is it necessarily so that you can deny me a share of the breast and thigh of a peace offering, where my right is superior with regard to my wives and my slaves, who may also partake of them?,The pure priest responded: The verse states with regard to the peace offering: “It shall be the priest’s that sprinkles the blood of the peace offerings against the altar” (Leviticus 7:14). If you wish to partake of a peace offering, come sprinkle its blood and partake of it. Since you cannot perform this service, having immersed only today, you cannot receive a share of its meat either.,The story concludes: The priest who immersed that day left in disappointment, with his a fortiori inferences upon his head, as they did not help him. And along with him walked an acute mourner on his right and a priest who had not yet brought an atonement offering on his left. They too were denied shares, because they were unfit for the Temple service.,Rav Aḥai refutes this: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, could have added to the contentions described in the story. Let the priest who immersed that day say to the pure priest: Give me a share of a firstborn offering, and I will partake of it in the evening.,Perhaps it is because the pure priest could say to him: Just as with regard to a sin offering, where my right is inferior with regard to my wives and my slaves, since it may be eaten only by male priests, I can nevertheless deny you a share of the sin offering of an Israelite, as I explained; so too is it not logical that with regard to a first-born, where my right is superior because all of its meat is mine, as firstborn offerings are given to a specific priest, I can deny you a share of it?,But the priest who immersed that day could respond: But if you can deny me a share of a sin offering, where just as your right is inferior, so is my right inferior; is it necessarily so that you can deny me a share of a firstborn offering, where just as your right is superior, so my right is superior?,The pure priest could respond: The verse says with regard to a firstborn offering: “You shall sprinkle their blood on the altar and shall make their fat smoke for an offering made by fire, for a pleasing aroma to the Lord. And the flesh of them shall be yours, as the breast and as the thigh, it shall be yours” (Numbers 18:17–18). If you wish to receive a share in the meat of a firstborn, come sprinkle its blood and partake of it. Why did Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, not include this exchange as another stage in his story?,The Gemara responds: But the other priest, the one who immersed that day, could refute this proof: Is it written: And the flesh of them shall be for the priest who sprinkles, as is written with regard to a meal offering, a sin offering, and a peace offering? Rather, it is written: “And the flesh of them shall be yours,” indicating that it can be given even to a priest other than the one who sacrificed it. This is why Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, did not include this exchange in his story.,The Gemara returns to Rava’s statement that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, taught this halakha in the bathroom. And how did Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, do this? But doesn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is permitted to contemplate matters of Torah in all places except the bathhouse and the bathroom? The Gemara answers: A case where the matter was involuntary is different. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, was so preoccupied by the issue that he taught it even though he was in the bathroom. MISHNA: In the case of any burnt offering for which the altar did not acquire its flesh, e.g., if it was disqualified prior to the sprinkling of its blood, the priests did not acquire its hide, as it is stated with regard to the burnt offering: “And the priest that sacrifices a man’s burnt offering, the priest shall have to himself the hide of the burnt offering that he has sacrificed” (Leviticus 7:8), indicating that the priest acquires only the hide of a burnt offering that satisfied the obligation of a man.,Nevertheless, in a case of a burnt offering that was slaughtered not for its sake but for the sake of another offering, although it did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, its hide goes to the priests. In addition, although the verse states: “A man’s burnt offering,” in the case of both the burnt offering of a man and the burnt offering of a woman, their hides go to the priests.,The hides of offerings of lesser sanctity belong to the owners; the hides of offerings of the most sacred order belong to the priests. The right of priests to hides of offerings of the most sacred order is derived via an a fortiori inference: If for a burnt offering, for which the priests do not acquire its flesh, as it is burned in its entirety, they acquire its hide, then for other offerings of the most sacred order, for which the priests acquire its flesh, is it not right that they should acquire its hide? And there is no room to contend that the altar will prove that this is not a valid inference, as it acquires the flesh of a burnt offering but not its hide, since it does not have the right to the hide of an offering in any place.,GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: The phrase “a man’s burnt offering” in the verse mentioned above serves to exclude the burnt offering of consecrated property, meaning that the priests do not acquire the hides of such offerings. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: The phrase serves to exclude the burnt offering of converts.,The Gemara clarifies: What does Rabbi Yehuda mean when he says that the phrase serves to exclude the burnt offering of consecrated property? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef says: He means it serves to exclude a burnt offering that comes from property that was left over. For example, if an animal consecrated as a guilt offering remains alive after its owner has achieved atonement by sacrificing another animal, the owner must wait until it acquires a blemish and then sell it. The proceeds are used to purchase a communal gift offering, which is sacrificed when there are no other offerings to be burned on the altar (see Temura 20b). Because it is a communal offering, it is not considered a man’s burnt offering, and the priests therefore have no right to the hide.,The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says: Leftover consecrated property goes toward communal gift offerings. But according to the one who says: Leftover consecrated property goes toward an individual’s gift offering, what can be said? As this is a man’s burnt offering, the priests should have a right to the hides.,The Gemara answers: According to that opinion, the halakha is as Rava says: The verse states: “And the priest shall kindle wood on it every morning; and he shall lay the burnt offering in order upon it” (Leviticus 6:5). The verse states: “The burnt offering,” with the definite article, to teach that the daily burnt offering is the first burnt offering sacrificed each day in the Temple. Here too, the verse states: “The priest shall have to himself the hide of the burnt offering which he has offered,” to teach that the priest acquires the hide of a first burnt offering, i.e., an animal that was initially designated as a burnt offering, but not of a burnt offering purchased from proceeds left over from another offering.,Rabbi Aivu says that Rabbi Yannai says: Rabbi Yehuda’s statement can be interpreted differently. The phrase “a man’s burnt offering” serves to exclude a case of one who consecrates a burnt offering for Temple maintenance. Since the owner seeks to shift its ownership to the Temple, the priests have no right to its hides.,The Gemara comments: It is not necessary to teach this halakha according to the one who says that consecration for Temple maintenance applies by Torah law to offerings already consecrated to the altar, as the animal in fact ceases to belong to the individual, and the priests clearly have no claim to its hide. Rather, even according to the one who says that it does not apply by Torah law, because the offering is already consecrated for the altar, this matter applies only to the meat; but as for the hide, the consecration for Temple maintenance applies and nullifies the priests’ claim to it.,The Gemara returns to the explanation of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef and comments: And so says Rav Naḥman that Rabba bar Avuh says: The phrase “a man’s burnt offering” serves to exclude a burnt offering that comes from property that was left over.,Rav Hamnuna said to Rav Naḥman: In accordance with whose statement is your opinion? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. But didn’t Rabbi Yehuda retract this statement? As it is taught in a baraita: The mishna in tractate Shekalim (6:5) states that the Temple had six collection boxes shaped like horns, for communal gift offerings. These funds would go toward burnt offerings that come from money that was left over. For example, if someone dedicated money to purchasing an offering, and after his purchase some of the sum remained, he would put it in these boxes. The halakha is that the priests have no right to the hide of such an offering. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.,Rabbi Neḥemya said to Rabbi Yehuda, and some say that Rabbi Shimon said to him: If so, you have nullified the interpretation of Jehoiada the priest. As it is taught in a mishna (Shekalim 6:6) that Jehoiada the priest taught this interpretation: The verse states: “It is a guilt offering; he is certainly guilty before the Lord” (Leviticus 5:19). The phrase “before the Lord” teaches that if any money comes on account of a sin offering or on account of a guilt offering, i.e., it is left over after their purchase, burnt offerings must be purchased with it, and their flesh must be burned on the altar to the Lord. But its hide shall go to the priests. Rabbi Yehuda did not respond, indicating that he conceded that the hides of such offerings go to the priests.,Rav Naḥman said to Rav Hamnuna: But how does the Master interpret the phrase: “A man’s burnt offering,” as meaning? Rav Hamnuna said to him: I interpret it as referring to one who consecrates all his property, including animals fit for burnt offerings. If these animals are later sacrificed as burnt offerings, the priests do not acquire the hides, since the offerings are consecrated property.,And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, as we learned in a mishna (Shekalim 4:7): If one consecrates his property without specifying the purpose, generally speaking, it goes toward Temple maintenance. But if among it were animals fit to be sacrificed on the altar, either male or female, then Rabbi Eliezer says: Animals that are fit for offerings must be sacrificed. Therefore, the male animals shall be sold for the purpose of burnt offerings to those who need to bring such offerings, and the female animals, which cannot be brought as burnt offerings, shall be sold for the purpose of peace offerings to those who need to bring such offerings. And because they were consecrated for Temple maintenance, their proceeds shall be allocated with the rest of the person’s property for Temple maintenance.,Rabbi Yehoshua says: The donor intended that all animals fit for sacrifice be brought as burnt offerings, and the rest of his property be given for Temple maintenance. Therefore, the males shall be sacrificed themselves as burnt offerings; and the females shall be sold for the purpose of being sacrificed as peace offerings, and he shall bring burnt offerings with their proceeds; and the rest of his property shall be allocated for Temple maintenance.,Rav Hamnuna explains: And even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who says that a person divides his consecrated property, as he rules that the animals are themselves sacrificed while the other property is given for Temple maintenance, this statement applies specifically to the flesh, which is fit to be burned on the altar; but as for the hide, which is not, the fund for Temple maintenance acquires it from the outset, and the priests therefore have no right to it. This is the halakha that Rabbi Yehuda derives from the phrase “a man’s burnt offering.”,The baraita states: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: The phrase “a man’s burnt offering” serves to exclude the burnt offering of converts. The priests do not acquire the hides of such offerings. Rav Simai bar Ḥilkai said to Ravina: Is that to say that a convert is not included in the category of a man? Ravina said to him: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, meant that the verse serves to exclude the burnt offering of a convert who died and has no heirs. The offering has no owner, and therefore the priests do not acquire its hide.,§ The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And the priest that offers a man’s burnt offering, the priest shall have to himself the hide of the burnt offering that he has sacrificed” (Leviticus 7:8). From this verse I have derived the halakha only with regard to a man’s burnt offering, i.e., that of a born-Jewish male. From where is the same derived with regard to the burnt offering of converts, women, or Canaanite slaves? The verse states: “The hide of the burnt offering,” and it thereby included these as well.,And if so, why must the verse state: “A man’s burnt offering”? It serves to teach that the priests acquire the hide only of a burnt offering that satisfied the obligation of a man, i.e., to exclude a burnt offering that was slaughtered with the intention of consuming it beyond its designated time or outside its designated area and was thereby disqualified. The verse teaches that the priests have no right to the hide of such an offering.,One might have thought that I include a burnt offering that was not slaughtered for its own sake but for the sake of another offering. Since it does not satisfy the obligation of the owner, I might have thought that the priests have no right to its hide. Therefore, the verse states: “The hide of the burnt offering,” to teach that in any case where the offering is not disqualified, the priests acquire its hide, even if it did not satisfy the owner’s obligation.,And from the phrase “the hide of the burnt offering” I have derived only that the priests acquire the hide of the burnt offering. From where do I derive that they acquire the hides of all offerings of the most sacred order? The verse states: “The hide of the burnt offering which he has offered,” which serves to include any offering that the priests sacrifice. If so, one might have thought that I include even offerings of lesser sanctity. Therefore, the verse states: “Burnt offering,” and not simply: Offering, to teach that just as a burnt offering is an offering of the most sacred order, so too the priests acquire the hides only of all offerings of the most sacred order; they do not acquire the hides of offerings of lesser sanctity.,The baraita continues: Rabbi Yishmael says there is a different derivation. From the phrase “the hide of the burnt offering,” I have derived only that the priests acquire the hide of the burnt offering. From where is it derived that they acquire the hides of all offerings of the most sacred order? It is based on a logical inference: Just as in the case of a burnt offering, for which the priests do not acquire its meat, the priests nevertheless acquire its hide, then in the case of offerings of the most sacred order, for which the priests do acquire its meat, is it not logical that they acquire their hides?,One may counter: Let the altar prove that this is not a valid a fortiori inference, as it acquires the meat, and still it does not acquire the hide. One may respond: What is notable about the altar? It is notable in that it does not acquire hides in any instance. Will you say the halakha concerning the altar should teach the halakha concerning the priests, who acquire hides of some of the offerings, as the Torah explicitly grants them the hides of burnt offerings? Rather say: Since the priests acquire hides of some of the offerings, they acquire the hides of all offerings of the most sacred order.,Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: There is no need to derive that hides of offerings of the most sacred order go to the priests. We need the verse itself only to teach that this is the halakha with regard to the hide of the burnt offering. As the Torah does not generally require that an offering be flayed, in all other cases the hide of the offering follows the flesh of the offering.,For example, bulls that are burned and goats that are burned must be burned themselves, and their hides burned with them, as the Torah states explicitly (see Leviticus 4:11–12). A sin offering, and a guilt offering, and a communal peace offering are given as a gift to the priest (see Leviticus 7:7); if the priests want, they may flay them and use the hides, and if they do not want to use the hides, they may eat the offerings together with their hides. Offerings of lesser sanctity are given to the owners; if they want, they may flay them and use the hides, and if they want, they may eat the offerings together with their hides.,But with regard to a burnt offering it is stated: “And he shall flay the burnt offering, and cut it into its pieces” (Leviticus 1:6). One might have thought that, because all the flesh of the burnt offering is burned on the altar, the priests