זבחים ל״א ב:י״ד-ל״ו ב:ט״ו

It can be inferred that if one had intent to eat and to eat in a manner similar to a case of intent to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk; Abaye interjects: And what are the circumstances of such a case? It is a case with two people, i.e., where each one will consume half an olive-bulk. Abaye continues with the conclusion of his statement: Then the two halves join together. The Gemara concludes: Learn from it that this is so.,Rava raises a dilemma: If one had intent to eat an olive-bulk in more than the period of time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread, what is the halakha? Do we equate the consumption of offerings to the consumption of the Most High, i.e., the burning of offerings on the altar, for which there is no maximum allotted time? Or do we equate it to the consumption of an ordinary person, for whom consumption slower than this rate is not considered eating?,Abaye said: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk not at the appropriate time or in the appropriate area, the offering is fit because eating and burning do not join together. One may infer that the reason the offering is fit is that he had intent to eat and to burn the offering. But if he had intent to eat half an olive-bulk at the normal rate and to eat half an olive-bulk in the time it takes to burn half an olive-bulk, the two would join together. But the burning of an olive-bulk of an offering can take more than the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread. It therefore seems that there is no upper limit on the time in which one is considered to have consumed an offering.,The Gemara rejects the proof: Perhaps the mishna is referring to intent to burn half an olive-bulk in a large fire, which can consume it in the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread. Accordingly, one may draw the inference only with regard to a case where his intent was to consume the halves of an olive-bulk within this time.,§ The mishna teaches: If one slaughtered the animal with intent to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk not at the appropriate time or in the appropriate area, the offering is fit. The Gemara infers: The reason that the two halves of an olive-bulk do not join together is because his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk. But if his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk of the meat and to eat half an olive-bulk of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it, then the halves do join together and disqualify the offering, as both intentions concern eating.,The Gemara notes an apparent contradiction: But the first clause of the mishna teaches: If one’s intent was to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, beyond its designated time, his intent joins together to disqualify the offering. One can infer that only if his intent was to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, does his intent join together, but if his intent was to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it, then it does not join together.,Rabbi Yirmeya says: In accordance with whose opinion is this latter clause? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: One can have intent to shift an item’s consumption from consumption by a person to consumption by the altar, or from consumption by the altar to consumption by a person. As we learned in another mishna (35a): In the case of one who slaughters the offering with intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one does not burn it on the altar, beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, the offering is fit, and Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit.,Abaye says: You may even say that the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And do not say that one should infer from the mishna that if his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk of an item normally consumed and to eat half an olive-bulk of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it, then the offering is disqualified. Rather, say that one infers that if his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk and to eat another half an olive-bulk, both halves from an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, then the halves join together to disqualify the offering.,The Gemara asks: If so, what is this latter clause teaching us? If it teaches us that two half olive-bulks from an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, join together, one can already learn this from the first clause of the mishna: If one has intent to consume half an olive-bulk outside its designated area and half an olive-bulk the next day, the offering is disqualified. One can infer that if his intent was to eat the first half an olive-bulk the next day, the offering would be rendered piggul.,But if one will say that this term teaches its literal meaning, that intentions to eat and to burn two halves of an olive-bulk do not join together, one can already learn this from the inference drawn above from the first clause of the mishna, namely that intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it does disqualify the offering, but intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it does not. By extension, intent to consume half an olive-bulk of such an item does not join to disqualify the offering.,Now, consider the following: And just as if when one has intent to partake of an item normally eaten and to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it, his intentions do not join together, even though both intentions concern consumption, is it necessary for the mishna to teach that intentions to consume and to burn do not join together? The last clause therefore seems unnecessary.,The Gemara responds: It was necessary for the mishna to explicitly address the case where one had intent to eat and to burn, as it might enter your mind to say that it is only there, where one’s intentions are referring solely to consumption, that they do not join together, since he has intent to act in a way that is not consistent with its typical manner and consume an item not normally consumed. But here, where his intent is to both eat and burn the offering, such that with regard to this half he intends to act in a way consistent with its typical manner, and with regard to that half he intends to act in a way consistent with its typical manner, one might say that they should join together. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that intentions to eat and to burn do not join together.,,MISHNA: With regard to all those who are unfit for Temple service who slaughtered an offering, their slaughter is valid, as the slaughter of an offering is valid ab initio when performed even by non-priests, by women, by Canaanite slaves, and by ritually impure individuals. And this is the halakha even with regard to offerings of the most sacred order, provided that the ritually impure will not touch the flesh of the slaughtered animal, thereby rendering it impure. Therefore, these unfit individuals can disqualify the offering with prohibited intent, e.g., if one of them intended to partake of the offering beyond its designated time or outside its designated area. And with regard to all of them, in a case where they collected the blood with the intent to offer it beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, if there is blood of the soul that remains in the animal, the priest fit for Temple service should again collect the blood and sprinkle it on the altar.,If the priest fit for Temple service collected the blood in a vessel and gave the vessel to an unfit person, that person should return it to the fit priest. If the priest collected the blood in a vessel in his right hand and moved it to his left hand, he should return it to his right hand. If the priest collected the blood in a sacred vessel and placed it in a non-sacred vessel, he should return the blood to a sacred vessel. If the blood spilled from the vessel onto the floor and he gathered it from the floor, it is valid.,If an unfit person placed the blood upon the ramp or on the wall of the altar that is not opposite the base of the altar, or if he placed the blood that is to be placed below the red line above the red line, or if he placed the blood that is to be placed above the red line below the red line, or if he placed the blood that is to be placed inside the Sanctuary outside the Sanctuary or the blood that is to be placed outside the Sanctuary inside the Sanctuary, then if there is blood of the soul that remains in the animal, the priest fit for Temple service should again collect the blood and sprinkle it on the altar.,GEMARA: The Gemara infers from the use of the past tense in the mishna: With regard to all those who are unfit for Temple service who slaughtered, that after the fact, yes, the slaughter is valid. But ab initio, no, those who are unfit may not slaughter an offering.,And the Gemara raises a contradiction from what was taught in the halakhic midrash Torat Kohanim: The verse states with regard to a burnt offering: “And he shall slaughter the bull before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:5). The fact that the verse does not stipulate that a priest must slaughter the offering teaches that slaughter is valid if performed by a non-priest, as stated in the mishna: As the sacrificial rite of slaughter is valid when