זבחים ל״ו ב:ט״ז-מ״ז א:י״א

the slaughterer would be liable to receive lashes?,But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: One might have thought that with regard to a sin offering that one slaughtered in the south, he would be liable for it. Therefore, the verse states: “You shall not sacrifice to the Lord your God an ox, or a sheep, that has a blemish, even any evil thing” (Deuteronomy 17:1), to teach that for slaughtering an evil thing, such as a blemished offering, you deem him liable to receive lashes, but you do not deem him liable for a sin offering that he slaughtered in the south. The Gemara answers: Here too, there are two tanna’im, and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.,§ Rabbi Abba says: Although Rabbi Yehuda says that an offering is rendered not valid if it was slaughtered with the intent that its blood would be left over until the next day, Rabbi Yehuda concedes that if the priest subsequently collected, conveyed, or presented the blood with the intent to sacrifice or partake of the offering beyond its designated time, he then establishes the offering as piggul. The intent to leave it overnight does not prevent it from being rendered piggul, in contrast to intent to sacrifice or partake of it outside its designated area, or performing a sacrificial rite of the Paschal offering or a sin offering not for its own sake, which do prevent the offering from subsequently being rendered piggul (see 29b).,Rava says: Know that this is so, as intent to sprinkle the blood the next day, which renders an offering piggul and which inherently includes the intent to leave the blood over until the next day so that he can then sprinkle it, is nothing before the sprinkling of the blood. And his intent during the slaughter to sprinkle the blood the next day does not render the offering piggul until the blood is sprinkled, and then the sprinkling of the blood comes and establishes the offering as piggul. Clearly, the intent to leave the blood over until the next day does not prevent the offering from subsequently being rendered piggul.,The Gemara rejects Rava’s proof: But it is not so that this is a valid proof, as there, with regard to standard piggul intent, it is one intent that is established with the sprinkling of the blood. By contrast, here, where he initially had intent to leave the blood until the next day and subsequently had intent to sprinkle it beyond its designated time, there are two separate intents. Therefore, since an improper intent already exists, the offering cannot thereafter be rendered piggul.,Rav Huna raised an objection to Rabbi Abba from a baraita: If one slaughtered an offering with the intent to place the blood that is to be placed above the red line below the red line, or to place the blood that is to be placed below the red line above the red line, and he had intent to do so immediately, i.e., on the same day, then it is valid, as such intent does not disqualify the offering. If he then had intent to sacrifice the offering outside its designated area, it is disqualified, but there is no liability to receive karet for it. If he had intent to sacrifice it beyond its designated time, then it is rendered piggul, and one is liable to receive karet for it.,The baraita continues: If one had intent to place the blood that is to be placed above the red line below the red line or vice versa the next day, then it is disqualified, due to his intent to leave it overnight, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. In this case, if he then had intent to sacrifice the same offering either beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, it is disqualified, and there is no liability to receive karet for it. Evidently, intent to leave it overnight prevents the offering from subsequently being rendered piggul. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Abba is indeed a conclusive refutation.,§ Rav Ḥisda says that Ravina bar Sila says: If one slaughtered an offering with intent that impure individuals would eat the meat of the offering the next day, one is liable to receive karet due the prohibition of piggul. Although impure individuals are not fit to partake of the meat, this is nevertheless considered intent to partake of it beyond its designated time. Rava says: Know that this is so, as meat prior to the sprinkling of the blood is not fit to be eaten, and when one has improper intent with regard to it, it is disqualified. Clearly, intent to partake of a forbidden item beyond its designated time renders the offering piggul.,The Gemara rejects Rava’s proof: But it is not so, as there, with regard to standard piggul intent, he sprinkles the blood, and the meat is rendered fit to be eaten the next day. By contrast, here, it is not rendered fit to be eaten by impure individuals at all. Therefore, such intent is not considered significant intent to consume the meat after its designated time.,Rav Ḥisda says that Rav Dimi bar Ḥinnana was wont to say the following halakha: With regard to the meat of a Paschal offering that was not roasted, and the loaves of a thanks offering from which the priests’ portion was not separated, although it is prohibited for them to be eaten, nevertheless one is liable to receive karet due to violating the prohibition against eating them in a state of impurity.,Rava said: Know that this is so, as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “But the soul that eats of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings that pertain to the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:20). The added words “that pertain to the Lord” serve to include the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity with regard to impurity, teaching that one who partakes of them while impure is liable to receive karet.,Apparently, even though they are not fit for consumption, one is liable to receive karet due to violating the prohibition against eating them in ritual impurity. Here too, with regard to the meat of a Paschal offering that was not roasted, and the loaves of a thanks offering from which the priests’ portion was not separated, even though they are not fit to be eaten, one is liable to receive karet due to violating the prohibition against eating them in impurity.,The Gemara rejects Rava’s proof: But it is not so, as there, the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that are burned on the altar are at least fit for the Most High, i.e., for the consumption of the altar, and therefore one is liable to receive karet for eating them while ritually impure. This is to the exclusion of the meat of a Paschal offering that was not roasted and the loaves of a thanks offering from which the priests’ portion was not separated, which are not fit at all, not for the Most High, and not for an ordinary person.,The Gemara presents another version of the proof and its rejection: But the sacrificial portions are not fit, and yet one is liable if he consumes them while impure. The Gemara responds: But it is not so, since these sacrificial portions are fit for their matters, and these, i.e., the meat of a Paschal offering that was not roasted and the loaves of a thanks offering from which the priests’ portion was not separated, are not fit at all.,,MISHNA: Beit Shammai say: With regard to all the offerings whose blood is to be placed on the external altar, even those that require that the blood be sprinkled on two opposite corners of the altar so that it will run down each of its four sides, in a case where the priest placed the blood on the altar with only one placement, he facilitated atonement. And in the case of a sin offering, which requires four placements, one on each of the four corners of the altar, at least two placements are necessary to facilitate atonement. And Beit Hillel say: Even with regard to a sin offering, in a case where the priest placed the blood with one placement, he facilitated atonement after the fact.,Therefore, since the priest facilitates atonement with one placement in all cases other than a sin offering according to Beit Shammai, and even in the case of a sin offering according to Beit Hillel, if he placed the first placement in its proper manner, and the second with the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time, he facilitated atonement. Since the second placement is not indispensable with regard to achieving atonement, improper intent while performing that rite does not invalidate the offering.,And based on the same reasoning, if he placed the first placement with the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time and he placed the second placement with the intent to eat the offering outside its designated area, the second of which does not render an offering piggul, the offering is piggul, an offering disqualified by improper intention, and one is liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [karet] for its consumption. This is because the intent that accompanied the second placement does not supersede the piggul status of the offering.,All this applies to those offerings whose blood is to be placed on the external altar. But with regard to all the offerings whose blood is to be placed on the inner altar, if the priest omitted even one of the placements, it is as though he did not facilitate atonement. Therefore, if he placed all the placements in their proper manner, and one placement in an improper manner, i.e., with the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time, the offering is disqualified, as it is lacking one placement; but there is no liability for karet for one who partakes of the offering, as the improper intention related to only part of the blood that renders the offering permitted for consumption, and an offering becomes piggul only when the improper intention relates to the entire portion of the offering that renders it permitted for consumption.,GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: From where is it derived with regard to those offerings whose blood is placed on the external altar, that if the priest placed the blood with one placement, he facilitated atonement? The verse states: “And the blood of your offerings shall be poured upon the altar of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:27), indicating that a single pouring of blood suffices. The Gemara asks: But does this verse come to teach this halakha? That verse is necessary for that which is taught in another baraita discussing a different matter: From where is it derived that all the blood that is left over from an offering after the requisite placement requires placement of blood on the base of the altar? The verse states: “And the blood of your offerings shall be poured upon the altar of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:27). The Gemara answers: The tanna of the first baraita derives this from the verse cited by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says with regard to a verse discussing a bird sin offering: “And the rest of the blood shall be squeezed out at the base of the altar; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 5:9). As there is no need for the verse to state “of the blood,” because the entire verse is talking about the blood, what is the meaning when the verse states “of the blood”?,The baraita continues: Since we have learned only about those offerings whose blood is placed on the altar with four placements, i.e., outer sin offerings, that they require placement of the leftover blood on the base of the altar, from where is it derived that the same applies to the leftover blood of all the other offerings? The verse states: “And the rest of the blood shall be squeezed out at the base of the altar; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 5:9). Since there is no need for the verse to state “of the blood,” because the entire verse is talking about the blood, what is the meaning when the verse states “of the blood”? This teaches that all the leftover blood from all the offerings requires placement of blood on the base of the altar.,The Gemara asks: But still, does this verse, Deuteronomy 12:27, come to teach this halakha, that if a priest placed the blood with one placement, he facilitated atonement? That verse is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: From where is it derived with regard to those offerings whose blood is supposed to be placed by means of sprinkling from a certain distance from the altar, that if the priest placed the blood by pouring it from up close he has fulfilled his obligation? The verse states: “And the blood of your offerings shall be poured upon the altar of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:27).,The Gemara answers that the ruling in this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, while the tanna of the earlier baraita holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says: Sprinkling is not included in pouring, and similarly pouring is not included in sprinkling. Rather, these are separate actions performed under different circumstances, and one does not fulfill his obligation to sprinkle the blood by pouring it. Therefore, the verse is available to him to teach that if a priest placed the blood with one placement, he facilitated atonement.,The Gemara demonstrates that this is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva: This is as we learned in a mishna (Pesaḥim 121a): If one recited the blessing over the Paschal offering, which is: Who sanctified us with His mitzvot and commanded us to eat the Paschal offering, he has also exempted himself from reciting a blessing over the Festival peace offering, i.e., the peace offering that is eaten together with the Paschal offering. The blessing for the Festival peace offering of the fourteenth of Nisan is: Who sanctified us with His mitzvot and commanded us to eat the offering.,If he recited the blessing over the Festival offering, he has not exempted himself from reciting a blessing over the Paschal offering. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Yishmael’s reasoning is based on the halakha that the blood of the Paschal offering is poured, while the blood of the Festival offering is sprinkled. He maintains that sprinkling is included in the more general category of pouring, and therefore the blessing over the Paschal offering includes the Festival offering. Pouring is not included in the more limited category of sprinkling, and therefore reciting the blessing over the Festival offering does not exempt one from reciting a blessing over the Paschal offering.,The mishna continues: Rabbi Akiva says: This blessing does not exempt one from reciting a blessing over that one, and that blessing does not exempt one from reciting a blessing over this one. Sprinkling is not included in pouring, and pouring is not included in sprinkling. Therefore, there is a separate blessing for each offering.,The Gemara asks: Still, does this verse, Deuteronomy 12:27, come to teach this halakha, that if a priest placed the blood with one placement he facilitated atonement? That verse is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yishmael says: Since it is stated: “But the firstborn of a bull, or the firstborn of a sheep, or the firstborn of a goat, you shall not redeem; they are sacred. You shall sprinkle their blood upon the altar and shall burn their fat for an offering made by fire, for an aroma pleasing to the Lord” (Numbers 18:17), we learned with regard to a firstborn animal, which must be given to a priest to be offered on the altar in the Temple, that it requires placement of its blood and sacrificial portions on the altar. From where is it derived that the same applies to an animal tithe offering and a Paschal offering? The verse states: “And the blood of your offerings shall be poured upon the altar of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:27). This verse teaches that all offerings require placement of their blood on the altar.,The Gemara answers that the tanna of the earlier baraita, who derives from Deuteronomy 12:27 the halakha that if a priest placed the blood with one placement he facilitated atonement, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili maintains that the halakha that the blood and sacrificial parts of an animal tithe offering and a Paschal offering must be placed on the altar is derived from the aforementioned verse concerning a firstborn animal: “You shall sprinkle their blood upon the altar and shall burn their fat for an offering made by fire, for an aroma pleasing to the Lord” (Numbers 18:17).,This is as it is taught in a baraita, that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: It is not stated in this verse: Its blood, but rather: “Their blood.” Similarly, it is not stated: Its fat, but rather: “Their fat.” The plural form teaches with regard to the firstborn animal, which is mentioned explicitly in the verse, as well as with regard to the animal tithe offering and the Paschal offering, which have a level of sanctity similar to that of a firstborn animal, that each requires placement of the blood and sacrificial portions on the altar.,The Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Yishmael derive one halakha from this verse and then derive another halakha from this same verse? It was stated earlier that Rabbi Yishmael derives from the verse “And the blood of your offerings shall be poured” that sprinkling is included in pouring, and yet here he derives from that same verse that the blood of an animal tithe offering and that of a Paschal offering must be presented on the altar. The Gemara answers: These are the opinions of two tanna’im, each of whom expressed his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael.,The Gemara raises a question with regard to the disagreement about the interpretation of Numbers 18:17. Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who interprets the entire verse as referring to a firstborn animal, and according to whom the plural form in the verse is referring to three such firstborns, that of a bull, that of a sheep, and that of a goat, this explains that which is written immediately afterward: “And their meat shall be yours” (Numbers 18:18), in the plural, i.e., the meat of these firstborn animals shall be eaten by the priests.,But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who interprets this verse as referring also to an animal tithe offering and a Paschal offering, there is a difficulty, as an animal tithe offering and a Paschal offering are eaten by their owners, not by the priests. If so, what is the meaning of the phrase “and their meat shall be yours”? The Gemara answers that the plural term “their meat,” is referring not to an animal tithe offering or a Paschal offering, but to different types of firstborns, i.e., both an unblemished animal, whose blood is poured on the altar, and a blemished one, which is not brought as an offering on the altar. This verse teaches that a blemished firstborn is given to a priest as a gift, and that he may eat its meat. This is a novel concept, as we have not found in the entire Torah another halakha similar to it, where a blemished offering is given to the priests for consumption.,The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yishmael, who interprets this verse differently, from where does he derive this halakha that a blemished firstborn is given to a priest? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the phrase: “As the breast of waving and as the right thigh, it shall be yours” (Numbers 18:18), which is the latter clause of that same verse. The repetition of the phrase “shall be yours” serves to teach that even the meat of a blemished firstborn shall be eaten by the priests.,§ The Gemara raises another question: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who interprets the verse as referring also to an animal tithe offering and a Paschal offering, this is as it is written in the same verse: “You shall not redeem; they are sacred” (Numbers 18:17). The word “they” indicates that only they are sacrificed on the altar, but their substitutes are not sacrificed. In general, if one substitutes a non-sacred animal for one designated as an offering, both the original and the substitute are considered to be consecrated, and they are therefore sacrificed. But if one substitutes a non-sacred animal for a firstborn, an animal tithe offering, or a Paschal offering, the substitute is not sacrificed.,This is as we learned in a mishna (Temura 21a): With regard to the substitute of a firstborn and of an animal tithe offering, both they, the substitutes themselves, and their offspring, and the offspring of their offspring, forever, i.e., for all future generations, are as the firstborn and the animal tithe offering, respectively, and therefore they are eaten in their blemished state by the owners; but unlike the firstborn and the animal tithe offering themselves, they are not sacrificed on the altar.,And likewise with regard to the substitute of a Paschal offering, we learned in a mishna (Pesaḥim 96b) that Rabbi Yehoshua says: I have heard two rulings from my teachers: One ruling was that the substitute of a Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace offering after Passover, and another ruling was that the substitute of a Paschal offering is not offered as a peace offering after Passover; and I cannot explain these apparently contradictory rulings, as I do not remember the circumstances to which each ruling applies. And as will be explained, if the substitution took place after the sacrifice of the Paschal offering, the animal is sacrificed, as it is considered the substitute of a peace offering, whereas if the substitution occurred before the sacrifice of the Paschal offering, it is not sacrificed, as it is the substitute of a Paschal offering. This indicates that the substitute of a Paschal offering is not sacrificed, just like the substitute of a firstborn is not sacrificed.,But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who interprets the entire verse as dealing with a firstborn, from where does he derive the halakha that the substitute of an animal tithe offering and of a Paschal offering are not sacrificed? The Gemara answers: With regard to an animal tithe offering, he derives this by means of a verbal analogy between the terms passing, and passing written with regard to a firstborn. Concerning a firstborn it is stated: “And you shall pass [veha’avarta] to the Lord all that opens the womb” (Exodus 13:12), and concerning an animal tithe it is stated: “Of whatever passes [ya’avor] under the rod” (Leviticus 27:32). From this verbal analogy it may be derived that just as the substitute of a firstborn is not sacrificed, so too, the substitute of an animal tithe offering is not sacrificed.,With regard to the Paschal offering, this halakha is not derived through a verbal analogy, but rather this halakha is explicitly written concerning it. The verse referring to peace offerings states: “If he offers a lamb for his offering” (Leviticus 3:7). The Torah could simply have stated: A lamb, and proceed from there to teach the halakhot of a lamb peace offering. If so, what is the meaning when the verse states: “If he offers a lamb”? This serves to include the substitute of a Paschal offering that was substituted after the sacrifice of the Paschal offering, teaching that it is sacrificed as a peace offering, since the Paschal offering has the status of a peace offering after that time. One might have thought that even before the sacrifice of the Paschal offering the same should apply, i.e., that the substitute of a Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace offering. Therefore, the verse states with regard to the Paschal offering: “It is the sacrifice of the Lord’s Passover” (Exodus 12:27), which indicates that it, the Paschal offering itself, is sacrificed, but its substitute is not sacrificed.,The Gemara asks: And as for all those tanna’im who derive a different exposition from this verse: “And the blood of your offerings shall be poured” (Deuteronomy 12:27), this halakha that is recorded in the mishna, that with regard to all the offerings whose blood is to be placed on the external altar, in a case where the priest placed the blood on the altar with one placement, he facilitated atonement, from where do they derive this? The Gemara answers: Those tanna’im hold in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, who say: Even with regard to a sin offering, in a case where the priest placed the blood with one placement, he facilitated