have no right to its hide. Therefore, the verse states: “The priest shall have to himself the hide of the burnt offering that he has sacrificed” (Leviticus 7:8).,The phrase “the priest shall have to himself” serves to exclude a priest who immersed that day and a priest who has not yet brought an atonement offering, and an acute mourner, i.e., meaning that they do not receive a share of the hides, just as they do not receive a share of the meat. As one might have thought that although these priests will not acquire the meat, this is because it is for consumption, and they are not permitted to partake of it; but they will acquire the hide, because it is not for consumption. Therefore, the verse states: “Shall have to himself,” to exclude a priest who has not yet brought an atonement offering, and a priest who immersed that day, and an acute mourner.,The Gemara asks: But let the first tanna also derive the halakha logically, as Rabbi Yishmael did. Why did he cite a verse? The Gemara answers: Often when there is a matter that can be derived through an a fortiori inference, the verse nevertheless takes the trouble and writes it explicitly.,And as for Rabbi Yishmael, what does he do with this phrase: “The hide of the burnt offering that he has sacrificed,” from which the first tanna derives the halakha? He holds that it serves to exclude a priest who immersed that day, and a priest who has not yet brought an atonement offering, and an acute mourner, who do not receive a share in the hides.,The Gemara challenges: But let Rabbi Yishmael derive this halakha from the phrase: “Shall have to himself,” as does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yishmael conforms to his line of reasoning, that the phrase teaches a different halakha. As Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: It is stated: “Shall have to himself” (Leviticus 7:8), with regard to a burnt offering, and it is stated: “The priest that makes atonement, he shall have to himself” (Leviticus 7:7), with regard to a guilt offering. The following verbal analogy is derived from here: Just as there, after the blood of a guilt offering is presented, its bones become permitted to the priest for any use, since only the portions intended for consumption on the altar are sacrificed whereas the rest of the animal is given to the priests, so too here, with regard to a burnt offering, its bones that are not attached to the flesh and are therefore not intended for the altar are permitted.,With regard to this verbal analogy the Gemara comments: It must be that those terms are free, i.e., superfluous in their context and therefore available for the purpose of establishing a verbal analogy. As, if they are not free, the verbal analogy can be refuted as follows: What is notable about a guilt offering? It is notable in that its meat is permitted to the priests, unlike the flesh of a burnt offering, which is burned upon the altar, and perhaps this is why the bones of a guilt offering are also permitted. Since the phrase: “Shall have it to himself,” is a superfluous term in each verse, the analogy stands, because a verbal analogy based on free terms cannot be refuted logically.,MISHNA: If any offerings of the most sacred order were disqualified prior to their flaying, their hides do not go to the priests; rather, they are burned together with the flesh in the place of burning. If they were disqualified after their flaying, their hides go to the priests. Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, said: In all my days, I never saw a hide going out to the place of burning.,Rabbi Akiva said: From the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, we learned that in a case where one flays the firstborn offering, and the animal is later discovered to have a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months [tereifa], the halakha is that the priests may derive benefit [sheye’otu] from its hide. And the Rabbis say: The claim: We did not see, is no proof; rather, if after flaying it is discovered that the animal was unfit before it was flayed, the hide goes out to the place of burning.,GEMARA: The previous mishna (103a) teaches: In the case of any burnt offering for which the altar did not acquire its flesh, e.g., if it was disqualified prior to the sprinkling of its blood, the priests did not acquire its hide. The mishna does not state any qualification, indicating that this is the halakha even if the priest flayed the hide before the sprinkling of the blood on the altar. The Gemara posits: Whose opinion is this? It is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who says: The blood does not effect acceptance of the hide by itself; i.e., it effects acceptance of the hide only together with the flesh. Since the flesh is disqualified and the sprinkling does not effect its acceptance, the sprinkling does not effect acceptance for the hide either.,The Gemara challenges: Say the latter clause, i.e., the mishna here: If any offerings of the most sacred order were disqualified prior to their flaying, their hides do not go to the priests. If they were disqualified after their flaying, their hides go to the priests. This indicates that once the hides are flayed, they go to the priests even if the flesh was disqualified before the sprinkling of the blood. If so, we arrive at the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who says: The blood effects acceptance of the hide, i.e., renders the hide permitted to the priests, by itself. Can it be that the former clause of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, and the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi?,Abaye said: Since the latter clause is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, it must be that the former clause is also the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And although Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that in principle the priests should acquire the hides if they are removed before the flesh is disqualified, in any case Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi concedes that the flaying is not done before the sprinkling. Since the offering cannot be disqualified before the hide is removed, practically speaking, the priests will never acquire the hides unless the altar acquires the flesh, as taught in the former clause.,Rava said: On the contrary, since the former clause is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, it must be that the latter clause is also the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon. When the mishna states that the priests acquire the hides if the flesh was disqualified after the flaying, it must mean that the flesh was disqualified after the sprinkling. Therefore, what does the mishna mean by the phrase: Before flaying, and what does it mean by the phrase: After flaying? It means before the moment the offerings became fit for flaying, and after the moment they became fit for flaying, i.e., before and after the sprinkling of the blood.,The Gemara clarifies: What is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and what is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon? Their opinions are as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The blood effects acceptance of the hide by itself, after it has been flayed, even if the flesh is disqualified. And if, when the hide is still with the flesh, a disqualification appears on the flesh, whether before the sprinkling of the blood or after the sprinkling of the blood, then the halakha with regard to the hide is parallel to the halakha with regard to the flesh: Both are burned.,Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: The blood does not effect acceptance of the hide by itself. And if, when the hide is still with the flesh, a disqualification appears on the flesh before the sprinkling of the blood, then the halakha with regard to the hide is parallel to the halakha with regard to the flesh: Both are burned. If a disqualification develops on the flesh after the sprinkling of the blood, the flesh was already accepted for a time. Therefore, even though the flesh is disqualified, the priest may flay the animal before it is burned, and its hide goes to the priests.,The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Elazar disagree about the same principle as do Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua? As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And you shall offer your burnt offerings, the flesh and the blood, upon the altar of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:27). Rabbi Yehoshua says: The verse teaches that if there is no blood sprinkled on the altar, no flesh may be burned on the altar, and if there is no flesh to be burned on the altar, no blood may be sprinkled on the altar.,Rabbi Eliezer says: The blood must be