זבחים ע׳ ב:ט״ו-פ״ג א:י״ד

When one approaches the matter this first way, the halakha that forbidden fat is pure applies specifically to kosher animals, but when one approaches the matter that second way, the halakha applies specifically to non-kosher animals. To decide the matter, the verse states: “The fat of a tereifa may be used for any other service” (Leviticus 7:24), indicating that only the forbidden fat of those animals to whose species the halakha of tereifa applies, i.e., kosher animals, is ritually pure. The status of tereifa is immaterial to a non-kosher animal as its consumption is prohibited in any event.,The baraita concludes: One might still assume that I will exclude from this halakha only the forbidden fat of a carcass of a non-kosher animal, as the halakha of tereifa does not apply to its species, but I will not exclude the fat of a carcass of an undomesticated kosher animal, as the halakha of tereifa applies to its species. Therefore, the verse states in conclusion: “But you shall in no way eat of it,” indicating that the reference is only to animals whose fat is forbidden for consumption if slaughtered but whose meat is permitted, i.e., kosher domesticated animals. Excluded are kosher undomesticated animals, whose fat and meat are both permitted for consumption.,Rav Ya’akov bar Abba said to Rava: If that is so, it appears from the baraita that the carcass of a kosher animal imparts impurity, but the carcass of a non-kosher animal does not impart impurity. Rava said to him: How many elders have you caused to err in the interpretation of this baraita? In the latter clause we come to discuss only the carcass of a non-kosher bird, which does not impart impurity. By contrast, carcasses of non-kosher animals are impure.,§ In the mishna, Rabbi Meir states that a bird offering whose nape was pinched and was found to be a tereifa does not impart impurity as would a carcass. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Meir deemed pure only unblemished birds whose napes were pinched, as they are fit to be sacrificed, but he did not deem pure blemished birds, which are not fit to be sacrificed. And Rabbi Elazar says: Rabbi Meir deemed even blemished birds pure and did not distinguish between the two. It was also stated that Rav Beivai says that Rabbi Elazar says: Rabbi Meir would deem pure blemished birds, and this was his opinion even concerning geese and chickens, species that may not be brought as offerings and as such are never supposed to be pinched.,Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: According to Rabbi Elazar’s understanding of Rabbi Meir’s opinion, what is the halakha with regard to one who broke the neck of a goat? Does the impurity of animal carcasses apply? The breaking of the neck is considered the proper procedure in certain cases, as the Torah commands that a heifer’s neck be broken if a murdered body is found between two cities and the identity of the murderer is unknown (see Deuteronomy 21:4).,One could claim: What is the reason that geese and chickens are pure if their napes are pinched? It is because they are species of birds and the napes of some birds are pinched; but a goat is not of the same species as a heifer, as goats are considered small livestock whereas cattle are large livestock. Or perhaps one could claim: Since a goat is still a species of domesticated animal, it is similar enough to a heifer that the breaking of its neck prevents it from imparting impurity as a carcass.,Rav Dimi was sitting and saying this halakha, i.e., this dilemma. Abaye said to him: By inference from this dilemma, it seems that you assume that a heifer whose neck is broken is itself pure and does not impart impurity as would a carcass. Rav Dimi said to him: Indeed, as the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai say: Since the language of atonement is written with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken, in the verse: “Forgive, Lord, Your people Israel” (Deuteronomy 21:8), just as atonement is written with regard to sacrificial animals, the breaking of the heifer’s neck is equivalent to the pinching of the nape of a bird offering, and breaking its neck prevents the heifer from imparting ritual impurity.,Rav Natan, father of Rav Huna bar Natan, raises an objection based on a baraita concerning the purity of the forbidden fat of a kosher animal, mentioned in the verse: “And the fat of a carcass, and the fat of a tereifa, may be used for any other service; but you shall in no way eat of it” (Leviticus 7:24). I have derived from the verse only that forbidden fat that is forbidden for consumption but from which deriving benefit is permitted is pure. From where is it derived that this halakha also applies to the forbidden fat of an ox that is stoned by the court or the forbidden fat of a heifer whose neck is broken, from both of which one is prohibited from deriving benefit?,The verse states: “You shall eat no fat nor blood” (Leviticus 3:17). The generalization “no fat” indicates that the same halakhot apply to the forbidden fats of all domesticated kosher animals, including those from which one is prohibited from deriving benefit.,Rav Natan concludes his objection: And if it enters your mind that the meat of a heifer whose neck is broken is pure, why must the verse teach that its forbidden fat is pure? Could one entertain the possibility that its meat is pure but its forbidden fat is impure?,The Gemara responds: The derivation in the baraita was not necessary for a case where one broke the neck of the heifer. It was necessary for the verse to teach that the forbidden fat is pure even in a case where one slaughtered a heifer whose neck was designated to be broken.,The Gemara asks: But the slaughter itself should be effective in purifying the forbidden fat, as slaughter prevents an animal from assuming the impure status of a carcass, and the derivation is still superfluous. The Gemara responds: No, it is necessary to teach that the forbidden fat of a heifer that died before its neck could be broken is pure even though the heifer itself assumes that status of a carcass.,The Gemara asks: If the baraita is referring only to a heifer that died before its neck could be broken, and it describes benefitting from it as being prohibited, by inference, is it prohibited to derive benefit from the heifer while it is still alive? The Gemara responds: Indeed, as Rabbi Yannai says: I heard the boundary, i.e., stage, beyond which it is forbidden, but I have forgotten what it is, and yet the members of the group of scholars were inclined to say that its descent to a hard valley (see Deuteronomy 21:4), where its neck was broken, is the action that renders it forbidden.,,MISHNA: All the offerings that were intermingled with animals from which deriving benefit is forbidden, e.g., sin offerings left to die, or with an ox that was sentenced to be stoned, even if the ratio is one in ten thousand, deriving benefit from them all is prohibited and they all must die. If the offerings were intermingled with animals whose sacrifice is forbidden but deriving benefit from them is not, the halakha is different. Examples of this are an ox with which a transgression was performed, which disqualifies it from being sacrificed as an offering, or an ox that is known to have killed a person based on the testimony of one witness or based on the admission of the owner. Had two witnesses testified, deriving benefit from the ox would have been prohibited. Additional examples include when an offering is intermingled with an animal that copulated with a person; or an animal that was the object of bestiality; or with an animal that was set aside for idol worship; or one that was worshipped as a deity; or with an animal that was given as payment to a prostitute or as the price of a dog, as it is written: “You shall not bring the payment of a harlot, or the price of a dog, into the house of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 23:19). Additional examples include an offering that was intermingled with an animal born of a mixture of diverse kinds, e.g., the offspring of a ram and a goat, or with an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa], or with an animal born by caesarean section. In all these cases the animals that are intermingled shall graze until they become unfit for sacrifice and then they shall be sold. And from the money received in the sale, the owner shall bring another offering of the monetary value of the highest-quality animal among them, of the same type of offering that the intermingled offering was.,The mishna continues: If sacrificial animals were intermingled with unblemished, non-sacred animals, which, if consecrated, are fit for sacrifice, the non-sacred animals shall be sold for the purpose of purchasing offerings of the same type as the offering with which they were intermingled.,In a case where sacrificial animals were intermingled with other sacrificial animals, if it was an animal of one type of offering with animals of the same type of offering, one shall sacrifice this animal for the sake of whoever is its owner and one shall sacrifice that animal for the sake of whoever is its owner, and both fulfill their obligation.,In a case where sacrificial animals were intermingled with other sacrificial animals, where an animal of one type of offering was intermingled with animals not of the same type of offering, e.g., two rams, where one is designated as a burnt offering and one as a peace offering, they shall graze until they become unfit for sacrifice and then they shall be sold. And from the money received in the sale, the owner shall bring another offering of the monetary value of the highest-quality animal among them as this type of offering, and another offering of the monetary value of the highest-quality animal among them as that type of offering, and he will lose the additional expense of purchasing two highest-quality animals, when he had sold only one highest-quality animal, from his own assets.,In a case where sacrificial animals were intermingled with a firstborn offering or with an animal tithe offering, they shall graze until they become unfit for sacrifice and they shall both be eaten as a firstborn offering or as an animal tithe offering.,All offerings can become indistinguishably intermingled with each other, except for a sin offering and a guilt offering, as the Gemara will explain.,GEMARA: The mishna teaches the halakha of all the offerings that were intermingled with animals from which deriving benefit is forbidden. This indicates that one offering became intermingled with a majority of prohibited animals, as it is usual to describe the smaller unit as being intermingled with the larger unit. The Gemara asks: If so, what is the meaning of the term: Even, in the clause: Even if the ratio is one in ten thousand, deriving benefit from them all is prohibited and they all must die. If the permitted animal is rendered prohibited by a simple majority, of course it is prohibited if the ratio is one in ten thousand.,The Gemara explains: This is what the mishna is saying: All the offerings in which were intermingled sin offerings left to die, or in which an ox that was sentenced to be stoned was intermingled, even if the ratio is one forbidden animal intermingled with ten thousand offerings, they all must die.,The Gemara raises a difficulty: Why is this mishna necessary? We already learn this halakha on another occasion, in a mishna (Temura 28a): With regard to all animals whose sacrifice on the altar is prohibited, if they are intermingled with animals whose sacrifice is permitted they render the entire mixture prohibited in any amount, regardless of the ratio of permitted to prohibited animals. The mishna adds that these are the animals whose sacrifice is prohibited: An animal that actively copulated with a person, and an animal that was the object of bestiality. That mishna proceeds to add other categories of animals to this list, including ones mentioned in the mishna here. In any event, the basic halakha of the mishna is also taught in tractate Temura.,Rav Ashi says: I said this halakha in the presence of Rav Shimi, and he explained to me that both mishnayot are necessary, as each teaches a novelty not included in the other. Rav Ashi clarifies: As, if this halakha was learned only from there, the mishna in Temura, I would say that this statement, that prohibited animals render a mixture prohibited in any ratio, applies only to prohibiting the animals from being sacrificed to the Most High; but with regard to prohibiting the animals even to an ordinary person [hedyot], e.g., that if they became intermingled with an ox that is to be stoned they all must die without the possibility of redemption, one might say that they are not all rendered prohibited in benefit, as the prohibited animal is nullified in a majority. Therefore, the mishna here teaches that even with regard to deriving benefit, all the animals in the mixture are prohibited.,Rav Ashi continues: And if this halakha was learned only from here, I would say that it is only these categories that are mentioned in this mishna, i.e., sin offerings that were condemned to die or an ox that was sentenced to be stoned, that render a mixture prohibited in any ratio. The halakha is stringent with regard to them, as they are items from which deriving benefit is prohibited. But with regard to these categories mentioned in the mishna in Temura, e.g., an animal that copulated with a person, which are not items from which deriving benefit is prohibited, one might say that they are not disqualified from being sacrificed, and they are nullified in a majority. Therefore, both mishnayot are necessary.,The Gemara questions this explanation: This justifies the mishna here, but concerning the halakha stated in Temura, why did that mishna teach the halakha with regard to those animals that are not items from which deriving benefit is prohibited, such as an animal that copulated with a person; the tanna already taught this halakha in the mishna here. The Gemara answers: Does the mishna here teach by what ratio they render the mixture prohibited? The important measure: In any amount, is taught there, in Temura, not in the mishna here, and that is the novelty of the mishna in Temura.,The Gemara challenges: But if so, let the tanna teach that mishna in Temura, and then he would not require this mishna here. Why teach the second clause of the mishna here? The Gemara explains: It was necessary for the tanna to mention the remedy, i.e., that the animals that are intermingled shall graze until they become unfit for sacrifice and then they shall be sold; and from the money received in the sale, the owner shall bring another offering of the monetary value of the highest-quality animal among them as the same type of offering that the sacrificial animal was. This halakha is not stated in the mishna in Temura.,The Gemara raises another difficulty. The halakha of the mishna that items from which deriving benefit is prohibited render a mixture prohibited in any amount even to an ordinary person, as stated with regard to the sin offerings that were condemned to die and an ox that was sentenced to be stoned, is also taught in a mishna (Avoda Zara 74a): And these following items are themselves forbidden, and any amount of them renders other items with which they become mixed forbidden: Wine used for a libation that became mixed with kosher wine, and objects of idol worship that were intermingled with permitted items. The Gemara explains that both the mishna here and the mishna in Avoda Zara are necessary, as, if this halakha had been learned only from there, the mishna in Avoda Zara, I would say that this applies only if the prohibited animal is intermingled with a non-sacred animal and thereby becomes prohibited to an ordinary person. But if it is intermingled with offerings that are designated to the Most High so a loss to the Temple would ensue, one might say that we should not lose all the valid offerings, and therefore the prohibited animal should be nullified in a simple majority. Accordingly, the ruling of the mishna here was necessary, to teach that the same applies to a mixture involving offerings.,The Gemara continues: And conversely, if this halakha were learned only from here I would say that this statement, that the entire mixture is prohibited, applies specifically to sacrificial animals, as it is repulsive to sacrifice to God an animal from a mixture that includes a prohibited animal. But with regard to deriving benefit from a non-sacred animal from this mixture, which is not a repulsive act, one might say: Let the items from which deriving benefit is prohibited be nullified in a majority. Therefore, the mishna in Avoda Zara is also necessary.,The Gemara questions the ruling of the mishna: But let the prohibited animals be nullified in a majority, as is the halakha concerning other matters, in which the minority items assume the status of the majority. And if you would say in response that animals are significant, as they are counted individually and therefore they are not nullified in a majority, this answer is unsatisfactory. The Gemara elaborates: This suggested answer works out well according to the one who says that we learned in the mishna discussing nullification in a majority (see Orla 3:6–7): Any item whose manner is also to be counted, i.e., that are sometimes sold by unit rather than weight or volume, is considered significant. This definition includes animals, as they are sometimes sold as individual animals, and therefore they would be considered significant.,But according to the one who says that we learned in that mishna: An item whose manner is exclusively to be counted, i.e., one that is always sold by unit, is considered significant, what can be said? Although animals are often sold by unit, they are occasionally sold as part of a herd, and would therefore not be considered significant. The Gemara cites the mishna in which this dispute appears. As we learned (Orla 3:6–7): With regard to one who had bundles of fenugreek, a type of legume, that were diverse kinds planted in a vineyard, from which it is prohibited to derive benefit, those bundles must be burned. If the bundles were intermingled with others, and those others were intermingled with others, they all must be burned. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: They can be nullified when the total is 201 items, i.e., one prohibited item intermingled with two hundred permitted ones.,The mishna continues: Rabbi Meir holds that they all must be burned, as Rabbi Meir would say: Any item whose manner is to be counted renders its mixture prohibited, as it is considered significant and cannot be nullified. And the Rabbis say: Only six items are sufficiently significant to render their mixture prohibited. Rabbi Akiva says: There are seven. And they are: Nuts with brittle shells, and pomegranates from Badan, and sealed barrels of wine, and beet greens, and cabbage stalks, and Greek gourd. Rabbi Akiva adds: Loaves of a homeowner are also in this category.,The mishna continues: Different prohibitions apply to these items. That which is fit to be forbidden due to the prohibition against eating the fruit of a tree during the first three years after its planting [orla], i.e., nuts, pomegranates, and sealed barrels of wine, prohibit their mixture as orla. That which is fit to be forbidden due to diverse kinds planted in a vineyard, i.e., beets, cabbage, and gourd, prohibit their mixture as diverse kinds in a vineyard.,And it was stated that there is a dispute between amora’im with regard to the wording of Rabbi Meir’s opinion in this mishna. Rabbi Yoḥanan says that we learned: Only an item whose manner is exclusively to be counted is significant and cannot be nullified, and it therefore renders its mixture prohibited according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that we learned: Any item whose manner is also to be counted is significant and cannot be nullified.,The Gemara reiterates its question: This works out well according to the opinion of Reish Lakish, but according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, what can be said? According to his opinion, since animals are not sold exclusively by unit, they are not sufficiently significant. Therefore, a prohibited animal should be nullified in a simple majority. Rav Pappa says: According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, this tanna, who says that a prohibited animal cannot be nullified, is the tanna of the halakha concerning a litra of dried figs, who says: Any item that is counted, even if it is prohibited by rabbinic law, e.g., teruma of fruit, cannot be nullified, and all the more so items prohibited by Torah law, such as animals that are disqualified for the altar, as in the mishna.,This is as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Terumot 5:11): The baraita discusses three cases, all of which relate to the tithing of figs, which is an obligation by rabbinic law. The first is the case of a litra of untithed dried figs that were pressed in different vessels and shaped into circles, that one placed into a barrel containing tithed figs, and during the process of producing a circle he pressed the figs onto the opening of one of the circular vessels in which the circles are formed, and he does not know into which circular vessel he pressed it. The second is the case in which he recalls that he pressed it on the opening of a barrel containing tithed figs, but he does not know into which barrel he pressed it. The third case is that he recalls that he pressed it on the opening of a straw receptacle containing tithed figs, but he does not know into which receptacle he pressed it. In all of these cases, there is a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda as to the details of a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua.,Rabbi Meir says that Rabbi Eliezer says: One views the upper layers of possibly untithed dried figs as though they are separate pieces, rather than one unit. And the lower ones, which were there beforehand and have certainly been tithed, nullify the upper ones, as there are enough circles of figs to nullify the upper layer. One does not need to tithe the figs at the top of any of the containers.,Rabbi Meir continues: By contrast, Rabbi Yehoshua says: If there are one hundred openings of containers present there, the untithed litra of figs on the opening of one of the containers is nullified in a ratio of one part of untithed figs to one hundred parts of similar, tithed figs. But if not, all of the layers of figs at the openings of the containers are prohibited, i.e., viewed as untithed, as one of them certainly contains an untithed litra that has not been nullified. And the figs on the insides of the vessels are permitted, as the untithed figs certainly did not reach there. This is Rabbi Meir’s version of the dispute.,The baraita continues: Rabbi Yehuda says that Rabbi Eliezer says: If there are one hundred openings of containers with tithed figs present there, in addition to the untithed figs, it is nullified in the one hundred. But if not, all of the layers of figs at the openings of the containers are prohibited, i.e., viewed as untithed, as one of them certainly contains an untithed litra that has not been nullified. And the figs on the insides of the vessels are permitted, as the untithed figs certainly did not reach there.,Rabbi Yehuda continues his statement: By contrast, Rabbi Yehoshua says: Even if there are three hundred openings present there, the layer at the top of the container is not nullified. This litra cannot be nullified in any manner, as Rabbi Yehoshua maintains that even an item occasionally sold by unit, such as a circle of dried figs, can never be nullified.,Rabbi Yehuda continues: But if one pressed the litra of dried figs into a circular vessel along with other dried figs, but does not know onto which place, i.e., which side, of the circular vessel he pressed it, whether, e.g., to its northern side or to its southern side, in this case, as the prohibited litra is not located in a defined place and it cannot be distinguished from the others, it is not considered an item of significance, and everyone agrees that it is nullified. Accordingly, the ruling of the mishna that animals that are disqualified from being sacrificed are not nullified is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua as stated by Rabbi Eliezer, that an item occasionally sold by unit is not nullified. Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement, that only an item whose manner is exclusively to be counted is significant and cannot be nullified, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.,Rav Ashi says: You may even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, i.e., Rabbi Meir, who maintains that an item that is not always counted is nullified in a majority. The reason is that living creatures are significant, and therefore they are not nullified.,§ The Gemara raises a difficulty with the ruling of the mishna that all of the animals are prohibited. And let us draw out and sacrifice one animal from the mixture, and say, i.e., apply the principle: Any item that separates from a group is assumed to have separated from the majority. Accordingly, the animal that was sacrificed is presumed to be fit. One can continue in this manner until only two animals from the mixture remain. The Gemara questions this suggestion: Should we draw out an animal from the mixture? But this is the removal of an item from its fixed place, and there is a principle that anything fixed is considered as though it was half and half, i.e., equally balanced, and it remains a case of uncertainty. The Gemara clarifies its suggestion: Rather, let us push the intermingled animals so that they all move from their places, which negates the fixed status of the prohibited item. And accordingly, let us say with regard to each animal: Any item that separates from a group is assumed to have separated from the majority.,Rava says: Now that the Sages have said that we do not sacrifice any of them, this is evidently a rabbinic decree, lest ten priests come simultaneously and sacrifice all the animals in the mixture together, not one at a time. Therefore, the fact that there could be a method to permit the animals is immaterial.,One of the Sages said to Rava: If that is so, do you hold that the large basin [megisa] on which the sacrificial portions of the animal are placed is prohibited? In other words, is it possible that these animals, which were slaughtered when they were initially declared permitted after being separated from their places, could later become prohibited again when their sacrificial portions are ready to be burned on the altar?,Rava responded that he did not mean there is a concern that ten priests would sacrifice their sacrificial portions simultaneously. Rather, the decree is due to the concern lest when the animals move, ten priests will come simultaneously and take them from the mixture. As all or most of the animals were separated simultaneously in this case, it is assumed that the prohibited animal is among those that were separated. The Gemara asks: Is it possible for ten priests to take these scattered animals simultaneously? Rather, Rava says that one may not allow the animals to be sacrificed by moving them due to a decree that if this is allowed, one may, in another circumstance, allow them to be sacrificed even when they are taken from a fixed location.,§ Rava said: Now that the Sages say in the mishna that we do not sacrifice any of the animals, if we did sacrifice one of them, the offering does not effect acceptance for the owner. Rav Huna bar Yehuda raised an objection to Rava from a mishna (Kinnim 22b): With regard to a bird sin offering that was intermingled with a bird burnt offering, or a bird burnt offering that was intermingled with a bird sin offering, even if the ratio is one in ten thousand, they all must die, as there is no remedy for these birds. It is not known which is which, and their sacrificial rites are performed differently.,The mishna continues: In what case is this statement said? In the case of a priest who consulted the court to ask how he should proceed. But in the case of a priest who did not consult the court, but sacrificed them of his own accord, if there was an equal number of bird sin offerings and burnt offerings, and he performed all their sacrificial rites above the red line that circumscribes the altar at its midpoint, as required for a burnt offering, half of the birds are fit, as in any event the burnt offerings were sacrificed properly, and half are unfit.,Likewise, if he performed all of their sacrificial rites below the red line, half are fit, as in any event the sin offerings were sacrificed properly, and half are unfit. If he performed the sacrificial rites of one of the birds below the red line and one of the birds above the red line, they are both unfit, as I say that the sin offering was sacrificed above the red line and the burnt offering was sacrificed below. This mishna proves that an offering that is prohibited to be sacrificed as part of a mixture is fit after the fact, which contradicts the statement of Rava.,Rather, Rava would claim that this matter depends on a dispute between tanna’im. This statement of Rava is in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that living creatures that become disqualified are permanently rejected from being sacrificed on the altar, and this animal was rejected when it was part of the mixture. That ruling of the mishna in Kinnim is in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that living creatures are not permanently rejected from the altar. Therefore, if the animal was sacrificed it is fit.,The Gemara raises a difficulty: But there is the case of slaughtered offerings that are rejected from the altar, concerning which everyone agrees that these are rejected. Even those who say that living creatures generally are not rejected agree that, in this case, they should be rejected. And we learned in a mishna (77b) that in a case where sacrificial portions from unblemished burnt offerings became mixed with sacrificial portions from blemished burnt offerings, which are disqualified, Rabbi Eliezer says: If the head of one of them was sacrificed on the altar before they knew of the blemish, all the heads should be sacrificed, as it is assumed that the head of the disqualified animal was the one already sacrificed on the altar. This indicates that even with regard to slaughtered animals, if they were rejected from the altar due to being in a mixture, they are not permanently rejected, but are fit after the fact.,The Gemara explains that this mishna affords no proof, as Rabbi Eliezer states his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Ḥanan the Egyptian, who maintains that even slaughtered animals are not permanently rejected. As it is taught in a baraita that Ḥanan the Egyptian says, with regard to the two goats of Yom Kippur, the one sacrificed to God and the scapegoat designated to be sent to Azazel: Even if the blood of the sacrificed goat is already in the cup where it was collected and the scapegoat dies, the sacrificed goat is still a fit offering, and the priest brings another goat and joins it to this slaughtered goat to serve as the scapegoat. By contrast, the other tanna’im, who maintain that slaughtered animals are rejected, hold that once they have become rejected due to being in a mixture they are no longer fit for sacrifice, as stated by Rava.,§ Concerning a similar case, Rav Naḥman says that Rava bar Avuh says that Rav says: With regard to a ring used in idol worship, from which it is prohibited to derive benefit and which is not nullified even in a ratio of one in one hundred, that was intermingled with one hundred permitted rings, and subsequently one of them fell into the Great Sea [Yam HaGadol], they are all permitted. The reason is that we say: That ring that fell into the Great Sea is the prohibited ring.,Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman from the mishna: With regard to all the offerings that were intermingled with animals from which deriving benefit is prohibited, even if the ratio is one in ten thousand, they all must die. According to the opinion of Rav, that we say the one that was lost is the prohibited item, why must they all die? Let us say, with regard to the first animal that died, that the prohibited animal died, and the rest should be permitted.,Rav Naḥman said to Rava: Rav states his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as we learned in the mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: If the head of one of them is sacrificed on the altar before the priests knew of the blemish, all the heads should be sacrificed, as it is assumed that the head of the disqualified animal was the one already sacrificed on the altar.,Rava asked Rav Naḥman: But doesn’t Rabbi Elazar say: Rabbi Eliezer permitted the sacrifice of all the heads only if they were sacrificed two by two, as at least one of them is certainly permitted; but he did not permit them to be sacrificed one by one, in case the priest sacrifices the prohibited head by itself? How, then, can Rav Naḥman permit the rings without qualification? Rav Naḥman said to Rava: I too am saying that Rav permits the rings only if they are sold two at a time, in which case one of them is certainly not from idol worship.,The Gemara discusses a similar case. Rav says: With regard to a ring used in idol worship that was intermingled with one hundred permitted rings, and then forty of them became separated to one place, and the other sixty became separated to another place, so that they are now two distinct groups of rings, if one ring from the group of forty became separated from them and then became intermingled with other rings, it does not render them prohibited. But if one ring from the other sixty became separated from its group and became mixed with other rings, it renders them prohibited.,The Gemara asks: What is different concerning the case in which one ring from the group of forty separated, that it does not render the other rings prohibited? The reason is that we say: The prohibited ring is in the group that contains the majority of the rings, i.e., it is in the group of sixty. If so, in the case where one ring from the group of sixty became separated and became intermingled with the other rings, we should also say that the prohibited ring is still in the group that contains the majority of the rings, i.e., it is one of the fifty-nine remaining rings. Rather, Rav’s statement was as follows: If all forty became separated to one place, where they became intermingled with other rings, the forty rings do not render those other rings prohibited, as it is assumed that the prohibited ring is in the group of sixty. Conversely, if all of the sixty rings became separated to one place, where they became intermingled with other rings, the sixty rings render those other rings prohibited.,Rav Yehuda, who said this statement citing Rav, added: When I said this ruling in the presence of Shmuel, that if the forty rings became intermingled with others they do not render them prohibited, he said to me: Disregard this halakha with regard to the case of idol worship, as this prohibition is so stringent that its uncertainty and its compound uncertainty are prohibited forever, i.e., no matter how many uncertainties are added they are all prohibited.,The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Shmuel from a baraita: An uncertainty of idol worship is prohibited, but its compound uncertainty is permitted. How so? With regard to a cup used in idol worship that fell into a storeroom full of cups, they are all prohibited. If one of these cups separated from the rest and fell into a group of ten thousand other cups, and from that ten thousand cups a single cup fell into ten thousand other cups, they are permitted. This baraita teaches that only one uncertainty is prohibited, not a compound uncertainty.,The Gemara explains: This is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Terumot 5:10) that Rabbi Yehuda says: Prohibited pomegranates from Badan, which are too significant to be nullified, prohibit a mixture in any amount. How so? If one of them fell into a group of ten thousand other pomegranates, and one of that group fell from that ten thousand into another ten thousand, they are all prohibited, despite the fact that this is a compound uncertainty.,The baraita continues: Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: If a prohibited pomegranate fell into a group of ten thousand pomegranates, they are all prohibited, as he concedes that these pomegranates are not nullified in a majority. But if one pomegranate from the ten thousand fell into a group of three pomegranates, and one of these three pomegranates fell into a different place, it is permitted, as this is a compound uncertainty.,The Gemara inquires: In accordance with the opinion of which of these tanna’im does Shmuel state his opinion that an item used in idol worship remains prohibited no matter how many uncertainties are involved? If you say that he stated his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, then even with regard to other prohibitions a compound uncertainty should be prohibited, as Rabbi Yehuda stated his ruling with regard to a prohibited pomegranate, not an item of idol worship. And if Shmuel stated his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, then even in the case of idol worship a compound uncertainty should be permitted, as Rabbi Shimon did not differentiate between different types of prohibitions.,And if you would say that there is a difference according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon between idol worship and other prohibitions, and he prohibits compound uncertainties only in the case of idol worship, then if so, that which is taught in the baraita cited previously: An uncertainty of idol worship is prohibited but its compound uncertainty is permitted, whose opinion does this represent? It is neither the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda nor the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.,The Gemara answers: Actually, that baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as he permits a compound uncertainty in all cases. And Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to one matter, that a compound uncertainty is prohibited in the case of idol worship, and disagrees with him with regard to one matter, as Shmuel does not apply this stringency to other prohibitions.,§ The Gemara continues its analysis. The Master, Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda citing Rabbi Shimon, says above: If one pomegranate from the ten thousand fell into a group of three pomegranates, and one of these three pomegranates fell into a different place, the mixture is permitted. The Gemara asks: What is different about a case where the pomegranate fell into a group of three other pomegranates? The essential factor is that there is a majority of permitted pomegranates, which nullify the pomegranate that fell from the ten thousand. Even if it fell into a group of two others, there is a majority of permitted items. Why must it fall into a group of three? The Gemara explains: What is the meaning of three that the tanna of this baraita teaches? It means that there were two permitted pomegranates initially, and the pomegranate of uncertain status fell into them, for a total of three.,The Gemara returns to the question concerning the opinion of which tanna is followed by Shmuel, who is stringent with regard to a compound uncertainty involving idol worship. And if you wish, say instead that Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as he is similarly stringent with regard to mixtures of items of idol worship, as explained in tractate Avoda Zara (49b).,§ The Gemara discusses a related topic. Reish Lakish says: In the case of a barrel of teruma produce, which may be eaten only by a priest and his household, that was intermingled with one hundred barrels of non-sacred produce, they are all considered as teruma, as a sealed barrel is significant and is not nullified. And if one of these barrels fell into the Dead Sea, all the barrels are permitted, as we say: Since there is that barrel that fell, the assumption is that it is the prohibited barrel that fell.,The Gemara comments: And it was necessary for the Gemara to record the ruling of Rav Naḥman with regard to rings used in idol worship, and it was also necessary for the Gemara to record the ruling of Reish Lakish with regard to barrels of teruma, despite the similarity between the two cases. The Gemara elaborates: As, if the halakha were taught only from the ruling of Rav Naḥman, I would say that this matter applies only with regard to a mixture involving an item of idol worship, which has no permitting factors; such items themselves cannot be permitted in any other manner. Therefore, the halakha is to be lenient, i.e., to assume that the prohibited ring fell into the sea. But in the case of teruma, which has permitting factors, as the mixture can be sold in its entirety to priests, perhaps the mixture should not be permitted because one of them fell into the sea.,And conversely, if the halakha was taught only from the ruling of Reish Lakish, I would say that the halakha is lenient only in the case of a barrel of teruma, as its falling is noticeable, and everyone will know that the other barrels were permitted due to the one that fell. Accordingly, they will not come to permit barrels in a similar case where no barrel became separated from the mixture. But with regard to a ring, whose falling is not noticeable, perhaps the rest of the rings should not be permitted. Therefore, both statements are necessary.,Rabba says: Reish Lakish deemed the rest of the items permitted only in the case of a barrel, as its falling is noticeable. But in the case of a fig that fell from a group of figs that contained a fig of teruma, Reish Lakish does not deem the rest of the figs permitted, as the one that fell is too small for its fall to be discernible. And Rav Yosef says: Reish Lakish deemed the rest of the items permitted even with regard to a fig. The reason is that just as the initial falling of one fig rendered the entire mixture prohibited, so too, the emerging of one fig from the pile permits the rest.,Rabbi Elazar says: With regard to a barrel of teruma wine that fell among one hundred barrels of non-sacred wine, it cannot be nullified in its current state, as sealed barrels are significant and are therefore not nullified. How should one proceed? He should open one of them, so that it is no longer an item of significance, and take from it as much as ought to be taken from a normal mixture of teruma and non-sacred produce, i.e., one-hundredth. He should give that to a priest, and then he may drink the rest of the wine.,Rav Dimi sat and said this halakha, and Rav Naḥman said to him: I see a ruling of: Swallow and drink here, i.e., this formulation indicates that one may act in this manner ab initio, which is puzzling. Rather, say: If one of the barrels was opened, after the fact one may take from it as much as ought to be taken from a normal mixture of teruma and non-sacred produce. He should give that to a priest, and then he may drink the rest of the wine.,With regard to the same issue, Rabbi Oshaya says: In the case of a barrel of teruma wine that was intermingled with 150 barrels of non-sacred wine, and one hundred of them opened, one may take from it as much as ought to be taken from a normal mixture of teruma and non-sacred produce. He should give that to a priest, and then he may drink the rest of the wine. And as for the rest of the fifty barrels, they remain prohibited, i.e., they have teruma status, until they are opened and the ratio of teruma is separated from them. This is because we do not say that the prohibited barrel is in the group that contains the majority of barrels and the one he opens is likely permitted.,§ The mishna listed various categories of prohibited animals: An animal that copulated with a person, or an animal that was the object of bestiality, an animal that was set aside for idol worship or one that was worshipped as a deity, an animal that was given as payment to a prostitute or as the price of a dog, or an animal born of a mixture of diverse kinds, or an animal that is a tereifa. The Gemara asks: Granted, with regard to all of the other examples in this list, the prohibited animal is not known. In other words, it is physically indistinguishable from the other animals. But with regard to this tereifa animal, what are the circumstances? If, due to its physical impairment, it is known to him which animal it is, let him come and take it from there, and all the other animals will be permitted. If it is not known to him, how does he know that a tereifa animal was intermingled with others in the first place?,They say in the school of Rabbi Yannai: What are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where an animal that was pierced by a thorn, which does not render it a tereifa, was intermingled with an animal that was clawed by a wolf, which renders it a tereifa. Since the skin of both animals has been pierced, one cannot identify the tereifa.,Reish Lakish says there is a different answer: The mishna is discussing a case where a healthy animal was intermingled with a fallen animal, i.e., one that has fallen from a great height. A fallen animal is prohibited in case it is a tereifa, despite the fact that it bears no external sign of injury. The Gemara raises a difficulty: With regard to a fallen animal as well, let us examine it and see if it can walk by itself, in which case it is not a tereifa. The Gemara answers: According to the opinion of Reish Lakish, even after an examination of this kind it is still a possible tereifa, which is prohibited to be sacrificed upon the altar, as he holds that if an animal fell and stood up again, it requires a twenty-four-hour waiting period to determine if it is in fact injured. Furthermore, even if it both stood up and walked after the fall, it requires inspection after slaughter to determine whether it was injured by the fall and rendered a tereifa.,Rabbi Yirmeya says there is a third answer: The mishna is referring to a case where a healthy animal was intermingled with the offspring of a tereifa, which of course bears no sign of a tereifa. And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: The offspring of a tereifa may not be sacrificed upon the altar.,The Gemara explains why each of these Sages suggests a different interpretation of the mishna: All of them, i.e., Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yirmeya, do not say that the explanation of the mishna is in accordance with the explanation of Rabbi Yannai that an animal pierced by a thorn became mixed up with one clawed by a wolf, as they maintain that the difference between an animal pierced by a thorn and one that was clawed by a wolf is known, as this perforation caused by a wolf is elongated, and that perforation caused by a thorn is round.,The Gemara continues: Rabbi Yannai and Rabbi Yirmeya do not say that the explanation of the mishna is in accordance with the explanation of Reish Lakish, that the mishna is discussing a case where a healthy animal became intermingled with one that has fallen, as they hold that if a fallen animal stood, it does not require a twenty-four-hour waiting period, and if it walked it does not require any further inspection after slaughter at all. Consequently, one can simply examine the animals to see if they can walk, and if they can, they are fit.,Finally, Rabbi Yannai and Reish Lakish do not say that the explanation of the mishna is in accordance with the explanation of Rabbi Yirmeya, that the mishna is discussing a case where a healthy animal became intermingled with the offspring of a tereifa, as they do not want to interpret the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer because the halakha does not follow his ruling.,§ The mishna teaches: In a case where sacrificial animals were intermingled with other sacrificial animals, if it was an animal of one type of offering with animals of the same type of offering, one should sacrifice this animal for the sake of whoever is its owner and one should sacrifice that animal for the sake of whoever is its owner, and both owners fulfill their obligations. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But each animal requires placing hands on its head, a rite that must be performed by its owner, and in this case the owner is unknown.,Rav Yosef says: The halakha of the mishna is stated with regard to an offering of women, who do not perform the placing of hands. The Gemara is puzzled by this suggestion: But this indicates that with regard to an offering of men, the halakha stated in the mishna is not applicable, and therefore there is no way of rectifying a mixture of consecrated animals of the same type of offering. Abaye raised an objection to this from a baraita (Tosefta 8:22): With regard to the offering of an individual that was intermingled with another offering of an individual, and likewise a communal offering that was intermingled with another communal offering, or the offering of an individual and a communal offering that were intermingled with each other, the priest places four placements of blood from each and every one of them on the altar, and in this manner fulfills the obligation of the blood rites of all the offerings. But if he placed one placement from each one, he has fulfilled his obligation. And likewise, if he placed four placements from all of them together, he has fulfilled his obligation.,The baraita continues: In what case is this statement, that he places from the blood of each of the offerings ab initio, said? In a case where the offerings were intermingled when they were still alive, before they were sacrificed, and therefore the priest could perform four placements from the blood of each animal separately. But if slaughtered animals were then intermingled, i.e., their blood became mixed together in one container, the priest places four placements from all of them together, only one set of four.,And in any case, if he placed one placement from all of them, he has fulfilled his obligation, as the blood of all these offerings is placed on the outer altar, and with regard to all of them one fulfills the obligation after the fact with a single placement. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One assesses the blood of the placement given from each animal; if there is enough in that blood for a placement of blood for this offering and enough for that one, it is fit, but if not, the offering is disqualified.,The Gemara explains the difficulty: This baraita indicates that if live offerings became intermingled, each is sacrificed for its owner, despite the fact that these offerings are owned by men and therefore require placing of the hands. It is evident that the baraita is referring to offerings of men, as it teaches the case of the offering of an individual adjacent to, and therefore similar to, the case of a communal offering: Just as a communal offering is sacrificed by men, so too, the offering of an individual that is being discussed here also belongs to men. This presents a difficulty to the explanation of Rav Yosef.,Rava says: And can you understand the baraita in this manner? Is this baraita accurate as it stands? There is another difficulty with the baraita, as it teaches: In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where these offerings were intermingled when they were still alive. But if slaughtered animals were intermingled it is not said. This is problematic, as what difference is it to me whether the animals are alive or whether they are slaughtered? This is not the decisive factor, as even if the animals were slaughtered, if the blood of each is in a separate vessel the priest should perform separate placements from the blood of each.,Rava continues: Rather, this is what the baraita is saying: In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where these offerings were intermingled after they were slaughtered, but they were similar to living animals, i.e., the blood of each animal was in separate cups. But in a situation where the blood of these animals was mixed together in a single cup, the priest places four placements of blood from all of them. And if he placed one placement from all of them, he has fulfilled his obligation. If so, this baraita has no bearing on the issue of offerings that became intermingled while they were still alive, as it deals exclusively with the blood of animals that have been slaughtered.,§ The baraita cited teaches that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One assesses the blood of the placement given from each animal; if there is enough in that blood for a placement of blood for this offering and enough for that offering, it is fit, but if not, the offerings are disqualified. The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi hold in accordance with this line of reasoning, that there must be a minimum amount of blood placed from each offering? But isn’t it taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Para 9:5) with regard to the water of purification into which water that is invalid for sprinkling fell that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: According to the statement of Rabbi Eliezer, a sprinkling of any amount of the water of purification on someone rendered impure by impurity imparted by a corpse purifies him from his ritual impurity, as sprinkling does not require a minimum measure to purify him. Likewise, a sprinkling of water that is half fit and half unfit for sprinkling serves to purify the individual. Evidently, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintains that no minimum amount is required for the sprinkling of the water of purification, and the same should apply to the sprinkling of blood on the altar.,The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi stated his opinion in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Eliezer, but he himself does not agree with this opinion. And if you wish, say instead that sprinkling of water of purification is discrete and placement of blood on the altar is discrete, i.e., these are two separate halakhot that have no bearing on each other.,§ The mishna teaches: In a case where sacrificial animals were intermingled with a firstborn offering or with an animal tithe offering, they shall graze until they become unfit for sacrifice and they shall both be eaten as a firstborn offering or as an animal tithe offering. This means that one may not sell them in the marketplace nor sell their meat by weight, so as not to degrade consecrated animals. Rami bar Ḥama says: With regard to a firstborn offering, according to the opinion of Beit Shammai, who hold (Bekhorot 33a) that even after a firstborn offering develops a blemish the priest may not eat it in a state of ritual impurity, and therefore one may not feed it to menstruating women, what is the halakha with regard to its substitute? That is, if the owner of a firstborn animal stated with regard to a non-sacred animal in his possession: This animal is a substitute for the firstborn offering, is a menstruating woman permitted to eat that substitute after it develops a blemish?,Rami bar Ḥama further asks: A firstborn offering itself may not be redeemed, even after it develops a blemish, but what is the halakha with regard to redeeming its substitute? He likewise inquired: A firstborn offering itself, even after it develops a blemish, may not be weighed and sold by the litra, in the manner that non-sacred meat is sold. What is the halakha of its substitute in this regard? Rava says that an answer to these questions is taught in a baraita: With regard to a firstborn offering or an animal tithe offering, from when they develop a blemish they can be used to render another animal a substitute, and their substitute has the same status as them. Their substitutes have the same halakhot as they do.,Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma: If the priest who received a firstborn offering dedicated the firstborn offering to the Temple maintenance, i.e., he vowed to give the value of the firstborn offering to the Temple, what is the halakha with regard to the matter that he may weigh its meat by the litra? The Gemara explains the dilemma: In this case, is consideration of the profit of the Temple treasury preferable, or perhaps avoidance of the demeaning of the firstborn offering is preferable. If the profit of the Temple treasury is preferable, the firstborn offering should be weighed in the normal manner so as to increase its price; a buyer will pay more for meat he is able to resell afterward by exact weight. If avoidance of demeaning the firstborn offering is preferable, it should not be weighed by the litra, even though a loss to the Temple would result.,Rabbi Yosei bar Zevida says: Come and hear a proof from the ruling of the mishna: In a case where sacrificial animals were intermingled with a firstborn offering or with an animal tithe offering, they shall graze until they become unfit for sacrifice and they shall both be eaten as a firstborn offering or as an animal tithe offering. Is this not meaning to say that the sacrificial animal that became intermingled with a firstborn offering is also not weighed by the litra, despite the fact that this causes a slight loss to the Temple?,Rav Huna and Rabbi Ḥizkiyya, the students of Rabbi Yirmeya, say: Are these cases comparable? There, the mishna is referring to two separate sanctities, the sanctity of a firstborn offering and that of another offering, and two separate bodies, i.e., two different animals, and in such a case one may not degrade the sanctity of the firstborn due to the other animal with which it is intermingled. Conversely, here, with regard to one who vows to give the value of a firstborn to the Temple, there are two sanctities, a firstborn offering and the Temple maintenance, but they are both found in one body. In this case, as the sanctity of the Temple maintenance itself is in the firstborn offering, it may be weighed by the litra, because of the profit the Temple will gain.,Rav Yosei bar Avin objects to this: What would be the halakha if one says: Redeem for me, i.e., I wish to redeem, a firstborn offering that he had previously dedicated as the object of his vow to the Temple maintenance? Does the court listen to him? His request is certainly not granted, as by Torah law a firstborn offering may not be redeemed. Similarly, the fact that he dedicated the value of the firstborn offering to the Temple should not negate the prohibition of weighing it by the litra. The Gemara questions this comparison: One cannot raise a difficulty from a case where someone says: Redeem the firstborn offering for me, as the Merciful One states with regard to a firstborn offering: “But the firstborn of a bull, or the firstborn of a sheep, or the firstborn of a goat, you shall not redeem; they are sacred” (Numbers 18:17). But the weighing of the offering by the litra is not prohibited by Torah law.,Rather, the Gemara suggests a different resolution of Rami bar Ḥama’s dilemma: Rabbi Ami says: Can this priest transfer to the Temple maintenance anything other than that which was transferred to him? In other words, just as the priest who took the vow may not weigh the firstborn by the litra and gain a profit, the same applies to the Temple treasury, the recipient of his vow.,§ The mishna teaches: All offerings can become indistinguishably intermingled with each other, except for a sin offering and a guilt offering. The Gemara asks: What is different about a sin offering and a guilt offering, that they cannot become intermingled? Is the reason that this, a guilt offering, is always a male, and that, a sin offering, is always a female?,The Gemara questions this explanation: A sin offering and a burnt offering are also like this, as a sin offering is always female while a burnt offering is always male. The Gemara answers that although the standard sin offering is always female, there is the goat of the Nasi, which is a male sin offering, and therefore it can become intermingled with a male goat burnt offering. And as to the statement of the mishna that a sin offering cannot become intermingled with a guilt offering despite the male sin offering of the Nasi, that is because this goat has straight hair and that guilt offering comes only from sheep or rams, which have wool, and the wool is curly.,The Gemara raises a difficulty: A Paschal offering and a guilt offering also cannot become intermingled, as this Paschal offering is in its first year, and that guilt offering is in its second year. The Gemara answers that there is the guilt offering of a nazirite and the guilt offering of a leper, which must be in their first year. And if you wish, say instead that an animal in its first year can become intermingled with an animal in its second year, as there is an animal in its first year that looks like an animal in its second year, and likewise there is an animal in its second year that looks like an animal in its first year.,MISHNA: In the case of a guilt offering that was intermingled with a peace offering, Rabbi Shimon says: Both of them should be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard, as a guilt offering must be slaughtered in the north while a peace offering may be slaughtered anywhere in the courtyard. And they both must be eaten in accordance with the halakha of the more stringent of them, i.e., the guilt offering, with the following halakhot: They may be eaten only in the courtyard rather than throughout Jerusalem; by male priests and not by any ritually pure Jew; and on the day they were sacrificed and the following night, and not on the day they were sacrificed, the following day, and the intervening night.,The Rabbis said to Rabbi Shimon: One may not limit the time of the consumption of an offering, as one may not bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness. According to Rabbi Shimon’s opinion, the peace offering becomes leftover, notar, the morning after it is sacrificed, and not at the end of that day, as is the halakha concerning peace offerings. Rather, the Rabbis hold, the owner shall wait until these animals become blemished, redeem them, and bring an offering of each type that is worth the monetary value of the higher-quality animal among them.,The mishna adds: Even according to the opinion of the Rabbis, if pieces of the meat of one offering were intermingled with pieces of the meat of another offering, e.g., meat from offerings of the most sacred order with meat from offerings of lesser sanctity; or if pieces of meat from offerings eaten for one day and the following night were intermingled with pieces of meat from offerings eaten for two days and one night, since in that case the remedy with regard to offerings that were intermingled cannot be implemented, they both must be eaten in accordance with the halakha of the more stringent of them.,GEMARA: In connection to the principle cited by the Rabbis in the mishna that one may not bring consecrated animals to the status of unfitness, a tanna taught a baraita (Tosefta, Shevi’it 6:29) before Rav: With regard to produce of the Sabbatical Year, one may not purchase produce of teruma from a previous year with its money, i.e., money received in its sale, because one thereby reduces the time of eating the teruma. The produce of the Sabbatical Year may be eaten only until the time of the removal of that type of produce from the field, whereas teruma may be consumed at any time.,The Sages said this baraita before Rabba, and they explained that this baraita is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the mishna. Their reasoning was that if you would say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, doesn’t he say, as can be inferred from the mishna, that one may bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness? Similarly, one can limit the time allowed for the consumption of the Sabbatical Year produce.,Rabba said to them: You may even say that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. That statement, that one may bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness, applies only in a case that is after the fact, as in the mishna, where offerings became intermingled. Rabbi Shimon did not permit one to bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness ab initio. The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Shimon not permit one to bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness ab initio? Abaye raised an objection to Rabba from a mishna that discusses the manner of eating the meat of offerings (Zevachim 90b): And with regard to all of the offerings that are eaten, the priests are permitted to alter the manner of their consumption and eat them as they choose. Therefore, the priests are permitted to eat them roasted, boiled, or cooked, and they are likewise permitted to place non-sacred spices or teruma spices in the cooking pot. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. This indicates that it is permitted to spice offerings with teruma spices ab initio, despite the fact that this reduces the time available to eat the teruma. Rabba said to Abaye: Set aside the halakha of teruma of spices, as this teruma applies by rabbinic law, not by Torah law.,Abaye raised an objection to Rabba from a mishna (Ma’aser Sheni 3:2): One may not purchase teruma with second tithe money, because he thereby limits the circumstances for the eating of the teruma. Teruma may be eaten in any place and even by an acute mourner, i.e., one whose relative died that same day and has not yet been buried, whereas second tithe and food purchased with second tithe money must be eaten in Jerusalem and is prohibited to an acute mourner. And Rabbi Shimon permits one to purchase teruma with second tithe money. This indicates that Rabbi Shimon allows one to bring teruma to the status of unfitness. Rabba was silent in response to his statement, and did not answer Abaye.,When Abaye came before Rav Yosef and told him of his discussion with Rabba, Rav Yosef said to him: Why didn’t you raise an objection to Rabba from this mishna (Shevi’it 8:7): One may not cook vegetables of the Sabbatical Year in teruma oil, so that one does not bring consecrated food, teruma, to the status of unfitness, as the teruma oil would have to be eaten before the time of the removal of the Sabbatical Year produce; and Rabbi Shimon permits one to cook in this manner. Evidently, Rabbi Shimon allows one to bring teruma to the status of unfitness ab initio.,Abaye said to Rav Yosef: And didn’t I raise an objection to Rabba from that mishna discussing the halakha of teruma spices, and he said to me: Disregard the halakha of teruma of spices, as this teruma applies by rabbinic law. Here too, with regard to vegetables of the Sabbatical Year, he could likewise say that this teruma oil is not olive oil, but oil that is teruma of vegetables, which applies by rabbinic law. Rav Yosef replied: If so, that this mishna is referring to vegetable oil of teruma, it should teach the opposite case, that one may not cook vegetables of teruma in oil of the Sabbatical Year. Since the tanna specifies teruma oil, he must certainly be speaking of teruma by Torah law, i.e., olive oil.,Abaye then said to Rav Yosef: And didn’t I raise an objection to Rabba from the mishna, in which Rabbi Shimon permits one to bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness, and Rabba said to me that Rabbi Shimon’s ruling applies only after the fact, when the guilt offering and peace offering have become intermingled? Here too, he would say that this ruling is after the fact, that when the teruma oil and the vegetables of the Sabbatical Year have become intermingled one may then cook them together, but he does not permit one to cook them together ab initio.,The Gemara asks: If this halakha is referring to a case where the foods have already become intermingled, what is the reason of the Rabbis for prohibiting one to cook them together? The Gemara answers: This is just as it is in the case of the mishna with regard to a guilt offering and a peace offering that became intermingled, that even after the offerings are intermingled, one may not bring the flesh of the peace offering to the status of unfitness.,The Gemara raises a difficulty: Are these two cases comparable? There, with regard to the offerings, the situation has a remedy by having the offerings graze until they develop a blemish, at which point the owner brings each offering of each type with the monetary value of the higher-quality animal. By contrast, in this case of teruma oil mixed with vegetables of the Sabbatical Year, the situation has no remedy similar to that of having the offerings graze, and therefore if the Rabbis prohibited the mixture the teruma would go to waste.,If one wishes to compare this case of oil and vegetables to an intermingling of sacrificial animals, this is comparable only to the other halakha of the mishna, which addresses a piece of the flesh of an offering of the most sacred order that was intermingled with pieces of the flesh of offerings of lesser sanctity. Here the Rabbis concede that since there is no remedy for the intermingled pieces, the halakha is that they both must be eaten in accordance with the halakha of the more stringent among them, but they are not prohibited.,Ravina objects to this comparison: Are these cases comparable? In the case of the piece of sacrificial flesh that is intermingled with the other pieces, it has no remedy at all, whereas this case of teruma oil has a remedy through squeezing the oil from the vegetables. If so, this case of vegetables is in fact comparable to that of an intermingling of a guilt offering and peace offering, which also have a means of remedy, and for this reason the Rabbis prohibited the mixture.,The Gemara asks: And how would Rav Yosef respond to the claim that the Rabbis prohibit this mixture after the fact because there is a remedy available through squeezing it? The Gemara explains that Rav Yosef would respond that squeezing is not in fact a remedy, as how can one squeeze it? If one squeezes the vegetables a lot, he thereby causes a loss of Sabbatical Year produce; if one squeezes the vegetables a little, ultimately the teruma oil and vegetables of the Sabbatical Year will still be intermingled, as this squeezing will be ineffective. If so, Rav Yosef’s contention that in this case the Rabbis would not have prohibited cooking vegetables of the Sabbatical Year in teruma oil remains valid. Consequently, this must be referring to a case where the vegetables and oil have not yet become mixed, which means that this case does prove that Rabbi Shimon permits one to bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness ab initio, not only after the fact, as claimed by Rabba.,Rav Yosef raised an objection to the opinion of Rabba from a baraita (Tosefta, Nazir 6:1): How should one whose status as a confirmed leper has not been determined bring his guilt offering and log of oil on the eighth day of his purification? Rabbi Shimon says: On the following day, after his seven days of purification, he brings his guilt offering and his log of oil with it, and says the following stipulation: If this offering is one of a leper, i.e., if I am a confirmed leper, this is his, i.e., my, guilt offering and that is his log of oil. And if he is not a leper, this animal that is brought for a guilt offering shall be a voluntary peace offering, because their sacrificial rites are equivalent. And that uncertain guilt offering requires slaughter in the north of the Temple courtyard as a guilt offering, and placement of the blood on the right thumb and big toe and right ear of the leper, as described in Leviticus 14:14, and it requires placing hands on the head of the animal, and the accompanying wine libations and waving of the breast and thigh like a peace offering.,And lastly, it is eaten by males of the priesthood on the day it is sacrificed and the following night, in the Temple courtyard, like a guilt offering, not for two days and one night in the manner of a peace offering. This indicates that Rabbi Shimon permits one to bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness even ab initio, not only when the animals became intermingled. The Gemara answers that the remedy of a man is different from the case discussed by Rabba. Since this person has no way of purifying himself from his leprosy other than by bringing the offering, the concern of reducing the time available for its consumption is disregarded.,The Gemara asks a question with regard to the resolution suggested by Rabbi Shimon of bringing the offerings and stating a stipulation. This works out well with regard to the guilt offering, but with regard to the log of oil what can be said? A log of oil does not accompany a peace offering. The Gemara explains that the individual bringing the offering says: If I am not a leper, then this log shall be a gift to the Temple, as one can dedicate oil to the Temple. The Gemara questions this resolution: But perhaps he is not in fact a leper, and if so, it is required that a priest remove a handful of the donated oil and sacrifice a handful of it on the altar before the rest of the oil may be consumed by the priests, as is the halakha with regard to oil brought as an offering. The Gemara explains that this is referring to a case where the priest already removed a handful.,The Gemara further questions: But perhaps he is in fact a leper, and he requires the placement of seven sprinklings of oil before the Lord (see Leviticus 14:15–16). The Gemara answers that the priest does place these sprinklings.,The Gemara raises a difficulty: How can the priest sprinkle the oil? But it is lacking, as a handful has been removed from the oil, and one sprinkles only from a whole log. The Gemara explains that after the handful is removed the priest brings a little more oil to the container and fills it up to a log. This is as we learned in a mishna (Nega’im 14:10): In a case where the log lacked a full measure, then if it became lacking before the priest poured from it into his palm in order to place it on the right thumb and big toe of the leper, he shall fill it.,The Gemara poses yet another question: But if he is not a leper, and that log of oil is a gift, that handful removed from the oil requires burning on the altar for the remainder of the oil to be permitted to the priests. The Gemara explains that the priest does in fact burn the handful.,The Gemara asks: When does the priest burn the handful? If he does so after the placement of seven sprinklings for the leper’s purification, in such a case the log will be lacking due to the sprinklings. That which remains is akin to the remainder of a meal offering that was lacking between the removal of the handful and the burning, and one may not burn the handful for that remainder. Similar to a gift of oil, in a meal offering a handful is removed from the offering and then sacrificed on the altar. If after the handful is removed but before it is sacrificed some of the remainder of the meal offering is separated, the handful may not be sacrificed. The same should apply if some of the oil was sprinkled after the handful was removed.,If, alternatively, the priest burns the handful before the placement of seven sprinklings, once he has burned the handful he may no longer perform the sprinklings, in accordance with the principle: Whatever is partly burned in the fire on the altar is subject to the prohibition of: You may not make as an offering (see Leviticus 2:11). This principle states that if part of an item, such as the blood of an animal offering or the handful of a meal offering, has been sacrificed, one who sacrifices any other part of it that is not designated for sacrifice has violated a prohibition. The sprinkling of the oil is equivalent to sacrifice in this regard.,Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, says that the priest does not sprinkle the oil as a definite rite but stipulates that if the man is not a leper he is sprinkling it in a manner analogous to other items that one burns for the sake of wood, i.e., as fuel for the altar and not as a sacrificial rite. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: The verse states: “No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven; for you shall make no leaven, nor any honey, smoke from it as an offering made by fire to the Lord. As an offering of first fruits you may bring them to the Lord; but they shall not come up for a pleasing aroma on the altar” (Leviticus 2:11–12). This verse indicates that you may not offer up leaven and honey as a pleasing aroma, an offering. But you may offer up leaven and honey and other substances for the sake of wood, not as an offering. Here as well, the priest stipulates that if the man is not a confirmed leper, the sprinkling of the oil should not be viewed as a rite.,The Gemara questions further: But even if the priest removes a handful from the oil and burns it, and also sprinkles from the oil, there is the matter of the remainder of the oil, which must be filled after the removal of the handful so that the priest can perform the sprinkling with a full log, and there is therefore that bit of oil that was added from which the priest did not remove the handful initially. If the one bringing the offering is not a leper, and the log of oil is a gift, it will turn out that there is a small portion of the oil that was not permitted by the removal of the handful. The Gemara explains that the priest redeems it, i.e., after the sprinklings of the oil have been performed, he stipulates that if the person who brought the offering is not a leper then the oil should be desacralized by his giving its value to the Temple treasury.,The Gemara asks: If you say that he redeems it, where does he redeem it? If he redeems it when the oil is within the walls of the Temple, he would thereby be bringing non-sacred oil into the courtyard. If he redeems the oil outside the courtyard, before he can redeem the oil it would become disqualified due to the prohibition of a consecrated item leaving the courtyard. The Gemara answers: Actually, he redeems the oil when it is within the walls of the Temple. This is permitted because the non-sacred oil is then found in the Temple courtyard by itself, i.e., he did not bring a non-sacred item into the Temple courtyard.,The Gemara asks a question with regard to the suggested resolution, according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, that one whose status as a leper is uncertain should bring a log of oil as a gift offering and state a stipulation. But doesn’t Rabbi Shimon say that one may not donate oil as a gift? The Gemara answers, as on 76b: The remedy of a person is different, i.e., Rabbi Shimon concedes that one may donate oil in this instance, as this is the only manner by which this person can undergo ritual purification.,The Gemara continues to discuss the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. It was stated above that according to Rabbi Shimon, one whose status as a leper is uncertain may bring a lamb as a gift for a peace offering and state a stipulation with regard to it. The Gemara relates that Rav Reḥumi was sitting before Ravina, and he was sitting and saying the following in the name of Rav Huna bar Taḥlifa: But why can’t he bring a lamb for a guilt offering and say that if he is not a leper then this guilt offering shall be a provisional guilt offering, brought by one who is uncertain whether he committed a sin that requires a sin offering? This guilt offering is eaten for one day and night, like the guilt offering of a leper, and therefore he would not be reducing the time for its consumption, unlike when he stipulates that it should be a peace offering.,Rav Reḥumi continued: Since this option was not suggested, one can learn from here that who is the tanna who disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that one may donate a provisional guilt offering (Keritut 25a)? It is Rabbi Shimon, who says, by inference from his suggestion here, that one may not donate a provisional guilt offering. Ravina said to Rav Reḥumi: Torah, Torah! That is, where is the Torah of such a great man as yourself? You are confusing lambs with rams. The guilt offering of a leper is a lamb in its first year (see Leviticus 14:10), which cannot be brought as a provisional guilt offering because these must be rams (see Leviticus 5:15), i.e., they must be in their second year.,MISHNA: In the case of the limbs of a sin offering, which are eaten by priests and may not be burned on the altar, that were intermingled with the limbs of a burnt offering, which are burned on the altar, Rabbi Eliezer says: The priest shall place all the limbs above, on the altar, and I view the flesh of the limbs of the sin offering above on the altar as though they are pieces of wood burned on the altar, and not as though they are an offering. And the Rabbis say: One should wait until the form of all the intermingled limbs decays and they will all go out to the place of burning in the Temple courtyard, where all disqualified offerings of the most sacred order are burned.,GEMARA: What is the reason of Rabbi Eliezer for deeming it permitted to burn the limbs of the sin offering on the altar as wood? The Gemara explains: The verse states: “No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven; for you shall make no leaven, nor any honey, smoke as an offering made by fire to the Lord. As an offering of first fruits you may bring them to the Lord; but they shall not come up for a pleasing aroma on the altar” (Leviticus 2:11–12). This indicates that you may not offer up leaven and honey as a pleasing aroma, i.e., as an offering. But you may offer up leaven and honey and other substances that are prohibited to be sacrificed upon the altar, such as the limbs of a sin offering, for the sake of wood.,The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, how do they respond to this reasoning? They claim that the Merciful One excludes other cases at the beginning of the verse: “As an offering of first fruits you may bring them.” This indicates that it is with regard to them, i.e., leaven and honey alone, that it is stated: You may not offer up as an offering, but you may offer up leaven and honey for the sake of wood. But with regard to any other substances that are prohibited to be brought on the altar, one may not offer them up to the altar at all.,The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Eliezer, what does he derive from this term of exclusion “them”? The Gemara explains: Rabbi Eliezer expounds this word as follows: It is only with regard to them, leaven and honey, that the verse includes a prohibition against bringing them up to the ramp of the altar like offering them up on the altar itself. But with regard to any other substances that are prohibited to be sacrificed upon the altar, bringing them up to the ramp is not considered like offering them up on the altar itself.,The Gemara further asks: And the Rabbis, from where do they derive this halakha? The Gemara answers that the Rabbis learn two halakhot from the word “them.” This term of emphasis teaches that all that is stated in this verse is referring only to leaven and honey, both the halakha that it is permitted to offer them up on the altar as wood, and the ruling that the ramp is considered like the altar with regard to this halakha.,§ The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of this following tanna, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 8:15) that Rabbi Yehuda said: Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis did not disagree with regard to the limbs of a sin offering that were intermingled with the limbs of a burnt offering, as all agree that they shall be sacrificed. Likewise, they agree that if limbs that are fit to be burned on the altar became intermingled with the limbs of an animal that actively copulated with a person, or with the limbs of an animal that was the object of bestiality, which are prohibited to be sacrificed upon the altar, that they shall not be sacrificed, even according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.,Rabbi Yehuda continues: With regard to which case did Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree? They disagreed with regard to the limbs of an unblemished burnt offering that were intermingled with the limbs of a blemished animal, which is disqualified from the altar. As in this case Rabbi Eliezer says: All the limbs shall be sacrificed, and I consider the flesh of the limbs of the sin offering above, on the altar, as though they are pieces of wood burned on the altar. And the Rabbis say: They shall not be sacrificed.,The Gemara asks: And concerning the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, what is different about the limbs of an animal that actively copulated with a person, or the limbs of an animal that was the object of bestiality, that they may not be sacrificed? If one says that the reason is that they are not fit for the altar, that cannot be the reason, as a blemished animal is not fit for the altar as well, and there he holds that the limbs are burned. Rav Huna says: When Rabbi Eliezer makes reference to a blemished animal, he is speaking of an unobtrusive blemish, e.g., one that is on the cornea of the eye. And his ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that in the case of an offering with such a blemish, if its sacrificial parts ascended the altar, they shall not descend from it, because it is not a disgrace to the altar for the sacrificial parts of such an offering to be burned on it. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Say that Rabbi Akiva says this is the halakha after the fact, meaning that if the priest already brought up the limbs of these blemished animals, they do not descend from the altar. Does Rabbi Akiva say that one may burn a mixture of these limbs ab initio?,Rav Pappa says: What are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where all the limbs in the mixture were brought up upon the ramp. Since they have been brought on the ramp and sanctified as offerings, it is considered after the fact. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, i.e., if we are dealing with a case in which the limbs were already carried to the ramp, then even if they were as is, and not intermingled, the limbs of the blemished animal should be burned, as claimed by Rabbi Akiva.,Rather, the reason of Rabbi Eliezer is that with regard to the prohibition against sacrificing a blemished animal upon the altar, the Merciful One excludes certain cases. After listing the various disqualifying blemishes, the verse states: “Neither from the hand of a foreigner shall you offer the bread of your God of any of these, because their corruption is in them, there is a blemish in them; they shall not be accepted for you” (Leviticus 22:25). This teaches that it is only if there is a blemish clearly in them that they shall not be accepted; but if they were sacrificed by means of a mixture they shall be accepted. This exclusion is stated only with regard to blemished animals, not with regard to animals that copulated with people, and consequently the limbs of these animals are not brought up to the altar even if they became intermingled with the limbs of fit offerings.,The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, how do they expound this verse? The Gemara explains that they expound it as follows: It is only if the blemish is still in them that they shall not be accepted; but if their blemish has passed, they shall be accepted. And Rabbi Eliezer derives this halakha from the previous clause in that same verse: “Because their corruption is in them [bahem].” Since the verse could have stated the shorter form of bam, and instead stated “bahem,” one derives from here that if the animal no longer is blemished it is accepted as an offering. And as for the Rabbis, they do not interpret anything from the variation between bam and “bahem”; they do not see this as a significant deviation from the standard language of the verse.,The Gemara asks: If that is so, and Rabbi Eliezer permits the limbs of blemished animals to be sacrificed if they are in a mixture, why is it necessary for him to say: I view the flesh of the limbs of the blemished animals as though they are pieces of wood? After all, the Merciful One permits them as an offering. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Eliezer is speaking to the Rabbis in accordance with their statement, as follows: According to my opinion, the Merciful One permits these limbs to be sacrificed upon the altar. But even according to your opinion, at least agree with me that the flesh of a blemished animal that was intermingled with the flesh of a qualified offering is considered like wood, just as is the halakha of the flesh of a sin offering that became intermingled with the flesh of a burnt offering, as according to this baraita the Rabbis concede that the flesh of these two offerings should be sacrificed together.,The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, how do they respond to this claim of Rabbi Eliezer? The Gemara explains: According to the Rabbis there is a difference between the cases: Here, with regard to a mixture that includes limbs of blemished animals, these limbs are repulsive, and therefore they may not be brought upon the altar, even as wood. Conversely, there, in the case of a mixture of limbs of a sin offering and limbs of a burnt offering, the limbs of the sin offering are not repulsive in and of themselves, and consequently they may be sacrificed upon the altar as wood.,MISHNA: In a case where limbs of burnt offerings fit for sacrifice were intermingled with limbs of blemished burnt offerings, Rabbi Eliezer says: Although all the limbs are unfit for sacrifice, if the head of one of them was sacrificed all the heads shall be sacrificed, as the head that was sacrificed is assumed to have been that of the unfit animal in the mixture. Likewise, if one sacrificed the legs of one of them all the legs shall be sacrificed. And the Rabbis say: Even if all the limbs were sacrificed except for one of them, there is a concern that the remaining limb is the unfit limb, which may not be sacrificed. Rather, all of the limbs must go out to the place of burning in the Temple courtyard.,GEMARA: Rabbi Elazar says: Rabbi Eliezer permitted the sacrificing of all the heads only if they were sacrificed two by two, as at least one of each pair is certainly permitted; but he did not permit them to be sacrificed one by one, in case the priest may be sacrificing the prohibited head by itself. Rabbi Yirmeya raises an objection from the mishna, which states: And the Rabbis say: Even if all the limbs were sacrificed except for one of them, all the limbs must go out to the place of burning in the Temple courtyard. This indicates that even in this situation, where only one of the limbs remains, the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis still applies, which means that Rabbi Eliezer permits it to be sacrificed despite the fact that it is only one limb.,Rabbi Yirmeya bar Taḥlifa said to Rabbi Yirmeya in response: I will explain the meaning of this statement to you: What does the mishna mean when it states: Except for one of them? It means except for one pair, i.e., two limbs, as even Rabbi Eliezer did not permit one to sacrifice the limbs individually.,MISHNA: In the case of blood of an offering fit for sacrifice that was mixed with water, if the mixture has the appearance of blood it is fit for sprinkling on the altar, even though the majority of the mixture is water. If the blood was mixed with red wine, one views the wine as though it is water. If that amount of water would leave the mixture with the appearance of blood it is fit for presentation. And likewise if the blood was mixed with the blood of a non-sacred domesticated animal or the blood of a non-sacred undomesticated animal, one considers the non-sacred blood as though it is water. Rabbi Yehuda says: Blood does not nullify blood. Therefore, the priest presents the blood of the mixture on the altar.,If blood fit for presentation was mixed with the blood of unfit offerings, there is no remedy. Therefore, the entire mixture shall be poured into the drain running through the Temple courtyard. Likewise, if blood fit for presentation was mixed with blood of exudate, i.e., that exudes from the neck after the initial spurt following its slaughter concludes, which is unfit for presentation, the entire mixture shall be poured into the Temple courtyard drain. Rabbi Eliezer deems this mixture fit for presentation. Even according to the first tanna, if the priest did not consult the authorities and placed the blood on the altar, the offering is fit.,GEMARA: The mishna teaches that in a case where water became mixed with the blood of an offering, if the mixture has the appearance of blood it is fit, despite the fact that there is more water than blood. Concerning this Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They taught this halakha only in a case where the water fell into the blood. But in a case where the blood fell into the water, the first drop of blood, and then the next first drop of blood, is nullified in the water, i.e., each drop is nullified in turn. Consequently, the mixture is unfit for presentation, regardless of whether it has the appearance of blood.,Rav Pappa says: But with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood of birds or undomesticated animals that are slaughtered, it is not so. In this case, even if the blood fell into water, the mitzva of covering applies to it, provided that the mixture has the appearance of blood. The blood is not nullified by the water because there is no permanent rejection with regard to mitzvot, i.e., its nullification was merely temporary, but once there is enough blood in the water, it reassumes its status of blood.,§ The Gemara continues to discuss various mixtures. Reish Lakish says: With regard to meat of piggul, i.e., an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it beyond its designated time, and meat of notar, an offering whose designated time for consumption has passed, and ritually impure sacrificial meat, each of which was an olive-bulk, the minimum size for which one is liable to be flogged for its consumption, that one mixed together and ate them as a mixture, he is exempt from being flogged. The reason is that it is impossible that while eating them one type would not be greater than another type and nullify it. Since it is unknown which prohibition will nullify the other, one cannot forewarn the offender as to which prohibition he is about to transgress, and in order to be liable to be flogged one must receive a forewarning concerning a specific prohibition.,The Gemara comments: Conclude three halakhot from this statement of Reish Lakish. Conclude from it that prohibitions nullify one another in a majority, just as permitted items nullify a prohibited item. And conclude from it that the halakha that when a prohibited food imparts flavor to a permitted substance it prohibits it even when the permitted substance is the majority does not apply by Torah law, but by rabbinic law. The proof is that if this principle were applied by Torah law, then one should be flogged for this consumption, as the meats are of different types and therefore one of them must have imparted flavor to the other. And finally, conclude from it that an uncertain forewarning, e.g., one in which the witnesses cannot be sure which prohibition the transgressor is about to violate, is not considered a forewarning.,Concerning the inference that the halakha that when a prohibited food imparts flavor to a permitted substance it prohibits it even when the permitted substance is the majority does not apply by Torah law, Rava raises an objection from a mishna (Ḥalla 3:7): In a case where one prepared a dough from wheat and from rice, if this mixture has the taste of wheat, it is obligated in the separation of ḥalla, a portion of dough that must be given to a priest (see Numbers 15:17–21). Ḥalla is separated only from one of the five species of grain, not rice. Rava explains his objection: And this halakha applies even though the majority of the mixture is flour from rice. Apparently, the fact that the wheat imparts flavor to the dough renders it obligated in ḥalla even if the wheat is the minority.,The Gemara answers: The obligation to set aside ḥalla in this case applies by rabbinic law, not by Torah law. Rava raises a difficulty: If so, say the latter clause of that same mishna: A person can fulfill his obligation with matza from this type of dough on the first night of Passover. Since by Torah law this mitzva must be fulfilled with matza made from a grain, evidently the principle that one substance that imparts flavor to a greater amount of a different substance affects its status applies by Torah law. Rather, one must say that according to Reish Lakish, in a case of a type of food mixed with food not of its own type, such as wheat flour and rice flour, whose tastes are different, the status is determined by the flavor. Therefore, if the dough tastes like wheat, it has the halakha of a dough made from wheat. But if it is a type of food mixed with food of its own type, e.g., a mixture of piggul and notar meat, which is the case addressed by Reish Lakish, the status of the mixture is determined by the majority.,The Gemara suggests: But let us estimate in a case of a type of food mixed with food of its own type as though it were a mixture of a type of food mixed with food not of its own type, and if so, the minority is not nullified if it is substantial enough to impart flavor to the majority. As we learned in the mishna: If the blood of an offering was mixed with wine, one considers it as though it is water. Although blood and wine certainly have different flavors, in the case of the mishna the determinative factor is not the taste of the mixture, but the appearance. Since they share the same appearance, they are considered a case of a substance in contact with the same type of substance. What, is it not correct to explain the mishna as stating that one views the wine as though it is water, i.e., a substance of a different type, and if the mixture would have the appearance of blood if the wine were water it is fit for presentation, despite the fact that the blood is not the majority?,The Gemara answers: No, this is not the explanation of the mishna. Rather, it means that one views the blood as though it is water, i.e., it is unfit for presentation, since it is as though one presented water on the altar. The Gemara questions this explanation: If so, the tanna of the mishna should have said: The blood is nullified.,And furthermore, it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Mikvaot 7:4): With regard to a ritually impure bucket containing a certain amount of white wine or milk that one immersed in a ritual bath, Rabbi Yehuda says: Although the appearance of the white wine or milk is not discernible in the water of the ritual bath that enters the bucket, one views the white wine or milk as though it is red wine, and makes the following determination: If its conjectured red appearance would pale due to the water that enters the bucket, the wine or milk is nullified by the water. Therefore, the act of purification is fit, and the bucket is ritually pure.,Rabbi Yehuda continues: But if its conjectured red appearance would not pale, the act of purification is unfit, and the bucket remains ritually impure. This is a case in which a substance was mixed with another substance of similar appearance, as white wine and milk have a similar appearance to the water, and yet it is treated as a mixture of a substance with a different type of substance, and it is not nullified in a majority.,The Gemara explains: One cannot cite a proof from the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as this is a dispute between tanna’im, and the ruling follows the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. As it is taught in that baraita: With regard to a ritually impure bucket in which there is white wine or milk, and one immersed it in a ritual bath, one follows the majority, i.e., if the majority of the contents of the bucket is now water from the ritual bath, it is pure. Rabbi Yehuda says: One views the white wine or milk as though it is red wine and makes the following determination: If its conjectured red appearance would pale due to the water that enters the bucket, the act of purification is fit, and the bucket is ritually pure. But if its conjectured red appearance would not pale, the act of purification is unfit, and the bucket remains ritually impure.,And the Gemara raises a contradiction to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda from a mishna (see Mikvaot 10:6): If one had an impure bucket that is filled with spittle and one immersed it in a ritual bath, the spittle is considered an interposition between the water of the ritual bath and that of the bucket, and therefore it is as though he did not immerse it.,If the impure bucket was full of urine and he immersed it, although urine is slightly different in appearance than water, one views the urine as though it is water, and therefore once the urine is in contact with the ritual bath it is considered connected to the water, and it is not an interposition preventing the bucket from becoming ritually pure.,The mishna continues: If the impure bucket was filled with water of purification, the bucket is not purified until the water of the ritual bath that enters the bucket becomes greater in quantity than the water of purification it contains, thereby nullifying it in a majority.,The Gemara explains the contradiction: Whom have you heard who accepts this reasoning of: One views, which appears in this mishna with regard to urine? It is Rabbi Yehuda, as stated in the baraita cited above. And yet the mishna teaches that a majority suffices to nullify the water of purification that became mixed with water, and it is not considered as though it is red wine. This conflicts with the ruling of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to white wine and milk.,Abaye says: This is not difficult; this statement, that the water of purification is nullified in a majority of water, is his, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda’s, own opinion, whereas that statement, in the baraita, that white wine is not nullified in a majority of water, is his teacher’s ruling, i.e., that of Rabban Gamliel, who is stringent with regard to a mixture of a substance in contact with the same type of substance. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabban Gamliel: Blood does not nullify blood, spittle does not nullify spittle, and urine does not nullify urine.,Rava says there is a different resolution of the apparent contradiction between the mishna that states that water of purification is nullified in a majority of water of a ritual bath and Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion in the baraita with regard to white wine mixed with water: In the mishna, we are dealing with a bucket whose internal surface is ritually pure, and only its external surface is impure. The significance of this is that by Torah law it suffices for the water of the ritual bath to enter the bucket in any amount to purify its external surface, and therefore the water of purification in the bucket does not prevent the purification of the bucket at all.,Rava continues: And it is the Sages who decreed with regard to this case that the internal surface must be purified as well, lest the owner wish to spare the water of purification and not to nullify it from its sanctity. In that case he would wish to avoid allowing water from the ritual bath to enter the vessel, and might immerse it in a manner which would not allow even the full external surface to come in contact with the water. Therefore, the Sages required that one immerse the entire vessel. But once there is a majority of water in the bucket from the ritual bath, he does not need to enable any more water to enter the vessel, as by Torah law it is already pure.,§ Rava says, in summary of these halakhot: The Sages said that the status of an item in a mixture is determined by the taste, i.e., if the taste of one substance is noticeable in a mixture with another substance it is not nullified, and the Sages said that a prohibited item is nullified by the majority, and the Sages also said that the status of an item in a mixture is determined by the appearance, i.e., if the appearance of a substance is recognizable in a mixture it is not nullified. Rava elaborates: With regard to a type of food mixed with food not of its own type, the nullification is determined by the taste. In the case of a type of food mixed with food of its own type, the nullification is determined by the majority. In a case where there is a possibility to determine the status of an item based on appearance, the nullification is by appearance.,§ The Gemara returns to its discussion of the opinion of Reish Lakish that prohibited items, such as piggul, notar, and ritually impure meat, nullify one another. The Gemara notes: And Reish Lakish disagrees with the statement of Rabbi Elazar, as Rabbi Elazar says: Just as items used in the performance of mitzvot do not nullify one another, despite the fact that one is of greater volume than the other or imparts flavor to it, so too, items to which prohibitions apply do not nullify one another.,The Gemara adds: Whom did you hear who says that items used in the performance of mitzvot do not nullify one another? It is Hillel, as it is taught in a baraita: They said about Hillel the Elder that when eating the Paschal offering, matza, and bitter herbs on the first night of Passover, he would wrap them all at once and eat them together, because it is stated with regard to the Paschal offering: “They shall eat it with matzot and bitter herbs” (Numbers 9:11), which indicates that these three foods should be eaten together. Hillel was not concerned that the taste of the bitter herbs would nullify the taste of the matza. § The Gemara continues its discussion of cases involving a mixture of one substance in contact with the same type of substance, in which according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna the prohibited substance is not nullified. The Sages taught a baraita (Tosefta, Teharot 5:3): In a case where a broken earthenware flask had absorbed the urine of a zav or a zava, whose urine is a primary source of ritual impurity, which imparts impurity to one who carries it, in such a case, if one poured water into this flask to clean it, after the first time and the second time one washed it, it remains ritually impure, but after the third time it is ritually pure, as the impure urine has been expelled from the flask.,The baraita continues: In what case is this statement said? It is said when one placed water into the flask. But if he did not place water into it, but instead placed the urine of a ritually pure person into it, even after the tenth time he places this urine into the flask it remains ritually impure, as one substance in contact with the same type of substance is not nullified. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: After the third time, even though he did not place water into it, but rather urine, it is ritually pure. The Gemara comments: Whom did you hear who says that a substance in contact with the same type of substance is not nullified? Rabbi Yehuda, and therefore he is the first tanna of this baraita.,And the Gemara raises a contradiction from another baraita (Tosefta, Teharot 4:11): With regard to flax that was woven by a menstruating woman, although it has absorbed the spittle of a menstruating woman, which imparts impurity by being carried, one who moves it remains ritually pure, as the spittle has dried. But if the flax was still moist, one who moves it is rendered impure due to the liquid of her mouth, i.e., the spittle of the menstruating woman. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even one who wets the flax with water is rendered impure due to the liquid of her mouth, and this halakha applies even if he wet the flax a great deal, several times, as the water does not nullify and expel the spittle. This apparently contradicts Rabbi Yehuda’s claim with regard to the broken flask that was washed with water three times.,Rav Pappa says: Spittle is different, as it is thoroughly absorbed and adheres to the flax, and therefore washing the flax with water does not nullify the spittle.,§ The mishna teaches: If blood fit for presentation was mixed with the blood of unfit offerings, the entire mixture shall be poured into the Temple courtyard drain, and similarly, if blood fit for presentation became mixed with blood of exudate, it shall be poured into the drain, whereas Rabbi Eliezer deems the mixture fit for presentation. The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do the first tanna and Rabbi Eliezer disagree?,Rav Zevid says: They disagree with regard to the question of whether the Sages issue a rabbinic decree of this kind with regard to the Temple. As one Sage, the first tanna, holds that the Sages issue a rabbinic decree with regard to the Temple, and therefore one may not present this mixture of blood, lest one present a mixture that contains a majority of blood of unfit offerings or blood of exudate. And one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that the Sages do not issue a rabbinic decree with regard to the Temple, and consequently this mixture of blood is fit for presentation.,Rav Pappa says that there is a different explanation of the dispute: Everyone agrees that the Sages issue a rabbinic decree with regard to the Temple, and therefore in a case where blood fit for presentation was mixed with the blood of unfit offerings Rabbi Eliezer agrees that it should be poured into the Temple courtyard drain, and he deems the blood permitted only if it was mixed with blood of exudate.,Rav Pappa continues: And here they disagree with regard to the question of whether it is common for blood of exudate to be greater in quantity than blood of the soul, i.e., the blood that emerges immediately following the slaughter of the animal. One Sage, the first tanna, holds that this is a common occurrence, and therefore the Sages issued a decree concerning all mixtures of blood of exudate and blood of the soul. And one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that this is not a common occurrence, and therefore the Sages did not issue a decree concerning a mixture of this kind.,The Gemara comments: Granted, according to the opinion of Rav Pappa that Rabbi Eliezer’s lenient ruling applies only to a mixture with blood of exudate, but that he concedes to the first tanna that if blood fit for presentation was mixed with the blood of unfit offerings it is poured down the Temple courtyard drain, this explanation is consistent with that which the mishna teaches: If blood fit for presentation was mixed with the blood of unfit offerings, it shall be poured into the Temple courtyard drain; if blood fit for presentation was mixed with blood of exudate, it shall be poured into the drain. In other words, the fact that the mishna separates these two cases into different clauses makes sense, as Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling applies only to one case.,But according to the interpretation of Rav Zevid that Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with regard to both cases, let the mishna combine them and teach them together, as follows: If blood fit for presentation was mixed with the blood of unfit offerings or with blood of exudate, the entire mixture shall be poured into the drain running through the Temple courtyard, and Rabbi Eliezer deems the mixtures fit for presentation. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, the wording of the mishna poses a difficulty to the explanation of Rav Zevid.,MISHNA: If the blood of unblemished offerings was mixed with the blood of blemished animals unfit for sacrifice, the entire mixture shall be poured into the Temple courtyard drain. This is the halakha when the fit and unfit blood were mixed in one vessel. By contrast, if a cup of the blood of a blemished offering was intermingled with cups of blood fit for offering and it is unclear which blood is in the cup, Rabbi Eliezer says: Although it is prohibited to present all the blood due to the uncertainty, if it happened that a priest already sacrificed, i.e., presented, one cup, the blood in all the other cups shall be sacrificed, as the blood that was presented is assumed to have come from the unfit cup in the mixture. And the Rabbis say: Even if the blood in all the cups was sacrificed except for one of them, the remaining blood shall be poured into the Temple courtyard drain.,With regard to blood that is to be placed below the red line circumscribing the altar, e.g., blood of a burnt offering, a guilt offering, or a peace offering, that was mixed with blood that is to be placed above the red line, e.g., blood of a sin offering, Rabbi Eliezer says: The priest shall initially place the blood of the mixture above the red line for the sake of the sin offering, and I view the blood that was to be placed below that was in fact placed above as though it is water, and the priest shall again place blood from the mixture below. And the Rabbis say: It shall all be poured into the Temple courtyard drain. Even according to the Rabbis, if the priest did not consult the authorities and placed the blood above the red line, the offering is fit, and he should then place the remaining blood below the red line. In a case of the blood of an offering that is to be placed on the altar with one placement that was mixed with the blood of another offering that is to be placed on the altar with one placement, e.g., the blood of a firstborn offering with the blood of another firstborn offering or the blood of an animal tithe offering, the blood shall be placed with one placement. In a case of the blood of an offering that is to be placed on the altar with four placements that was mixed with the blood of another offering that is to be placed on the altar with four placements, e.g., the blood of a sin offering with that of another sin offering, or the blood of a burnt offering with that of a peace offering, the blood shall be placed with four placements.,If the blood of an offering that is to be placed on the altar with four placements was mixed with the blood of an offering that is to be placed on the altar with one placement, Rabbi Eliezer says: The blood shall be placed with four placements. Rabbi Yehoshua says: The blood shall be placed with one placement, as the priest fulfills the requirement with one placement after the fact.,Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua: According to your opinion, the priest violates the prohibition of: Do not diminish, as it is written: “All these matters that I command you, that you shall observe to do; you shall not add thereto, nor diminish from it” (Deuteronomy 13:1). One may not diminish the number of required placements from four to one. Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Eliezer: According to your opinion, the priest violates the prohibition of: Do not add, derived from the same verse. One may not add to the one required placement and place four.,Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua: The prohibition of: Do not add, is stated only in a case where the blood is by itself, not when it is part of a mixture. Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Eliezer: Likewise, the prohibition of: Do not diminish, is stated only in a case where the blood is by itself. And Rabbi Yehoshua also said: When you placed four placements, you transgressed the prohibition of: Do not add, and you performed a direct action. When you did not place four placements but only one, although you transgressed the prohibition of: Do not diminish, you did not perform a direct action. An active transgression is more severe than a passive one.,GEMARA: The mishna teaches that according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, if a cup containing the blood of blemished animals became intermingled with cups holding the blood of fit offerings, and the blood in one of the cups was sacrificed, all the remaining cups are fit. Rabbi Elazar says: Rabbi Eliezer permitted the rest of the cups only if they were sacrificed two by two, as at least one of them is certainly permitted; but he did not permit them to be sacrificed one by one, as he may be found to have presented the blood of the prohibited cup by itself.,Rav Dimi raises an objection from the mishna: And the Rabbis say that even if the blood in all the cups was sacrificed except for the blood in one of them, the blood shall be poured into the Temple courtyard drain. This indicates that even in this case, where only one cup remains, Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with the Rabbis and permits the blood in the cup to be presented. Rabbi Ya’akov said to Rabbi Yirmeya bar Taḥlifa: I will explain it to you: What does the mishna mean when it states: Except for the blood in one of them? It means except for one pair, i.e., two cups, as even Rabbi Eliezer did not permit the presentation of the cups one by one.,§ The dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis was also stated above with regard to a mixture of limbs from fit and unfit offerings. The Gemara notes: And it is necessary for the mishna to teach this dispute with regard to both cases, as, if it were stated only with regard to that case of the limbs, one would have said that it is in that case alone that Rabbi Eliezer says that the rest of the limbs are sacrificed, because the offering’s atonement, i.e., the presenting of the blood, has already been performed, as the limbs are sacrificed after the blood has been presented. But in this case of the blood in the cups, say that Rabbi Eliezer concedes to the Rabbis that the rest of the blood is unfit to be presented.,And conversely, if the dispute were stated only with regard to this case of the cups, one would have said that it is in this case alone that the Rabbis say that the blood in the rest of the cups is unfit, but in that case of the limbs, say that the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Eliezer that the rest of the limbs are fit to be sacrificed, as the blood has already been presented. Therefore, it is necessary for the mishna to state that the dispute applies in both cases.,§ The Gemara continues its discussion of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis. We learned in a mishna there (Para 9:1): With regard to a flask containing water of purification into which any amount of regular water fell, Rabbi Eliezer says: The priest should sprinkle two sprinklings on the ritually impure person, as in this manner he ensures that he will be sprinkled with some of the water of purification; but the Rabbis disqualify the mixture for purification.,The Gemara clarifies: Granted, one can understand why the Rabbis disqualify the mixture, as they hold three opinions: They hold that there is mixing, i.e., when two substances are mixed together each drop is assumed to contain a bit of each of them. And they hold that an act of sprinkling of the water of purification requires a minimum measure of water of purification, and in this case each sprinkling contained some of the regular water. And they hold that it is of no help to sprinkle the water twice, as one cannot combine sprinklings, i.e., two acts of sprinkling the water of purification do not combine to render one pure. Therefore, the person is not purified.,But what does Rabbi Eliezer hold? If he holds that there is no mixing, i.e., when two substances are mixed together each drop is not assumed to contain a bit of each of them, then even if one sprinkles two sprinklings, what of it? Perhaps on both occasions he sprinkles regular water. Rather, one must say that Rabbi Eliezer holds that there is mixing. If he holds that the act of sprinkling does not require a minimum measure, why do I need two sprinklings? One act of sprinkling would be enough. Rather, you must say that Rabbi Eliezer holds that the act of sprinkling requires a minimum measure. And if Rabbi Eliezer holds that one cannot combine sprinklings, then even if one sprinkles two sprinklings, what of it? And alternatively, if he holds that one combines sprinklings, who says that the two sprinklings will amount to the minimum measure? Perhaps most of the water he sprinkled was regular water.,Reish Lakish says: Actually, Rabbi Eliezer holds that there is mixing, and sprinkling requires a minimum measure. And here we are dealing with a case where the two types of water were mixed together in a ratio of one to one, and therefore by performing two sprinklings the priest ensures that he has sprinkled the minimum measure of one sprinkling of water of purification.,Rava says: Actually, Rabbi Eliezer maintains that there is mixing, and sprinkling does not require a minimum measure. Consequently, it should suffice for the priest to perform one sprinkling. And the requirement to sprinkle twice is a penalty that the Sages imposed, so that one who mixes regular water with the water of purification would not benefit from this act by diluting the valuable water of purification.,Rav Ashi states a different explanation: Rabbi Eliezer holds that there is no mixing, and therefore if the priest sprinkles only once there is a concern that he might not have sprinkled any water of purification at all, and therefore he sprinkles two sprinklings.,The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita against Reish Lakish’s opinion that Rabbi Eliezer holds that sprinkling requires a minimum measure. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: According to the statement of Rabbi Eliezer that if the priest performs two sprinklings the purification ritual is valid, a sprinkling of any amount renders the impure person ritually pure, as sprinkling does not require a minimum measure, and even a sprinkling that contains half fit water and half unfit water renders the individual ritually pure. The Gemara adds: And furthermore, one can raise another difficulty against the opinion of Rav Ashi, who maintains that according to Rabbi Eliezer there is no mixing, as it is taught explicitly in a baraita: With regard to blood of an offering, e.g., a sin offering, which is to be placed above the red line that was mixed with blood of an offering, e.g., a burnt offering, which is to be placed below the red line, Rabbi Eliezer says: The priest shall initially place the blood of the mixture above the red line for the sake of the sin offering, and the priest should then place blood from the mixture below the red line for the sake of the burnt offering, and both the blood placed above and the blood placed below count for him toward the fulfillment of the mitzva.,The Gemara explains the difficulty from this baraita: And if you say that there is no mixing, why do both of the placements count for him? Perhaps he placed the blood of the mixture that belongs above the red line below it, and the blood that belongs below the red line above it.,The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a case where there is a majority of blood that is to be placed above the line, and the priest placed blood above by the measure of the blood in the mixture that is to be placed below the line, and slightly more blood. In this manner he ensures that he must have placed above the red line some of the blood that belongs there.,The Gemara raises a difficulty: But the baraita teaches: The blood placed below counts for him toward the fulfillment of the mitzva. According to this explanation, it is possible that all the blood of the burnt offering was placed above the red line. Why, then, has he fulfilled the mitzva by placing blood below the red line? The Gemara explains: The baraita does not mean that it counts for the mitzva of the placing of the blood of a burnt offering below the red line; rather, it means that it counts for him for the sake of the remainder of the blood of the sin offering, which must be poured onto the base of the altar.,The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: If the priest placed the mixed blood below the red line and did not consult the authorities, what should he do now? Rabbi Eliezer says: He shall again place the blood above the red line, and the blood placed below counts for him. Once again, the difficulty is that if Rabbi Eliezer maintains that there is no mixing, why does the placement count for him? Perhaps he placed the blood of the mixture that belongs above the red line below it, and the blood that belongs below the red line above it.,The Gemara answers: Here too, we are dealing with a case where the majority of blood belongs above the line, and the priest placed blood above from the measure of the blood in the mixture that belongs below the line, and slightly more blood. Again the Gemara asks: But the baraita teaches: The blood placed below counts for him. Since it is possible that all of the blood of the burnt offering was placed above the red line, why does the blood placed below count for him? The Gemara answers that the baraita means it counts for him for the sake of the remainder of the sin offering.,The Gemara further suggests: Come and hear another proof from a baraita: If the priest placed the mixed blood above and did not consult the authorities, both these Sages and those Sages, i.e., the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer, concede that he shall again place the blood below the red line, and these placements and those placements count for him. If Rabbi Eliezer maintains that there is no mixing, he would not concede this point, as perhaps he placed the blood that belongs below the red line above it, and the blood that belongs above, below.,The Gemara answers: Here too, this is referring to a case where the majority of blood belongs above the line, and the priest placed blood above in the measure of the blood in the mixture that belongs below the line, and slightly more blood. In this manner he fulfills the mitzva of the blood that is to be placed above the red line alone.,The Gemara raises a difficulty: But the baraita teaches: These and those count for him, not only the blood that is to be placed above. The Gemara explains: Does the baraita teach: These Sages and those Sages concede that these placements and those placements count for him? It teaches only: These and those count for him. In other words, although the baraita states in the first clause that both the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer concede that the priest returns and places the blood below the red line, this agreement does not apply to the next clause of the baraita, as in the latter clause we come to the opinion of the Rabbis alone, who say that there is mixing, which is why both placements count.,The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: In a case of the blood of an offering that is to be placed on the altar with one placement that was mixed with the blood of another offering that is to be placed on the altar with one placement, the blood shall be placed with one placement. And if you say that according to Rabbi Eliezer there is no mixing, why shall they be placed with one placement? Perhaps he places from this blood and does not place from that blood. The Gemara answers: This is referring to a case where the measure of one placement of this blood was mixed with the measure of one placement of that blood, and no more. Consequently, he certainly placed both types of blood.,The Gemara raises another difficulty: The mishna teaches that in a case of the blood of an offering that is to be placed on the altar with four placements that was mixed with the blood of another offering that is to be placed on the altar with four placements, the blood shall be placed with four placements. But if there is no mixing, perhaps he placed only the blood of one offering. The Gemara explains: Here too, it is referring to a case where the measure of four placements of this blood was mixed with the measure of four placements of that blood, and therefore he certainly placed blood from both offerings.,The Gemara raises another difficulty: The mishna teaches that if the blood of an offering that is to be placed on the altar with four placements was mixed with the blood of another offering that is to be placed on the altar with one placement, Rabbi Eliezer says: The blood shall be placed with four placements. Here too, if there is no mixing according to Rabbi Eliezer, perhaps he placed the blood of only one of the offerings. And if you would say that here too, the mishna is discussing a case where the measure of four placements was mixed with precisely the amount of one placement, and therefore the priest certainly placed some blood of both offerings, if so, how would one explain the clause in the mishna that states: Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Eliezer: According to your opinion, doesn’t the priest violate the prohibition of: Do not add? From where is the violation of: Do not add, here? After all, the priest places only the measure of one placement from the offering that requires one placement.,Rather, Rava says: Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis do not disagree with regard to a case of actual blood mixed together. When they disagree it is with regard to a case of cups of blood that were intermingled, and it is unknown which blood is in which cup. The explanation according to Rabbi Eliezer is that he is of the opinion that one views the blood that was not placed properly as though it were water, and therefore it is permitted to present the blood; whereas the explanation according to the Rabbis is that they are not of the opinion that one views the blood that was not placed properly as though it were water, and consequently all of it must be poured into the Temple courtyard drain.,The Gemara asks: And do they not disagree with regard to blood mixed together? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda said: Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis did not disagree in a case of blood of a sin offering that was mixed with blood of a burnt offering that the mixture shall be sacrificed, or in a case of blood that was fit for presentation that was mixed with the blood of an animal that copulated with a person, or an animal that was the object of bestiality, that it shall not be sacrificed. The baraita continues: With regard to what case did they disagree? With regard to blood of an unblemished animal that was mixed with blood of a blemished animal, as Rabbi Eliezer says that it shall be sacrificed, whether in a case of blood mixed together or in a case of cups intermingled, and the Rabbis say it shall not be sacrificed.,The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, i.e., when Rabbi Yehuda teaches the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, teaches that the dispute applies both in a case of blood mixed together and in a case of intermingled cups, but the Rabbis who taught the mishna maintain that Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree only in a case of intermingled cups.,§ The mishna teaches that if the blood of a sin offering, which is to be placed above the red line, was mixed with blood of a burnt offering, which is to be placed below the line, Rabbi Eliezer holds that it shall all be placed above the red line, and one views the blood of the burnt offering placed there as though it is water, and subsequently the priest shall place the blood below the red line. By contrast, the Rabbis rule that all the blood shall be poured into the Temple courtyard drain. Concerning this, Abaye says: The mishna taught that according to the opinion of the Rabbis the blood shall be poured into the drain only if the first portion of the blood of a sin offering, i.e., that blood which is to be placed above the red line, and the blood of a burnt offering were mixed.,But if the final portion of the blood of a sin offering, i.e., the remainder of the blood that is poured onto the base of the altar (see Leviticus 4:25), and the blood of a burnt offering were mixed, everyone agrees that since the place of the blood of a burnt offering, below the red line, is the same as the place of the remainder of the blood of a sin offering, as the remainder of the blood of a sin offering is poured on the base of the altar, the priest shall place all the blood on the side of the altar below the red line. Rav Yosef said to Abaye: This is what Rav Yehuda says: The places are not the same, as the remainder of blood needs to be placed on the bench, i.e., on the upper horizontal surface of the base itself, and not on the side of the altar as is the case with the blood of a burnt offering.,The Gemara notes that amora’im of Eretz Yisrael disagreed in the same manner as Abaye and Rav Yosef: And likewise Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: The mishna taught that according to the opinion of the Rabbis the blood shall be poured into the drain only if the first portion of the blood of a sin offering and the blood of a burnt offering were mixed. But if the final portion of the blood of a sin offering and the blood of a burnt offering were mixed, everyone agrees that since the place of the blood of a burnt offering is the same as the place of the remainder of the blood of a sin offering, the priest shall place all the blood on the side of the altar below the red line. Rabbi Yoḥanan says, and some say it was Rabbi Elazar who says: This case of the remainder of blood of a sin offering that was mixed with the blood of a burnt offering is still included in the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis.,Rav Huna bar Yehuda raises an objection from a baraita: The verse states with regard to firstborn animals: “They are holy” (Numbers 18:17). The emphasis of the term “they” serves to teach that even if the blood of a firstborn offering was mixed with blood of other sacrificial animals, the blood shall be sacrificed, as the blood of firstborn offerings is not nullified. What, is it not referring even to a case of the final portion of the blood of a burnt offering and the blood of a firstborn offering that were mixed, indicating that the priest places the mixture below the red line? And if so, one can learn from this baraita that the place of the blood of a burnt offering, which is also the place of the blood of a firstborn offering, is the same as the place of the remainder of blood of a sin offering. The Gemara answers: No, the baraita is referring to the first part of the blood of a burnt offering and the blood of a firstborn offering.,The Gemara raises a difficulty: But if so, what is this baraita teaching us? Is it teaching that the blood of offerings that ascend to the altar do not nullify one another? This halakha is already derived from the verse: “And he