performed by non-priests, by women, by Canaanite slaves, and by ritually impure individuals, and even with regard to offerings of the most sacred order. Or perhaps the term “and he shall slaughter” in the verse is referring only to slaughter by priests?,You can say in response: From where did you come to the idea that the verse is referring only to a priest? It is from the fact that it is stated to Aaron: “And you and your sons with you shall keep your priesthood in everything that pertains to the altar” (Numbers 18:7).,One might have thought that this is the halakha even with regard to slaughter, that only priests are fit to slaughter an offering. Therefore, the verse states: “And he shall slaughter the bull before the Lord, and Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall present [vehikrivu] the blood” (Leviticus 1:5), from which it is inferred that specifically from the collection of the blood and onward it is a mitzva exclusively of the priesthood. This teaches about the rite of slaughter that it is valid ab initio if performed by any person. This contradicts the inference from the mishna that slaughter of an offering by a non-priest is valid only after the fact.,The Gemara answers: The same is true that even ab initio as well it is permitted for those unfit for Temple service to slaughter an offering, but because the mishna wants to teach with regard to the ritually impure that they may not slaughter an offering ab initio due to a rabbinic decree lest they touch the flesh and render it ritually impure, therefore the mishna taught this halakha with the expression in the past tense: Who slaughtered, i.e., after the fact.,The Gemara asks: And in the case of a ritually impure individual who performed the slaughter, is it permitted even after the fact? And one can raise a contradiction from what is taught in the halakhic midrash: The Torah states two consecutive directives: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the burnt offering…And he shall slaughter the bull before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:4–5). This juxtaposition indicates that both directives are referring to the same individual, which teaches that just as placing hands on the head of an offering may be performed only by ritually pure individuals, so too, the slaughter may be performed only by ritually pure individuals. The Gemara answers: By rabbinic law, an impure person is prohibited from slaughtering an offering lest he touch the flesh of the offering, but by Torah law the slaughter is valid.,The Gemara asks: What is different about placing hands that it can be performed only by those who are ritually pure even by Torah law? It is that it is written: “Before the Lord,” which is referring to the Temple courtyard, and an impure person may not enter the Temple courtyard. With regard to slaughter as well, isn’t it written: “Before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:5)? How can a ritually impure person enter the Temple courtyard to slaughter an offering? The Gemara answers: It is possible, in a case where he fashions a long knife, stands outside the Temple courtyard, and slaughters the offering that is inside the courtyard.,The Gemara asks: With regard to placing hands also, it is possible, in a case where he inserts his hands into the Temple courtyard and places them on the head of the offering. The Gemara answers: The tanna holds that a partial entry, in which only a part of the body enters the Temple courtyard, is called entry. Therefore, an impure individual may not insert even part of his body, such as his hands, into the Temple courtyard.,Rav Ḥisda taught the baraita in the opposite manner: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the burnt offering…and he shall slaughter the bull” (Leviticus 1:4–5), teaches that just as slaughter may be performed only by ritually pure individuals, so too, placing hands may be performed only by ritually pure individuals. The Gemara asks: What is different about slaughter that it may be performed only by those who are ritually pure? It is that it is written with regard to it: “Before the Lord,” which refers to the Temple courtyard, and a ritually impure person may not enter the Temple courtyard. With regard to placing hands on the head of an offering as well, it is written: “Before the Lord.” The Gemara answers that it is possible, in a case where he inserts his hands into the Temple courtyard and places them on the head of the offering while he remains outside. The Gemara asks: But with regard to slaughter also, it is possible, in a case where he fashions a long knife and slaughters the animal while standing outside the Temple courtyard.,The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Shimon HaTimni, who holds that the one who slaughters an offering must stand inside the Temple courtyard. This is as it is taught in a baraita, that when the verse states: “And he shall slaughter the bull before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:5), it teaches that the bull must be inside the Temple courtyard, but the slaughterer need not be “before the Lord.” Therefore, he may stand outside the Temple courtyard and slaughter the offering that is inside. Shimon HaTimni says: From where is it derived that the hands of the slaughterer must be farther inside the Temple courtyard than the animal that is slaughtered? The verse states: “And he shall slaughter the bull before the Lord,” which teaches that the slaughterer of the bull must be before the Lord.,§ Apropos the question of whether partial entry into the Temple courtyard is considered entry, Ulla says that Reish Lakish says: A ritually impure individual who inserted his hand inside the Temple courtyard is flogged for transgressing the prohibition of entering the Temple while impure, as it is stated with regard to the impurity of a woman who gave birth: “Every consecrated item she shall not touch, and to the Temple she shall not come, until the days of her purification are complete” (Leviticus 12:4). The verse juxtaposes entry into the courtyard to touching a sacred item. Just as touching with even a part of the body is considered touching, so too, entry with part of the body is considered entry.,Rav Hoshaya raised an objection to Ulla from that which was taught in a baraita: There is the case of a leper whose eighth day, on which he becomes ritually pure from his leprosy and performs the final stages of his purification process, occurs on Passover eve, such that it would be possible to bring his offerings and be fit to partake of the Paschal offering that evening. And he experienced a seminal emission on that day before he performed the final stages of his purification process, rendering him ritually impure and prohibited from entering the Temple. And he then immersed himself in a ritual bath. The question is whether he may come to the gate of the Temple courtyard, which is necessary to complete his purification process and terminate his status as a leper.,The Sages said: Although any other individual who was ritually impure who immersed that day and is waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed may not enter the Temple mount until nightfall, this one may enter. The reason is that it is better for a positive mitzva that has a punishment of karet, i.e., the bringing of the Paschal offering, to come and override a positive mitzva for which there is no liability to be punished with karet, i.e., the mitzva to remove individuals who are ritually impure from the Temple courtyard, than have the positive mitzva that has a punishment of karet not be performed.,And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: By Torah law, there is not even a positive mitzva that restricts from entering the Temple courtyard one who has immersed that day and will become pure only upon nightfall, as it is stated: “And Jehoshaphat stood in the congregation of Judea and Jerusalem, in the House of the Lord, before the new courtyard” (II Chronicles 20:5). What is the meaning of “the new courtyard”? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This is referring to the place in which they innovated many matters and said that one who immersed that day may not enter the camp of the Levites, which in Jerusalem includes the entire Temple Mount. This indicates that the prohibition is of rabbinic origin, and by Torah law it is permitted for him to enter.,Rav Hoshaya concludes his objection: And if you say that partial entry into the courtyard is considered entry, how does the leper who immersed himself that day insert his hands into the courtyard so that his right thumb and big toe will become purified? In this situation, both this mitzva to eat of the Paschal offering and that mitzva for an impure person to not enter the courtyard are each a positive mitzva for which there is liability to be punished with karet, as someone who immersed himself that day who enters the Temple courtyard is liable to be punished with karet.,Ulla said to Rabbi Hoshaya: A proof to my opinion can be brought from your own burden, i.e., from the question you asked. A leper is different, as the Torah permitted him to insert his right thumb and big toe into the courtyard in order to become purified despite the fact that he has not yet brought an atonement offering to complete the purification process, and since he was permitted to partially enter the courtyard for purification from his leprosy, he was also permitted with regard to his impurity due to his seminal emission. Nevertheless, a partial entry into the courtyard is in fact considered an entry.,Based on Ulla’s previous comment, Rav Yosef said: Ulla holds that if most of the Jewish people were zavim on Passover eve, and were therefore prohibited from sacrificing the Paschal offering while impure, and then they became ritually impure due to a corpse, which allows them to sacrifice the Paschal offering despite their impurity as they are a majority of the Jewish people, since they are permitted to sacrifice the offering with regard to their impurity due to a corpse, they are also permitted with regard to their ziva.,Abaye said to him: Are the cases comparable? With regard to a leper who experienced a seminal emission, he was already permitted to partially enter the courtyard despite his initial impurity. Therefore, the subsequent impurity does not prohibit him from entering. By contrast, the zavim were originally prevented from sacrificing the Paschal offering. Therefore, even if he would be permitted to enter the courtyard despite becoming impure due to a corpse, he would not be permitted to enter due to the ziva that was previously present.,Furthermore, Abaye said to him: Perhaps this is what the Master is saying: If most of the Jewish people were initially ritually impure due to a corpse, and they subsequently became zavim, since they are permitted with regard to their impurity due to a corpse, they are permitted with regard to their ziva as well. Rav Yosef said to him: Yes, that was what I meant.,The Gemara asks: But still, this is not comparable to the case of Ulla, since with regard to a leper, it is with total permission that he is allowed partial entry into the courtyard. And since it was permitted with regard to one impurity, it was permitted with regard to a second impurity. But the ritual impurity with regard to the sacrificing of the Paschal offering is only overridden, and there is not a total permission. Perhaps with regard to this, i.e., ritual impurity due to a corpse, it is overridden, but with regard to that, i.e., the impurity of ziva, it is not overridden.,Rava said to him: On the contrary, the opposite is more reasonable. With regard to a leper, it is with specific permission that he was allowed by the Torah to insert his right thumb and big toe into the courtyard in order to become purified despite his ritual impurity, which was not granted for other impurities. Therefore, perhaps only with regard to this impurity it is permitted, but with regard to that impurity, i.e., due to a seminal emission, it is not permitted. But with regard to ritual impurity, since it is overridden in the case of ritual impurity due to a corpse, what difference does it make to me if there is one impurity that is overridden, and what difference does it make to me if there are two impurities that are overridden? The Gemara comments: It can be derived by inference that both Abaye and Rava hold that impurity is overridden in cases involving the public and is not entirely permitted.,The Gemara returns to discussing Ulla’s statement that partial entry of a ritually impure individual is considered entry: Let us say that a baraita (Tosefta, Nega’im 8:10) supports Ulla’s opinion: Concerning all the cases of placing hands that were there in the Temple, I say about them that the principle: Immediately following the placing of hands on the head of an offering is its slaughter, is applied, meaning that these acts must take place uninterruptedly and in the same location.,This is so except for this case of a leper who places hands on his guilt offering, which was done in the threshold of the Nicanor Gate and not in the Temple courtyard where the guilt offering was slaughtered. The reason for this is that a leper cannot enter the courtyard until they sprinkle from the blood of his sin offering and from the blood of his guilt offering on the altar on his behalf. The Gemara explains the proof: And if you say that partial entry is not considered entry, let him insert his hands and place them on the head of the offering, and the offering should then be slaughtered in that location next to the gate.,Rav Yosef said: There is no proof from here, as in accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that the northern side of the courtyard in which it is permitted to slaughter offerings of the most sacred order, which includes a guilt offering, includes only the area to the north of the altar and not the entire northern section of the courtyard. This area is far north of the entrance to the courtyard, i.e., more than twenty-two cubits away. Consequently, even if the leper were to insert his hands into the courtyard and place them on the head of his guilt offering, it would not be permitted to slaughter it there.,The Gemara suggests: But let an opening [pishpash] be made in the northern courtyard wall facing the altar, where the leper can insert his hands. The Gemara explains: Abaye and Rava both say that such structural changes cannot be made to the Temple, since the verse states with regard to the Temple construction: “All in writing, as the Lord has made me wise by His hand upon me, even all the works of this pattern” (I Chronicles 28:19).,There are those who say that Rabbi Yosef said another explanation as to why the leper cannot insert his hands into the courtyard and place them on the head of the offering: Anyone who places hands on the head of an offering must insert his head and most of his body into the courtyard. What is the reason? We require placing hands with all of his force. Therefore, it is not possible for the leper to perform the placing of his hands properly without entering the courtyard, and the placing of hands on the offering is done instead in the threshold of the Nicanor Gate.,The Gemara clarifies: What does the tanna of the baraita hold? If he holds that placing hands on the head of a guilt offering of a leper is by Torah law, and the principle that immediately following the placing of hands on the head of an offering must be its slaughter is also by Torah law, let the leper openly insert his hands into the courtyard and place them on the head of the offering, as the Merciful One states in the Torah that he must do so.,Rav Adda bar Mattana says: In principle that should be done. But the prohibition against the leper entering the courtyard is a rabbinic decree, due to the concern that perhaps he will increase his steps, enter the courtyard more than is necessary, and be liable for entering there in a state of impurity. There are those who say that Rav Adda bar Mattana says that placing hands on the head of a guilt offering of a leper is indeed by Torah law, but the requirement that immediately following the placing of hands is the slaughter is not by Torah law. Therefore, he places hands on the offering outside of the courtyard.,The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita cited previously (32a): The verse states: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the burnt offering…And he shall slaughter the bull” (Leviticus 1:4–5). Just as placing hands may be performed only by ritually pure individuals, so too, the slaughter may be performed only by ritually pure individuals. And if you say that the requirement that placing hands must immediately precede the slaughter is not by Torah law, then with regard to ritually impure individuals you also find that placing hands may be performed, since they can do so outside the courtyard.,Rather, reverse it and say that placing hands on the head of the guilt offering of a leper is not by Torah law, and therefore the leper must do so outside the courtyard, but with regard to offerings that require placing of hands by Torah law, the requirement that immediately following the placing of hands must be the slaughter is by Torah law. The Gemara returns to Ulla’s statement in the name of Reish Lakish (32b) that an impure individual who inserted his hand into the Temple courtyard is flogged, as partial entry is considered entry. An objection was then raised from the case of the leper, where he is not liable to be punished with karet for partial entry, and Ulla offered one answer. Ravina says that there is another answer: It was stated only with regard to lashes, teaching that one is flogged for partially entering the courtyard while ritually impure. Reish Lakish agrees that there is no punishment of karet for partial entry as there is for a full entry.,When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Abbahu says that the statement of Reish Lakish with regard to this verse was stated with regard to a ritually impure individual who touched sacrificial food, and not with regard to partial entry into the courtyard, as Ulla had said.,This is as it was stated: There is an amoraic dispute with regard to an impure person who touched sacrificial food. Reish Lakish says: He is flogged. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged. The Gemara elaborates. Reish Lakish says: He is flogged, as it is written: “Every consecrated item she shall not touch” (Leviticus 12:4). And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged, as that verse is written with regard to touching the portion of the produce designated for the priest [teruma].,The Gemara asks: But does Reish Lakish actually hold that this verse comes to teach this halakha? He requires this verse to teach a prohibition for a ritually impure person who eats sacrificial meat. As it was stated: From where is the prohibition for a ritually impure person who eats sacrificial meat derived? Reish Lakish says it is derived from the verse: “Every consecrated item she shall not touch,” which the Gemara will explain is referring to eating.,Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The Sage Bardela teaches that this prohibition is derived from a verbal analogy of the term “his impurity [tumato]” written with regard to one who eats sacrificial meat while impure (Leviticus 7:20), and the term “his impurity [tumato]” written with regard to one who enters the Temple while impure (Numbers 19:13). Just as there, with regard to entering the Temple while impure, the Torah prescribed the punishment of karet and also explicitly prohibited doing so, so too here, with regard to eating sacrificial meat while impure, the Torah prescribed the punishment of karet and also explicitly prohibited doing so. Clearly, Reish Lakish understood this verse as referring to eating sacrificial meat, not merely touching it.,The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish holds that both can be derived from Leviticus 12:4. The prohibition with regard to a ritually impure individual who touched sacrificial food is derived from the fact that the Merciful One expressed this prohibition with a term of touching, while the prohibition with regard to one who eats sacrificial food while impure is derived from the fact that the Torah juxtaposed the prohibition of eating sacrificial food while impure to the prohibition of entering the Temple while impure in the verse: “Every consecrated item she shall not touch, and to the Temple she shall not come” (Leviticus 12:4).,The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish. It is written: “Every consecrated item she shall not touch”; this is a prohibition for an impure person who eats sacrificial food. Do you say that it is a prohibition for an impure person who eats sacrificial food, or perhaps it is only a prohibition for an impure person who touches sacrificial food?,The verse states: “Every consecrated item she shall not touch, and to the Temple she shall not come” (Leviticus 12:4). The verse juxtaposes the matter pertaining to sacrificial food to the matter of entering the Temple while ritually impure. Just as entering the Temple is a matter that entails a punishment that involves the taking of a life, i.e., karet, so too, the matter pertaining to sacrificial food entails a punishment that involves the taking of a life. The Gemara explains: And if the prohibition is with regard to touching sacrificial food, is there a punishment that entails the taking of a life? Rather, the prohibition is with regard to eating.,The Gemara asks: But this verse is still necessary for Reish Lakish to teach the halakha of a ritually impure person who ate sacrificial meat before the sprinkling of the blood of the offering on the altar, when the meat is not yet permitted. As it was stated: With regard to an impure individual who ate sacrificial meat before the sprinkling of the blood, Reish Lakish says: He is flogged for doing so, and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged.,Reish Lakish says: He is flogged, as it is written: “Every consecrated item she shall not touch,” without limiting the prohibition to a specific time, indicating that it is no different if one eats the sacrificial meat prior to sprinkling the blood, and it is no different if one does so after sprinkling the blood. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged, as the Sage Bardela teaches that the prohibition is derived by means of the verbal analogy cited before, as the verse states “his impurity” with regard to an impure person who eats sacrificial food, and states “his impurity” with regard to an impure person entering the Temple. And when “his impurity” is written, it is with regard to partaking of sacrificial meat after the sprinkling of the blood (see Leviticus 7:20).,The Gemara answers for Reish Lakish: If so, that the verse was referring only to partaking of sacrificial meat after the sprinkling of the blood, let the verse say: A consecrated item she shall not touch. What is the reason for using the phrase “every consecrated item”? Conclude two conclusions from it, i.e., it also includes not eating sacrificial meat before the sprinkling of the blood.,§ The Gemara discusses the matter itself: With regard to an impure individual who ate sacrificial meat before the sprinkling of the blood, Reish Lakish says: He is flogged for doing so, and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged. Abaye says: This dispute applies with regard to a case of impurity of the body of the one who eats the meat, but with regard to impurity of the flesh itself, i.e., if the sacrificial meat was ritually impure, all agree that he is flogged.,This is as the verse states: “And the flesh that touches any impure item shall not be eaten; it shall be burned with fire; and the flesh, every one that is pure may eat the flesh” (Leviticus 7:19). The Sages derived that the extra term “and the flesh” serves to include wood and frankincense, which are not fit for consumption, and even so the verse included them as being susceptible to impurity, and one who eats them while he is impure is flogged. Therefore, sacrificial meat before the sprinkling of the blood, which is fit for consumption, is certainly included in the prohibition.,And Rava says: This dispute applies with regard to a case of impurity of the body, but with regard to impurity of the meat all agree that he is not flogged. What is the reason? Since one does not apply to meat before the sprinkling of the blood the verse: “But the soul that eats of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings of the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:20), which is referring to meat after the sprinkling of the blood, so too, one does not apply to it the prohibition: “And the flesh that touches any impure item shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 7:19).,The Gemara challenges the statement of Rava: But doesn’t the Master say that the term “and the flesh” serves to include wood and frankincense that became impure as items that are forbidden to be eaten, despite the fact that they are not fit for consumption? Certainly, then, sacrificial flesh before the sprinkling of the blood should also be included in the category of items forbidden to be eaten.,The Gemara answers: What are we dealing with here, that one would be liable for eating wood and frankincense that are impure? It is a case where the wood and frankincense were sanctified in a vessel, and the reason for the liability is that they are then considered like an item for which all of its permitting factors were sacrificed, such as flesh after the sprinkling of the blood, and only then is one liable for eating it while impure.,This is as we learned in a mishna (Me’ila 10a): With regard to anything that has permitting factors, i.e., rites that must be performed or items that must be sacrificed before the meat of the offering may be eaten, such as the meat of an offering that is permitted to be eaten by the sprinkling of the blood; one is liable for eating it while impure from the time that its permitting factors were sacrificed. With regard to anything that does not have permitting factors, such as the handful removed from a meal offering and the frankincense, which themselves render the rest of the meal offering permitted for consumption, one is liable for eating it while impure from the time it is sanctified in a vessel.,§ It was stated: In the case of one who offers up the limbs of a non-kosher animal upon the altar, Reish Lakish says: He is flogged for doing so, while Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged. The Gemara explains the logic for each opinion: Reish Lakish says that he is flogged, because there is a positive mitzva to sacrifice an offering from the herd and the flock (see Leviticus 1:2), which are kosher animals. Therefore, it can be inferred that a kosher animal, yes, one may sacrifice, but a non-kosher animal one may not sacrifice, and one who transgresses a prohibition that stems from a positive mitzva is flogged for it. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One is not flogged for it, as one who transgresses a prohibition that stems from a positive mitzva is not flogged for it.,Rabbi Yirmeya raises an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from a baraita cited in Torat Kohanim: “Whatsoever parts the hoof, and is wholly cloven-footed, and chews the cud, among the beasts, that may you eat” (Leviticus 11:3). One can infer: But you may not eat a non-kosher animal; and a prohibition that stems from a positive mitzva has the status of a positive mitzva.,Rabbi Ya’akov said to Rabbi Yirmeya bar Taḥlifa: I will explain it to you: With regard to one who sacrifices the limbs of a non-kosher animal upon the altar, everyone agrees that he is not flogged, as he violates only a positive mitzva. When they disagree, it is with regard to one who sacrifices a kosher undomesticated animal on the altar, and it was stated like this: Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He transgresses a positive mitzva. Reish Lakish says: He does not transgress anything.,The Gemara explains their reasoning: Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He transgresses a positive mitzva, since the Torah commanded that a domesticated animal, yes, should be sacrificed, from which it can be inferred that an undomesticated animal may not be sacrificed, and a prohibition that stems from a positive mitzva has the status of a positive mitzva. Reish Lakish says: He does not transgress anything, since that verse which instructs one to sacrifice offerings from the herd and the flock is referring to the optimal manner of fulfilling the mitzva, but if he sacrificed an undomesticated animal, he has not transgressed the mitzva.,Rava raised an objection from a baraita: Had the verse (Leviticus 1:2) stated only: When any man of you brings an offering to the Lord, animals [behema], I would say that even an undomesticated animal is included in the category of an animal [behema], like that which is stated: “These are the animals [behema] that you may eat: The ox, the sheep, and the goat, the deer, and the gazelle, and the fallow deer, and the wild goat, and the oryx, and the aurochs, and the mountain sheep” (Deuteronomy 14:4–5), and, for example, the deer and gazelle are undomesticated animals. Therefore, the verse states: “From animals, from the cattle and from the flock” (Leviticus 1:2), which indicates that God says: I have told you to bring offerings from the cattle and the flock, but not an undomesticated animal.,One might have thought that one should not bring an undomesticated animal ab initio, but if one did bring it, it is valid, and to what is this comparable? To a student whose teacher says to him: Bring me wheat, and the student brought him wheat and barley. In this case, it is not as though the student is disobeying the statement of the teacher; rather, he is merely adding to his statement, and that should be valid.,Therefore, the verse states again: “From the cattle” (Leviticus 1:3), and: “From the flock” (Leviticus 1:10), to reiterate that God says: I have told you to bring offerings from the cattle and the flock, but not an undomesticated animal. To what is this comparable? To a student whose teacher told him: Bring me only wheat, and the student brought him wheat and barley. It is not as though the student is adding to the statement of the teacher; rather, it is as though he is disobeying his statement, since his teacher instructed him to bring only wheat. Consequently, one who sacrifices an undomesticated animal does not merely add to a mitzva of the Torah, but also violates a prohibition, and the offering is therefore disqualified. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Reish Lakish is indeed a conclusive refutation.,§ The mishna teaches: And with regard to all of them, in a case where they collected the blood with the intent to offer it beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, if there is blood of the soul that remains in the animal, the priest fit for Temple service should again collect the blood and sprinkle it on the altar. Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yoḥanan: If an individual unfit for Temple service presented the blood, what is the halakha with regard to the blood that remains in the animal? Does the fact that he presented some blood render the rest of it a remainder and no longer fit to be presented, or perhaps the presenting performed by an unfit individual is not considered valid, and therefore a priest fit for Temple service may present the blood again?,Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: An invalid presenting does not render the rest of the blood a remainder unless it is a case where a priest fit for Temple service presented the blood with the intent to offer it beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, since it is only in that case that the presenting of the blood effects acceptance, i.e., it is considered a valid presenting, with regard to rendering the offering piggul, i.e., an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its designated time.,Rav Zevid teaches the matter in this way: Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yoḥanan: Concerning a cup of disqualified blood, e.g., one which had been taken out of the Temple courtyard and was then nevertheless presented on the altar, what is the halakha with regard to it rendering the remaining blood a remainder and unfit to be presented? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: In the case of an unfit individual who himself presented the blood, what do you hold to be the halakha? If an unfit individual who presented the blood renders the remaining blood a remainder, then a cup of disqualified blood should also render the remaining blood a remainder. If an unfit individual does not render the remaining blood a remainder, then a cup of disqualified blood should also not render the remaining blood a remainder.,Rav Yirmeya of Difti teaches the discussion this way: Abaye asked Rabba: If the blood was collected in more than one cup and the presenting of the blood on the corners of the altar was performed with one cup, what is the halakha? Does the cup render the blood of the other cup rejected, and it is therefore poured into the drain running through the Temple courtyard, or does it render it a remainder, which is poured on the base of the altar?,Rabba said to him: This is a dispute between Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, and the Rabbis. As it is taught in a baraita with regard to the remainder of the blood of the external sin offering: In the verse above, discussing the sin offering of a Nasi, it states: “And he shall pour its blood out at the base of the altar of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:25). In the verse below, discussing the sin offering of an individual, it states: “And he shall pour all its blood out at the base of the altar” (Leviticus 4:30).,The discrepancy between the first verse and the second verse, which contains the additional term “all,” is explained as follows: From where is it derived with regard to a sin offering which the priest collected its blood in four cups and placed one placement of blood onto the altar from this cup, and one placement of blood from that cup, and likewise for all four corners of the altar, that the remainder of blood from all the cups are poured out onto the base of the altar? The verse states: “And he shall pour all its blood.”,One might have thought that if he placed four placements of blood of the sin offering from one cup, the blood in all the rest of the cups should be poured onto the base of the altar. Therefore, the verse states: “And he shall pour its blood,” and not all of its blood. How so? Only that blood in the cup from which blood was properly presented on the altar is poured onto the base of the altar, and the rest of the cups of blood are rejected and are poured into the Temple courtyard drain.,The baraita continues: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: From where is it derived with regard to a sin offering which the priest collected its blood in four cups and then placed four placements from one cup, that the blood from all the cups are poured out onto the base of the altar? The verse states: “And he shall pour all its blood.” The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written: “And he shall pour its blood,” which indicates that not all of the blood is poured? Rav Ashi said: That verse serves to exclude the remainder that is in the throat of the animal that was never collected in a vessel to be presented, which is not poured onto the base of the altar but into the Temple courtyard drain.,§ The mishna discussed three similar cases: If the priest fit for Temple service collected the blood in a vessel and gave the vessel to an unfit person, that person should return it to the fit priest. If the priest collected the blood in a vessel in his right hand and moved it to his left hand, he should return it to his right hand. If the priest collected the blood in a sacred vessel and placed it in a non-sacred vessel, he should return the blood to a sacred vessel.,The Gemara comments: And it was necessary to mention all of these cases, as had the mishna taught us only the case where he gave the blood to an unfit individual, I would say: What does the term: Unfit, mean? It means an impure priest, who is not completely unfit, as he is fit for communal service in the Temple when the priests or the entire community are impure, and that is why the blood is not disqualified; but if the priest moved the blood to his left hand, which under no circumstances may be used to perform the rite of collecting and carrying the blood, it is no longer valid.,And had the mishna taught us only with regard to moving the blood to his left hand that he should return it to his right hand and present it, one would assume that the reason is that the left hand has validity on Yom Kippur, since the High Priest carries the spoon of incense with his left hand, but if he poured the blood into a non-sacred vessel then it is not valid.,And had the mishna taught us only with regard to a non-sacred vessel that the blood is not disqualified, one could suggest that perhaps it is because the vessels are suitable to be consecrated, but with regard to these, i.e., an unfit individual and the left hand, which have no possibility of becoming fit for service, say that the blood does not remain valid. Therefore, it is necessary for all of the cases to be mentioned.,§ The Gemara questions the actual halakha: But let the blood be considered rejected when placed in the hand of the unfit individual, the left hand, or the non-sacred vessel. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This is what Rav Yirmeya of Difti says in the name of Rava: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Ḥanan the Egyptian, who does not subscribe to the halakha of rejection, but holds that a sacrifice that was rejected temporarily is not rejected entirely.,This is as it is taught in a baraita: Ḥanan the Egyptian says: In the event that the scapegoat of Yom Kippur was lost, even if the blood of its partner that is sacrificed to God has already been collected in the cup, the blood is not rejected, but rather he brings another scapegoat as its counterpart, and pairs it with the goat that has already been slaughtered, and the blood is sprinkled.,Rav Ashi says that there is another explanation to the mishna: Anything that is in his power to rectify is not considered rejected, as in these cases where he can simply return the blood to its proper place.,Rav Shaya said: It is reasonable to explain the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ashi, as whom have you heard who accepts the reasoning of rejection? It is Rabbi Yehuda, as we learned in a mishna (Yoma 62a): And furthermore, Rabbi Yehuda said: If the blood of the goat sacrificed to God spilled from the cup before it was sprinkled, the scapegoat is left to die. Similarly, if the scapegoat died, the blood of the goat sacrificed to God should be spilled, and two other goats are used. Consequently, Rabbi Yehuda holds that the scapegoat, or in the opposite case, the blood of the goat to be sacrificed to God, is totally rejected.,And yet, we have heard that Rabbi Yehuda says: Anything that is in his power to rectify is not rejected. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: A priest would fill one cup with blood of the many Paschal offerings brought that day that was now mixed together on the floor and then sprinkle it with a single sprinkling against the base of the altar. Conclude from the baraita that Rabbi Yehuda holds that although the blood originally spilled from the cup, anything that is in his power to rectify is not rejected. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that it is so.,§ The Gemara discusses the matter itself: It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: A priest would fill one cup with the mixed blood, so that if one of the cups with the collected blood of one of the Paschal offerings were to spill, it would be found that this cup of the mixed blood that was sprinkled would render the sacrifice valid. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: But the mixed blood was not collected in a vessel. The Gemara asks: From where do the Rabbis know that the blood was not collected in a vessel? Perhaps it was collected and it spilled out. Rather, this is what they are saying: Perhaps it was not collected in a vessel. Rabbi Yehuda said to them: I too said that the blood should be sprinkled only when it was collected in a vessel. The Gemara asks: But he, Rabbi Yehuda, himself, from where did he know if the blood was indeed collected? The Gemara answers: He relies on the fact that priests are vigilant, and perform their service properly and collect all of the blood. But they work swiftly, and the blood therefore spills from the cup.,The Gemara asks: But isn’t blood of exudate, which is unfit to be sprinkled upon the altar, mixed with the blood of the soul on the floor? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as he says that blood of exudate is considered blood.,This is as it is taught in a baraita: Blood of exudate is subject to a prohibition, and one who consumes it receives lashes. This is not as severe as consuming blood of the soul, the blood that spurts out of an animal as it is being slaughtered, for which one is liable to receive karet. Rabbi Yehuda says: One who consumes blood of exudate is liable to receive karet, as this blood is treated as proper blood.,The Gemara challenges this answer: But doesn’t Rabbi Elazar say that Rabbi Yehuda concedes with regard to atonement that presenting blood of exudate does not effect atonement, as it is stated: “For the soul of the flesh is in the blood; and I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls; for it is the blood that makes atonement by reason of the soul” (Leviticus 17:11).,This verse indicates that blood with which the soul leaves the animal, i.e., that spurts immediately upon slaughter, is called blood; but blood with which the soul does not leave the animal, i.e., blood of exudate, is not called blood. If so, even according to Rabbi Yehuda, blood of exudate is unfit for presenting upon the altar, and collecting blood from the floor should therefore be ineffective.,Rather, Rabbi Yehuda conforms to his line of reasoning, as he says: Blood does not nullify blood. Therefore, the blood in the cup that is fit for sprinkling on the altar is not nullified by the blood of exudate, and the entire mixture may be sprinkled on the altar.,The Gemara cites the continuation of the baraita: Rabbi Yehuda said to the Rabbis: According to your statement that the mixed blood on the floor may not be used, why do they plug the drain of the Temple courtyard on Passover eve and not allow the blood to flow out through it? The Rabbis said to him: It is a source of praise for the sons of Aaron that they should walk in blood up to their ankles, thereby demonstrating their love for the Temple service.,The Gemara challenges: But the blood is an interposition between the feet of the priests and the floor of the Temple, and this should invalidate the service. The Gemara explains: The blood is moist and is therefore not an interposition, as we learned in a baraita: With regard to blood, ink, honey, and milk, when they are dry they interpose, but when they are moist they do not interpose.,The Gemara asks further: But don’t their garments become soiled? And we learned in a baraita: If a priest’s garments were soiled and he performed a Temple rite while wearing them, his rite is disqualified. And if you would say that they raised their garments so that they would stay clean, but isn’t it taught in a baraita: “And the priest shall put on his linen garment [middo vad]” (Leviticus 6:3). The term middo, literally, his measure, teaches that his garment must be according to his measure [kemiddato], i.e., that it should not be too short and that it should not be too long. If the priest raises his garment, it will no longer be exactly his size. The Gemara answers that the priests would walk in the blood only while carrying the sacrificial limbs to the ramp of the altar, which is not actually a rite, but only preparation for a rite.,The Gemara asks: And is it not one of the rites? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: “And the priest shall bring it all and burn it upon the altar” (Leviticus 1:13); this is referring to the carrying of the limbs to the ramp? Rather, the priests would walk in the blood only while carrying wood to the arrangement of wood on the altar, which is not a rite. The Gemara asks: But if the floor of the Temple was full of blood; how did they walk to perform the actual rites without soiling their garments? The Gemara answers: They would walk on platforms raised above the floor, so that the blood would not reach their garments.,MISHNA: In the case of one who slaughters an offering with the intent to eat, beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it, e.g., the portions of the offering consumed on the altar, or with the intent to burn, beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, an item whose typical manner is such that one does not burn it on the altar, e.g., the meat of the offering, the offering is fit, and Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit.,One who slaughters an offering with the intent to eat, beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, an item whose typical manner is such that one does partake of it, or with the intent to burn, beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, an item whose typical manner is such that one does burn it on the altar, but his intent was to partake or burn less than an olive-bulk, the offering is fit. If his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, the offering is fit, because eating and burning do not join together.,In the case of one who slaughters an offering with the intent to eat, beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, an olive-bulk from the hide, or from the gravy, or from the spices that amass at the bottom of the pot together with small amounts of meat, or from a tendon in the neck, or from the bones, or from the tendons, or from the horns, or from the hooves, the offering is fit and one is not liable to receive karet for it, neither due to the prohibition of piggul, if the sacrificial rites were performed with the intent to partake of the offering beyond its designated time, nor due to the prohibition of leftover meat beyond the designated time, nor due to the prohibition against partaking of the meat while ritually impure.,In the case of one who slaughters sacrificial female animals with the intent to eat the fetus of those animals or their placenta outside the designated area, he has not rendered the offering piggul. Likewise, in the case of one who pinches doves, i.e., slaughters them for sacrifice by cutting the napes of their