sprinkled even if there is no flesh, as it is stated in the continuation of the verse: “And the blood of your sacrifices shall be poured out against the altar of the Lord your God, and you shall eat the flesh.” If so, what is taught when the verse states: “And you shall offer your burnt offerings, the flesh and the blood”? It is stated to tell you: Just as blood is placed on the altar by sprinkling, so too, the flesh is placed on the altar by tossing. Consequently, you learn that there is a space between the ramp and the altar, such that the priest must toss the flesh from the edge of the ramp.,The Gemara explains: Shall we say that the one who says that the hide is accepted independent of the flesh holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, that the blood is sprinkled independent of the flesh, and the one who says that the hide is not accepted independent of the flesh holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, that if there is no flesh then the blood is not sprinkled?,The Gemara rejects this: According to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that the blood may be sprinkled even if the flesh is disqualified, everyone agrees that this sprinkling effects acceptance of the hide. When they disagree, it is according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua.,The one who says that the hide is not accepted independently, i.e., Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds in accordance with the straightforward meaning of the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua; once the flesh is disqualified, the blood cannot be sprinkled and does not effect acceptance of the hide. The one who says that the hide is accepted, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, could say to you: Rabbi Yehoshua says only there that the blood may not be sprinkled in a case where nothing but the flesh was at stake, where there is no loss for the priests, who never receive meat from burnt offerings. But in cases where the hide would go to waste, where there is a loss for the priests, perhaps even Rabbi Yehoshua concedes that the blood effects acceptance.,This latter interpretation of Rabbi Yehoshua’s opinion with regard to the hides is just as it is with regard to disqualified flesh after the fact. As we learned in a baraita: If the flesh contracted ritual impurity or was disqualified, or if it emerged beyond the curtains delineating its designated area, Rabbi Eliezer says: The priest must nevertheless sprinkle the blood on the altar. Rabbi Yehoshua says: The priest may not sprinkle the blood on the altar. And Rabbi Yehoshua concedes that if the priest nevertheless sprinkled the blood, the offering is accepted after the fact. Apparently, the sprinkling is sufficiently valid to effect acceptance of the hide.,§ The mishna teaches: Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, said: In all my days, I never saw a hide going out to the place of burning. The Gemara challenges: And is it so that he did not see? Aren’t there bulls that are burned and goats that are burned together with their hides as a matter of course?,The Gemara answers: We are not saying that Rabbi Ḥanina never saw hides go out to be burned in accordance with their mitzva; he certainly did. Rather, he never saw hides being burned because the offering was disqualified.,The Gemara challenges: But isn’t there a case where an offering is disqualified before flaying and before the sprinkling of the blood, in which case all agree that the animal is burned with its hide? The Gemara answers: We are saying that Rabbi Ḥanina never saw a hide go out stripped from its flesh.,The Gemara challenges: But isn’t there a case where an offering is disqualified after the flaying of the hide and before the sprinkling of the blood, in which case the hide is burned according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who says: The blood does not effect acceptance of the hide by itself?,The Gemara answers: Rabbi Ḥanina holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, that the blood does effect acceptance of the hide in such a case, and so it would not be burned. And if you wish, say instead that you can even interpret the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi concedes that the flaying is not done before the sprinkling, and so in practice Rabbi Ḥanina never saw a hide that was flayed before the offering was disqualified.,The Gemara challenges: But isn’t there the case of an animal that, after the hide was flayed and the blood was sprinkled, was found to have a wound in its intestines rendering it a tereifa, in which case the offering was already disqualified when the blood was sprinkled?,The Gemara answers: Rabbi Ḥanina holds that in the case of an animal that was found to be a tereifa due to a wound in its intestines, the sprinkling of the blood nevertheless effects acceptance, because the wound was unknown at the time of the sprinkling. The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: Rabbi Akiva said: From the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, we learned that in a case where one flays the firstborn offering, and the animal is later discovered to be a tereifa, the halakha is that the priests may derive benefit from its hide. This indicates that the sprinkling of the blood effects acceptance if the wound was unknown. The Gemara affirms: Indeed, learn from the mishna that this is so.,The Gemara challenges: But if this is what Rabbi Ḥanina meant, then what is Rabbi Akiva teaching us? His statement seems unnecessary. The Gemara answers: This is what Rabbi Akiva is teaching us: This halakha applies not just in the Temple but even in the outlying areas, e.g., with regard to a blemished firstborn animal, which is slaughtered outside the Temple. If it is discovered to be a tereifa before its slaughter, it must be buried with its hide, but if it is slaughtered and later discovered to be a tereifa, then its slaughter renders the hide permitted to the priests, just as the sprinkling of the blood renders the hide permitted in the Temple.,Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara adds: And even Rabbi Akiva said this halakha only in a case where an expert verified the firstborn animal’s blemish and permitted it to be slaughtered. But if an expert did not permit it, then its slaughter does not render the hide permitted to the priest.,The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis, not Rabbi Akiva. Therefore, the flesh is discarded by burial and the hide by burning.,MISHNA: With regard to bulls that are burned, i.e., the bull of Yom Kippur, the bull of the anointed priest, and the bull brought for an unwitting communal sin, which are burned after their blood is sprinkled and their sacrificial portions burned on the altar, and goats that are burned, i.e., the goat of Yom Kippur and the goat brought for the unwitting communal transgression of the prohibition against idol worship, when they are burned in accordance with their mitzva, they are burned in the place of the ashes (see Leviticus 4:12) outside of Jerusalem, and they render the garments of the priests who tend to their burning impure (see Leviticus 4:25). And if these offerings are not burned in accordance with their mitzva because they were disqualified, and offerings that are disqualified are also burned, they are burned in the place of burning in the bira, and they do not render the garments of the priests who tend to their burning impure. The priests would carry the bulls and the goats that are burned suspended on poles. When the first priests, carrying the front of the pole, emerged outside the wall of the Temple courtyard and the latter priests did not yet emerge, the first priests render their garments impure, and the latter priests do not render their garments impure until they emerge. When both these and those priests emerged, they render their garments impure. Rabbi Shimon says: They do not render their garments impure, as this halakha applies only to those who burn the offerings. And even then their garments do not become ritually impure until the fire is ignited in the majority of the offerings. Once the flesh is completely scorched, with no moisture remaining, one who then burns the remains does not render his garments impure.,GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if offerings of a type that are burned were disqualified, they are burned in a place of burning called the bira. The Gemara asks: What is the bira? Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: There is a place on the Temple Mount, and its name is bira, and this is where they would burn these offerings. And Reish Lakish says: The entire Temple is called the bira, as it is stated in the prayer of David: “And give unto Solomon my son a whole heart, to keep Your commandments, Your testimonies, and Your statutes, and to do all this, and to build the Temple [bira] for which I have made provision” (I Chronicles 29:19).,§ Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: There are three places of the ashes. First was the great place of the ashes that was in the Temple courtyard, where the priests would burn the disqualified offerings of the most sacred order, and the disqualified sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity, and bulls that are burned and goats that are burned if they were disqualified prior to the sprinkling of the blood.,And there was another place of the ashes on the Temple Mount, where the priests would burn bulls that are burned and goats that are burned if they were disqualified after the sprinkling of the blood. And the third place of the ashes was for the bulls and goats that were burned in accordance with their mitzva, outside the three camps, i.e., outside the walls of Jerusalem.,Levi teaches a different version of this baraita: There are three places of the ashes. First was the great place of the ashes that was in the Temple courtyard, where the priests would burn the disqualified offerings of the most sacred order, and the disqualified sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity, and bulls that are burned and goats that are burned if they were disqualified, whether prior to the sprinkling of the blood or after the sprinkling of the blood. And there was another place of the ashes on the Temple Mount, where the priests would burn bulls that are burned and goats that are burned if they were disqualified upon emerging from the Temple courtyard. And the third was for bulls and goats burned in accordance with their mitzva, outside the three camps.,§ Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: The flesh of most offerings is disqualified by being left overnight. What is the halakha as to whether being left overnight is effective to disqualify bulls that are burned and goats that are burned? Given that their flesh is neither eaten nor burned on the altar, do we say: When being left overnight is effective to disqualify flesh, this is only in a case of flesh that is fit for consumption, either by the altar or by human beings; but in the case of these bulls and goats that are burned, which are not fit for consumption, being left overnight does not disqualify the flesh? Or perhaps this case is no different, and being left overnight disqualifies the flesh.,Rava said: This matter, Rabbi Yirmeya’s dilemma, was raised by Abaye, and I resolved it from this baraita: The mishna (43a) records a dispute as to whether the sacrificial portions of bulls that are burned are subject to disqualification by intent to burn them beyond their designated time [piggul]. But the disputants agree that if the priest intended for the consumption of the bulls’ meat and their burning to be beyond their designated time, he did nothing, as piggul applies only to flesh consumed by human beings or the altar. What, is it not the case that since the intention of burning after the designated time does not disqualify bulls that are burned, one can infer that being left overnight also does not disqualify bulls that are burned?,The Gemara responds: But perhaps it is only improper intention that does not disqualify such offerings, but being left overnight does disqualify them.,The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a mishna (Me’ila 9a): With regard to bulls that are burned and goats that are burned, one who benefits from them is liable for misuse of consecrated property from the time that they were consecrated. Once they have been slaughtered, they are susceptible to be rendered disqualified for sacrifice through contact with one who immersed that day, and through contact with one who has not yet brought an atonement offering, and through being left overnight without the requirements of the offering having been fulfilled. What, is it not referring to the flesh of bulls, indicating that the flesh is disqualified if left overnight?,The Gemara responds: No, the mishna indicates only that the offerings’ sacrificial portions are disqualified if left overnight, since they must be burned on the altar.,The Gemara responds: But evidence to the contrary can be adduced from the fact that the latter clause of the mishna teaches: In all of those cases, one who benefits from them is liable for misuse of consecrated property if he derives benefit while they are burned in the place of the ashes, until the flesh is completely incinerated. The Gemara explains: From the fact that the latter clause is discussing flesh, infer that the first clause also discusses flesh, and not the sacrificial portions. The Gemara rejects this: Are the cases comparable? The latter clause discusses flesh, and the first clause discusses sacrificial portions.,The Gemara suggests: Come and hear that which Levi teaches in the baraita: There was another place of the ashes on the Temple Mount, where the priests would burn bulls that are burned and goats that are burned if they were disqualified upon emerging from the Temple courtyard. What, is it not referring to offerings disqualified by being left overnight? The Gemara rejects this: No, it is referring to disqualification by contracting ritual impurity or disqualification by leaving the courtyard before the blood was sprinkled on the altar. The dilemma of Rabbi Yirmeya stands unresolved.,§ Rabbi Elazar raises a dilemma: In general, the flesh of offerings is disqualified by leaving the Temple courtyard. What is the halakha as to whether leaving is effective to disqualify bulls that are burned and goats that are burned?,The Gemara asks: What is the dilemma he is raising? Here it is a mitzva to burn the flesh of these offerings outside the Temple courtyard. Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said: Rabbi Elazar raises his dilemma in accordance with the opinion of the one who says: With regard to offerings of lesser sanctity, even though the flesh may be consumed anywhere in Jerusalem, nevertheless, if it emerges from the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood, it is disqualified, because its time to leave from the Temple courtyard has not yet arrived. Perhaps the same halakha applies to bulls and goats that are burned: Even though the flesh must eventually leave the Temple, if it leaves before its designated time, it is disqualified.,The dilemma is: Do we say that this matter, disqualification by leaving the Temple courtyard prematurely, applies only to flesh that need not eventually leave due to an obligation? One may consume the meat of offerings of lesser sanctity in the Temple courtyard if he wishes. But perhaps these bulls and goats that are burned, which must eventually leave due to an obligation, are not disqualified by emerging prematurely. Or perhaps here too the flesh is disqualified if its time to leave has not yet arrived.,The Gemara suggests: Come and hear that which Levi teaches in the baraita: There was another place of the ashes on the Temple Mount, where the priests would burn bulls that are burned and goats that are burned if they were disqualified upon emerging from the Temple courtyard. What, is it not referring to disqualification by leaving the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood? The Gemara responds: No, it is referring to disqualification by contracting ritual impurity or disqualification by being left overnight. The dilemma of Rabbi Elazar stands unresolved.,§ Rabbi Elazar raises another dilemma: With regard to bulls that are burned and goats that are burned, if the majority of the animal’s body emerged from the Temple courtyard, but it consists of a majority only by inclusion of the minority of a limb, the majority of which remains inside the courtyard, what is the halakha? Do we determine the status of this minority of a limb by casting it after the majority of that limb, and the majority of that limb did not leave? Or perhaps we determine its status by casting it after the majority of the animal, and therefore a majority of the animal has left?,The Gemara clarifies: Isn’t it obvious that we do not disregard the majority of the animal and instead follow the majority of the limbs? Rather, Rabbi Elazar’s dilemma must be as follows: In a case where half of the animal emerged from the courtyard such that the majority of a certain limb emerged, but a minority of the limb remained inside, what is the halakha? Do we determine the status of this minority of a limb by casting it after the majority of that limb, and the majority of that limb did leave? Or perhaps we determine its status by casting it after the half of the animal, which did not leave the courtyard. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma of Rabbi Elazar shall stand unresolved.,Rabba bar Rav Huna teaches this dilemma with regard to people: In a case where five people are handling an offering and carrying it out to be burned, and three of them emerged and two of them remained in the Temple courtyard, such that the animal is partly inside and partly outside, what is the halakha? Do we follow the majority of the people handling the offering, who have left the courtyard, or do we follow the animal, the majority of which did not yet leave? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.,Rabbi Elazar raises another dilemma: If bulls and goats that are burned left the Temple courtyard and returned, what is the halakha with regard to the garments of those who carry them inside the courtyard? Do we say: Once they left, they became impure? Or perhaps once they return, they return and do not render garments impure?,Rabbi Abba bar Memel says: Come and hear the mishna: They would carry the bulls and the goats that are burned suspended on poles. When the first priests, carrying the front of the pole, emerged beyond the wall of the Temple courtyard and the latter ones did not yet emerge, the first ones, who emerged beyond the wall of the Temple courtyard, render their garments impure, but the latter ones do not render their garments impure until they emerge. Rabbi Abba bar Memel explains: And if it enters your mind to say that once they leave, they become impure, these latter ones mentioned in the mishna who are still inside should be rendered impure, since the offering itself has emerged. It follows that if the offering returns, their garments are not rendered impure.,Ravina said: And can you understand this as a proof? The reason that the latter ones’ garments are not rendered impure is that I require the fulfillment of the verse: “And he who burns them shall wash his garments, and bathe his flesh in water, and afterward he may come into the camp” (Leviticus 16:28). And since they have not yet left the camp, they cannot come into it, and therefore they do not contract the impurity described in the verse.,The Gemara asks: But if they can become impure only after they leave, how did Rabbi Elazar raise this dilemma? The Gemara answers: He raised the dilemma with regard to a case where they take the offering with staffs [bevakulsei], i.e., after the offering is returned to the Temple courtyard, other people stand outside the courtyard and bring it out again using staffs. Does the offering render these people impure, even though they are standing outside the courtyard? The dilemma of Rabbi Elazar remains unresolved.,§ The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to bulls that are burned, and a red heifer, and the scapegoat of the Yom Kippur service, the one who sends them, the one who burns them, and the one who takes them out of the Temple courtyard render their garments impure. And the animals themselves, after they emerge from the Temple courtyard, do not render garments that they touch impure, but they render food and drink that they touch impure. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: A red heifer and bulls that are burned render food and drink impure, but the scapegoat does not transmit impurity at all, as it is still alive when it leaves the Temple, and a living being does not render food and drink impure.,The Gemara comments. Granted, according to Rabbi Meir there is no difficulty, as his opinion is in accordance with that which the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught. As the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught in a baraita: The verse states that seeds can contract impurity from the carcass of a creeping animal only if they first come in contact with water: “And if any part of their carcass fall upon any sowing seed which is to be sown, it is pure. But if water be put upon the seed, and any part of their carcass fall thereon, it is impure unto you” (Leviticus 11:37–38).,Just as is the case for seeds, which, like any food, can never contract impurity severe enough to transmit it to human beings, and they need exposure to liquid to be rendered susceptible to their less severe level of impurity, so too, all items that can never contract impurity severe enough to transmit it to human beings need exposure to liquid to be rendered susceptible to their less severe level of impurity and to transmit it. This serves to exclude the carcass of a kosher bird, which can contract impurity severe enough to be transmitted to a human being who swallows it, and therefore does not need to be rendered susceptible to ritual impurity in order to transmit ritual impurity. According to this baraita, bulls that are burned, a red heifer, and a scapegoat, which are all sources of impurity for human beings, are able to transmit impurity to food and drink on their own, even if they have not been exposed to liquid and have not come in contact with any source of impurity. Rabbi Meir’s opinion accords with this principle.,But for the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Meir and say that a scapegoat does not transmit impurity to food and drink, this is difficult. If they accept that which the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught, then even the scapegoat should transmit impurity to food and drink. And if they do not accept that statement, then from where do we derive that even a red heifer and bulls that are burned transmit impurity to food and drink?,When Rav Dimi came to Babylonia from Eretz Yisrael he said: The Sages in the West, Eretz Yisrael, say: The opinion of the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Meir is that bulls that are burned and a red heifer need to contract impurity from somewhere else to be able to transmit impurity to foods. Since the scapegoat cannot contract impurity, as it is alive, it cannot transmit impurity.,§ Rabbi Elazar raises a dilemma: With regard to bulls and goats that are burned, what is the halakha as to whether they can transmit impurity to food and drink inside the Temple courtyard, before they leave, as they do outside afterward? Is an offering that has not yet left the Temple considered as if it were an item for which a necessary action has not yet been performed, i.e., because it has not yet become a source of impurity to those who carry it, it also does not transmit impurity to food without being rendered susceptible by coming into contact with a liquid and then coming into contact with a source of impurity? Or perhaps no, because the offering will become a source of impurity to those who carry it once it leaves the Temple courtyard, it already transmits impurity to food without being rendered susceptible.,After Rabbi Elazar raised the dilemma, he then resolved it: An offering that has not yet left is considered as if it were an item for which a necessary action has not yet been performed, and it does not transmit impurity to food without being rendered susceptible.,§ Rabbi Abba bar Shmuel posed another dilemma to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Food transmits impurity to other food or drink only if it is the volume of at least one egg-bulk and it is first rendered susceptible to impurity. The carcass of a kosher bird transmits impurity to a person who swallows it even if it is of the volume of at least one olive-bulk, and even if it has not been rendered susceptible to impurity. According to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that the carcass of a kosher bird transmits impurity to other food without first being rendered susceptible to impurity, what is the halakha as to the requisite measure? Does the carcass of a kosher bird transmit impurity to food even if it is of the volume of an olive-bulk, as it would to a person?,The Gemara clarifies: Do not raise the dilemma in a case where the carcass lies on the ground, as in that case it certainly must be of the volume of an egg-bulk, like any other impure food. And do not raise the dilemma in a case where a person holds the bird’s flesh in his mouth, as it may be swallowed and transmit impurity to him even if it is of the volume of only an olive-bulk; in this case it certainly transmits impurity to food in the same measure. When you raise the dilemma, raise it in a case where he holds the bird’s flesh in his hand. When the flesh has not yet been brought close to being swallowed, is it considered to be like an item for which a necessary action has not yet been performed, in which case it is considered a normal food and must be of the volume of an egg-bulk, or perhaps not?,After Abba bar Shmuel raised the dilemma, he then resolved it: Even if the carcass of a kosher bird has not yet been brought close to being swallowed, it is still not considered as if a necessary action has not yet been performed, and an olive-bulk is sufficient to transmit impurity to food and