shall take of the blood of the bull and of the blood of the goat” (Leviticus 16:18), from which it is understood that although the blood of the two animals is in the same vessel, they each retain their distinct identity. The Gemara answers: This is a dispute between tanna’im, as there is a tanna who derives this halakha from here, and there is a tanna who derives it from there.,Rava raises an objection from a baraita that discusses a verse describing a burnt offering: “And Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall present the blood and sprinkle the blood” (Leviticus 1:5). The superfluous second mention of the blood teaches that it is still called the blood of a burnt offering even after it was mixed with other blood, and therefore it should be sprinkled in its proper manner. What does it mean when the verse states twice: “Blood,” “blood”? The baraita explains: If “blood” were written only once, one might have thought: I have derived only that this halakha was stated with regard to a case where this, i.e., the blood of a burnt offering, was mixed with the blood of its substitute, as even if these offerings were intermingled when the animals were alive, the burnt offering and its substitute shall be sacrificed. From where is it derived to include even a case of the blood of a thanks offering or a peace offering that was mixed with the blood of a burnt offering, as these offerings are not sacrificed if they became intermingled with a burnt offering while alive?,The baraita continues: And even if one says: I include in this first mention of blood the case of the blood of a thanks offering or a peace offering that was mixed with the blood of a burnt offering, as they are similar in that they both come as a vow offering and a gift offering, like a burnt offering, from where is it derived to include even a case of the blood of the guilt offering that was mixed with the blood of a burnt offering, as a guilt offering cannot be brought as a vow offering or a gift offering?,The baraita continues: And even if one says: I include in this first mention of blood even a case of the blood of the guilt offering that was mixed with the blood of a burnt offering, as they are similar in that a guilt offering requires the placement of two placements that are four, like a burnt offering, from where is it derived that the same applies to the blood of a firstborn offering, and the animal tithe offering, and the Paschal offering, whose blood is placed once on the altar? Therefore, the verse states twice: “Blood,” “blood.” This repetition serves to teach that in any case where the blood of a burnt offering became mixed with the blood of another offering that is placed below the red line, this blood is presented.,The Gemara analyzes this baraita: What, is it not referring even to a case of the final portion of the blood of a burnt offering and the blood of a firstborn offering that were mixed? And if so, one can learn from this baraita that the place of the blood of a burnt offering is the same as the place of the remainder of the blood of a firstborn offering.,The Gemara answers: No, the baraita is referring to the first part of the blood of a burnt offering and the blood of a firstborn offering. But if so, what is this baraita teaching us? Is it teaching that the blood of offerings that ascend to the altar do not nullify one another? This halakha is already derived from the verse: “And he shall take of the blood of the bull and of the blood of the goat” (Leviticus 16:18). The Gemara explains: This is a dispute between tanna’im, as there is a tanna who derives this halakha from here, and there is a tanna who derives it from there.,§ The Gemara has cited three different verses as the source for the halakha that the blood of offerings that ascend to the altar do not nullify one another: “They are holy” (Numbers 18:17); “And he shall take of the blood of the bull and of the blood of the goat” (Leviticus 16:18); “And Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall present the blood and sprinkle the blood” (Leviticus 1:5). The Gemara notes: And these other tanna’im do not derive this principle from the verse: “And he shall take of the blood of the bull and of the blood of the goat,” as they maintain that the High Priest does not mix the blood of the bull with the blood of the goat in order to place the blood on the corners of the golden altar; rather, each type of blood is placed separately. Additionally, these other tanna’im do not derive this halakha from the repeated mention of: “Blood,” “blood,” as they do not learn anything from this repetition.,The Gemara asks: But what is the reason that those other tanna’im do not derive this halakha from the verse: “They are holy” (Numbers 18:17)? The Gemara explains: They hold that the verse should be understood as follows: “They are holy,” i.e., they, the firstborn offerings themselves, are sacrificed, but their substitutes are not sacrificed.,The Gemara asks: And the other tanna, i.e., the tanna who derives the halakha that the blood of offerings that ascend to the altar do not nullify one another from the verse: “They are holy” (Numbers 18:17), from where does he learn that the substitute of a firstborn is not sacrificed? The Gemara explains: He derives it from the verse: “Whether it be ox or sheep, it is the Lord’s” (Leviticus 27:26). The emphasis of “it is” teaches that it is sacrificed but its substitute is not sacrificed.,§ The Gemara resumes its discussion of whether the place of the blood of a burnt offering is the same as the place for the remainder of the blood of offerings. Come and hear a baraita: With regard to blood that is to be placed above the red line that was mixed with blood that is to be placed below the line, which according to the Rabbis must be poured into the Temple courtyard drain, if the priest placed the mixed blood above and did not consult the authorities, both these Sages and those Sages, i.e., the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer, concede that he shall again place the blood below the red line, and these placements and those placements count for him.,The Gemara analyzes this baraita: What, is it not referring to a case where the blood of a sin offering and a burnt offering were mixed? And once the priest placed blood of the sin offering above the red line, that which is left from the blood of the sin offering is considered the remainder of the blood. And yet the baraita teaches: Both these Sages and those Sages concede that he shall again place the blood below the red line. And if so, one can learn from the baraita that the place of the blood of a burnt offering is the same as the place of the remainder of the blood of a sin offering.,The Gemara relates: When Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that they say in the West, Eretz Yisrael: What are we dealing with here? We are dealing not with a mixture of blood of a sin offering and blood of a burnt offering, but with a case where the blood of a sin offering sacrificed on the external altar, which is placed above the red line, was mixed with the remainder of the blood of a sin offering whose blood is presented inside the Sanctuary. This remainder is poured on the base of the external altar. Consequently, once the priest has placed blood from the mixture above the red line, all that remains is a mixture of remainders, which are placed in the same location.,Abaye said to Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef: Why is it necessary to cite the case of the remainder of the blood of a sin offering whose blood is presented inside the Sanctuary? But let the Master say that it is referring to a case where the blood of a sin offering sacrificed on the external altar was mixed with the remainder of the blood of a sin offering sacrificed on the external altar. Perhaps you chose that case to indicate that this is what the baraita teaches us: Even according to the one who says that failure to pour the remainder of the blood of a sin offering whose blood is presented inside the Sanctuary disqualifies the offering, nevertheless, if the remainder was merely lacking, as in this case, as some of the blood had been placed above the red line, this does not disqualify the offering.,Rava Tosfa’a said to Ravina: How can that baraita be cited as proof for the issue at hand? We already interpreted it (80b) with regard to a mixture of blood that is to be placed above the red line with blood that is to be placed below the red line, which contains a majority of blood that is to be placed above the line, and the priest places above the red line a measure of blood that is to be placed below the line and slightly more. Ravina said to him: That statement applies according to those who said initially that Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree with regard to a mixture of blood, and that Rabbi Eliezer holds that there is no mixing. But according to the conclusion, Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree with regard to cups of blood that were intermingled, and therefore the above interpretation of the baraita was rejected.,MISHNA: Blood that is to be placed on three locations inside the Sanctuary, i.e., between the staves, on the Curtain, and on the golden altar, that was mixed with blood that is to be placed outside the Sanctuary on the external altar in the Temple courtyard, has no remedy, as one may not change the location of the placement of the blood of one to fulfill his obligation with the other type of blood. Therefore, all the blood shall be poured into the Temple courtyard drain. If the priest, on his own initiative, placed the mixture of blood outside the Sanctuary and again placed the mixture of blood inside the Sanctuary, the offering is fit.,If the priest, on his own initiative, placed the mixture of blood inside the Sanctuary and again placed the mixture of blood outside the Sanctuary, Rabbi Akiva deems the blood placed outside disqualified, and the Rabbis deem it fit. As Rabbi Akiva says: Any blood that is to be presented outside that entered to atone in the Sanctuary is disqualified; but the Rabbis say: That is the halakha with regard to the blood of an external sin offering alone, as it is written: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23). Rabbi Eliezer says: The status of a guilt offering is like that of a sin offering as well, as it is stated: “As is the sin offering, so is the guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:7), i.e., there is one halakha for them. That is not the case with regard to the blood of other offerings.,GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if blood that is to be placed inside the Sanctuary was mixed with blood that is to be placed outside the Sanctuary, all the blood should be poured into the Temple courtyard drain, and there is no opposing opinion recorded in the mishna. The Gemara asks: And let Rabbi Eliezer disagree even with regard to this case, just as he disagrees with regard to a mixture of blood that is to be placed above the red line that was mixed with blood that is to be placed below the red line, where he holds that the improperly placed blood is considered as though it were water.,The Gemara explains that Rabbi Eliezer does not disagree in this case, as how should the priest act? If one says that he should first place blood from the mixture on the altar outside the Sanctuary, and again place blood from the mixture inside the Sanctuary, this is not allowed. Just as it is a mitzva to give precedence to the blood that is to be placed above the red line over the blood that is to be placed below the line, e.g., the presentation of the blood of a sin offering precedes the presentation of the blood of a burnt offering, since a sin offering serves to effect atonement, so too is it a mitzva to give precedence to the blood that is to be placed inside the Sanctuary over blood that is to be placed outside the Sanctuary. And if you suggest that the priest should first place blood from the mixture inside the Sanctuary and again place blood outside, on the altar, although this resolution is applicable to most offerings whose blood is placed outside, nevertheless the tanna of the mishna chose to omit this case. The reason is that since there are a sin offering and a guilt offering, concerning which, according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, when their blood enters the Sanctuary they are disqualified from being placed on the external altar, the tanna could not teach this halakha categorically. In other words, as the tanna could not issue a categorical ruling that applies to all types of offerings, he omitted the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer here.,§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Akiva would say: Any blood that is to be presented outside that entered to atone in the Sanctuary is disqualified. The Gemara discusses the source for Rabbi Akiva’s ruling. The verse states: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23). How does Rabbi Akiva apply this halakha to all offerings whose blood is presented on the external altar? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: Hear a parable: To what is this matter comparable? To a student who mixed wine with hot water for his teacher. And the teacher said to him: Mix another drink for me. The student said to him: With what should I mix the wine, hot or cold water? The teacher said to him: Aren’t we dealing with hot water? Now that I requested that you mix me another cup, I mean that you should mix it either in hot water or in cold. Otherwise, the teacher would not have needed to say anything.,Here too, since we have been dealing with a sin offering in that passage (see Leviticus 6:17–22), why do I need the term “sin offering” that the Merciful One writes in this verse? Even without this term it is clear that the Torah is referring to a sin offering. Rather, as in the parable, the Torah mentions a sin offering to teach: I do not say this halakha with regard to a sin offering alone, i.e., that only the blood of a sin offering is disqualified when it is brought inside the Sanctuary, but the blood of all sacrificial animals is disqualified by being brought into the Sanctuary.,Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, objects to this explanation: Accordingly, one should reach the opposite conclusion: Since all sacrificial animals that are sacrificed on the altar are included in this passage of the Torah with regard to scouring and rinsing, as derived by the Sages, despite the fact that this requirement is stated in connection with a sin offering (see Leviticus 6:21), it is already established that this chapter is speaking of all offerings. Consequently, why do I need the term “sin offering” that the Merciful One writes with regard to the matter of blood that entered the Sanctuary? Learn from the verse that in the case of a sin offering whose blood entered the Sanctuary, yes, it is disqualified, but if the blood of any other offering entered the Sanctuary, no, it is not disqualified.,Rav Huna addresses Shmuel’s parable: And if you wish to provide a comparison, it is comparable only to a student who initially mixed wine for his teacher with both hot and cold water, and his teacher then said to him: Mix wine for me only with hot water.,Rav Huna continues: Rather, the reasoning of Rabbi Akiva is from the fact that the verse does not state simply: “Sin offering,” but states: “Any sin offering”; this serves to include all other offerings. As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23). I have derived that this halakha applies only with regard to a sin offering; from where is it derived that it also applies to offerings of the most sacred order? The verse states: “Any sin offering.” And from where is it derived that it also applies to offerings of lesser sanctity? The verse states: “And any sin offering.” This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.,Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said to Rabbi Akiva: Even if you include offerings in this manner from the verse all day long, I will not listen to you. Rather, this verse is referring to a sin offering alone, and it should be expounded as follows: The verse states: “Sin offering”; I have derived only that this halakha applies to the sin offering of an individual. From where is it derived that the same applies to a communal sin offering? The verse states: “Any sin offering.” And one can still say: I have derived only that this halakha applies to a male sin offering; from where is it derived that the same applies to a female sin offering? The verse states: “And any sin offering.”,The Gemara asks: Why is it assumed that the application of this halakha to a male sin offering is more obvious than to a female sin offering? Isn’t it the opposite [kelapei layya], as the standard sin offering of an individual is a female? Rather, this is what Rabbi Yosei HaGelili is saying: One can still ask: I have derived only that this halakha applies to a female sin offering; from where is it derived that the same applies to a male sin offering? The verse states: “And any sin offering.”,The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yosei HaGelili hold that this verse comes for this purpose, to teach the halakha of sin offerings whose blood was brought inside the Sanctuary? But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: As we have found the entire matter that is stated in the verse: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten; it shall be burned with fire” (Leviticus 6:23), is not stated with regard to a standard sin offering improperly brought inside the Sanctuary; rather, it speaks only about bulls that are burned and goats that are burned.,Rabbi Yosei HaGelili elaborates: These are unique sin offerings, and the Torah states that their blood should be brought inside the Sanctuary. The verse is stated with regard to these sin offerings both in order to command the Jewish people to burn their disqualified ones in the Temple and in order to establish a prohibition with regard to their consumption.,The baraita continues: The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: If you expound the verse in this fashion, then from where is it derived that a standard sin offering whose blood entered the innermost sanctum, the Holy of Holies, must be burned? Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said to them that it is derived from the verse: “Behold, its blood was not brought into the Sanctuary within” (Leviticus 10:18). This indicates that had the sin offering referred to in the verse been brought inside the Sanctuary, it should have been burned. In any event, with regard to the issue at hand, since Rabbi Yosei HaGelili interprets the verse from Leviticus 6:23 in this manner, how can he interpret it differently in his dispute with Rabbi Akiva?,The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili spoke according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, i.e., although Rabbi Yosei HaGelili interprets the verse in a different manner, according to Rabbi Akiva’s explanation it should be understood as referring only to a sin offering, not to other offerings.,MISHNA: In the case of a sin offering whose blood placement is on the external altar whose blood the priest collected in two cups, if one of them left the Temple courtyard and was thereby disqualified, the cup that remained inside the courtyard is fit to be presented. If one of the cups entered inside the Sanctuary and was thereby disqualified, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili deems the blood in the cup that remained outside the Sanctuary, in the courtyard, fit to be presented, and the Rabbis deem it disqualified from being presented.,Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said in support of his opinion: The halakha is that if one slaughters an offering with the intent that its blood be presented outside of the Temple courtyard, the offering is disqualified, but if his intention was that the blood be presented inside the Sanctuary, the offering is not disqualified. Just as in a case where part of the blood reached a place where the intent to present the blood there disqualifies the offering, i.e., outside the Temple courtyard, and yet when some of the blood is taken there it does not render the status of the remaining blood disqualified like that of blood that leaves the courtyard, so too, in a case where part of the blood reached a place where the intent to present the blood there does not disqualify the offering, i.e., inside the Sanctuary, is it not logical that we will not deem the status of the remaining blood like that of blood that entered the Sanctuary?,The mishna continues: If all of the blood of a sin offering whose blood placement is on the external altar entered the Sanctuary to atone through sprinkling, despite the fact that the priest did not actually sprinkle the blood to atone, the offering is disqualified; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Shimon says: The offering is disqualified only when he atones and sprinkles the blood in the Sanctuary. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he took the blood into the Sanctuary unwittingly, the blood remains fit to be presented.,With regard to all the blood disqualified for presentation that was placed on the altar, the frontplate effects acceptance only for offerings sacrificed that are ritually impure. Although it is written with regard to the frontplate worn on the forehead of the High Priest: “And it shall be upon Aaron’s forehead, and Aaron shall bear the iniquity committed in the sacred matters” (Exodus 28:38), this does not apply to all disqualifications of offerings. This is because the frontplate effects acceptance for offerings sacrificed that are ritually impure but does not effect acceptance for offerings that leave the courtyard.,GEMARA: With regard to the dispute between Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and the Rabbis as to whether the blood of a sin offering in a second cup is disqualified if the blood in the first cup entered the Sanctuary, it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said: This is an a fortiori inference: And just as in a case where part of the blood reached a place where the intent to present the blood there disqualifies the offering, i.e., outside the Temple courtyard, and yet that blood that was taken outside does not disqualify the blood that is still inside the courtyard, so too, in a case where part of the blood reached a place where the intent to present the blood there does not disqualify the offering, i.e., inside the Sanctuary, is it not logical that the blood that was taken inside will not disqualify the blood that is still outside the Sanctuary?,The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: But the verse states: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23). This indicates that even if part of its blood is brought inside the Sanctuary, the sin offering is disqualified.,Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said to the Rabbis: If you expound the verse in that manner, then from now one can derive an a fortiori inference with regard to the blood that leaves the courtyard: And just as in a case where part of the blood reached a place where the intent to present the blood there does not disqualify the offering, i.e., inside the Sanctuary, the blood that was taken inside disqualifies the blood that is still outside, i.e., in the courtyard, so too, in a case where part of the blood reached a place where the intent to present the blood there disqualifies the offering, i.e., outside the Temple courtyard, is it not logical that the blood that was taken outside will disqualify the blood that is still inside the courtyard? Why do the Rabbis deem this blood fit?,The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili in response: But the verse states: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23). This teaches that only blood that enters the Sanctuary disqualifies the blood in the courtyard, but the blood that leaves the courtyard does not disqualify the blood in the courtyard.,In light of this discussion, the Gemara asks: And let intent to present the blood inside the Sanctuary disqualify the offering based on an a fortiori inference: And just as in a place where the part of the blood that went outside does not disqualify the rest of the blood that is inside the courtyard, and yet intent to present the blood in this place disqualifies the offering, i.e., outside the courtyard, so too, in a place where the part of the blood that went inside the Sanctuary disqualifies the rest of the blood that is outside the Sanctuary, in the courtyard, is it not logical that intent to present the blood in this place will disqualify the offering, i.e., inside the courtyard?,The Gemara explains that one does not derive this a fortiori inference, as the verse states: “And if it be eaten at all on the third day, it is piggul; it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 19:7), and the Sages expounded this verse with regard to the halakha of intent while slaughtering an offering. This verse teaches that the place where improper intent disqualifies the offering must be triply functional: For the presenting of the blood, for the eating of the meat, and for the burning of the sacrificial portions of the offering that are consumed on the altar. In other words, it must be outside its designated place with regard to all three of these issues. Consequently, intent to present the blood in the Sanctuary does not disqualify the blood.,The Gemara suggests the opposite: And if so, let intent to present the blood outside the Sanctuary not disqualify the offering based on an a fortiori inference: And just as in a place where the part of the blood that went inside the Sanctuary disqualifies the rest of the blood that is outside in the courtyard, and yet intent to present the blood inside the Sanctuary does not disqualify the offering, so too, in a place where the part of the blood that went outside the courtyard does not disqualify the rest of the blood that is inside the courtyard, is it not logical that intent to present the blood outside the courtyard does not disqualify the offering?,The Gemara answers that the verse states: “And if it be eaten at all on the third day, it is piggul; it shall not be accepted,” and the Sages interpreted this verse as follows: “On the third day” is referring to intent to perform its rites beyond its designated time; “it is piggul” is referring to intent to perform its rites outside its designated area.,A baraita teaches: The meat of offerings that left its designated area and was taken to a place that is outside its designated area for consumption, which is outside the wall of Jerusalem in the case of offerings of lesser sanctity and outside the wall of the Temple courtyard in the case of offerings of the most sacred order, is disqualified from being eaten. By contrast, meat of offerings that entered inside the Sanctuary is not disqualified and remains fit to be eaten.,One might have thought that it should be derived based on a logical inference that this meat is disqualified, as follows: And just as in a place where the part of the blood that went outside the courtyard does not disqualify the rest of the blood that remained inside the courtyard, yet meat that leaves and is taken outside the courtyard is disqualified, so too, in a place where the part of the blood that went inside the Sanctuary disqualifies the rest of the blood that is outside the Sanctuary, is it not right that meat that enters the Sanctuary should be disqualified?,The baraita explains that one does not derive this inference, as the verse states: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23), which indicates that the blood of an offering that is brought inside is disqualified, but not meat that enters the Sanctuary.,The baraita continues: From now, as it has been established that the meat of offerings that is brought inside the Sanctuary is not disqualified, one can suggest an a fortiori inference: And just as in a place where blood that went inside the Sanctuary disqualifies the blood that remained outside in the courtyard, and yet meat that enters the Sanctuary is fit, therefore, in a place where the blood that went outside the courtyard does not disqualify the blood that is inside the courtyard, is it not logical that meat that left and was taken outside the courtyard should be fit?,The Gemara explains that one does not derive this a fortiori inference, as the verse states: “And you shall not eat any flesh that is torn of beasts in the field” (Exodus 22:30). The apparently superfluous term “in the field” teaches a general halakha: Once meat has left and been removed outside of its boundary, i.e., the area in which it is permitted to consume it, it has become prohibited.,§ The Gemara returns to its discussion of the blood of a sin offering that entered the Sanctuary. The Sages taught: It is stated that when Moses questioned Aaron as to why a sin offering was not consumed, he said: “Behold, its blood was not brought into the sacred place within” (Leviticus 10:18). This indicates that had the blood been brought within, Moses would have understood that the offering would have been disqualified and rendered prohibited for consumption. The baraita comments: I have derived only that the offering is disqualified if the blood is brought within, i.e., into the Holy of Holies; from where is it derived that the same applies if it was merely brought into the Sanctuary? The verse states: “Into the sacred place within,” and this sacred place is the Sanctuary.,The Gemara questions this derivation: And let the verse state only “sacred place,” and it need not state “within.” If blood that entered the Sanctuary is already disqualified, this halakha certainly applies if it was brought farther inside, to the Holy of Holies. Rava says: This verse comes and teaches about that verse. In other words, had the verse stated only “sacred place,” it would have been interpreted as referring to the Holy of Holies. The addition of “within” indicates that this sacred place is the Sanctuary, while the term “within” is referring to the Holy of Holies. The Gemara cites a similar example: This is just as it is with regard to a tenant and a hired worker.,As it is taught in a baraita concerning teruma: The verse states: “A tenant of a priest or a hired worker shall not eat of the consecrated” (Leviticus 22:10). “A tenant”; this is referring to a Hebrew slave who has been acquired as a permanent acquisition, i.e., one who said he wishes to stay with his master. This slave has his ear pierced and he remains with his master until the Jubilee Year. “A hired worker”; this is referring to a Hebrew slave who has been acquired for an acquisition of six years, the standard period of servitude for a Hebrew slave.,The baraita asks: Let the verse say “tenant” and let it not say “hired worker,” and I would say: If one who is acquired as a permanent acquisition does not partake of his master’s, i.e., the priest’s, teruma, as despite his status as a slave he is not considered his master’s property, is it not all the more so logical that one who is acquired for an acquisition of six years should not be permitted to partake of teruma?,The baraita answers: If so, that the verse were stated in this manner, I would say: “A tenant”; this is one who was acquired for an acquisition of six years, as the term itself is ambiguous, but one who was acquired as a permanent acquisition may partake of teruma. Therefore, the term “hired worker,” which is certainly referring to one who is less permanent than a tenant, comes and teaches about the meaning of the term “tenant,” that this one was acquired as a permanent acquisition and that one was acquired for an acquisition of six years, and both this one and that one may not partake of teruma. Similar reasoning applies in the above case concerning the terms “sacred place” and “within.”,Abaye said to Rava: Are these cases comparable? Granted, there, the tenant and the hired worker are two bodies. And this is significant, as even though the verse could have written explicitly that a pierced tenant may not partake of teruma, from which the halakha of a Hebrew slave for six years could have been inferred, and the other case, that of a slave for six years, is therefore a matter that can be derived through an a fortiori inference, it need not be stated explicitly. Nevertheless, there is a principle: At times, with regard to a matter that can be derived through an a fortiori inference, the verse nevertheless takes the trouble and writes it explicitly. But here, the same blood enters the Holy of Holies via the Sanctuary, and once it is disqualified in the Sanctuary, why is it necessary for the verse to teach that this blood is disqualified when it enters the innermost sanctum, the Holy of Holies?,Rather, Abaye says: This mention of “within” is necessary only for a case where the blood entered the Holy of Holies not via the Sanctuary but in a roundabout manner, e.g., from the roof or the loft of the Holy of Holies, without having entered the Sanctuary. Rava said to Abaye: But an expression of bringing is written in the verse: “Behold, its blood was not brought into the sacred place within,” which indicates a standard manner of bringing it into the Holy of Holies. Rather, Rava says: In any circumstance where the priest intended to bring the blood inside the innermost sanctum, it is not disqualified when it is only in the Sanctuary, and therefore it was necessary for the verse to teach both disqualifications.,§ Rava raises a dilemma: With regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin and the goat for a sin of idol worship, whose blood should be presented in the Sanctuary, if it occurred that the priest brought their blood into the innermost sanctum, what is the halakha?,Rava explains the sides of the dilemma: Do we say that since the verse states: “Into the sacred place within” (Leviticus 10:18) as a single phrase, and therefore anywhere that we read a prohibition against bringing the blood “into the sacred place,” i.e., that the blood is disqualified by being brought into the Sanctuary, we also read a prohibition against bringing the blood “within,” i.e., that it is likewise disqualified when it is brought into the Holy of Holies; but anywhere that we do not read a prohibition against bringing the blood “into the sacred place,” such as with regard to these offerings, whose blood is supposed to be brought into the Sanctuary, we do not read a prohibition against bringing the blood “within” the Holy of Holies? Or perhaps, since in any event the Holy of Holies is not the proper place for the blood of these offerings, it is disqualified.,And if you say that the Holy of Holies is not the proper place for the blood of these offerings and they are therefore disqualified, one can raise another dilemma: In the case of the bull and goat of Yom Kippur, where the High Priest sprinkled from their blood on the staves of the Ark, as required (see Leviticus 16:14), and he brought their remaining blood out to the Sanctuary and subsequently brought it in again to the Holy of Holies, what is the halakha? Is the blood disqualified by this improper second entrance into the Holy of Holies?,Rava explains the sides of the question: Do we say that it is its place, as the High Priest is supposed to bring this blood into the Holy of Holies on Yom Kippur at some point? Or perhaps one should say that since the High Priest has performed the mitzva and the blood has been brought out, it has been brought out, and the Holy of Holies is no longer considered its place.,And if you say that since the blood has been brought out, it has been brought out, one can raise another dilemma: If the High Priest sprinkled from their blood on the Sanctuary Curtain and then brought out the blood to the golden altar in the Sanctuary and sprinkled the blood there, as required (see Leviticus 16:18), but subsequently brought the remainder of the blood in toward the Curtain dividing the Sanctuary from the Holy of Holies, what is the halakha?,Rava explains the sides of the dilemma: Do we say that here the area of the Curtain and the golden altar is certainly one place, as they are both in the Sanctuary, and therefore the blood should not be disqualified by being brought back toward the Curtain? Or perhaps, since we call the taking of the blood to the golden altar: Going out, in the verse: “And he shall go out unto the altar” (Leviticus 16:18), its return to the Curtain should be considered bringing in, and therefore the blood should be disqualified? No answers were found, and therefore the Gemara states that these dilemmas shall stand unresolved.,§ The mishna teaches that the Sages disagree as to the halakha in a case where the priest carrying the blood of a sin offering whose blood placement is on the external altar entered the Sanctuary to atone through sprinkling, but in practice the priest did not actually sprinkle the blood. According to Rabbi Eliezer the blood is disqualified, whereas Rabbi Shimon maintains that the blood is disqualified only if the priest sprinkles it in the Sanctuary. Concerning this, it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: It is stated here: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23), and it is stated there, with regard to the service of the High Priest on Yom Kippur: “And there shall be no man in the Tent of Meeting when he goes in to atone in the Sanctuary, until he comes out” (Leviticus 16:17).,Rabbi Eliezer explains: Just as there, with regard to Yom Kippur, the phrase “when he goes in to atone” is referring to the stage when he has not yet atoned, so too here, with regard to the disqualification of blood brought inside the Sanctuary, the phrase “to atone in the Sanctuary” is referring to a situation where the blood enters the Sanctuary at a time when the priest has not yet atoned.,Conversely, Rabbi Shimon says: It is stated here: “To atone” (Leviticus 6:23), and it is stated there, with regard to the conclusion of the service on Yom Kippur: “And the bull of the sin offering and the goat of the sin offering, whose blood was brought in to atone in the Sanctuary, shall be taken outside the camp, and they shall burn in the fire” (Leviticus 16:27). Just as there, the phrase “to atone” is referring to the stage when he has already atoned, as the bull and goat of Yom Kippur are burned after their blood has been sprinkled, so too here, the phrase “to atone” is referring to a situation where he has already atoned, whereas merely bringing the blood into the Sanctuary does not disqualify it.,The Gemara inquires: With regard to what principle do Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon disagree? The Gemara explains that one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that one derives a case of outside, i.e., the blood of a sin offering whose blood placement is on the external altar, which may not be brought inside the Sanctuary, from another prohibition of outside, the prohibition against entering the Sanctuary; but one does not derive a case of outside from the bull and goat of Yom Kippur, whose blood is brought inside the Sanctuary.,And one Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that one derives a halakha involving an animal, i.e., a sin offering whose blood placement is on the external altar, from another halakha involving an animal, the bull and goat of Yom Kippur; but one does not derive a case of an animal from a prohibition involving a person.,§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: If the priest took the blood into the Sanctuary unwittingly, the blood remains fit for presentation. The Gemara infers: But if his taking of the blood into the Sanctuary was intentional, it is disqualified. The Gemara analyzes this halakha: Is the blood disqualified only in a case where he took the blood into the Sanctuary and atoned, by sprinkling it inside the Sanctuary, as claimed by Rabbi Shimon in the mishna; or even in a case where he took the blood in and did not yet atone, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer?,Rabbi Yirmeya said that one can cite a proof from a baraita: From the fact that it is stated with regard to the Yom Kippur service: “And the bull of the sin offering and the goat of the sin offering, whose blood was brought in to atone in the Sanctuary, shall be taken outside the camp, and they shall burn in the fire their skins, and their flesh, and their dung; and he who burns them shall wash his clothes” (Leviticus 16:27–28), one can ask the following question: Why must the verse state: “And he who burns”?,The Gemara interrupts its citation of the baraita to question its line of inquiry. Why must the verse state: “And he who burns”? One can answer that this term was necessary for itself, to teach that the one who burns the bull and goat of Yom Kippur is thereby rendered ritually impure. Rather, this is what the baraita is saying: Why must the verse state twice: “Sin offering,” “sin offering,” with regard to the bull and the goat? It could have stated merely: And the bull and the goat of the sin offering.,The baraita answers that if the term “sin offering” had appeared only once, we would have learned only with regard to the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur that are burned in the place of the ashes that they render ritually impure the garments of the one who carries them. From where is it derived that the same applies to other sin offerings that are burned? The verse states: “Sin offering,” “sin offering,” twice, to include all sin offerings that are burned. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.,Rabbi Meir says: This derivation from the repeated mention of sin offering is not necessary. Now consider, the verse states: “And the bull of the sin offering and the goat of the sin offering…shall be taken outside the camp.” As there is no need for the verse to state with regard to these offerings: “Whose blood was brought in to atone in the Sanctuary,” why must the verse nevertheless state: “To atone”? This teaches with regard to all offerings that atone inside the Sanctuary that one who burns them renders his garments impure.,The Gemara notes: And Rabbi Yehuda does not learn anything from the term “to atone.” What is the reason for this? Is it not because he requires this phrase for a verbal analogy, to derive that the blood of an external sin offering that was taken inside the Sanctuary is disqualified only if the priest sprinkled it, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? This answers the Gemara’s question, as Rabbi Yehuda evidently follows the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.,,MISHNA: Certain unfit items, once they have been placed on the altar, are nevertheless sacrificed. The mishna teaches: The altar sanctifies only items that are suited to it. The tanna’im disagree as to the definition of suited for the altar.,Rabbi Yehoshua says: Any item that is suited to be consumed by the fire on the altar, e.g., burnt offerings and the sacrificial portions of other offerings, which are burned on the altar, if it ascended upon the altar, even if it is disqualified from being sacrificed ab initio, it shall not descend. Since it was sanctified by its ascent upon the altar, it is sacrificed upon it, as it is stated: “It is the burnt offering on the pyre upon the altar” (Leviticus 6:2), from which it is derived: Just as with regard to a burnt offering, which is suited to be consumed by the fire on the altar, if it ascended it shall not descend, so too, with regard to any item that is suited to be consumed by the fire on the altar, if it ascended it shall not descend.,Rabban Gamliel says: With regard to any item that is suited to ascend upon the altar, even if it is not typically consumed, if it ascended, it shall not descend, even if it is disqualified from being sacrificed ab initio, as it is stated: “It is the burnt offering on the pyre upon the altar,” from which it is derived: Just as with regard to a burnt offering, which is fit for the altar, if it ascended it shall not descend, so too, any item that is fit for the altar, if it ascended it shall not descend.,The mishna comments: The difference between the statement of Rabban Gamliel and the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua is only with regard to disqualified blood and disqualified libations, which are not consumed by the fire but do ascend upon the altar, as Rabban Gamliel says: They shall not descend, as they are fit to ascend upon the altar, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: They shall descend, as they are not burned on the altar.,Rabbi Shimon says: Whether the offering was fit and the accompanying libations were unfit, e.g., if they became ritually impure or they were brought outside their designated area, or whether the libations were fit and the offering was unfit, rendering the accompanying libations unfit as well, and even if both this and that were unfit, the offering shall not descend, as it was sanctified by the altar, but the libations shall descend.