atonement after the fact. And they derive the halakha applying to all the other offerings from that which applies to a sin offering.,§ The mishna teaches that Beit Shammai maintain that in the case of a sin offering, which requires four placements, at least two placements are necessary to facilitate atonement, whereas Beit Hillel hold that even in the case of a sin offering one placement suffices. Rav Huna said: What is the reasoning for the opinion of Beit Shammai?,He explains: The verse states: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger, and put it upon the corners of the altar” (Leviticus 4:25). Subsequently, the verse states: “The priest shall take of its blood with his finger, and put it on the corners of the altar” (Leviticus 4:30), and an additional verse states: “The priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger, and put it on the corners of the altar” (Leviticus 4:34). As the minimum amount justifying the use of the plural form, i.e., in the word “corners,” is two, one may conclude that there are six references to the corners of the altar here. Four of them are mentioned for a mitzva, meaning that the priest should place the blood on all four corners of the altar ab initio, and the other two are mentioned to invalidate the offering if he did not present the blood on at least two corners.,The Gemara asks: And what is the reasoning for the opinion of Beit Hillel? The Gemara answers: The matter should be understood according to the written consonantal text, i.e., the way in which the words are actually spelled. The word “corners” is written plene, i.e., with a vav, in one of the verses, which means that it must be read in the plural form. In the other two verses, “corners” and “corners” are written deficient, i.e., without a vav, in a way that can be vocalized in the singular form, i.e., as karnat. Therefore, there are four references to corners here. Three of these references are written to indicate the placements of blood are performed only as a mitzva, i.e., they are performed ab initio, and the remaining one is written to indicate that its absence invalidates the offering, i.e., the offering is not valid if the blood was not placed against at least one corner of the altar.,The Gemara asks: But according to this explanation of Beit Hillel, why not say that all of them are written for the mitzva and none are to invalidate, i.e., that the blood must be presented on all four corners ab initio, but the offering atones after the fact even if the blood was not presented at all? The Gemara rejects this possibility: We have not found anywhere in the Torah an example of an offering in which atonement can be achieved with no placement of the blood.,And if you wish, say instead that this is the reason of Beit Hillel: The vocalized text of the Torah, i.e., the way in which the words of the Torah are pronounced based on the tradition of what vowels the words contain, is effective in determining how the verses are to be expounded. And likewise, the consonantal text of the Torah, i.e., the way in which the words are actually written, is also effective in determining how the verses are to be expounded. The Gemara elaborates: The vocalized text is effective in adding one more corner and the consonantal text is effective in subtracting one corner. Consequently, the verse is interpreted as referring to five corners, four of which are necessary for the mitzva ab initio, and one of which is indispensable after the fact.,The Gemara asks: But if that is so, that this is the proper manner of expounding the verses, consider the case of the phylacteries of the head, about which it is stated: “And for frontlets [totafot] between your eyes” (Exodus 13:16), and: “They shall be for frontlets [totafot] between your eyes” (Deuteronomy 6:8), and subsequently: “They shall be for frontlets [totafot] between your eyes” (Deuteronomy 11:18). The word totafot is written once in plene form, i.e., with a vav, indicating the plural form, and twice in a deficient form, i.e., without a vav, indicating the singular. Accordingly, there are four frontlets here, and from here the Sages derive that the phylacteries of the head consist of four compartments, which together form a cube. Why not say that the vocalized text, read in the plural, is effective, i.e., that it requires six compartments, and likewise, the consonantal text, read in the singular, is effective, i.e., it requires four compartments, and therefore one should be required to prepare five compartments for the phylacteries of the head?,The Gemara answers that Beit Hillel hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that the requirement to have four compartments in the phylacteries of the head is not derived from the number of times that the word totafot is mentioned, but rather from an exposition of the word totafot itself: Tot in the Katpi language means two, and pat in the Afriki language means two, for a total of four.,The Gemara raises another objection to this method of exposition: If that is so, consider the case of a sukka, about which it is stated: “In sukkot [basukkot] shall you reside seven days; all that are homeborn in Israel shall reside in sukkot [basukkot]. So that your future generations will know that I caused the children of Israel to reside in sukkot [basukkot] when I took them out of the land of Egypt: I am the Lord your God” (Leviticus 23:42–43). Two instances of the word basukkot are written in a deficient manner, i.e., without a vav, indicating the singular, and one instance is written in plene form, i.e., with a vav, indicating the plural form. The Sages derived from here that a sukka must have four walls. Why not say that the vocalized text, read in the plural, is effective, requiring six walls, and likewise, the consonantal text, read in the singular, is effective, requiring four walls, and therefore one should be required to build a sukka with five walls? The Gemara answers: There, one of the five indicated by the verse is needed entirely for the mitzva itself, i.e., to teach the basic halakha that one must dwell in a sukka. And another one of the five is needed to teach that a sukka, as is indicated by its name, must have a covering [sekhakha]. Accordingly, there are three left, alluding to the requirement that a sukka must have three walls. The Gemara adds that the halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai comes and reduces the size of the third wall, teaching that it need not be complete, and sets its minimum length at only one handbreadth.,The Gemara raises yet another objection: If that is so, that both the vocalized and the consonantal texts are taken into account, consider the case of a woman who gives birth to a female child. Concerning this woman the verse states: “But if she bear a female child, then she shall be impure two weeks [shevu’ayim], as in her menstruation” (Leviticus 12:5). The way that the word is written allows it to be read as shivim, seventy. Why not say that the vocalized text of the Torah is effective, teaching us that the woman is ritually impure for fourteen days, and the consonantal text is also effective, teaching us that she is impure for seventy days, and, therefore, she should be required to sit in a state of ritual impurity for forty-two days, which is the halfway point between fourteen and seventy days?,The Gemara answers: There it is different, and the consonantal text is disregarded entirely, as it is written: “As in her menstruation,” and a menstruating woman is impure for one week. Evidently, the verse is speaking in terms of weeks, and is not alluding to the number seventy at all.,§ The Gemara further analyzes the opinion of Beit Hillel that even in the case of a sin offering, if the priest placed the blood on the altar with one placement, he facilitated atonement. And a tanna cites proof for this from here, as it was taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the sin offering brought by a king: “And the priest shall make atonement for him” (Leviticus 4:26), and with regard to the goat brought as a sin offering by an ordinary person: “And the priest shall make atonement for him” (Leviticus 4:31), and with regard to the sheep brought as a sin offering by an ordinary person: “And the priest shall make atonement for him” (Leviticus 4:35). The repetition of this term is due to a logical inference.,As one might have thought to say: Could this not be derived through logical inference as follows: It is stated that blood is placed below the red line, and it is stated that blood is placed above the red line. Just as with regard to the blood concerning which it is stated that it is placed below the red line, when the priest placed it on the altar with one placement he facilitated atonement, so too, with regard to the blood concerning which it is stated that it is placed above the red line, when the priest placed it on the altar with one placement he facilitated atonement.,Or perhaps, go this way, turning away from the previous explanation and toward this explanation: It is stated that blood is presented on the inner altar, i.e., with regard to a sin offering of the community or of the High Priest; the blood of these offerings is sprinkled on the incense altar that is inside the Sanctuary. And it is stated that blood is presented on the external altar, i.e., with regard to the sin offering of an ordinary person, which is offered on the outer altar that is in the courtyard. Just as with regard to the blood concerning which it is stated that it is presented on the inner altar, if the priest omitted one of the placements he has done nothing, i.e., the offering is not valid, so too, with regard to the blood concerning which it is stated that it is presented on the external altar, if the priest omitted one of the placements he has done nothing.,The Gemara analyzes the two possibilities: Let us see to which of the two cases the blood of an animal sin offering is more similar. It can be claimed: We derive a halakha stated with regard to the external altar from a halakha stated with regard to the external altar, but we do not derive a halakha stated with regard to the external altar from a halakha stated with regard to the inner altar. Or, go this way: We derive a halakha stated with regard to a sin offering whose blood is to be placed on the four corners of the altar from a halakha stated with regard to a sin offering whose blood is to be placed on the four corners of the altar. But a sin offering consisting of a bird, which is not a sin offering whose blood is to be placed on the four corners of the altar, cannot serve as proof to the halakha concerning an animal sin offering, whose blood is to be placed on the four corners of the altar.,Since both of the above inferences are reasonable, neither can serve as the source of the halakha. Therefore, the verse states: “And the priest shall make atonement,” “And the priest shall make atonement,” “And the priest shall make atonement,” for a total of three times. The verses are interpreted as follows: “And the priest shall make atonement,” even if he placed only three placements. Subsequently: “And the priest shall make atonement,” even if he placed only two placements, and then: “And the priest shall make atonement,” even if he placed only one placement. This interpretation is the source of Beit Hillel’s opinion.,The Gemara challenges: But each of these verses is necessary for itself, to teach that atonement is achieved for each of the sins through its respective sin offering. Rava said: Bar Adda Mari explained this matter to me: The verse states with regard to each of these sin offerings: “And the priest shall make atonement…and he shall be forgiven” (Leviticus 4:26, 31, 35). This is atonement and this is forgiveness; they are one and the same. Since it would have sufficed to say: “And he shall be forgiven,” the superfluous mentions of the phrase: “And the priest shall make atonement,” serve to teach that the priest facilitates atonement even if he has not performed all the placements.,The Gemara asks: But even if these phrases are superfluous, do they necessarily indicate that a priest who omitted placements has nevertheless facilitated atonement? Why not say that these phrases serve to teach that if the priest placed all the placements he facilitated atonement even if the placements were placed in the wrong place? And expound the verses as follows: “And the priest shall make atonement,” even if he placed the blood on the altar with only three placements above, on the corners of the altar, and one below, on the lower portion of the altar; “And the priest shall make atonement,” even if he placed the blood with only two placements above and two below; “And the priest shall make atonement,” even if he did not place the blood above at all, but only below.,Rav Adda bar Yitzḥak says: If so, that the priest facilitates atonement even if he placed all the placements below, you have abolished the requirement of four corners that is stated with regard to the sin offering (see, e.g., Leviticus 4:34), as the four corners are on the upper portion of the altar. The Gemara is puzzled by Rav Adda bar Yitzḥak’s claim: But if the Merciful One states that this is so, let this requirement be abolished.,As Rav Adda bar Yitzḥak’s claim was rejected, Rava said there is a different reason why the previous claim cannot be accepted: What is the item that requires three repetitions of “and the priest shall make atonement,” i.e., to what are these verses referring? You must say that these are the corners of the altar. The Torah must teach that the priest facilitates atonement even if he did not place the blood on three of the four corners. But in order for the verses to teach that all four placements can be placed below, the phrase “and the priest shall make atonement” would have to be written four times.,The Gemara asks further: Even so, it is possible to interpret the three repetitions of the phrase “and the priest shall make atonement” as referring to the location of the placements, without abolishing the requirement of corners, as one can say: “And the priest shall make atonement,” even though he placed the blood on the altar with only three placements above and one below; “And the priest shall make atonement,” even though he placed the blood with only two placements above and two below; “And the priest shall make atonement,” even though he placed the blood with only one placement above and three below.,The Gemara answers: This entire line of inquiry can be rejected, as we do not find a case involving blood, half of which is placed above the red line and half of which is placed below it. One either places all the blood on the lower half of the altar, as in the case of most offerings, or all of it on the upper half of the altar, as in the case of sin offerings. The Gemara asks: And is there really no case of that sort? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Yoma 53b): The High Priest took the blood of the bull into the Holy of Holies and sprinkled from the blood one time upward and then seven times downward? Apparently, part of the blood of an offering can be sprinkled upward, toward the upper part of the Ark Cover, and part can be placed downward, toward the lower part of the Ark Cover.,The Gemara rejects this: That is not a case where half the blood is sprinkled upward and half is sprinkled downward. Instead, that sprinkling was like a matzlif. The Gemara explains: What is the meaning of like a matzlif? Rav Yehuda demonstrated with his hand; it means like one who whips. One who whips another does not strike repeatedly in one place but directs one lash beneath the other.,The Gemara further asks: And is there really no case of that sort? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Yoma 58b) about the Yom Kippur service: After the High Priest sprinkled blood on the four corners of the incense altar, he sprinkled blood seven times on tohoro of the altar. What, is it not referring to the middle of the side of the altar, as people say: Clear noon [tihara], that is the middle of the day? Accordingly, the root tet, heh, reish denotes the middle; in the one case, the middle of the day, and in the other case, halfway up the altar. Now, since the blood was sprinkled on the altar seven times, inevitably some of the blood landed above the midpoint and some of it landed below the midpoint. Rava bar Sheila said: No, that is not the meaning of tohoro. Rather, tohoro means on the revealed part, i.e., the top, of the altar, as it is written: “Like the very clear [latohar] sky” (Exodus 24:10). Tohoro is referring to the top of the altar when it has been revealed, after the ashes of the incense are cleared and the pure gold is visible.,The Gemara asks again: Is there not a case where some of the blood is presented above the red line and some of it is presented below? But there is the remainder of the blood, which is poured on the base of the altar even in the case of a sin offering, the main blood of which is placed on the upper portion of the altar. The Gemara answers: The pouring of the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar is not indispensable for atonement. Blood that is indispensable for atonement is in no instance presented half above the red line and half below it.,The Gemara continues this line of questioning: But there is the remainder of the blood of the inner sin offerings, the main blood of which is sprinkled on the inner altar. The remainder of the blood of these offerings is poured on the base of the external altar, and there is one who says that this pouring of the blood is indispensable for atonement. The Gemara explains: When we said that there is no blood, half of which is presented above and half below, we said this with regard to one place, i.e., the same altar. The blood of inner sin offerings is sprinkled on the inner altar, while the remainder of that blood is poured on the base of the external altar. There is no case of blood, half of which is presented above and half of which is presented below on the same altar.,§ The mishna teaches that according to the opinion of Beit Shammai, in the case of a sin offering two placements facilitate atonement, while with regard to other offerings a single placement is sufficient. Beit Hillel disagree and say that even in the case of a sin offering one placement suffices after the fact. With regard to this issue, it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Beit Shammai say that two placements in the case of a sin offering, and one placement in the case of other offerings, they render the offering permitted for eating since these actions facilitate atonement after the fact, despite the fact that blood was not placed on all four corners of the altar. And similarly they render the offering piggul. That is to say, if the priest placed two placements of the blood of a sin offering or one placement of the blood of any another offering, intending to eat or burn the offering beyond its designated time, the offering is piggul. ,Beit Hillel say: One placement in the case of a sin offering, and likewise one placement in the case of all the other offerings, if done with proper intent, renders the offering permitted for eating and, if done with improper intent, renders the offering piggul.,Rav Oshaya objects to this: If so, let this halakha be taught in the fourth chapter of tractate Eduyyot alongside the other rare cases of Beit Shammai’s leniencies and Beit Hillel’s stringencies. According to Beit Hillel, a sin offering is piggul even if the priest intended to partake of it beyond its designated time even while performing a single placement, whereas Beit Shammai maintain that the offering is piggul only if he had this improper intent during two placements.,Rava said to Rav Oshaya: When this question was initially asked, and the Sages stated their opinions concerning the matter, it was asked with regard to the permission to partake of the sin offering. In other words, the dispute arose as a result of an inquiry into the other relevant halakha, i.e., whether the priests may partake of a sin offering, the blood of which was placed only one time. In this case it is Beit Shammai who are more stringent, as they permit the meat of a sin offering only after two placements have been placed. For this reason, this case was not listed among the other leniencies of Beit Shammai and stringencies of Beit Hillel.,§ Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Despite the fact that, according to the opinion of Beit Hillel, the last three placements in the case of a sin offering are not indispensable to the atonement, they may not be performed at night, because the blood is invalidated at sunset. And these three placements may be performed after the death of the owner. If the owner of the offering died before any of the blood was placed on the altar, the blood may not be placed, and the offering is burned as a disqualified offering. But if he died after one placement, the priest may perform the other three placements, as he has already facilitated atonement by means of the first placement. And as it is a mitzva to perform these three placements on the altar, one who offers this blood up on an altar outside the Temple is liable to receive karet, the punishment received by one who offers a sacrifice outside the Temple.,Rav Pappa says: There are some respects in which the blood of the last three placements of a sin offering is treated like the blood presented at the outset, i.e., like the blood of the first placement, and there are some respects in which the blood of the last three placements is treated like the blood presented at the end, i.e., like the remainder of the blood of a sin offering.,Rav Pappa elaborates: With regard to liability for presenting blood outside the Temple, and concerning the prohibition against presenting blood at night, and with regard to the disqualification of a non-priest from presenting blood and his liability for death at the hand of Heaven if he presents blood in the Temple, and with regard to the requirement that the blood that is to be presented must first be placed in a service vessel, and that the blood must be placed on the corner of the altar, and that the placement must be performed with the priest’s finger, and concerning the obligation to launder a garment onto which the blood of a sin offering sprayed, and finally with regard to the requirement of pouring the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar, the last three placements are treated like blood presented at the outset, i.e., like the first placement.,But these last three placements may be performed after the death of the owner; and they do not render the offering permitted for eating, as that was already achieved by means of the first placement; nor do they render the offering piggul if during these placements the priest intended to eat or burn the offering beyond its designated time; and similarly, they are not governed by the halakha that if the blood enters inside the Sanctuary the sin offering is disqualified. With regard to all these matters the blood of the last three placements is treated like the blood presented at the end, i.e., like the remainder of the blood of a sin offering.,With regard to the obligation to launder a garment onto which the blood of a sin offering sprayed, Rav Pappa said: From where do I say that this halakha applies even to the blood of the last three placements? It is as we learned in a mishna (93a): If the blood of a sin offering sprayed directly from the neck of the animal onto a garment, that garment does not require laundering, as the blood had never been received in a vessel. Likewise, if the blood sprayed onto the garment from the corner of the altar after having been placed there, or from the base of the altar after the remainder was poured there, the garment does not require laundering. It may be inferred from here that blood that sprayed from the corner of the altar does not require laundering. But blood that is fit to be placed on the corner, as it has not yet been placed, requires laundering, and the blood of the last three placements is indeed fit to be placed on the corner of the altar.,The Gemara rejects this proof: But according to your reasoning, one can claim in the same manner that it is only blood that sprayed from the base of the altar that does not require laundering; but blood that is fit for the base of the altar, i.e., what remains of the blood after it has been placed on the corners, requires laundering. This is difficult, as it is