drink.,Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba raised an objection to Rabbi Abba bar Shmuel, based on a mishna (Teharot 1:1): Thirteen matters were stated with regard to the carcass of a kosher bird, and this is one of them: In order to be susceptible to impurity as a food, it requires a person’s intention that it be eaten; and it does not need to be rendered susceptible to such impurity by contact with liquid; and it transmits ritual impurity of food in the amount of an egg-bulk. In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? What, is it not the opinion of Rabbi Meir? If so, he holds that an egg-bulk of a carcass of a kosher bird is necessary to transmit impurity.,The Gemara responds: No, the mishna is the opinion of the Rabbis.,The Gemara challenges: But the first clause of that mishna teaches: In order to be susceptible to impurity as a food, it requires a person’s intention that it be eaten and it does not need to be rendered susceptible by contact with liquid. And from whom do you learn this reasoning? From Rabbi Meir, as was taught in the baraita (105a). And since the first clause is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, it follows that the latter clause is also the opinion of Rabbi Meir.,The Gemara responds: Are the cases comparable? Must both clauses be the opinion of the same tanna? This case is as it is, and that case is as it is.,The Gemara challenges: But one can still infer this from the fact that the latter clause of that mishna teaches: The slaughter or the pinching of the nape of a bird offering purifies it from its impurity, i.e., prevents it from assuming the impure status of a carcass, even if it is found to have a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months [tereifa]. And from whom did you learn this reasoning? From Rabbi Meir (see 67a). Could it be that the first clause and the last clause represent the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and the middle clause represents the opinion of the Rabbis?,The Gemara responds: Yes, the first clause and the last clause represent the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and the middle clause represents the opinion of the Rabbis.,§ Rav Hamnuna said to Rabbi Zeira: Do not sit down until you tell me the resolution of this matter: In general, when a food touches a primary source of ritual impurity after having been rendered susceptible to impurity by contact with a liquid, it contracts first-degree impurity. If it then touches another food, it imparts to it second-degree impurity. The carcass of a kosher bird, according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, transmits impurity to food without being rendered susceptible. Does one count its first and second degrees of impurity when it touches food or drink, treating it like a primary source of impurity? Or perhaps one does not count first and second degrees of impurity, but rather treats it as a food with first-degree impurity, which imparts second-degree impurity?,Rabbi Zeira said to him: Wherever an item can render a person impure through contact, it is considered a primary source of impurity, and one counts its first and second degrees of impurity. And wherever it cannot render a person impure through contact, one does not count its first and second degrees of impurity. Since the carcass of a kosher bird does not render a person impure through contact, but only by being swallowed, it is treated as a food with first-degree impurity.,Rabbi Zeira posed a dilemma to Rabbi Ami bar Ḥiyya, and some say to Rabbi Avin bar Kahana concerning that which we learned in a mishna (Teharot 8:8): Connections between foods by liquid, i.e., liquids in contact with two foods, a situation that causes the impurity of one food to be transmitted to the other and their sizes to be combined toward the minimum measure for transmitting impurity, are considered a connection for the lenient impurity of foods, but are not considered a connection for impurity severe enough to be transmitted to a human being. If two pieces of animal carcass are connected by a liquid, they do not combine to form the minimum measure for transmitting their impurity to a person, but they can transmit impurity to food.,Rabbi Zeira asks: If these two pieces of animal carcass come in contact with food, does one count its first and second degrees of impurity and treat the pieces as a primary source of impurity, such that the food will impart second-degree impurity to other food? Or does one not count its first and second degrees of impurity, and treat the animal carcass as food with first-degree impurity?,Rabbi Zeira said to him: Wherever an item can render a person impure, one counts its first and second degrees of impurity. And wherever it cannot render a person impure, one does not count its first and second degrees of impurity. Since the pieces of carcass cannot transmit their impurity to a person, they are treated as food with first-degree impurity.,§ The mishna teaches: When both these priests and those priests emerged, all of their garments were rendered ritually impure. The Gemara explains: From where are these matters derived? As the Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the bull and goat that are burned on Yom Kippur: “They shall be carried forth outside the camp” (Leviticus 16:27). There, elsewhere, the verse states that such bulls and goats are burned outside three camps, those of the Tabernacle, the Levites, and the Israelites, whereas here, the verse states only that they are taken outside one camp, i.e., the Tabernacle. This serves to tell you: Once the offering emerges beyond one camp, one who carries it renders his garments impure, as the next verse states: “And he who burns them shall wash his garments” (Leviticus 16:28).,The Gemara explains further: And from where do we derive that halakha itself, that the bulls and goats are burned outside the three camps? As the Sages taught in a baraita: It is stated about the bull brought as a sin offering of the High Priest: “Even the whole bull shall he carry outside the camp unto a pure place, where the ashes are poured out, and burn it” (Leviticus 4:12), meaning that he should take it outside the three camps. Do you say that he takes it outside the three camps, or is he required to take it outside only one camp?,When the verse states with regard to the bull brought as a communal sin offering: “He shall carry the bull outside the camp, and burn it as he burned the first bull” (Leviticus 4:21), it requires explanation, as there is no need for the verse to state “outside the camp,” since it is already stated at the end of that same verse: “And burn it as he burned the first bull,” which indicates that all the halakhot of the bull brought as a sin offering of a High Priest apply to the bull brought as a communal sin offering. What then does the verse mean when it states “outside the camp”? To give it a second camp, i.e., it indicates that it must be removed not only from the camp of the Divine Presence, corresponding to the Temple, but also from the Levite camp, corresponding to the Temple Mount.,And when another verse states with regard to the removal of the ash: “And he shall put off his garments, and put on other garments, and carry forth the ashes outside the camp to a pure place” (Leviticus 6:4), that verse also requires an explanation, as there is no need for the verse to state this, since it is already stated with regard to the bull brought as a sin offering of a High Priest: “Even the whole bull shall he carry outside the camp to a pure place, where the ashes are poured out, and burn it on wood with fire; where the ashes are poured out shall it be burned” (Leviticus 4:12). The repetition of “outside the camp” indicates that he is required to give it a third camp, i.e., teaching that it is burned when outside the Israelite camp, corresponding to the land outside the walls of Jerusalem.,The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Shimon do with this phrase, stated with regard to the bull and goat of Yom Kippur: “Outside the camp” (Leviticus 16:27), given that he holds that the garments do not become impure until the offering is burning? The Gemara answers: He requires it for that which is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: It is stated here: “Outside the camp,” and it is stated there, with regard to the red heifer: “He shall bring it outside the camp” (Numbers 19:3). Just as here, the bull and goat of Yom Kippur are burned outside three camps, so too there, the red heifer is burned outside three camps. And just as there, the red heifer is burned east of Jerusalem, since it must be burned “toward the front of the Tent of Meeting” (Numbers 19:4), opposite the entrance of the Temple, which is to its east, so too here, the bull and goat of Yom Kippur are burned east of Jerusalem.,But according to the Rabbis, then, where outside Jerusalem do they burn them? The Gemara responds: As it is taught in a baraita: Where are the bulls and goats burned? They are burned north of Jerusalem, outside of the three camps. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: They are burned on the place of the ashes, where the ashes from the altar were poured.,Rava said: Who is the tanna who disagrees with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili? It is Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to bulls that are burned: “Where the ashes are poured out [shefekh hadeshen] shall it be burned” (Leviticus 4:12). This teaches that ashes must be there already when the bulls are burned. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: This verse teaches that its place should slope [meshupakh] downward so that ashes from the burning will slide downhill.,Abaye said to Rava: Perhaps they disagree only about whether the place must slope, but Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov agrees that it must be the place where the ashes from the altar were deposited.,§ The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the bull and goat of Yom Kippur: “And he who burns them shall wash his garments” (Leviticus 16:28). This teaches that only the one who burns them renders his garments impure, but the one who kindles the fire does not render his garments impure, and the one who sets up the arrangement of wood does not render his garments impure. And who is considered the one who burns? One who assists at the actual time of burning.,One might have thought that this priest renders his garments impure even after the bull and goat become ash. Therefore, the verse states: “And he who burns them” (Leviticus 16:28), teaching that they, the whole bull and goat, render garments impure, but they do not render garments impure once they become ash. Rabbi Shimon says: The word “them” teaches that they render garments impure, but once the flesh is incinerated they do not render garments impure.,The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the opinion of the first tanna and the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? Rava said: The difference between them is when he turned it into a charred mass, and the form of the animal has become distorted, but has not actually become ash. The first tanna holds that at this stage the offering still transmits impurity, whereas Rabbi Shimon holds that it does not.,,MISHNA: One who slaughters an offering outside the Temple courtyard and one who offers it up outside the Temple courtyard is liable for the slaughter and liable for the offering up, as each act involves an independent prohibition. If done intentionally, he is liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [karet] for each act, and if done unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each act.,Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: If he slaughtered an offering inside the courtyard and then offered it up outside the courtyard, he is liable. But if he slaughtered it outside, thereby rendering it unfit, and then he offered it up outside, he is exempt for the offering up, as he offered up only an item that is unfit, and one is liable only for offering up an item that is fit to be offered up inside the Temple. The Rabbis said to him: According to your reasoning, even in a case where he slaughters it inside and offers it up outside, he should be exempt, since the moment that he took it outside the courtyard, he thereby rendered it unfit. Yet, in such a case, he is certainly liable for offering it up. So too, one who slaughters an offering outside and then offers it up outside is liable.,One who is ritually impure who ate sacrificial food, whether it was ritually impure sacrificial food or ritually pure sacrificial food, is liable to receive karet if he did so intentionally and to bring a sliding-scale offering if he did so unwittingly. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: An impure person who ate pure sacrificial food is liable. But an impure person who ate impure sacrificial food is exempt, as he merely ate an impure item, and the prohibition against eating sacrificial food while one is impure applies only to pure sacrificial food. The Rabbis said to him: According to your logic, this halakha would apply even in a case of an impure person who ate what had been pure sacrificial food, because once he touched it, he thereby rendered it ritually impure. Yet, in such a case, he is certainly liable for eating it. So too, an impure person who ate impure sacrificial food is liable.,And a pure person who ate impure sacrificial food is exempt, as one is liable for eating sacrificial food in impurity only due to the impurity of one’s body, but not due to the impurity of the food.,GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if one both slaughters and offers up an offering outside the Temple courtyard, he is liable for each act, as they are independent prohibitions. The Gemara asks: Granted that one is liable for the offering up, as the punishment for this act is written in the Torah and the prohibition concerning this act is also written in the Torah. The punishment is as it is written: “Any man…that offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice, and will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice it to the Lord, and that man shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 17:8–9). The prohibition is as it is written: “Take heed to yourself lest you offer up your burnt offerings in every place that you see” (Deuteronomy 12:13). And this is in accordance with that which Rabbi Avin says that Rabbi Elazar says: Wherever it is stated in the Torah: Observe, or: Lest, or: Do not, it is nothing other than a prohibition. Accordingly, the verse in Deuteronomy is understood as issuing a prohibition.,But for the slaughtering, why is one liable? Granted that the punishment is stated in the Torah, as it is written: “Any man…that slaughters it outside the camp, and he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice an offering to the Lord, before the Tabernacle of the Lord…that man shall be cut off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:3–4). But from where do we derive its prohibition? One is liable only in a case where the Torah specifies both the prohibition and the punishment. The Gemara answers: The verse states in the continuation of that passage: “And they shall not slaughter anymore their offerings to the se’irim after whom they go astray” (Leviticus 17:7).,The Gemara questions the use of this verse as a source: But this verse is necessary for the purpose of expounding in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Elazar, as he says: From where is it derived with regard to one who slaughters an animal as an offering to Mercury, a pagan deity, that he is liable even though this is not the established manner in which that deity is worshipped? As it is written: “And they shall not slaughter anymore their offerings to the se’irim.” If the verse is not needed to teach the matter of worshipping a deity in accordance with its established manner, as it is already taught that one is liable for this, as it is written: “Take heed to yourself…lest you inquire after their gods, saying: How do these nations serve their gods, so too will I do likewise” (Deuteronomy 12:30), then apply it to the matter of worshipping a deity in a way that is not in accordance with its established manner.,Rabba said: Both halakhot can be derived from the same verse. Read into the verse as though it stops after the phrase: “And they shall not slaughter” (Leviticus 17:7), and relates to the prohibition against slaughtering outside the Temple courtyard, which was mentioned in the previous verses. And also read into the verse as relating to the verse’s continuation: And not anymore their offerings to the se’irim, which serves as the source for the prohibition against sacrificing offerings to false deities.,The Gemara challenges: But the verse is still necessary for the purpose of expounding that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “Any man…that slaughters it outside the camp, and he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice an offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 17:3–4). Until this point, the verse is speaking about sacrificial animals that one consecrated during a period when the prohibition against sacrificing on private altars was in effect, i.e., after the Tabernacle was erected, and then he also sacrificed them during a period when the prohibition against sacrificing on private altars was in effect.
About This Text
Source
Zevachim
Category
Talmud
Reference
Zevachim 98b:6-106a:8
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