written: “And when there will be sprinkled [yizze] of its blood upon any garment” (Leviticus 6:20). The future form of the word yizze serves to exclude this blood sprayed onto the garment from the corner of the altar, as it has already been sprinkled.,The Gemara explains: In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, as we learned in a mishna (110b) that Rabbi Neḥemya says: With regard to the remainder of the blood of an offering, which was to be poured at the base of the altar, if one presented it outside the Temple, he is liable. Since Rabbi Neḥemya treats the remainder of the blood as blood with regard to liability for a service performed outside the Temple, he also treats the remainder of the blood of a sin offering as blood with regard to laundering. Accordingly, Rav Pappa’s inference from the previously cited mishna is valid only according to Rabbi Neḥemya, but not according to the majority opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with him.,The Gemara challenges the proof even according to the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya: Say that you heard that Rabbi Neḥemya ruled in this manner with regard to the offering up of the remainder of the blood outside the Temple, just as is the case with regard to limbs and fats. Even though the offering of the limbs and fats is not indispensable for atonement, one who offers them outside the Temple is liable. But did you also hear him say this with regard to laundering, that one must launder a garment sprayed with the remainder of the blood of a sin offering? The Gemara answers: Yes, we also heard Rabbi Neḥemya rule in this manner with regard to laundering. And this is as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to blood that requires the base of the altar, presumably a reference to the remainder of the blood of a sin offering, which must be poured on the base of the altar, it requires laundering; and improper intent is effective with regard to it, i.e., if the priest poured such blood with the intent to partake of the sacrificial meat beyond its designated time, the offering is piggul; and one who offers it up outside the Temple is liable.,And conversely, with regard to blood that is poured into the Temple courtyard drain that passed through the Temple and emptied into the Kidron River, which is blood that has become disqualified, it does not require laundering, and improper intent is not effective with regard to it, and one who offers it up outside the Temple is exempt.,The Gemara inquires: About whom did you learn that he said that one who offers up the remainder of the blood outside the Temple is liable? It is Rabbi Neḥemya who says this, and he states in this baraita that a garment that was sprayed with such blood requires laundering.,The Gemara asks: And is improper intent effective with regard to blood that must be poured on the base of the altar? But isn’t it taught in a baraita discussing the intent that renders an offering piggul: The possibility of piggul applies only with regard to a service that is indispensable for atonement. This serves to exclude pouring the remainder of the blood on the altar and burning the sacrificial portions on the altar, actions that are not indispensable for atonement, concerning which the halakha is that improper intent is not effective with regard to them.,Rather, when that baraita is taught, stating that blood that requires the base requires laundering, it is not referring to the remainder of the blood after the placements have been completed. Instead, it is referring to the blood that is to be used for the last three placements of the blood of a sin offering.,The Gemara asks: If so, is it correct to describe this blood as requiring the base of the altar? After all, this blood goes to the corner of the altar, not the base. The Gemara answers: Say that this means: Blood that becomes required for the base, i.e., blood that in the end, after the placements are completed, will be poured on the base of the altar. The Gemara further asks: But is improper intent effective with regard to the blood of the last three placements of the blood of a sin offering? Didn’t you say that this blood does not render the offering permitted for eating, nor does it render the offering piggul, and it is not governed by the halakha that if the blood enters inside the Sanctuary the sin offering is disqualified? With regard to all these matters the blood of the last three placements is treated like the blood presented at the end, i.e., like the remainder of the blood of a sin offering.,The Gemara explains: Rather, when that baraita is taught, stating that blood requiring the base requires laundering, and improper intent is effective with regard to it, and one who presents of it outside the Temple is liable, it is indeed referring to the remainder of the blood after the placements have been completed. It is stated not with regard to the remainder of the blood of a standard sin offering, but with regard to the remainder of the blood of inner sin offerings, which are brought on the inner altar located inside the Sanctuary.,The Gemara asks: But if that is the case, with regard to the remainder of the blood of external sin offerings that are brought on the external altar, what is the halakha? Is one who presents them outside the Temple exempt? If so, rather than teaching the halakha of disqualified blood that is poured into the Temple courtyard drain, let the baraita distinguish and teach the halakha within the case of the remainder of the blood itself, in the following manner: In what case is this statement said? In a case of the blood of sin offerings brought on the inner altar. But in the case of the blood of sin offerings brought on the external altar, one who offers up such an offering outside the Temple is exempt.,The Gemara answers: The baraita could not have made such a distinction, for in accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, who says: With regard to the remainder of the blood of a sin offering brought on the external altar, in a case where one presented it outside the Temple, he is liable. And therefore, were the tanna to contrast the halakha of the blood of sin offerings brought on the external altar with that of the blood of sin offerings brought on the inner altar, he would not have been able to teach three rulings of exemptions corresponding to three rulings of liabilities, as Rabbi Neḥemya maintains that even with regard to the remainder of the blood of a sin offering brought on the external altar, if one presents it outside the Temple he is liable. Therefore, the tanna preferred to compare the halakhot of the remainder of the blood of inner sin offerings to the disqualified blood that is poured into the Temple courtyard drain, so that he could list three lenient rulings alongside three stringent ones.,§ The Gemara returns to discuss the statement of Rav Pappa, that a garment sprayed by blood from the last three placements of the blood of a sin offering requires laundering, and to his proof from the mishna that states that if the blood of a sin offering sprayed onto a garment from the corner of the altar or from the base of the altar, the garment does not require laundering. Ravina says, in answer to the objection raised against Rav Pappa above, that according to Rav Pappa the mishna (93a) should be understood as follows: The term: From the corner, means from the corner, literally, after the blood was placed there, and therefore Rav Pappa could infer from this that blood that is fit to be placed on the corner, including the blood to be used for the last three sprinklings, requires laundering. But the term: From the base of the altar, does not mean from the base, literally. Rather, it means: From blood that is fit for the base of the altar, i.e., from the remainder of the blood, which is to be poured on the base.,Rav Taḥlifa bar Gazza said to Ravina: One can say a different explanation, that both this and that, i.e., the term: From the corner, and the term: From the base, are referring to blood that is fit for the corner or the base, in which case the mishna teaches that a garment sprayed by the blood that was to be used for the last three placements of a sin offering does not require laundering, contrary to the opinion of Rav Pappa. Ravina replied: What is this claim? Now that you say that blood which is fit for the corner does not require laundering, is it necessary to state that the same applies to blood that is merely fit for the base of the altar? That ruling would be unnecessary. Rather, it must be that the term: From the corner, means from the corner, literally, i.e., that the blood has already been placed there, whereas the term: From the base, means from blood that is fit for the base, i.e., from the remainder of the blood, which is to be poured on the base.,§ The mishna teaches: With regard to all the offerings whose blood is to be placed on the inner altar, which are the bull and goat of Yom Kippur, the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, the bull for an unwitting communal sin, and the goat for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship, if the priest omitted even one of the placements, it is as though he did not facilitate atonement. The Sages taught in a baraita: The Torah first discusses the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest and afterward the bull for an unwitting communal sin, concerning which it states: “And he shall do with the bull, as he did with the bull for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:20). It may be asked: This phrase: “And he shall do…as he did,” what does this come to teach? All the details stated with regard to the first bull, i.e., that of the anointed priest, seem to be stated explicitly with regard to the second bull as well.,Rather, the verse comes to repeat the halakha of the sprinkling of the blood, as though it were written twice with regard to the same bull. This repetition of the halakha indicates that the sprinkling is indispensable, thereby teaching that if the priest omitted one of the placements he has done nothing. I have a derivation only with regard to the seven placements on the Curtain separating between the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, that they are indispensable, as these seven are indispensable in all cases, as the Gemara will explain (40a). From where is it derived that the same applies to the four placements on the inner altar? The verse states: “So shall he do” (Leviticus 4:20).,The baraita continues: The verse states: “And he shall do with the bull” (Leviticus 4:20); this alludes to a different bull whose service is similar, namely the bull of Yom Kippur. “As he did with the bull” (Leviticus 4:20); this is a reference to the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, teaching that all of the sprinklings of the blood of this bull are also indispensable. “A sin offering”; these are the goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship, teaching that they are offered in the same manner as the bull for an unwitting communal sin, their blood being sprinkled in the Sanctuary and their flesh burned. One might have thought that I should include also the goats of the Festivals and the goats sacrificed on the New Moons, which are communal offerings as well, i.e., that their service should be performed inside the Sanctuary like that of the bull for an unwitting communal sin. Therefore, the verse states: “So shall he do with this” (Leviticus 4:20), which indicates that this service is performed only with this animal and not with the goats of the Festivals or the goats of the New Moons.,The Gemara asks: And what did you see to include these goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship and to exclude those goats sacrificed on the Festivals and the New Moons? The Gemara answers: After noting that the verse included some offerings and excluded others, one can say: I include these goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship, as they atone for the known transgression of a mitzva, i.e., idol worship, and therefore they are similar to the bull for an unwitting communal sin, which is brought for an erroneous ruling of the Sanhedrin with regard to a specific mitzva. And I exclude those goats sacrificed on the Festivals and the New Moons, as they do not atone for the known transgression of a mitzva, but rather they atone for the unwitting defilement of the Temple or its sacrificial foods.,The baraita resumes its interpretation of the verse. “And the priest shall make atonement”; this teaches that atonement is achieved even if the Elders did not place their hands on the head of the bull as they are commanded to do (see Leviticus 4:15). “And they shall be forgiven”; this teaches that atonement is achieved even if the priest did not place the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar, as is required (see Leviticus 4:7).,The Gemara again asks: And as the verse does not specify which aspects of the service are included and which are excluded, what did you see to disqualify the offering in the case of the seven sprinklings; how did you derive that the phrase “And he shall do…as he did” teaches that the seven sprinklings are indispensable? And what did you see to render the offering fit in the absence of placing hands on the head of the offering and pouring out the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar, based on the words “And the priest shall make atonement…and they shall be forgiven”?,The Gemara answers: You should say the following logical argument: I disqualify the offering in the absence of the seven sprinklings, as these seven sprinklings are indispensable in all cases, as will be explained (40a), and I render the offering fit in the absence of placing hands on the head of the offering and in the absence of the pouring of the remainder of the blood onto the base of the altar, as these are not indispensable in all cases, and therefore it is reasonable to conclude that they are not indispensable here either. The Gemara analyzes the baraita in detail. The Master said in the baraita: I have a derivation only with regard to the seven placements on the Curtain separating between the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, that they are indispensable, as these seven are indispensable in all cases. The Gemara asks: Where are the seven indispensable? Rav Pappa says: In the case of the red heifer (see Numbers 19:2–4), and in the purification process of one afflicted with leprous marks (see Leviticus 14:16).,The baraita continues: From where is it derived that the same applies to the four placements on the inner altar? The verse states: “So shall he do” (Leviticus 4:20). The Gemara asks: What is different about seven placements, that they should be indispensable? If you say that the reason is that the seven placements are written and repeated, by means of the terms “And he shall do…as he did,” which teaches that they are indispensable, I can say that the four placements as well are written and repeated. Why then should their halakha be any different?,Rabbi Yirmeya says: This is necessary only according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that only two placements are written in this chapter, while the other two are derived through a juxtaposition. Consequently, a specific derivation is required for these. As it is taught in a baraita with regard to the placements on the inner altar: Above, in the case of the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, the verse states corner in the plural form of corners (see Leviticus 4:7), i.e., it says “corners [karnot],” in the plural, where it could have written corner, in the singular. These are two corners. And below, with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin, it again states corner in the plural form of corners (see Leviticus 4:18). Together these amount to four corners. This is the statement of Rabbi Shimon.,Rabbi Yehuda says: This derivation is not necessary, as it states in these same verses: “And he shall put of the blood upon the corners of the altar which is before the Lord, which is in the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 4:18). The superfluous expression “in the Tent of Meeting” teaches that the blood must be placed on all the corners of the altar that are stated with regard to the Tent of Meeting, i.e., on all four corners. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yehuda, what does he do with the phrase “so shall he do,” which Rabbi Shimon interprets as referring to the four placements?,The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yehuda requires this verse for that which is taught in a baraita: As we did not learn with regard to the bull of Yom Kippur that placing hands is required, i.e., that the High Priest must place his hands on this animal before it is slaughtered, and likewise it is not stated that the remainder of its blood must be poured on the base of the altar. From where is it derived that these actions must be performed? The verse states: “So shall he do.”,The Gemara asks: And did we not learn with regard to the bull of Yom Kippur that these requirements apply? But you said earlier in the baraita: “With the bull” (Leviticus 4:20); this alludes to the bull of Yom Kippur, which indicates that all the rites performed in connection with the bull for an unwitting communal sin apply also to the bull of Yom Kippur.,The Gemara answers: The derivation from the phrase “so shall he do” was necessary, as it could enter your mind to say that this matter, the comparison between the bull for an unwitting communal sin and the bull of Yom Kippur, applies only to a service that is indispensable for atonement, e.g., the sprinkling of the blood. But with regard to a service that is not indispensable for atonement, such as placing hands on the head of the animal or pouring out the remainder of the blood, one might say that these actions need not be performed. Therefore, the verse teaches us: “So shall he do,” i.e., these services, too, must be performed with the bull of Yom Kippur.,The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Shimon, what does he do with this phrase: “In the Tent of Meeting,” from which Rabbi Yehuda derives that the blood must be placed on all four corners of the altar? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon requires the phrase “in the Tent of Meeting” to teach that if the roof of the Sanctuary was breached by a hole, the priest would not sprinkle the blood, as it would no longer be called the Tent of Meeting. The Gemara asks: And the other tanna, Rabbi Yehuda, from where does he derive this halakha? The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yehuda derives it from the superfluous term “which is in the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 4:7, 18). The Gemara asks: And the other tanna, Rabbi Shimon? He does not interpret the term “which is” as he maintains that this expression is not significant enough to serve as the source of a halakha.,Abaye said: According to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda as well, it was necessary to learn from the phrase “so shall he do” that the four placements are indispensable. As it might enter your mind to say that just as it is with regard to placing hands and the remainder of the blood, that even though they are written and repeated they are not indispensable, so too, the four placements of blood should not be indispensable. Therefore, the phrase “so shall he do” teaches us that this is not the case, and the four sprinklings are indeed indispensable.,§ The baraita teaches: “With the bull” (Leviticus 4:20), this alludes to the bull of Yom Kippur. To what halakha does this statement relate? If it serves to teach that all matters stated with regard to the bull of Yom Kippur are indispensable, this is obvious, since the word “statute” is written concerning it: “And this shall be an everlasting statute to you” (Leviticus 16:29), and there is a principle that halakhot described as statutes are indispensable.,Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: This statement is necessary only according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: When the term “statute” is written concerning the Yom Kippur service, indicating that no details may be altered, it is written only with regard to actions performed in white garments inside the Holy of Holies, e.g., burning the incense and sprinkling the blood, which are the essential services of the day, and it teaches that if the High Priest performed one of the actions before another, i.e., not in the proper order, he has done nothing.,But with regard to those actions performed in white garments outside, in the Sanctuary, if he performed one action before another, what he did is done and he is not required to repeat the rite. Consequently, one might say that from the fact that their order is not indispensable, it may be derived that the sprinklings, i.e., placements, themselves are also not indispensable. Therefore, the term “with the bull” teaches us that the placements are indeed indispensable.,Rav Pappa objects to this: And how can you say this, that Rabbi Yehuda derives from here that the placements are indispensable? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: The verse discussing the Yom Kippur service states: “And when he has finished atoning for the Sanctuary” (Leviticus 16:20). This indicates that if he performed the atonement, i.e., the sprinklings, inside the Sanctuary, he has finished the order of the service, even though he has not poured the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar; and if he did not perform the atonement, he has not finished; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.,Rabbi Yehuda said to him: For what reason do we not say: If he finished the entire service, which includes sprinkling the blood in the Sanctuary and pouring the remainder of the blood onto the base of the altar, he has facilitated atonement; and if he did not finish, he has not facilitated atonement? This indicates that Rabbi Yehuda derives from this verse the halakha that the sprinklings in the Sanctuary are indispensable.,Rav Pappa says: This reference to the bull of Yom Kippur in the term “with the bull,” is necessary only to apply to the bull of Yom Kippur three halakhot that are derived from that which is stated with regard to the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest: “And the priest shall immerse his finger [et etzba’o] in the blood” (Leviticus 4:6). These halakhot can be summarized in the shortened form: Et, blood, and with immersion. The Gemara elaborates: With regard to the word et, Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov says: This word is necessary only to render fit service performed by a priest who has a wart or blister on his finger. These are not considered an interposition between his finger and the blood. With regard to the term “in the blood” (Leviticus 4:6), this teaches that the blood in the service vessel must be of a sufficient measure for immersion from the outset. The priest must initially collect in the vessel enough blood for all the sprinklings, rather than adding blood to the vessel for each sprinkling. Finally, the term “and the priest shall immerse his finger in the blood” indicates that there must be enough blood in the vessel such that the priest can immerse his finger in it and not have to wipe the sides of the utensil to collect blood for sprinkling.,The Gemara explains: And it was necessary for the verse to state both these last two terms. It had to write “in the blood,” as had the Merciful One written only “and the priest shall immerse,” I would say that the sprinklings are valid even if there was not a sufficient measure of blood for immersion from the outset, but only enough for a single sprinkling, provided that the priest then added more blood to the vessel for each sprinkling. Therefore, the Merciful One writes “in the blood” to teach that from the outset there must be enough blood in the vessel for all the sprinklings.,And conversely, had the Merciful One written only “in the blood,” I would say that even if there was enough blood in the vessel at the outset it is not necessary that there be enough blood for immersion for the last sprinklings, as the priest can wipe the sides of the utensil to collect blood for sprinkling. Therefore, the Merciful One writes “and the priest shall immerse.”,The Gemara addresses another apparently superfluous phrase in the same chapter: “And the priest shall put some of the blood upon the corners of the altar of sweet incense before the Lord” (Leviticus 4:7). Why do I need the verse to mention the sweet incense? It would have been enough to identify the altar as being “before the Lord” and one would have understood that the reference is to the inner altar. Rather, this serves to teach that if the altar had not been inaugurated with sweet incense, the priest would not sprinkle blood on it.,The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa that the superfluous phrase in the passage discussing the bull for an unwitting communal sin alludes to the bull of Yom Kippur in order to teach the three halakhot of et, in the blood, and immersion, from the case of the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, which is also alluded to in that verse. The baraita states: “And he shall do with the bull, as he did with the bull for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:20). What is the meaning when the verse states “with the bull”? This serves to include the bull of Yom Kippur for all that is stated in this matter, i.e., in the passage concerning the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, specifically the halakhot of et, in the blood, and immersion. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.,Rabbi Yishmael said: This inclusion is unnecessary, as these halakhot can be derived via an a fortiori inference: Just as in a case in which one offering is not equated with another offering of a different type of animal, the Torah equated the actions of sprinkling the blood in one offering with the actions of the blood in the other offering, as will be explained, in a case in which the Torah equated one offering with another offering, i.e., the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest and the bull of Yom Kippur, isn’t it logical that the Torah should equate the actions of sprinkling the blood in the one offering with the actions of the blood in the other offering? Therefore, the derivation by way of a special inclusion is not necessary.,Rather, what is the meaning when the verse states: “And he shall do with the bull, as he did with the bull for a sin offering”? With regard to the first instance of “with the bull,” this is the bull for an unwitting communal sin. And with regard to the second instance of “with the bull,” this is the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest. And the verse serves to teach that just as in the first case, if the priest omitted one of the sprinklings, he has done nothing, the same is true in the second case.,The Gemara clarifies the baraita. The Master said above: Just as in a case in which one offering is not equated with another offering. What is the meaning of the expression: One offering is not equated with another offering? Which offerings are not brought from the same type of animal, but nevertheless the halakhot governing the sprinkling of their blood are the same?,If we say that Rabbi Yishmael is referring to the bull of Yom Kippur and the goat of Yom Kippur, and from them he derives by way of an a fortiori inference that the actions concerning the bull of Yom Kippur are the same as those concerning the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, which are the same animal, this can be refuted as follows: What is notable about these offerings, the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur? They are notable in that their blood enters the innermost sanctum, the Holy of Holies. This is not so of the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, the blood of which is sprinkled only in the outer area of the Sanctuary.,Rather, say that the reference here is to the bull for an unwitting communal sin and the goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship. But once again this claim can be refuted: What is notable about these offerings? They are notable in that they both atone for the known transgressions of a mitzva, whereas the bull of Yom Kippur atones for unknown transgressions (see Shevuot 2a).,Rather, the reference here is to the bull for an unwitting communal sin and the goat of Yom Kippur, and this is what Rabbi Yishmael is saying: Just as in a case in which one offering is not equated with another offering, as this is a bull and that is a goat, nevertheless the actions of sprinkling the blood in one offering are equated with the actions of the blood in the other offering with regard to that which is written concerning it, in a case in which one offering is equated with another offering, i.e., the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest and the bull of Yom Kippur, as this is a bull and that is a bull, isn’t it logical that the actions of sprinkling the blood in one offering are equated with the actions of the blood in the other offering? The blood of the goat of Yom Kippur is sprinkled even inside the Holy of Holies, which is not so concerning the blood of the bull. Nevertheless, with regard to the sprinkling in the Sanctuary, which is common to both, their actions are performed in the same manner, with the blood being sprinkled with a finger on the Curtain and on the corners of the altar.,And by means of this a fortiori inference the case of the bull of Yom Kippur is derived from the case of the bull of an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, with regard to the halakhot summarized by the words et, in the blood, and immersion, as they are both bulls. And likewise, the case of the goat of Yom Kippur is derived from the case of the goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship, with regard to the halakhot of et, in the blood, and immersion, via this a fortiori inference, as they are both goats.,The Gemara asks: How can the halakhot of the goat of Yom Kippur be derived from the goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship? But does a matter derived by juxtaposition, i.e., a halakha that is not written explicitly in the Torah but that is learned by means of a comparison, again teach by a fortiori inference? There is a principle that a halakha derived by juxtaposition with regard to consecrated matters cannot subsequently teach another halakha via an a fortiori inference. The halakhot alluded to by the words et, in the blood, and immersion, are not explicitly stated with regard to the goats of an unwitting communal sin of idol worship. Rather, they are derived from the comparison found in the verse: “And he shall do…as he did” (Leviticus 4:20), which alludes to the goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship and the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest. Rav Pappa said: The school of Rabbi Yishmael maintains that a matter derived by juxtaposition does again teach by a fortiori inference, even with regard to consecrated matters.,The Gemara continues to analyze the statement of Rabbi Yishmael in the baraita: “With the bull”; this is the bull for an unwitting communal sin. The Gemara asks: Why is it necessary to derive this case by way of an exposition? This verse itself is written in reference to the bull for an unwitting communal sin. Rav Pappa said: The derivation is necessary because Rabbi Yishmael wants the case of the bull for an unwitting communal sin to teach with regard to the burning on the altar of the sacrificial portions, including the diaphragm and the two kidneys, that this obligation applies also to the goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship, despite the fact that this requirement is not stated with regard to them.,Rav Pappa continues: And as the obligation to burn the diaphragm and the two kidneys on the altar is not written with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin itself, but rather it is derived by juxtaposition from the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, in which this requirement is explictly stated (see Leviticus 4:8–9), it was necessary to include the bull for an unwitting communal sin once again with the term “with the bull.”,The Gemara elaborates: This derivation is required in order that it should be as though this halakha of burning the diaphragm and the two kidneys was written with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin itself. And in this manner the derivation from this case, teaching the halakha in the case of the goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship, should not be a matter derived by juxtaposition that again teaches by juxtaposition, as such a derivation is not done with regard to consecrated matters.,§ The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa: “And he shall do with the bull, as he did” (Leviticus 4:20); what is the meaning when the verse states: “With the bull”? It is clear that this verse is referring to the bull.,The baraita answers: Because it is stated with regard to the goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship: “And they have brought their offering, an offering made by fire to the Lord, and their sin offering before the Lord for their error” (Numbers 15:25), and this verse is interpreted as follows: “Their sin offering”; these are the goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship, alluded to in that passage. “Their error”; this is the bull for an unwitting communal sin, which is brought for an inadvertent transgression of the community. The juxtaposition of these offerings in the verse: “Their sin offering…for their error,” indicates that the Torah means to say: Their sin offering is for you like their error, i.e., all the portions consumed on the altar in the case of the bull for an unwitting communal sin are also burned on the altar in the case of the goats for an unwitting sin of idol worship.,The Gemara asks: With regard to the offering brought for their error, i.e., the bull for an unwitting communal sin, from where did you learn this halakha? Was it not via juxtaposition from the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, as the diaphragm and the two kidneys are not explicitly mentioned with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin? But this is difficult, as does a matter derived via juxtaposition again teach via juxtaposition?,Therefore, the verse states: “And he shall do with the bull, as he did with the bull for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:20). With regard to the first instance of “with the bull,” this is the bull for an unwitting communal sin. And with regard to the second instance of “with the bull,” this is the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest. Due to this juxtaposition, it is as though the burning of the diaphragm and the two kidneys was explicitly written with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin, and therefore the halakha can be taught by juxtaposition with regard to the goats for an unwitting sin of idol worship, as stated by Rav Pappa.,The Gemara analyzes the previous baraita. The Master said above: “Their sin offering,” these are the goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship, which are juxtaposed in this verse to the bull for an unwitting communal sin. The Gemara asks: But let the tanna derive this from the earlier verse stated with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin, as the Master said in the baraita cited earlier (39b): “A sin offering” (Leviticus 4:20), this serves to include the goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship. Rav Pappa said: This derivation was necessary, as if there were only the juxtaposition from Leviticus 4:20, it would enter your mind to say: This matter applies only to the acts of sprinkling, which are written with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin itself. But with regard to the burning of the diaphragm and the two kidneys, which are not written with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin itself, you might say that this halakha should not be derived from it. Therefore, this additional derivation of “their sin offering” teaches us that the two offerings are similar with regard to this detail as well.,Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said to Rav Pappa: But the tanna said: “With the bull”; this serves to include the bull of Yom Kippur for all that is stated in this matter. This statement indicates that all the details applying to the bull for an unwitting communal sin are extended to the bull of Yom Kippur by means of a single derivation. Rav Pappa responded: This issue is a dispute between tanna’im, as the tanna of the school of Rav amplifies the halakha through this juxtaposition, whereas the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael does not amplify the halakha through this juxtaposition, but maintains that an additional derivation is necessary with regard to the diaphragm and the two kidneys.,§ The Gemara cites a statement that is related to the above halakhot. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: For what reason are the diaphragm and the two kidneys stated with regard to the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, and they are not explicitly stated with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin? This can be explained by a parable: It can be compared to a flesh-and-blood king who grew angry with his beloved servant for his misdeeds, but spoke little of the servant’s offense due to his great affection for him. Likewise, as the Jewish people are beloved by God, the Torah does not describe their sin offering in detail.,And the school of Rabbi Yishmael further taught: For what reason is it stated: “Before the Curtain of the Sanctuary” (Leviticus 4:6), with regard to the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, and this is not stated with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin, where it merely states: “Before the Curtain” (Leviticus 4:17)? This can be explained by a parable: It can be compared to a flesh-and-blood king against whom a province sinned. If a minority of that province sinned, his relationship with his entourage [pamalya] remains, i.e., the king continues to treat his loyal followers in the usual manner. But if the majority of the province sinned, his relationship with his entourage does not remain, and he no longer meets even those who remained devoted to him. Similarly, when the entire people sins, God no longer has the same relationship with them, and it is as though the place where the priest sprinkles the blood is no longer sacred.,§ The mishna teaches that all the placements upon the inner altar are indispensable, and therefore if the High Priest placed all the placements in their proper manner, and one in an improper manner, i.e., with the intent to eat or burn the offering beyond its designated time, the offering is disqualified, but there is no liability for karet for one who partakes of the offering. The Gemara states that we learned in a mishna there (Menaḥot 16a), with regard to the burning of the handful of a meal offering and the frankincense, both of which render the meal offering permitted for eating: If the priest had an intention that can render the offering piggul, and this occurred during the burning of the handful but not during the burning of the frankincense, or during the burning of the frankincense but not during the burning of the handful, i.e., he burned one of them with the intention of eating the remainder of the offering beyond its designated time, Rabbi Meir says: The offering is piggul and one who eats it is liable to receive karet.,And the Rabbis say: There is no liability for karet in this case unless he renders the offering piggul during the performance of the entire permitting factor, i.e., the burning of both the handful and the frankincense.,Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Do not say that the reason of Rabbi Meir, who holds that the offering is piggul, is that he holds in general that one renders an offering piggul even if he intended to eat or burn the offering beyond its designated time during the performance of only half a permitting factor. Rather, what are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where he initially placed the handful of the meal offering on the altar, to burn it, with the improper intention to eat the remainder beyond its designated time, and afterward he placed the frankincense on the altar silently, i.e., without any particular intent. Rabbi Meir holds: Anyone who performs an action performs it with his initial intent. Therefore, his action with the frankincense is considered to have been performed with the same improper intention as his action with the handful.,The Gemara asks: From where does Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish learn that this is the case? He learns it from the fact that the mishna teaches: Therefore, if he placed all the placements in their proper manner and one in an improper manner, the offering is disqualified, but there is no liability for karet. Consequently it follows that if he initially placed one placement in an improper manner, with the intent to eat or burn the offering beyond its designated time, and all the other placements in the proper manner, the offering is piggul.,The Gemara explains: Whose opinion is this? If we say it is the opinion of the Rabbis, don’t the Rabbis explicitly say that one cannot render an offering piggul with an improper intention in the performance of only half a permitting factor? Here, the priest placed one placement in the proper manner. Rather, it must represent the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that if he had an improper intention with regard to the handful and not the frankincense the offering is piggul.,And if Rabbi Meir’s reason is that he holds in general that one renders an offering piggul even during the performance of only half a permitting factor, even if the priest acted as it taught in the mishna, the offering should also be piggul, as he had an improper intention during half the permitting factor. Rather, is Rabbi Meir’s reason not because he holds that anyone who performs an action performs it with his initial intent? Consequently, if he placed the first placement with an improper intention, the offering is piggul, and if his intention during the first placement was proper, the offering is not piggul.,Rabbi Shmuel bar Yitzḥak says: Actually, it is possible that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that one cannot render an offering piggul with an improper intention during half a permitting factor. And what is the meaning of the term: In their proper manner, in the context of the mishna? It means in their proper manner with regard to piggul, i.e., he placed the blood with an intention that renders the offering piggul. The mishna is teaching that although he placed the first placements with an improper intention, one does not say that the last placement, which was placed without any specific intention, was performed with his initial intent.,The Gemara raises a difficulty: But from the fact that it teaches: Therefore, if he placed all the placements in their proper manner and one in an improper manner, the offering is disqualified but there is no liability for karet, which indicates that the offering is disqualified due to the one placement performed improperly, one can learn by inference that the term: In their proper manner, comes to indicate an intention that renders the offering fit, and not an intention that renders it piggul.,Rava says: It can still be explained that the term: In their proper manner, is referring to an intention that renders the offering piggul; and what is the meaning of: In an improper manner? This is referring to the intent to eat the offering outside its designated area. This intention serves to disqualify the offering, which means that it is not piggul, as not all its rites have been performed in the proper manner. Rav Ashi says: The term: In an improper manner, in the mishna, means that he placed one placement not for the sake of the offering being sacrificed, and in the case of a sin offering an intention of this kind disqualifies the offering; therefore, it is not piggul.,The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, one can learn by inference that when the priest does not perform the last placement with the intent to eat the offering outside its designated area or not for the sake of the offering, but silently, he becomes liable, as the offering is piggul. This is certainly not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, as they maintain that one cannot render an offering piggul with an improper intention during half a permitting factor.,The Gemara answers: The wording of the mishna is imprecise, as in fact, even if he placed the last placement silently the offering is not piggul. But since the tanna of the mishna taught in the first clause, with regard to an offering whose blood is placed on the external altar: If he placed the first placement with the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time and the second placement with the intent to eat it outside its designated area, the offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet for its consumption, he likewise taught the latter clause, with regard to a sin offering whose blood is placed on the inner altar, in a similar manner, that if he placed the last placement with the intent to eat it outside its designated area or not for the sake of the offering, the offering is disqualified, but there is no liability for karet for its consumption. One cannot infer from here that if he placed the last placement without intent the offering is piggul.,The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish from a baraita: In what case is this statement, that the offering is rendered piggul even when he intends to eat it beyond its designated time only in the first placement, said? In the case of blood that is placed on the external altar, where one placement renders the offering permitted. But with regard to the blood placed inside, i.e., in the Holy of Holies, on the Curtain, and on the inner altar, e.g., the forty-three presentations of the blood of the bull and goat of Yom Kippur, and the eleven presentations of the blood of the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, and the eleven presentations of the blood of the bull for an unwitting communal sin, if in those cases the priest had an intention that can render the offering piggul, whether during the first set of presentations, whether during the second set, or whether during the third set, i.e., in any of the requisite sets of presentations, Rabbi Meir says: The offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet for its consumption. And the Rabbis say: There is no liability for karet unless he had an intention that can render the offering piggul during the performance of the entire permitting factor.,In any event, this baraita teaches: If the priest had an intention that can render the offering piggul, whether during the first set of presentations, whether during the second set, or whether during the third set, and yet Rabbi Meir disputes the ruling of the Rabbis and says that the offering is piggul. If the priest’s intent renders the offering piggul whether it was during the first, second, or third set of presentations, evidently Rabbi Meir’s ruling must be based on the consideration that one can render an offering piggul during half a permitting factor. According to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish’s claim that Rabbi Meir’s reason is that anyone who performs an action performs it with his initial intent, the offering should be piggul only if the first set of presentations was performed with an improper intention while the rest were performed silently.,Rav Yitzḥak bar Avin says: What are we dealing with here? We are not dealing with a case of a priest who had improper intention in the presentations themselves, where the issue of half a permitting factor is relevent. Rather, we are dealing with a case where he had an improper intention that can render the offering piggul during the act of slaughter. In other words, after presenting the blood of the bull inside the Sanctuary, the rest of the blood spilled, and he had to slaughter another bull so that he could continue with the presentations, this time on the Curtain. The reason for Rabbi Meir’s ruling is that the act of slaughter is one permitting factor, and therefore the priest’s improper intent involved an entire service, not half a permitting factor. The Gemara asks: If so, what is the reason for the ruling of the Rabbis?,Rava says: Who are these Rabbis? This is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as we learned in a mishna (109b): With regard to the handful of a meal offering, and the frankincense, and the incense, and the meal offering of priests, and the meal offering of the anointed priest, and the meal offering brought with the libations that accompany animal offerings, in a case where one sacrificed even an olive-bulk from any one of these, which should be sacrificed on the altar, outside the Temple, he is liable, as the burning of an olive-bulk is considered a proper burning. And Rabbi Eliezer deems him exempt unless he sacrifices the whole of any one of these items outside the Temple. This indicates that according to Rabbi Eliezer even when one performs a proper action he is not liable unless he completes the service. The same should apply to the slaughter of different bulls for different sets of presentations; one should be liable only if he rendered each of them piggul.,The Gemara raises a difficulty: How can you explain Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion with regard to the presentation of the blood in this manner? But doesn’t Rava say: And Rabbi Eliezer concedes with regard to blood that even one who sacrifices part of the blood outside the Temple is liable? As we learned in a mishna (Yoma 60a) that Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon say: If the blood of the bull or goat of Yom Kippur spilled, even if this occurred in the middle of one of the sets of sprinklings, and the High Priest slaughtered another animal, nevertheless, from the place that he interrupted that particular rite, when the blood spilled, there he resumes performance of that rite. In Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion, each individual sprinkling in each of these rites is an act in and of itself, and therefore the offering can be rendered piggul through any one of them. This is certainly not the opinion of the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Meir in the baraita.,Rather, Rava says: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish would explain that the baraita does not mean that the priest had an improper intention either during the first set of sprinklings or the second or the third. Instead, this is referring to a case where the High Priest had an improper intention that can render the offering piggul during the first set of sprinklings, in the Holy of Holies, and was silent during the second set of sprinklings, on the Curtain, and again had an improper intention that can render the offering piggul during the third set of sprinklings, on the inner altar. There is a certain novelty in this case according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who maintains that anyone who performs an action performs it with his initial intent.,Rava elaborates: Lest you say that if it enters your mind that when the priest performs the second set of sprinklings he does so with his initial intent, i.e., that which he had at the time of the first set of sprinklings, why do I need him once again to have an improper intention that can render the offering piggul during the third set of sprinklings? Doesn’t his explicit intent during the third set of sprinklings indicate that he did not have this intent during the second set of sprinklings? Therefore, the baraita teaches us that this is not so, but rather his silence during the second set is considered a continuation of his initial intent. Rav Ashi objects to this: Is it taught that he was silent during the second set of sprinklings? According to Rava’s interpretation this is the key detail of the case, and yet it is not mentioned in the baraita.,Rather, Rav Ashi said: What are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where the High Priest had an intention that can render the offering piggul during the first set of sprinklings, in the Holy of Holies, and during the second set, on the Curtain, and during the third, on the corners of the inner altar. But during the fourth set, the sprinklings on the top of the inner altar, he was silent. Lest you say that if it enters your mind to say that anyone who performs an action performs it with his initial intent, why do I need him once again to have an improper intention that can render the offering piggul during each and every set of sprinklings? Therefore, the baraita teaches us that even so he is considered to have performed all the sprinklings with his initial intent. The Gemara raises a difficulty: How can Rav Ashi explain the baraita as referring to a case where the High Priest had an improper intention during the first, second, and third sets of sprinklings? But doesn’t the baraita teach: If the priest had an intention that can render the offering piggul, whether during the first set of presentations, whether during the second set, or whether during the third set? This indicates that he did not have improper intent during all the sprinklings but only in part of them. The Gemara comments: Indeed, this is difficult, as the wording of the baraita does not suit this interpretation.,§ The Gemara returns to discuss the baraita that addresses the blood presented inside the Sanctuary. The Master said that if the High Priest had an improper intention in one of the sets of presentations, e.g., inside the Holy of Holies, Rabbi Meir says: The offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet for its consumption, despite the fact that he performed the rest of the rite silently. The Gemara asks: Now consider, one is not liable to receive karet unless all the permitting factors of the offering have been sacrificed, i.e., if the whole service is completed, including the presentation of the blood. As the Master said: As is the acceptance of a valid offering, so is the lack of acceptance of a disqualified offering: Just as there is no acceptance of a valid offering unless all its permitting factors have been sacrificed, so too, there is no lack of acceptance of a disqualified offering, i.e., it is not rendered piggul, unless all its permitting factors have been sacrificed. That is to say, in the absence of one of its permitting factors it does not become piggul.,But here, in the case of the bull or goat of Yom Kippur, since he intended to burn the offering beyond its designated time while he was sprinkling the blood inside the Holy of Holies, the sprinkling is not valid, and therefore the High Priest is considered like one who did not sprinkle the blood, as every one of the sprinklings of the blood of an inner sin offering is indispensable. If so, when he sprinkles the blood again later in the Sanctuary, on the Curtain and the inner altar, it is as though he is merely sprinkling water, and not the blood of the offering. Consequently, the permitting factors of the offering have not been sacrificed, and therefore the offering should not be rendered piggul.,Rabba says: You find it in a case of four bulls and of four goats. After sprinkling blood inside the Holy of Holies with the intent to burn the offering beyond its designated time, the blood spilled. Since the priest did not use that blood again, the service inside the Holy of Holies was completed, and that permitting factor was performed properly. He then had to slaughter another bull and goat for the other sprinklings inside the Sanctuary, which he again performed with improper intent and again the blood spilled. The same sequence repeated itself in the sprinklings on the inner altar and on the top of the altar. In this manner each permitting factor was performed properly.,Rava said: You may even say that this is a case where there is only one bull and one goat, as the sprinkling effects acceptance with regard to the offering’s status of piggul. In other words, even though the High Priest sprinkled the blood inside the Holy of Holies with an improper intention, and thereby disqualified the offering, nevertheless, since he completed the service, he is considered as having sacrificed all the permitting factors with regard to piggul.,§ The baraita mentioned that there are forty-three presentations of the blood of the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught otherwise in a different baraita, that there are forty-seven presentations of that blood? The Gemara answers: This statement, that there are forty-three presentations, is in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that the High Priest mixes the blood of the bull and the goat before placing it on the corners of the inner altar, rather than placing the blood of each one separately. And that statement, that there are forty-seven presentations, is in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that the High Priest does not mix the two types of blood before placing them on the corners, but sprinkles four times from the blood of the bull and another four times from the blood of the goat, and only afterward mixes the blood of the two animals for placement on the top of the altar.,The Gemara raises another difficulty: But isn’t it taught in yet another baraita that there are forty-eight presentations? The Gemara answers: This statement, that there are forty-eight presentations, is in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that the pouring of the remainder of the blood on the base of the external altar is indispensable, and therefore this act is added to the total. That statement, that there are only forty-seven presentations, is in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that the pouring of the remainder of the blood is not indispensable.,The Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish’s understanding of Rabbi Meir’s opinion, that one cannot render an offering piggul with an improper intention during the performance of half a permitting factor, from a baraita discussing piggul of a meal offering, which states: In what case is this statement said, i.e., that if the priest had an improper intention during the performance of one of its services, the offering is piggul, despite the fact that he performed the rest of the services silently? When he had the improper intention in the removal of the handful, or in the placement of the handful in a service vessel, or in the walking with the handful to the altar.,But if he came to perform the burning of the handful and the frankincense, and he presented the handful on the altar with an improper intention and the frankincense he presented silently, or he presented the handful silently and the frankincense he presented with an improper intention, Rabbi Meir says: The offering is piggul and one is liable to receive karet for consuming it. And the Rabbis say: There is no liablility to receive karet unless the priest had an improper intention that can render the offering piggul during the performance of the entire permitting factor.,In any event, this baraita teaches: Or he presented the handful silently and the frankincense he presented with an improper intention, and yet Rabbi Meir disagrees with the ruling of the Rabbis and says that the offering is piggul. This indicates that the decisive factor according to Rabbi Meir is not that the priest continues his initial intent, but that one can render an offering piggul during the performance of half a permitting factor. The Gemara answers: Say and explain the baraita as follows: Or he presented the handful silently after he had already presented the frankincense with an improper intention. In this case the offering is piggul because he performed the second action with his initial intent.,The Gemara refutes this interpretation: One counterclaim is that if this is what the baraita is saying, this is exactly the same case as the first clause. And furthermore, isn’t it taught explicitly in another baraita: And afterward he presented the frankincense with an improper intention. The Gemara states: Indeed, this is difficult for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who claims that according to Rabbi Meir one cannot render an offering piggul during the performance of half a permitting factor.,MISHNA: And these are the items for which one is not liable to receive karet due to violation of the prohibition of piggul. One is liable to receive karet only if he partakes of an item that was permitted for consumption or for the altar by another item. As for the items listed here, either nothing else renders them permitted for consumption or for the altar, or they themselves render other items permitted. They are as follows: The handful of flour, which permits consumption of the meal offering; the incense, which is burned in its entirety, without another item rendering it permitted for the altar; the frankincense, which is burned together with the handful of the meal offering; the meal offering of priests, from which no handful of flour is removed and which is burned in its entirety (see Leviticus 6:16); the meal offering of the anointed priest, which is sacrificed by the High Priest each day, half in the morning and half in the evening; the blood, which permits all the offerings; and the libations that are brought by themselves as a separate offering and do not accompany an animal offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The same halakha applies even with regard to libations that are brought with an animal offering.,With regard to the log of oil that accompanies the guilt offering of a recovered leper, Rabbi Shimon says: One is not liable for consuming it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, because it is not permitted by any other item. And Rabbi Meir says: One is liable for consuming it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, as the blood of the guilt offering of the leper permits its use, as only after the blood’s sacrifice is the oil sprinkled and given to the priests. And the principle is: With regard to any item that has permitting factors, either for consumption by a person or for burning on the altar, one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul.,The mishna elaborates: The burnt offering, its blood permits its flesh to be burned on the altar and its hide to be used by the priests. The bird burnt offering, its blood permits its flesh and its skin to be burned on the altar. The bird sin offering, its blood permits its meat for consumption by the priests. Bulls that are burned, e.g., the bull for an unwitting communal sin, and goats that are burned, e.g., the goats sacrificed for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship, their blood permits their sacrificial portions to be sacrificed on the altar.,Rabbi Shimon says: Those bulls and goats are not subject to piggul because their blood is presented in the Sanctuary, and in the case of any offering whose blood is not presented on the external altar like that of a peace offering, with regard to which the halakha of piggul was stated in the Torah, one is not liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul.,GEMARA: Ulla says: With regard to a handful of a meal offering that is piggul that was offered up on the altar, its piggul status has left it. His reasoning is as follows: If this handful brings other items to a status of piggul, with regard to itself is it not all the more so? The Gemara asks: What is Ulla saying? This consideration does not explain why the status of piggul should leave the handful. The Gemara answers that this is what he is saying: If the handful is not accepted, i.e., if its sacrifice is disqualified, how can it bring other items to a status of piggul? A meal offering is considered piggul only if its handful is properly sacrificed.,The Gemara asks: What is Ulla teaching us? If he is teaching us that one is not liable for eating the handful due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, we learn this in the mishna: These are the items for which one is not liable due to piggul: The handful, the incense, the frankincense, the meal offering of priests, the meal offering of the anointed priest, the meal offering brought with the libations that accompany animal offerings, and the blood. If so, one is not liable for eating the handful even if it was not offered up on the altar.,Rather, Ulla is teaching that if items with piggul status ascended the altar, they shall not descend. But this too, we learn in a mishna (84a): With regard to sacrificial flesh that is left overnight, or that emerges from the Temple courtyard, or that is ritually impure, or an offering that was slaughtered with the intention of eating the meat beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, thereby acquiring the status of piggul, if any one of these ascended the altar they shall not descend.,Rather, Ulla is teaching that if items with piggul status descended from the altar after having been brought up there, they ascend once again. But we also learn in that same mishna (84b) that this is not so: Just as if they ascended the altar, they shall not descend, so too, if they descended from the altar they shall not ascend. The Gemara answers: No, Ulla’s ruling is necessary in a case where the fire has already taken hold of it, i.e., the handful began to burn before it came down from the altar. Ulla teaches that in such a case the priests should return the handful to the altar, as its piggul status has already left it.,The Gemara raises a difficulty: But this halakha too, Ulla already said it on another occasion. As Ulla says: The mishna taught that items that descended from the altar shall not ascend again only where the fire has not taken hold of them, but where the fire has already taken hold of them, they shall ascend. The Gemara explains: Even so, there is a novelty in Ulla’s ruling: Lest you say that this matter applies only to a limb of an offering, which is all connected together so that it forms a single unit, and one can say that if fire took hold of part of it, all of it is considered the food of the altar, and therefore it is returned to the altar if it came down; but with regard to a handful, which consists of separate pieces, perhaps only the part that the fire took hold of is returned to the altar, but as for the rest you might say that it does not ascend again. Therefore, Ulla teaches us that the same halakha applies to the handful as to a limb, i.e., if it descended from the altar after fire already took hold of any part of it, it ascends once again in its entirety to the altar.,Rav Aḥai says: Since the handful is considered one unit, therefore, in the case of this handful of piggul, half of which lies on the ground and half of which was brought up to the wood arrangement on the altar and the fire took hold of it, one brings all of it up to the altar ab initio.,Rabbi Yitzḥak says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to piggul, notar, i.e., offerings that remain after the time allotted for their consumption, and ritually impure flesh, where one brought them up to the altar, their prohibition has left them. Rav Ḥisda said in astonishment: Teacher of this halakha, is the altar a bath of ritual purification that can render an impure item pure? Rabbi Zeira says: This is referring to a case where the fire took hold of them, and therefore the item belongs to the altar and the prohibition lapses.,Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Bisna raises an objection from a baraita. Others say: The verse states: “But the soul that eats of the meat of the sacrifice of peace offerings, which pertain to the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:20). Although this can also be read as: Having its impurity upon it, referring to the meat of the peace offerings, the verse in fact is referring to one whose impurity can depart from him, i.e., a person who is currently impure, but can attain a state of ritual purity by immersing in a ritual bath. This serves to exclude the impure flesh of offerings, as its impurity cannot depart from it, since ritually impure flesh cannot be purified. And if it is so that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement is correct, the impurity of flesh can in fact depart from it by means of the fire of the altar.,Rava says: When the baraita speaks of an item whose impurity cannot depart from it, we say it is referring to purification by means of a ritual bath, not through any other means. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Is the term ritual bath written in the baraita? It speaks only in general terms about impurity that can or cannot depart from an item. Rather, Rav Pappa says: In that verse we are dealing with the meat of peace offerings, which are not fit for sacrificing, as the meat of a peace offering is eaten rather than being burned on the altar. Therefore, bringing it up to the altar does not remove its impurity from it.,Ravina says there is a different answer: Even if the impurity of flesh leaves it when it is brought up to the altar, this verse cannot be referring to the impure meat of peace offerings, as the phrase “having his impurity upon him” is referring to one whose impurity departs from him when he is whole; the term “upon him” indicates that he is in a state of wholeness. This serves to exclude sacrificial flesh, which is an item whose impurity does not depart from it when it is whole, but only when it is deficient, i.e., when fire takes hold of it on the altar.,§ The Gemara proceeds to analyze the matter itself. In the baraita the Rabbis attempt to prove that the verse: “But the soul that eats of the meat of the sacrifice of peace offerings, which pertain to the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:20), is referring to a ritually impure person, and not to impure flesh. The baraita states: “Having his impurity upon him”; the verse speaks of impurity of the body of the person, not the impurity of the flesh of the offering.,The question may be raised: Do you say that it is dealing with impurity of the body? Or is it speaking only of impurity of the flesh, as is suggested by the fact that the term for “meat” [basar] is masculine, matching the masculine pronominal suffix attached to the word “impurity,” whereas the word for “soul” [nefesh] is feminine? The answer is that here it is stated: “Having his impurity upon him,” and there it is stated: “Whoever touches the dead, the body of any man that has died, and does not purify himself, he has defiled the Tabernacle of the Lord; and that soul shall be cut off from Israel, because the water of sprinkling was not sprinkled upon him, he shall be impure, his impurity is yet upon him” (Numbers 19:13). Just as there, the verse is speaking of impurity of the body, so too here, the verse is speaking of impurity of the body.,Rabbi Yosei says there is a different proof: Since in this verse (Leviticus 7:20) the sacrificial animals are mentioned in the plural form, i.e., “peace offerings,” but the impurity is mentioned in the singular: “Upon him,” evidently the verse is speaking of impurity of the body, and not impurity of the peace offerings. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says there is yet another proof: Since the next verse states: “And when anyone shall touch any impure item…and eat of the meat of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:21), this indicates that the verse is speaking of impurity of the body, as will be explained. Others say that the phrase “having his impurity upon him” proves that the reference here is to one whose impurity can depart from him, i.e., a person. This serves to exclude the impure flesh of offerings, as its impurity cannot depart from it. This concludes the baraita.,The Gemara analyzes the baraita. The Master said: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that the term “and eat” indicates that the verse is speaking of impurity of the body. The Gemara asks: From where is this inferred? How is the meaning of this verse derived from this term, which appears in a different verse? In this connection the Gemara notes that Rava said: Any verse that was not explained by Rav Yitzḥak bar Avudimi, and any baraita that was not explained by Rav Ze’eiri, was not explained, as these Sages are the most accomplished interpreters of verses and baraitot, respectively.,Rava cites the relevant explanation of the verse referred to by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: This is what Rav Yitzḥak bar Avudimi says: The next verse states: “And when anyone shall touch any impure item, whether it is the impurity of man, or an impure animal, or any impure detestable thing, and eat of the meat of the sacrifice of peace offerings, which pertain to the Lord, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:21). The beginning of that verse: “And when anyone shall touch,” and the end of that verse: “That soul shall be cut off,” are in the feminine form, whereas the middle of the verse: “And eat of the meat,” is in the masculine form, and yet it is clear that the verse is speaking of impurity of the body. The same may be said about the previous verse: Since the verse begins in the feminine form and ends in the feminine form, and the masculine form is used in the middle, the verse must be speaking of impurity of the body, despite the change from the feminine to the masculine.,The Gemara cites the baraita, alluded to by Rava, through which the interpretative prowess of Rav Ze’eiri is demonstrated. This baraita also discusses the topic of eating consecrated food while in a state of ritual impurity. As it is taught in a baraita: If the lenient are stated, why are the stringent stated; and if the stringent are stated, why are the lenient stated? If the lenient were stated and not the stringent, I would say: For the lenient, one is liable to receive lashes for violating a prohibition, and for the stringent, one is liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven. Therefore, the stringent are stated. And if the stringent were stated and the lenient were not stated, I would say: Only for the stringent should one be liable to receive a punishment; but for the lenient, one should be entirely exempt. Therefore, the lenient are stated. This concludes the baraita, the meaning of which is opaque.,The Gemara asks: What are the lenient, and what are the stringent? It is known that the baraita is discussing the broad topic of eating consecrated food in a state of impurity, but its precise meaning requires elucidation. If we say that the lenient is referring to the consumption of second tithe while one is impure, and the stringent is referring to the partaking of teruma, the portion of the produce designated for the priest, in a state of impurity, how can the baraita say that had the Torah stated only the prohibition against eating second tithe I would incorrectly have said that one who partakes of teruma is liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven? Now too, this is the halakha; one who partakes of teruma when he is in a state of impurity is indeed liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven.,And furthermore, is it correct to say: And if the Torah had not stated the stringent case of teruma but only the lenient case of second tithe, and I would learn the halakha in the stringent case from the halakha in the lenient case by way of an a fortiori inference, I would then say that the punishment in the stringent case is that of death at the hand of Heaven? This is impossible, as there is a principle with regard to a fortiori inferences that it is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source. In other words, a halakha derived by means of an a fortiori inference can be no more stringent than the source from which it is derived. In this instance, if an impure person who eats second tithe is flogged for violating a prohibition, then the punishment for partaking of teruma in a state of impurity, were it not stated in the Torah, could be no more severe than that.,Rather, when the baraita refers to the lenient it is referring to the impurity of the carcass of a creeping animal, while the stringent is referring to the impurity imparted by a corpse, as the Torah discusses both these cases in the context of eating consecrated foods in a state of ritual impurity: “And whoever touches anything that is impure by the dead, or a man whose semen goes from him, or whoever touches any creeping animal” (Leviticus 22:4–5).,The Gemara asks: But if so, to what food is this referring? If it is referring to the partaking of teruma, both this one who was rendered impure by the dead and that one who was rendered impure by a creeping animal are liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven. No matter how he became impure, if he partakes of teruma in a state of ritual impurity he is liable to be punished with death. And furthermore, how can the baraita state: Therefore, the stringent are stated, i.e., to teach that one is liable only to be flogged for violating a prohibition, and not to be punished with death. After all, one who partakes of teruma when impure is in fact liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven. Consequently, the reference to stringent and lenient cannot be referring to the partaking of teruma.,And if the baraita is referring to the eating of second tithe, this too is difficult. If the stringent case of impurity imparted by a corpse were not stated, but only the lenient case of the impurity of a creeping animal, would I say that the punishment in the stringent case is that of death at the hand of Heaven? Rather, the halakha in the case of impurity imparted by a corpse would be derived from the halakha in the case of the impurity of a creeping animal by means of an a fortiori inference, and it is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source, in this case that one is liable to be flogged for the violation of a prohibition, and no more.,Ze’eiri says: Indeed, the lenient case is referring to the impurity of a creeping animal, and the stringent case is referring to impurity imparted by a corpse. And this is what the baraita is saying: If the impurity of a creeping animal was stated, and it was stated that one who eats second tithe while impure with such impurity has violated a prohibition and one who partakes of teruma in that state is liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven, and the impurity imparted by a corpse was not stated in this context, I would say as follows: The lenient level of impurity, that of a creeping animal, with regard to food with lenient halakhot, second tithe, involves the violation of a prohibition, and with regard to food with stringent halakhot, teruma, it involves liability to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven.,Ze’eiri continues his explanation of the baraita: And from the fact that the lenient level of impurity, that of a creeping animal, with regard to food with stringent halakhot, teruma, involves liability to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven, it may be inferred that also in the analogous case of the stringent level of impurity, imparted by a corpse, with regard to food with lenient halakhot, there is liability to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven. Therefore, the stringent level of impurity, imparted by a corpse, was stated with regard to second tithe, which has lenient halakhot, to teach that even if one contracted impurity from a corpse, he has violated only a prohibition for eating second tithe, and is not liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven.,§ The mishna teaches: With regard to any item that has permitting factors, either for consumption by a person or for burning on the altar, one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul. The Gemara cites a verse and a related baraita. The verse states: “And if any be at all eaten of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offering on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed to him who sacrifices it; it shall be piggul, and the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 7:18). The baraita first demonstrates that the halakha of piggul applies not only to a peace offering, with regard to which it is stated in the Torah, but to all offerings.,The Sages taught in a baraita: Or perhaps the halakha of piggul extends only to an offering that is similar to peace offerings: Just as peace offerings are notable in that they are eaten for two days and one night, so too, the halakha of piggul applies to any offering that is eaten for two days and one night.,But as for an offering that is eaten only for one day, i.e., the day the offering is sacrificed, and the following night, e.g., a sin offering, guilt offering, and firstborn offering, from where is it derived that the halakha of piggul applies to this offering as well? The verse states: “Of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offering,” which teaches that the status of piggul can apply to any offering whose remainder of meat is eaten after its sacrificial portions have been offered on the altar. The baraita asks: With regard to a burnt offering, whose remainder of meat is not eaten, as it is burned in its entirety on the altar, from where is this halakha derived? The verse states: “Sacrifice,” which includes any offering that is slaughtered.,The baraita asks: From where is it derived to include bird offerings, e.g., doves or pigeons, which are not slaughtered but whose napes of their necks are pinched, and meal offerings, until I include even the log of oil that accompanies the guilt offering of a recovered leper? The verse states with regard to the consumption of consecrated food in a state of ritual purity: “That they separate themselves from the sacred items of the children of Israel, which they consecrate to Me, and that they do not profane My holy name” (Leviticus 22:2).,The baraita clarifies this derivation: The halakha that the prohibition of notar applies to all these offerings is derived through a verbal analogy of profanation in the context of notar: “And if anything remains until the third day, it shall be burned in fire…and anyone who eats it shall bear his iniquity, because he has profaned the sacred item of the Lord” (Leviticus 19:6–8), and profanation stated in the verse discussing ritual impurity: “And that they do not profane My holy name.” And the halakha that piggul applies to all these offerings is subsequently derived through a verbal analogy of “iniquity” in the context of piggul and “iniquity” stated in the verse discussing notar. With regard to piggul, the verse states: “It shall be piggul, and the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 7:18), and with regard to notar, it is stated in the aforementioned verse: “And anyone who eats it shall bear his iniquity.”,The baraita asks: And since the verse eventually includes all items, even meal offerings and the log of oil of a leper, now one can ask: Why does the verse state piggul specifically with regard to peace offerings? The baraita answers: This serves to tell you that the offering must be similar to peace offerings in the following way: Just as peace offerings are notable in that they have permitting factors, either for consumption by a person or for burning on the altar, so too, with regard to any item that has permitting factors, either for a person or for the altar, one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul.,The baraita specifies: With regard to the burnt offering, its blood renders its flesh permitted to be burned on the altar and its hide to be used by the priests. With regard to the bird burnt offering, its blood renders its flesh and its skin permitted to be burned on the altar. With regard to the bird sin offering, its blood renders its flesh permitted for consumption by the priests. With regard to bulls that are burned, e.g., the bull sacrificed for an unwitting communal transgression, and goats that are burned, e.g., the goat sacrificed for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship, their blood renders their sacrificial portions permitted to be sacrificed on the altar.,And I exclude, via the analogy to peace offerings, the handful of a meal offering, the frankincense, the incense, the meal offering of priests, the meal offering of the anointed priest, the meal offering brought with the libations that accompany animal offerings, and the blood. All these do not have an item that renders them permitted either for a person or for the altar.,The baraita concludes: Rabbi Shimon says that the fact that the verse specifies peace offerings as the standard case of piggul teaches: Just as peace offerings are notable in that they have a permitting factor that is sacrificed on the external altar, i.e., their blood, and one is liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, so too, with regard to any item that has a permitting factor that is sacrificed on the external altar, one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul. This serves to exclude bulls that are burned and goats that are burned: Since their blood is not presented on the external altar like peace offerings, one is not liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of piggul.,The Gemara analyzes the baraita. The Master said: Perhaps the halakha of piggul extends only to an offering that is similar to peace offerings: What is this offering that is similar to a peace offering but not included in the category of peace offerings? The Gemara answers: The reference is to a firstborn offering, which is eaten for two days and one night, as is a peace offering. The Gemara raises a difficulty: By what hermeneutical principle is the halakha of the firstborn offering derived? If it is by the hermeneutical principle of: What do we find with regard to, a principle of inductive reasoning involving a comparison between cases that include similar details, i.e., since the peace offering and firstborn offering are similar with regard to the time designated for their eating, piggul status should apply to each, this can be refuted.,The Gemara clarifies the refutation: What is notable about peace offerings? They are notable in that they require placing hands on the head of the offering, libations, and waving of the breast and thigh. None of these apply in the case of a firstborn offering.,Rather, the halakha that piggul status applies to a firstborn offering is derived through the hermeneutical principle of a generalization and a detail and a generalization, from the following verse: “And if any be at all eaten of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings on the third day, it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18). The terms: “And if any” and “be at all eaten” are generalizations, while the words: “The flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offering” constitute a detail. According to the hermeneutical principle of a generalization and a detail and a generalization, in such a case one includes any item that is similar to the detail, and therefore one includes the firstborn offering.,The Gemara raises a difficulty: These two phrases are generalizations that are adjacent to one another, which means that this is not an instance of a generalization and a detail and a generalization, as they are not in that order. Rava said: The hermeneutical principle applies even in this case, as they say in the West, Eretz Yisrael: In every place that you find two generalizations that are adjacent to one another, cast the detail that is written afterward between them, and interpret them in the manner of a generalization and a detail and a generalization. Consequently, this verse is considered to state a generalization and a detail and a generalization.,§ The baraita teaches: Until I include even the log of oil of a leper. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? The Gemara answers that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to the log of oil of the leper, one is liable for consuming it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, if the guilt offering that this oil accompanied became piggul; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Say the latter clause: And I exclude the meal offering brought with the libations that accompany animal offerings, and the blood, as they do not have a permitting factor. Here we arrive at the opinion of the Rabbis, who dispute the ruling of Rabbi Meir.,The Gemara elaborates: As it is taught in another baraita: With regard to the libations of an animal offering, one is liable for consuming them due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, as the blood of the offering renders them permitted to be offered on the altar; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The Rabbis said to him: But a person may bring his offerings today and the accompanying libations from now until even ten days later. Evidently, then, the blood of the offering does not render the libations permitted. Rabbi Meir said to them: I too spoke only about libations that come to be sacrificed together with the offering. If so, the baraita under discussion represents two conflicting opinions.,Rav Yosef said: In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling, that even the log of oil of a leper is included in the prohibition of piggul? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who agrees with the Rabbis that the libations of an animal offering are not permitted by the blood of the offering. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says with regard to the log of oil of a leper that it is not the blood of the guilt offering that renders it permitted; rather, the placements of its oil “before the Lord” (Leviticus 14:16) render the remainder of the oil permitted to be eaten by the priests. And from the fact that the placements of its oil render the oil permitted, by the same token the placements of its oil render it piggul, i.e., if the oil was placed with the intent that the priests should consume its remainder on the following day, one who consumes the oil is liable for consuming piggul.,The Gemara cites the source for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s opinion. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to the log of oil of a leper, one who derives benefit from it is liable for misusing consecrated property if he derives benefit from it at any point after it has been consecrated in a service vessel, until the blood of the leper’s guilt offering is sprinkled. At this stage the oil is permitted to the priests, and therefore the prohibition against misusing property consecrated to the Temple no longer applies to it. Once the blood has been sprinkled, one may not derive benefit from the oil ab initio, by rabbinic law, as it must still be placed on the leper’s right ear, thumb, and big toe. But if one derived benefit from it, he is not liable for misuse.,Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One who derives benefit from the oil is liable for misusing consecrated property until the priest places its own placements, i.e., until the oil is sprinkled seven times toward the Sanctuary, as these sprinklings render the remainder of the oil permitted to the priests. And the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi agree that consumption of the log of oil is prohibited until the priest places the seven placements, i.e., sprinklings, of oil toward the Sanctuary, and performs the placing of the oil on the leper’s thumb and big toe.,They said this statement before Rabbi Yirmeya in Eretz Yisrael, whereupon he said: Would a great man such as Rav Yosef say such a matter, that the sprinkling of the oil renders the rest of the oil piggul? But there is the case of the log of oil that is brought by itself, i.e., where the leper brings it after he has sacrificed his offerings. There everyone agrees that its placements render the remainder of the oil permitted to the priests, and yet they do not render the oil piggul, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to the log of oil of a leper, one is liable for consuming it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, as the blood of the offering renders it permitted to be placed on the thumb and big toe of the leper. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.,The Rabbis said to Rabbi Meir: But a person may bring his guilt offering today and the accompanying log of oil from now until even ten days later. Rabbi Meir said to them: I too spoke only about a log of oil that comes with the guilt offering. This indicates that even according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, it is the blood of the offering that renders the oil piggul.,Rather, Rabbi Yirmeya says: Actually, the aforementioned baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and omit the case of the meal offering brought with the libations that accompany animal offerings from the list of items that are not subject to the halakha of piggul. Abaye says: Actually, do not omit this item from the list, and the baraita can be explained in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir as follows: The tanna first taught the halakha with regard to the log of oil that comes with the leper’s guilt offering, and the same is true of libations that come with an animal offering, as according to Rabbi Meir piggul status applies to both of these. And then the tanna taught that piggul does not apply to libations that come by themselves, and the same is true of a log of oil that comes by itself.,§ The mishna teaches: With regard to the bird burnt offering, its blood renders its meat and its skin permitted to be eaten by the priests. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter, that the meat of a bird burnt offering is eaten by the priests, derived? The Gemara cites a baraita that Levi teaches, with regard to a verse that discusses the gifts that are to be presented to the priests: “This shall be yours of the most sacred items, from the fire: Every offering of theirs, every meal offering of theirs, and every sin offering of theirs, and every guilt offering of theirs, which they shall render to Me, shall be most sacred for you and for your sons” (Numbers 18:9).,The baraita clarifies what is included by the term “every” in each of these clauses. The verse states: “Every offering of theirs,” which serves to include the log of oil of a leper; it too is given to the priests. The Gemara explains why it is necessary to derive from the verse that the oil is a gift to the priesthood: It might enter your mind to say that the oil should not be included, as the Merciful One writes in this same verse: “From the fire,” and this log of oil, notwithstanding its status as an offering, is not reserved from the fire. Only an item concerning which part of it is brought to the altar can be said to be reserved from the fire, and none of the oil is brought to the altar. Therefore, the verse teaches us by the phrase: “Every offering of theirs,” that the oil goes to the priests.,The phrase: “Every meal offering of theirs,” serves to include the omer meal offering, brought as a communal offering on the sixteenth of Nisan, and the meal offering of jealousy, brought by a sota. The Gemara elaborates: It might enter your mind to say that as the verse states with regard to the consumption of sacrificial food by the priests: “And they shall eat those items with which atonement is achieved” (Exodus 29:33), only those foods that facilitate atonement are given to the priests. And this would exclude the omer meal offering and the meal offering of jealousy, as the omer meal offering comes to permit the consumption of the new crop, and the meal offering of jealousy comes to clarify the transgression of the sota, as part of the ordeal undergone by the woman. Therefore, the verse teaches us by the phrase: “Every meal offering of theirs,” that even these meal offerings are eaten by the priests.,The phrase: “And every sin offering of theirs,” serves to include the bird sin offering; its meat too is given to the priests. The Gemara explains: It might enter your mind to say that this meat should not be eaten at all, as it is an unslaughtered animal carcass, since the bird is killed by pinching its nape (see Leviticus 5:8) rather than by slaughtering, which is the manner of ritual slaughter of non-sacred birds. Therefore, the phrase: “And every sin offering of theirs,” teaches that the bird sin offering is eaten by the priests.,The phrase: “Every guilt offering of theirs,” serves to include the guilt offering of a nazirite who contracted ritual impurity, and the guilt offering of a leper. The Gemara elaborates: It might enter your mind to say that these should not be given to the priests to eat, as they come to qualify these individuals, rather than to atone. The guilt offering of a nazirite renders him fit to restart his term of naziriteship, and the guilt offering of a leper qualifies him to eat sacrificial food, whereas the verse states: “And they shall eat those items with which atonement is achieved” (Exodus 29:33). Therefore, the verse teaches us by the phrase: “Every guilt offering of theirs,” that these offerings as well are eaten by the priests.,The Gemara challenges: It is explicitly written with regard to the guilt offering of a leper that it is consumed by the priests: “For as the sin offering is the priest’s, so is the guilt offering” (Leviticus 14:13). Why, then, is this derivation necessary? Rather, the baraita means to say that the phrase: “Every guilt offering of theirs,” serves to include the guilt offering of a nazirite, teaching that it is like the guilt offering of a leper, in that both are eaten by the priests.,The baraita continues: With regard to the phrase “which they shall render to Me,” this is referring to an item stolen from a convert. One who robs a convert who then dies with no heirs must give the stolen item and an additional one-fifth to the priests. Finally, the term “for you” teaches that it shall be yours, even to betroth a woman with it, i.e., these gifts are considered the priest’s property in all regards.,§ According to the first tanna of the mishna, the bulls that are burned and the goats that are burned, the blood of which is presented on the inner altar, are subject to piggul, whereas Rabbi Shimon rules that they are not subject to piggul. It is taught in a baraita that there is a third opinion concerning the matter: Rabbi Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: If in his service of the bulls that are burned or the goats that are burned the priest had an intention that can render the offering piggul with regard to a matter that is performed outside the Sanctuary, i.e., in the Temple courtyard, he has rendered the offering piggul. If his intention was with regard to a matter that is performed inside the Sanctuary or the Holy of Holies, he has not rendered the offering piggul.,The baraita elaborates: How so? If he was standing outside when slaughtering the animal, and said: I hereby slaughter the animal with the intention of sprinkling its blood tomorrow inside the Sanctuary, he has not rendered the offering piggul. The reason is that in the case of an intention outside with regard to a matter that is performed inside, one has not rendered the offering piggul. Likewise, if he was standing inside when sprinkling, and said: I hereby sprinkle the blood of the sin offering in order to burn its sacrificial portions on the external altar and to pour out its remainder on the base of the altar tomorrow, he has not rendered the offering piggul, as this is an intention inside with regard to a matter that is performed outside.,But if he was standing outside, and said: I hereby slaughter the animal with the intention of pouring out the remainder of its blood tomorrow, or to burn its sacrificial portions tomorrow, he has rendered the offering piggul, as this is an intention outside with regard to a matter that is performed outside.,Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: What is the verse from which this is derived? The verse states with regard to the sacrificial portions of a bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, which is one of the bulls that are burned: “As it is taken off from the bull of the peace offering” (Leviticus 4:10). But what, then, do we learn from the bull of a peace offering? Everything that is specified with regard to a peace offering is stated with regard to this bull as well.,Rather, the verse juxtaposes the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest with the bull of the peace offering: Just as the bull of the peace offering is not rendered piggul unless the priest’s actions and intentions relate to the service performed on the external altar, as that is where it is offered, so too, the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest is not rendered piggul unless the priest’s intentions and actions relate to the service performed on the external altar.,Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says that Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says his ruling in the name of Rabbi Yosei.,Rava said: Does one issue a halakha for the messianic period, when the Temple will be rebuilt? Abaye said to him: If that is so, that such halakhot are not taught, let the tanna not teach all the halakhot of the slaughter of sacrificial animals, i.e., tractate Zevaḥim, as it is entirely a halakha for the messianic period. Rather, one studies these halakhot due to the principle of: Study Torah and receive reward, i.e., one is rewarded for the study of Torah regardless of its practical applicability. Here too, study Torah and receive reward. Rava said to him: This is what I am saying to you: Why do I need a practical ruling of halakha? According to another version, which presents the same answer in different terms, Rava said to him: I spoke in reference to the ruling of halakha, as it is puzzling that a halakhic ruling is given in this case.,MISHNA: With regard to offerings consecrated by gentiles for sacrifice to God, one is not liable for eating them, neither due to violation of the prohibition of piggul if the sacrificial rites were performed with the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time, nor due to violation of the prohibition of notar, nor due to violation of the prohibition against eating the meat while ritually impure. And one who slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard is exempt; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. And Rabbi Yosei deems him liable.,GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to offerings consecrated by gentiles, one may not derive benefit from them ab initio, but if one derived benefit from them, he is not liable after the fact for misusing consecrated property. And one is not liable for eating them, neither due to violation of the prohibition of piggul if the sacrificial rites were performed with the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time, nor due to violation of the prohibition of notar, nor due to violation of the prohibition against eating the meat while ritually impure.,And gentiles cannot render an animal a substitute, i.e., if a gentile stated with regard to an animal that it should be the substitute of a consecrated animal, the substitution does not take effect. And gentiles cannot bring libations that are brought by themselves as a separate offering and do not accompany an animal offering, but their animal offerings require libations. This is the statement of Rabbi Shimon.,Rabbi Yosei says: I see the logic of the opinion that in all of these cases it is correct to be stringent about the offerings of gentiles, as it is stated with regard to them: “Any man of the house of Israel, or of the strangers in Israel that will sacrifice his offering…to the Lord” (Leviticus 22:18). This indicates that all offerings, even those of gentiles, are fully consecrated to God; therefore, the halakhot of misuse, piggul, notar, and eating the meat while ritually impure should all apply to the offerings of gentiles. In what case is this statement said? In the case of items consecrated for the altar. But with regard to items that are consecrated by gentiles for Temple maintenance, one who derives benefit from them is liable for misusing them. This concludes the baraita.,The Gemara begins to analyze this baraita in detail. The baraita taught that one may not derive benefit from items consecrated by gentiles ab initio, but if one derived benefit from them, he is not liable after the fact for misusing of consecrated property. The Gemara explains: One may not derive benefit from them by rabbinic law, as the Sages prohibited deriving benefit from any item that was consecrated to God.,The Gemara’s explanation continues: But if one derived benefit from them, he is not liable after the fact for misusing consecrated property, as the tanna of the baraita derives the halakha of misuse of consecrated property through a verbal analogy between “sin” stated with regard to misuse of consecrated items and the word “sin” stated with regard to teruma. With regard to misuse of consecrated property, the verse states: “If any one commits a trespass, and sins through error, in the sacred items of the Lord” (Leviticus 5:15). In the case of teruma, the verse states: “Lest they bear sin for it, and die due to it, if they profane it” (Leviticus 22:9). And with regard to teruma, it is written: “And they shall not profane the sacred items of the children of Israel” (Leviticus 22:15), which indicates: But not the sacred items of gentiles, i.e., one is not liable for partaking of the teruma of gentiles while he is in a state of ritual impurity.,The baraita further taught: And one is not liable for eating the offerings of gentiles due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, or notar, or eating the meat while ritually impure. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? The Gemara explains that the halakha of piggul is derived through a verbal analogy between the word “iniquity” stated with regard to piggul and the word “iniquity” stated with regard to notar. With regard to piggul, the verse states: “It shall be piggul, and the soul that eats it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 7:18), and with regard to leftover sacrificial meat the verse states: “Therefore anyone who eats it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 19:8).,And the halakha of notar itself is derived through a verbal analogy between profanation stated with regard to notar and profanation stated with regard to ritual impurity. With regard to notar the verse states: “Because he has profaned the sacred item of the Lord” (Leviticus 19:8), and with regard to impurity the verse states: “And that they do not profane My holy name” (Leviticus 22:2). And with regard to impurity it is written in that same verse: “That they separate themselves from the sacred items of the children of Israel,” which indicates: But not the sacred items of gentiles.,The baraita also teaches: And gentiles cannot render an animal a substitute. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? The Gemara explains: It is because substitution is juxtaposed in the Torah with animal tithe, as the verse states: “And concerning the tithe of the herd, or of the flock…the tenth shall be sacred to the Lord…neither shall he make a substitute for it” (Leviticus 27:32–33). And animal tithe is juxtaposed with the tithe of grains, as the verse states: “You shall tithe [asser te’asser] all the increase of your seed that the field brings forth year by year. And you shall eat before the Lord your God, in the place that He shall choose to place His name there, the tithe of your grain” (Deuteronomy 14:22–23). The doubled verb form, asser te’asser, is understood as an allusion to two tithes, grain tithe and animal tithe. And with regard to the tithe of grains it is written: “When you take of the children of Israel the tithes” (Numbers 18:24), which indicates: But not of gentiles.,The Gemara asks: But does a matter derived via a juxtaposition again teach via a juxtaposition? There is a principle that in consecrated matters, a halakha derived via a juxtaposition cannot teach another halakha via a juxtaposition. The Gemara answers: This derivation is not relevant exclusively to consecrated matters, as the tithe of grains is non-sacred food.,The Gemara raises a difficulty: This works out well according to the one who says that when implementing this principle we follow the source that teaches the halakha, i.e., if the matter that teaches the first juxtaposition involves non-sacred items, one can employ two juxtapositions even with regard to deriving the halakha for consecrated matters. But according to the one who says that we follow the matter that is taught the halakha, i.e., the case to which we wish to apply the halakha, and if that case involves offerings one cannot employ two juxtapositions, what can be said?,Rather, the reason why gentiles cannot bring an animal tithe offering is that animal tithe is an obligation for which there is no fixed time, and with regard to any obligation for which there is no fixed time, a Jew can bring it but gentiles cannot bring it. And as stated, substitution is juxtaposed with the animal tithe, and therefore gentiles can also not render an animal a substitute.,§ The baraita teaches: And gentiles cannot bring libations that are brought by themselves as a separate offering and do not accompany an animal offering, but their animal offerings require libations. The Gemara cites the source of these halakhot. The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to libations: “All who are homeborn shall do these things after this manner” (Numbers 15:13), which teaches that those who are homeborn, i.e., Jews, can bring libations as a separate offering, but a gentile cannot bring such libations. One might consequently have thought that a gentile’s burnt offering should not require the standard accompanying libations. Therefore, the verse states: “So it shall be done for each bull” (Numbers 15:11), which indicates that every offering requires libations.,The baraita continues: Rabbi Yosei says: I see that in all of these cases it is correct to be stringent. In what case is this statement said? In the case of items consecrated for the altar. But with regard to items that are consecrated by gentiles for Temple maintenance, one who derives benefit from them is liable for misusing them. The Gemara asks: What is the reason of Rabbi Yosei?,The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yosei holds that when the halakha of misuse of consecrated property is derived through a verbal analogy between “sin” stated with regard to misuse of consecrated property and “sin” stated with regard to teruma, this is referring to items that are similar to teruma, which is sacred with inherent sanctity. But with regard to an item consecrated for Temple maintenance, which has no inherent sanctity, but only sanctity that inheres in its value, this exemption of gentiles does not apply.,The Gemara continues to analyze the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to blood that became impure and a priest sprinkled it on the altar, if he did so unwittingly, the offering is accepted. But if he sprinkled the blood intentionally, the offering is not accepted. In what case is this statement said? It is with regard to the offering of an individual. But with regard to the offering of the community, whether the priest sprinkled the blood unwittingly or he did so intentionally, the offering is accepted. And in the case of the offerings of gentiles, whether he sprinkled the blood unwittingly or he did so intentionally, the offering is not accepted.,The Sages said before Rav Pappa: In accordance with whose opinion was this baraita taught? Apparently, it was taught not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, as if it reflects the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, there is a difficulty: Doesn’t Rabbi Yosei say: I see the logic of the opinion that in all of these cases it is correct to be stringent about the offerings of gentiles? This indicates that Rabbi Yosei equates the halakhot applying to the offerings of gentiles with those governing the offerings of Jews.,Rav Pappa said to them: You may even say that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and it is different there, as the verse states with regard to the High Priest’s frontplate, which atones for ritual impurity contracted by offerings in the Temple without the knowledge of those offering them: “And it shall be always upon his forehead that it may be accepted for them before the Lord” (Exodus 28:38), which indicates that it is accepted for them, i.e., for Jews, but not for gentiles.,Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said to Rav Pappa: If that is so, with regard to the verse discussing ritually impure priests and consecrated items: “That they separate themselves from the sacred items of the children of Israel, which they consecrate to Me” (Leviticus 22:2), so too, would Rabbi Yosei say that the prohibition against eating consecrated items in a state of ritual impurity applies only to offerings which they, the Jews, consecrate, and not to those of gentiles? This cannot be, as Rabbi Yosei explicitly states in the baraita that in this regard the offerings of gentiles are like those of Jews.,Rather, Rav Ashi says that it is not from the words “for them” that one derives that the offering of a gentile is not accepted when the blood that was sprinkled had become impure. Rather, it is because the atonement achieved by way of the High Priest’s frontplate does not apply to gentiles, as the verse states: “That it may be accepted for them before the Lord” (Exodus 28:38), and gentiles are not subject to the acceptance of offerings.,MISHNA: Even with regard to those items enumerated in the previous mishna (42b) for which one is not liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, e.g., the handful, the frankincense, and the incense, one is, nevertheless, liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of notar, and due to violation of the prohibition against eating consecrated food while ritually impure, except for the blood. Rabbi Shimon deems one liable for an item whose typical manner is such that one eats it. But with regard to the wood, the frankincense, and the incense, one is not liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition against eating a consecrated item while ritually impure.,GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: It might have been thought that one should be liable due to violation of the prohibition against eating consecrated food while in a state of ritual impurity only for an item that has permitting factors, either for consumption by a person or for burning on the altar.,The baraita explains: And this may be derived via a logical derivation: Just as with regard to piggul, which renders one who unwittingly eats it liable to bring a fixed sin offering, and this liability is incurred with one change in his awareness, i.e., it suffices for the sinner to become aware after the fact that he had sinned unwittingly, and it has no permitted exceptions from its general prohibition, as there are no circumstances in which one is permitted to eat piggul, and yet one is liable due to violation of the prohibition against eating piggul only for an item that has permitting factors, either for consumption by a person or for burning on the altar, so too, the same should certainly apply to the more lenient case of ritual impurity.,The Gemara elaborates: Impurity is more lenient than piggul, as it renders the unwitting sinner liable only to bring a sliding-scale offering, which varies according to his financial circumstances: A poor person brings a bird offering or even a meal offering (see Leviticus 5:6–13). And liability is incurred only with two changes in his awareness, i.e., when the sinner was aware of his impurity beforehand, then forgot about it at the time of his sin, and then once again become aware of his impurity. And it has permitted exceptions from its general prohibition with regard to the community, as it is permitted to sacrifice communal offerings in the Temple in a state of impurity. With these leniencies in mind, is it not right that one should be liable due to violation of the prohibition against eating consecrated food while ritually impure only for an item that has permitting factors, either for a person or for the altar.,Therefore, the verse states, with regard to eating consecrated foods in a state of ritual impurity: “That they separate themselves from the sacred items of the children of Israel, which they consecrate to Me, and that they do not profane My holy name” (Leviticus 22:2). This teaches that a ritually impure person is liable for eating any item that has been consecrated.,One might have thought that one is liable for eating sacred items immediately after they have been consecrated. Therefore, the verse states: “Whoever he is of all your seed among your generations that approaches the sacred items” (Leviticus 22:3), and Rabbi Elazar said, in explanation of this verse: But is there one who merely touches, i.e., approaches, consecrated items, who is liable? Only one who eats consecrated food while in a state of ritual impurity is liable.,Rather, what is the meaning when the verse states: “Approaches [yikrav]”? This term alludes to sacrificing [hakrava], as though the verse has stated: Whoever sacrifices sacred items and eats them. This teaches that the verse is speaking of flesh that has been rendered fit to be sacrificed. How so? With regard to an item that has permitting factors, one is liable from when the permitting factors are sacrificed. In the case of an item that does not have permitting factors, one is liable from when it is sanctified in a service vessel for the purpose of its sacrifice.,The Gemara asks: We have found proof that the prohibition against eating consecrated food in a state of ritual impurity applies even to an item that does not have a permitting factor. From where do we derive that notar likewise applies to an item that does not have a permitting factor? The Gemara answers: This is derived through a verbal analogy between profanation stated in the context of notar and profanation stated in the context of ritual impurity. With regard to notar the verse states: “Because he has profaned the sacred item of the Lord” (Leviticus 19:8), and with regard to impurity the verse states: “And that they do not profane My holy name” (Leviticus 22:2).,The Gemara challenges: But let the halakha of notar be derived through a verbal analogy between “iniquity” stated in the context of notar and “iniquity” stated in the context of piggul. With regard to piggul, the verse states: “It shall be piggul, and the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 7:18), and with regard to leftover sacrificial meat the verse states: “Therefore anyone who eats it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 19:8). If so, the halakha of notar should be similar to that of piggul, for which one is liable only for an item that has a permitting factor.,The Gemara answers that it is more reasonable to derive notar from ritual impurity, for several reasons, as indicated by the mnemonic: Gimmel, zayin, lamed. Both notar and impurity are disqualifications that apply to the body [guf ] of the offering itself, whereas piggul is caused by intent; unlike piggul, these two disqualifications are not determined by the sprinkling [zerika] of the blood, and in both cases the Torah uses the term profanation [ḥillul ].,The Gemara responds: On the contrary, it is more reasonable to derive notar from piggul, as like piggul it does not have permitted exceptions from its general prohibition, it has no atonement through the High Priest’s frontplate, both notar and piggul apply to a ritually pure offering, these disqualifications are dependent on time, and both of them are disqualifications of the item being sacrificed, not the priest performing the service. None of these features are true of ritual impurity. And these reasons for comparing notar to piggul are more numerous.,Rather, the halakha of notar is derived from that which Levi taught with regard to the verse: “That they separate themselves from the sacred items of the children of Israel, which they consecrate to Me, and that they do not profane My holy name” (Leviticus 22:2), which is referring to the eating of consecrated food in a state of ritual impurity. As Levi taught: From where is it derived that the verse is speaking even of a disqualification caused by time, and not only ritual impurity? The verse states profanation elsewhere: “And they shall not profane the sacred items of the children of Israel” (Leviticus 22:15). The verse is speaking here of two profanations; one is the disqualification of notar and one is the disqualification of ritual impurity. This teaches that like impurity, notar applies even to an item that does not have a permitting factor.,§ The mishna teaches: Even with regard to the items for which one is not liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, one is, nevertheless, liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of notar, and due to violation of the prohibition against eating consecrated food while ritually impure, except for the blood. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Before answering this question, the Gemara cites another discussion as to why the halakha of misuse of consecrated property does not apply to blood. Ulla says: The verse states with regard to blood: “For the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls” (Leviticus 17:11). “To you” indicates that it shall be yours; it is not the property of the Temple, so it is not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property.,The school of Rabbi Yishmael similarly taught: The verse states: “To make atonement,” teaching that God is saying: I gave it for atonement, and not for the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property.,Rabbi Yoḥanan says that this halakha is derived from the latter part of the verse, which states: “For it is the blood that makes atonement for the soul” (Leviticus 17:11). The term “it is” teaches that the status of the blood remains as it is, i.e., it is before atonement as it is after atonement. As the Gemara will state, there is a principle that once the mitzva involving a consecrated item has been performed, the item is no longer subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. Accordingly, the term “it is” teaches that just as after atonement, i.e., after the blood has been presented on the altar, it is not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property, as the mitzva has already been performed, so too, before atonement, i.e., before the blood has been presented on the altar, it is not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property.,The Gemara asks: But if the term “it is” teaches that the status of the blood remains the same before and after atonement, one can say just the opposite: It is after atonement as it is before atonement. Just as before atonement the blood is subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property, so too after atonement it is subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. The Gemara rejects this: This cannot be the case, as there is a principle: There is no item whose mitzva has been performed that is still subject to the prohibition of misusing consecrated property.,The Gemara asks: And is there no such case? But there is the mitzva of the removal of the ashes of offerings burned on the altar. Any benefit derived from them between their removal and their required burial constitutes misuse of consecrated property, despite the fact that their mitzva has already been performed.,The Gemara answers: The principle does not apply in that case, because the matter of the removal of the ashes and the matter of the priestly vestments, the four white garments worn by the High Priest on Yom Kippur, are both subject to the halakha that misuse of consecrated property applies to them even after their mitzva has been performed. Consequently, they are two verses that come as one, i.e., they share a unique halakha not found elsewhere. And there is a principle: Any two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to apply to other cases. Instead, they are considered exceptional instances that cannot serve as models for other cases.,The Gemara raises a further difficulty: This works out well according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that the verse: “And he shall take off the linen garments, which he wore when he went into the Sanctuary, and shall leave them there” (Leviticus 16:23), teaches that the four white garments worn by the High Priest on Yom Kippur are not fit for further use, and they require interment.,But according to the opinion of Rabbi Dosa, who says that these priestly vestments are fit for an ordinary priest and do not require interment, provided that a High Priest does not use them on Yom Kippur in a different year, one does not misuse consecrated property by using them after their mitzva has been performed, and therefore what is there to say? In his opinion, the halakha of misuse of consecrated property after the performance of a mitzva applies only to the removal of ashes from the altar, not to the priestly vestments, which means it is stated in only a single case. Why, then, does this case not serve as a paradigm for other instances in the Torah?,The Gemara responds: It is because the cases of the removal of the ashes and the halakha of the heifer whose neck is broken are two verses that come as one, as it is prohibited to derive benefit from either of them even after their mitzva is completed, and any two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to apply to other cases.,The Gemara challenges this from a different angle: This works out well according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to apply to other cases, but according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do teach their common element to apply to other cases, what is there to say?,The Gemara answers: Two exclusions are written in these two cases, which indicate that this halakha applies to them alone. Here, with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken, it is written: “Whose neck was broken” (Deuteronomy 21:6), and this superfluous description teaches that this halakha, that the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property is in effect even after the performance of a mitzva, applies solely to this case and should not be extended to others. And there, with regard to the removal of ashes, it is written: “And he shall put it” (Leviticus 6:3), indicating that this halakha applies to “it,” and nothing else.,The Gemara asks: And why do I need these three verses stated with regard to blood, from which it is derived that the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property does not apply to blood? The reference is to the three terms specified earlier, in the expositions of Ulla, the school of Rabbi Yishmael, and Rabbi Yoḥanan, from the verse: “I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls, for it is the blood that makes atonement for the soul” (Leviticus 17:11).,The Gemara answers: One of those terms serves to exclude the blood from the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. Another phrase serves to exclude blood from the prohibition of notar. If one consumed leftover blood, he is not liable for consuming notar. Rather, he is liable for violating only the prohibition against consuming blood. And the last phrase serves to exclude it from the prohibition of ritual impurity. If one consumed this blood in a state of ritual impurity, he is liable only for consuming blood, but not on account of consuming consecrated food while ritually impure.,But no verse is required to exclude this blood from the halakha of piggul, because this is already derived from another source, as we learned in the mishna (43a): With regard to any item that has permitting factors, either for consumption by a person or for burning on the altar, one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul. The permitting factor itself is not subject to piggul. And consequently, piggul does not apply to blood itself, as it renders the offering permitted for human consumption or for the altar.,§ Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Why do I need three mentions of karet with regard to one who eats peace offerings in a state of ritual impurity? The three verses are: “But the soul that eats of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings, that pertain to the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off [venikhreta] from his people” (Leviticus 7:20); “And when anyone shall touch any impure item, whether it is the impurity of man, or an impure animal, or any unclean detestable thing, and eat of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings, that pertain to the Lord, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:21); and: “Whoever he is of all your seed among your generations that approaches the sacred items, which the children of Israel consecrate to the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from before Me; I am the Lord” (Leviticus 22:3). One mention of karet in the verse: “That approaches the sacred items,” is for a generalization, and one mention in the verse: “Of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings,” is for a detail. This detail serves to include all items consecrated to the altar, in accordance with the hermeneutical principle that any matter that was included in a generalization but was explicitly specified to teach a certain halakha was intended to teach not just about itself but about the entire generalization. And one mention of karet in the verse: “And when anyone shall touch any impure item,” serves to include items whose typical manner is such that they are not to be eaten, e.g., wood and frankincense, and teaches that one who eats even these items is liable to receive karet.,The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says in the mishna with regard to items whose typical manner is such that they are not to be eaten, that one is not liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition against eating consecrated items in a state of ritual impurity, what does this last mention of karet serve to include? The Gemara answers that it serves to include the sin offerings whose blood is presented inside the Sanctuary.,The Gemara explains why this inclusion is necessary. It might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Shimon says that concerning any offering whose blood is not presented on the external altar like that of a peace offering, one is not liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, one should likewise not be liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of ritual impurity. Therefore, the additional mention of karet teaches us that one who is impure is in fact liable for eating these sin offerings brought inside the Sanctuary.,§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Shimon stated a ruling in which he deems one liable for eating in a state of ritual impurity an item whose typical manner is such that one eats it, but not for eating the wood, the frankincense, or the incense, whose typical manner is such that one does not eat it. The Rabbis disagree and deem him liable in all these cases. It was stated that two pairs of amora’im disagreed with regard to this issue; one pair is Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, and the other pair is Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina. The two different opinions that follow were respectively stated by one of this pair and one of that pair.,One says: The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon is with regard to the impurity of meat, i.e., the item that is eaten is impure. The Rabbis maintain that one who eats impure wood or frankincense is flogged, as derived from the two mentions of flesh in the verse: “And the meat that touches any impure item shall not be eaten; it shall be burned with fire. And as for the meat, everyone who is pure may eat of it” (Leviticus 7:19). But if one ate wood or frankincense in a state of impurity of the body, everyone agrees that he is not flogged.,And one says: As there is a dispute with regard to this case, when the item eaten is impure, so is there a dispute with regard to that case, when the one eating the wood or frankincense is impure. What is the reason for this opinion? Since one reads with regard to these inedible items: “And the flesh that touches any impure item” (Leviticus 7:19), as this phrase serves to include even items such as wood and frankincense in the prohibition against eating them when they are impure, one likewise reads with regard to them the next verse: “But the person that eats of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings…having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:20), which discusses one in a state of impurity who eats consecrated items.,The Gemara notes: Rav Tavyumei teaches the discussion in this preceding manner, whereas Rav Kahana teaches it in this alternative manner: One of this pair of amora’im and one of that pair disagreed with regard to the latter clause in the mishna, i.e., the meaning of Rabbi Shimon’s statement. One says that Rabbi Shimon’s dispute with the Rabbis is with regard to the impurity of the body, as he maintains that an impure individual who eats wood or frankincense is exempt. But with regard to the impurity of flesh, i.e., these items themselves, everyone agrees that one is flogged. And one says: As there is a dispute with regard to this case, so is there a dispute with regard to that case, i.e., Rabbi Shimon holds that one is exempt in both cases.,Rava said: It stands to reason that the correct interpretation is like the one who says: As there is a dispute with regard to this case, so is there a dispute with regard to that case. What is the reason? Since one does not read with regard to these inedible items: “Having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off,” as according to both alternative explanations Rabbi Shimon deems exempt one who eats these items when he is in a state of impurity, similarly one does not read with regard to them the previous verse: “And the flesh that touches any impure item shall not be eaten.”,The Gemara raises a difficulty: But doesn’t the Master say that the term: “And as for the flesh,” in the same verse, serves to include wood and frankincense? This indicates that even these items can become ritually impure, and the prohibition against eating consecrated items that are impure applies to them. The Gemara answers: This is referring merely to disqualification, i.e., this inclusion applies by rabbinic law, and the verse is cited in mere support.,MISHNA: The slaughtered offering is slaughtered for the sake of six matters, and one must have all of these matters in mind: For the sake of the particular type of offering being sacrificed; for the sake of the one who sacrifices the offering; for the sake of God; for the sake of consumption by the fires of the altar; for the sake of the aroma; for the sake of the pleasing of God, i.e., in fulfillment of God’s will; and, in the cases of a sin offering and a guilt offering, for the sake of atonement for the sin.,Rabbi Yosei says: Even in the case of one who did not have in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of any one of these, the offering is valid, as it is a stipulation of the court that he should not state any intent ab initio. This is necessary because the intent follows only the one performing the sacrificial rite, and therefore if the one who slaughters the animal is not careful and states the wrong intent, the offering would be disqualified through his improper intent.,GEMARA: Rav Yehuda says that Rav says with regard to the verse: “A burnt offering, an offering made by fire, of a pleasing aroma to the Lord” (Leviticus 1:9), the term “a burnt offering” means that one must intend that it be for the sake of a burnt offering, to the exclusion of one who sacrifices a burnt offering for the sake of a peace offering, which one may not do. The mention of fires, i.e., the term “an offering made by fire,” teaches that the offering must be sacrificed for the sake of complete consumption by the fires of the altar, to the exclusion of one who intends that its portions should only be roasted on the fire, as one may not do so.,Rav continues to expound the verse. The term “aroma” indicates that the offering must be sacrificed for the sake of the aroma, to the exclusion of limbs that one first roasted and afterward took them up to the altar, which he may not do. As Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: With regard to limbs that one first roasted and afterward took them up to the altar, they do not constitute fulfillment of the requirement that the offering must be sacrificed for the sake of the aroma.,The term “pleasing” means for the sake of pleasing God’s spirit, i.e., that the offering should be accepted by God. Finally, the expression “to the Lord” indicates that it should be for the sake of the One Who spoke and the world came into being.,Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: With regard to a sin offering that one slaughtered with intent that the slaughter be for the sake of a burnt offering, it is disqualified. As explained (2a), a sin offering that was slaughtered for the sake of another offering is entirely disqualified. But if he intended the slaughter to be for the sake of a non-sacred animal, it is valid. Rabbi Elazar says: What is the reason of Rav? The verse states: “And they shall not profane the sacred items of the children of Israel” (Leviticus 22:15). This teaches that consecrated items, i.e., the intent to slaughter an offering for the sake of another type of offering, profane consecrated items, but the intent to slaughter an offering for the sake of a non-sacred animal does not profane consecrated items.,Rabba raises an objection from the mishna: Rabbi Yosei says: Even in the case of one who did not have in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of any one of these, the offering is fit, as it is a stipulation of the court that one not state any intent ab initio. Rabba infers from this that the reason the offering is valid and it effects acceptance is that he did not have in mind any intent at all. But if he had in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of a non-sacred animal, it is disqualified.,Abaye said to Rabba: Perhaps Rabbi Yosei means the following: If he did not have in mind any intent at all, the offering is valid and it effects acceptance, but if he had in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of a non-sacred animal, the offering is valid, but it does not effect acceptance, as it is a flawed offering. Rav’s statement can be understood in a similar fashion.,Rabbi Elazar says: Indeed, a sin offering that one intentionally slaughtered for the sake of a non-sacred animal is valid, as stated by Rav. But if he slaughtered it as a non-sacred animal, actually thinking that it was non-sacred, it is disqualified, as when he slaughtered it, he did not intend to perform a sacrificial rite. This is like the dilemma that Shmuel raised before Rav Huna: From where is it derived with regard to one who acts unawares in the case of consecrated items, i.e., if one slaughtered an offering without intending to perform the act of slaughter at all, but rather like one occupied with other matters, that the offering is disqualified? Rav Huna said to Shmuel: It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “And he shall slaughter the young bull before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:5), teaching that the mitzva is not performed properly unless the slaughter is for the sake of a young bull, i.e., knowing that he is performing an act of slaughter.,Shmuel said to Rav Huna: We have this as an established halakha already, that it is a mitzva to slaughter the offering for the sake of a bull, but from where is it derived that this requirement is indispensable? Rav Huna said to him that the verse states: “With your will you shall slaughter it” (Leviticus 19:5), i.e., with your full awareness you shall slaughter it, in the form of a purposeful action.,§ The mishna teaches: Because the intent follows only the one performing the sacrificial rite. The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, says: I heard that even the owner of an offering can render it piggul through improper intention. Rava says: What is the reason of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei? As the verse states: “Then he who sacrifices shall sacrifice his offering to the Lord” (Numbers 15:4). The term “he who sacrifices” is a reference to the owner; since the owner is considered one who sacrifices, he too can render his offering piggul with an improper intention.,Abaye says: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Eliezer, and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar all hold that even in a case involving two people, where this one has intention and that one performs the service, it is the intention that is relevant, i.e., it is as though the one performing the service had the intention. The Gemara explains: The statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, is that which we just said, that the owner can render his offering piggul through improper intention despite the fact that it is the priest who performs the service.,The statement of Rabbi Eliezer is as we learned in a mishna (Ḥullin 38b): With regard to one who slaughters an animal on behalf of a gentile, his slaughter is valid and a Jew may eat the meat of this animal. But Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit, as the intention of the gentile, which is presumably to use the animal for idol worship, invalidates the act of slaughter performed by the Jew.,The statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar is as we learned in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated a principle: In the case of any item that is not fit to be stored, and therefore people do not typically store items like it, but it was deemed fit for storage by this person and he stored it, and another person came and carried out on Shabbat the item that was stored, that one who carried it out is rendered liable by the thought of this one who stored it.,The Gemara notes: These two Sages, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, although their rulings are stated in the context of entirely different matters, accept as halakha the ruling of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei. The Gemara explains: Now that concerning matters outside the Temple, i.e., non-sacred slaughter and carrying on Shabbat, with regard to which the Torah makes no reference to intention, we say that the intention of one person is effective for the action of another, is it necessary to state that the same halakha applies to matters inside the Temple, i.e., offerings, with regard to which it is explicitly stated that intention is effective, as indicated by the verse: “With your will you shall slaughter it” (Leviticus 19:5)?,But Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, does not necessarily accept as halakha the rulings of these two Sages, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. The Gemara explains: Perhaps it is only concerning inside the Temple that we say that one person’s intention is effective for the action of another, whereas concerning outside the Temple, we do not say this.,The Gemara further differentiates between the opinions of those two Sages themselves. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar accepts as halakha the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer: Now that with regard to Shabbat we say that the intention of one person is effective for the action of another, is it necessary to say that the same applies concerning idol worship, where the actions are somewhat similar to those performed in the Temple?,But Rabbi Eliezer does not necessarily accept as halakha the ruling of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar: Perhaps it is only with regard to idol worship that you say that one person’s intention is effective for the action of another, as idol worship is somewhat similar to service performed inside the Temple. Consequently, it is reasonable that one person’s intention is effective for the action of another in the case of idolatry, as it does for offerings. But with regard to Shabbat, the Torah prohibited only planned, constructive labor, i.e., one is liable only for an action that includes the creative intent of the doer, and here the one who took the item out did not intend to perform a labor.,,MISHNA: What is the location of the slaughtering and consumption of offerings? The principle is that with regard to offerings of the most sacred order, their slaughter is in the north of the Temple courtyard.,Specifically, with regard to the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur, their slaughter is in the north and the collection of their blood in a service vessel is in the north, and their blood requires sprinkling between the staves of the Ark in the Holy of Holies, and upon the Curtain separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, and on the golden altar. Concerning all those sprinklings, failure to perform even one placement of their blood disqualifies the offering. As to the remainder of the blood, which is left after those sprinklings, a priest would pour it onto the western base of the external altar. But if he did not place the remainder of the blood on the western base, it does not disqualify the offering.,With regard to bulls that are burned and goats that are burned, their slaughter is in the north of the Temple courtyard, and the collection of their blood in a service vessel is in the north, and their blood requires sprinkling upon the Curtain separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, and upon the golden altar,