necks with his fingernail, with the intent to eat their eggs that are still in their bodies outside the designated area, he has not rendered the offering piggul. This is because the fetus, the placenta, and the eggs are not considered part of the body of the animal or the bird.,For the same reason, one who consumes the milk of sacrificial female animals or the eggs of doves is not liable to receive karet for it, neither due to the prohibition of piggul, nor due to the prohibition of notar, nor due to the prohibition against partaking of the meat while ritually impure.,GEMARA: Rabbi Elazar says: If one renders an offering piggul by slaughtering it with the intent to partake of it beyond its designated time, its fetus is rendered piggul as well, and one who eats it is liable to receive karet. But if he intended to partake of the fetus beyond its designated time, the offering has not been rendered piggul. Likewise, if he rendered a bird offering piggul by having intent to partake of a tendon in the neck, which is edible, beyond its designated time, then the crop of the bird is rendered piggul as well, although it is not considered an item that is usually eaten, since there are people who eat it. But if he intended to partake of the crop beyond its designated time, then a tendon in the neck is not rendered piggul.,If he rendered the offering piggul, i.e., had improper intent by intending to burn the sacrificial portions that are consumed on the altar beyond their designated time, then the rest of the bulls are rendered piggul. Therefore, if one partakes of their meat, he is liable to receive karet due to the prohibition of piggul. But if he intended to partake of the rest of the bulls beyond their designated time, since piggul does not apply to them, as they are not destined to be consumed on the altar or to be eaten, the sacrificial portions that are consumed on the altar are not rendered piggul.,The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the following baraita supports the opinion of Rabbi Elazar: And even those who hold that piggul applies to the bulls that are burned agree that if he intended to partake of the bulls or to burn them beyond their designated time he did not do anything. This is because these bulls are not eaten or burned on the altar, and intentions can render an offering piggul only in the cases of offerings that are eaten or burned on the altar. The Gemara infers: What, is it not possible to infer that if he intended with regard to the sacrificial portions of the bulls that are consumed on the altar to burn them beyond their designated time, the bulls are rendered piggul, which is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Elazar? The Gemara rejects this: No, derive instead as follows: But if he intended, with regard to the sacrificial portions of the bulls, to burn them beyond their designated time, the sacrificial portions themselves are rendered piggul, and one is liable to receive karet for eating them. The flesh of the bulls is never rendered piggul.,The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (Me’ila 9a): In the case of the bulls that are burned and the goats that are burned, one who derives benefit from them is liable for misuse of consecrated property from the time that they were consecrated. Once they were slaughtered, they are susceptible to being rendered disqualified for sacrifice through contact with one who immersed that day, and through contact with one who has not yet brought an atonement offering, and through being left overnight without the requirements of the offering having been fulfilled.,The Gemara derives: What, is it not referring to the flesh being left overnight, which would render it not valid? And conclude from the mishna that since the flesh is rendered disqualified by being left overnight, the flesh is also rendered disqualified by the intention to burn the sacrificial portions the next day, i.e., it is subject to piggul, which is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Elazar.,The Gemara responds: No, it is referring to leaving overnight the sacrificial portions of the offering, not the flesh. Likewise, only the sacrificial portions are rendered piggul by intent to eat them after their designated time. The Gemara asks: But from the fact that the latter clause teaches: One who derives benefit from all of them by the place of the ashes where they are burned is liable for misuse of consecrated property until the flesh is completely scorched, it may be inferred that the first clause of the mishna is also referring to the flesh being left overnight. The Gemara answers: Are the cases comparable? This case is as it is, and that case is as it is. The first clause is referring to the sacrificial portions that are consumed on the altar, and the latter clause is referring to the flesh.,Rabba raises an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar from a baraita: And these are portions of the offering that do not render an offering piggul, and they do not become piggul: The wool that is on the head of the lambs, the hair that is in the beard of the goats, the hide, the gravy, the spices that amass at the bottom of the pot together with small amounts of meat, a tendon in the neck, the crop, the bones, the tendons, the horns, the hooves, the fetus, the placenta, the milk of sacrificial animals, and the eggs of doves.,The baraita continues: All of these do not render other items piggul in the case of intent to consume them after their designated time, and they are not rendered piggul, and one is not liable to receive karet for them, neither due to the prohibition of piggul, nor the prohibition of notar, nor the prohibition against partaking of the meat while ritually impure. And one who offers up one of these outside the Temple is exempt, since they are not fit to be sacrificed on the altar.,Rabba explains: What, does the baraita not mean that all of these items do not render the offering piggul if one intends to partake of them beyond the designated time, and they are also not rendered piggul due to the rest of the offering having been rendered piggul? This includes the fetus and placenta, and is therefore not in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Elazar that the rest of the offering does render them piggul.,The Gemara responds: No, it means that they do not render the offering piggul, and they are not rendered piggul due to themselves if one had intent to partake of them beyond the designated time. But such intent with regard to the offering can render them piggul. The Gemara asks: If so, concerning that which is taught in the latter clause: All of these do not render other items piggul and they are not rendered piggul, why do I also need this? Doesn’t it teach that they are not rendered piggul due to the rest of the offering?,The Gemara answers: And according to your reasoning that the additional statement is necessary, then with regard to that which it says a third time: One is not liable to receive karet for them due to the prohibition of piggul, why do I also need this? Rather, the third statement does not teach an additional halakha, but since the tanna wants to teach that one is not liable to receive karet due to violating the prohibition of notar and the prohibition against partaking of the meat while ritually impure, he taught the halakha with regard to piggul as well.,Here too, it can be explained similarly: Since the tanna wants to teach the halakha that one who offers up one of these items outside the Temple is exempt, he also taught: And all of these do not render other items piggul and they are not rendered piggul. It may be that the rest of the offering does in fact render them piggul, as Rabbi Elazar stated.,Rava says: We learn in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Elazar in the mishna as well: One who slaughters sacrificial female animals with the intent to eat the fetus of those animals or their placenta outside their designated area has not rendered the offering piggul. And one who pinches doves, i.e., slaughters them for sacrifice by cutting the napes of their necks with his fingernail, with the intent to eat their eggs that are still in their bodies outside their designated area, has not rendered the offering piggul.,And then it is taught: One who consumes the milk of sacrificial female animals or the eggs of doves is not liable to receive karet for it due to the prohibition of piggul, nor due to the prohibition of notar, nor due to the prohibition against partaking of the meat while ritually impure. But it can be inferred that one who partakes of the fetus or placenta, which are not mentioned, is liable to receive karet due to the prohibition of piggul.,Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from the mishna that here, they are rendered piggul due to the offering, and there, due to themselves, i.e., if he had improper intent concerning them, then they are not rendered piggul. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from the mishna that it is so.,§ The baraita cited by Rabba is now discussed in a different context: We learned in a mishna there (84a) that if disqualified offerings are nevertheless brought upon the altar, they are removed, and blemished animals are also included in this halakha. Rabbi Akiva deems blemished animals fit, and if they were brought upon the altar they are not removed.,Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Akiva deemed fit only an animal with a blemish on the cornea of the eye and similar blemishes that are not noticeable, since they are valid in the case of birds. And in addition, this is the halakha provided that its consecration preceded its blemish, i.e., when the animal was consecrated it was still entirely fit.,Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says: And Rabbi Akiva concedes with regard to a female burnt offering that was brought upon the altar that since a burnt offering may be only a male animal, it is comparable to a case where its blemish preceded its consecration, since the disqualifying factor was there from the outset. Therefore, if it was brought upon the altar it must be removed.,Rabbi Zeira raises an objection to this from the baraita cited by Rabba: One who offers up one of these outside the Temple is exempt, as they are not fit to be sacrificed on the altar. But it can be inferred that if he were to sacrifice from the flesh of the mother of one of these outside the Temple, he would be liable. And how can you find these circumstances? It is only in the case of a female burnt offering. This is because with regard to a peace offering, which may also be from a female animal, its flesh is not burned on the altar but is eaten. Therefore, there would be no liability for sacrificing it outside the Temple.,Rabbi Zeira explains his objection: Granted, if you say that Rabbi Akiva holds with regard to a female burnt offering that if it ascended onto the altar it does not descend, in accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is that of Rabbi Akiva. This is because one is liable for sacrificing any offering outside the Temple that may be sacrificed on the altar, including one that was brought upon the altar inappropriately but is not removed. But if you say that with regard to a female burnt offering if it ascended the altar it must descend, and it entirely lacks the status of an offering fit to be sacrificed on the altar, in accordance with whose opinion is this baraita?,The Gemara answers: Say that the inference should be as follows: One who offers up one of those items outside the Temple is exempt, but if he sacrificed from the sacrificial portions of the mother of one of these, he is liable. This halakha can apply to both a sin offering and a peace offering, for which a female may be brought and whose sacrificial portions are burned on the altar.,The Gemara challenges: But the baraita teaches this halakha with the term: Of one of these, indicating that it is referring to one who sacrifices the flesh, and not the sacrificial portions alone. And the case of their mother is similar to that of them, and is therefore referring to sacrificing the flesh of the mother outside the Temple, and not the sacrificial portions. Rather, say as follows: One who offers up part of their sacrificial portions outside the Temple is exempt, but one who offered up some of the sacrificial portions of the mother of one of these is liable.,MISHNA: If one slaughters the animal in order to leave its blood or its sacrificial portions for the next day, or to remove them outside the designated area, but not in order to sacrifice them the next day, Rabbi Yehuda deems the offering unfit, and the Rabbis deem it fit. In the case of one who slaughters the animal in order to place the blood upon the ramp or on the wall of the altar that is not opposite the base of the altar, or in order to place the blood that is to be placed above the red line below the red line, or to place the blood that is to be placed below the red line above the red line, or the blood that is to be placed inside the Sanctuary outside the Sanctuary, or the blood that is to be placed outside the Sanctuary inside the Sanctuary; and likewise, if he slaughtered the animal with the intent that ritually impure people will partake of it, or that ritually impure people will sacrifice it, or that uncircumcised people will partake of it, or that uncircumcised people will sacrifice it; and likewise, with regard to the Paschal offering, if he had intent during the slaughter to break the bones of the Paschal offering, or to eat from the meat of the Paschal offering partially roasted, or to mix the blood of an offering with the blood of unfit offerings, in all these cases, although he intended to perform one of these prohibited acts, some of which would render the offering unfit, the offering is fit.,The reason is that intent does not render the offering unfit except in cases of intent to eat or to burn the offering beyond its designated time and outside its designated area, and in addition, the Paschal offering and the sin offering are disqualified by intent to sacrifice them not for their sake.,GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda, who deems the offering unfit if there was intent to leave it over until the next day or to take it out of its designated area? Rabbi Elazar said: There are two verses that are written with regard to notar. One verse states: “You shall let nothing of it remain until the morning, and that which remains of it until the morning you shall burn with fire” (Exodus 12:10), and one verse states: “He shall not leave any of it until the morning” (Leviticus 7:15). If the additional verse is not necessary for the matter of the prohibition against leaving it overnight, which is already mentioned by the first verse, apply it to the matter of intent of leaving it overnight, which would therefore be prohibited as well.,The Gemara asks: But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, does this verse come to teach this idea? This verse is necessary for him to derive that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanksgiving shall be eaten on the day of his offering; he shall not leave any of it until the morning” (Leviticus 7:15). From the words: “And the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanksgiving,” we learned with regard to a thanks offering that it is eaten for a day and a night.,With regard to animals exchanged for thanks offerings, and the offspring of thanks offerings, and the substitutes of thanks offerings, from where is it derived that they too are eaten for only a day and a night? The verse states: “And the flesh [uvesar],” and the additional “and” includes them. With regard to a sin offering and a guilt offering, from where is it derived that they are eaten for only a day and a night? The verse states: “Sacrifice,” to include other types of offerings.,The baraita continues: And from where is it derived to include the peace offering of a nazirite, i.e., the ram that a nazirite brings at the close of his term of naziriteship, and the peace offering of Passover? The verse therefore states: “His peace offerings,” in the plural. With regard to the loaves of the thanks offering, and the loaves and wafers that are part of the offering brought by a nazirite, from where is it derived that they are eaten for only a day and a night? The verse states: “His offering.” With regard to all of them I will read the phrase “He shall not leave any of it until the morning” as being applicable. Evidently, this verse is necessary to teach numerous halakhot concerning the allotted time to partake of offerings.,The Gemara answers: If so, let the verse state: And you shall let nothing of it remain until the morning, as stated in the other verse. What is indicated by the phrase “He shall not leave any of it”? If it is not necessary for the matter of the prohibition against leaving it overnight, apply it to the matter of intent to leave it overnight.,The Gemara now questions the source cited by Rabbi Elazar: This works out well to explain the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to one who had intent to leave the sacrificial portions overnight. But with regard to disqualifying the offering due to one who had intent to remove them from the Temple, what can be said to explain the source of Rabbi Yehuda, as it cannot be derived from these verses?,And furthermore, the statement of Rabbi Elazar can be questioned, as the rationale of Rabbi Yehuda is based on logical reasoning and is not derived from a verse. This is as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda said to the Rabbis: Do you not concede that if he left it over until the next day that it is disqualified? So too, if he intended to leave it over until the next day it is disqualified. Clearly, Rabbi Yehuda bases his opinion on logical reasoning, as he equates intent with action. The Gemara asks: Rather, is the rationale of Rabbi Yehuda based on logical reasoning and not derived from the verse? But if so, Rabbi Yehuda should also disagree with regard to all of the other cases in the mishna due to the same reasoning.,The Gemara rejects this: With regard to which case should Rabbi Yehuda disagree? Should he disagree with regard to one who slaughters the offering with intent to break the bones of the Paschal offering, or with intent to partake of the Paschal offering while it is partially roasted? Even had he actually realized such intent, would the offering itself thereby be disqualified? It presumably would not, as the presenting of the blood effects acceptance.,Likewise, if a rite was performed on the condition that ritually impure individuals will partake of it, or that ritually impure individuals will sacrifice it, i.e., burn the sacrificial portions on the altar, would the offering itself be disqualified if such actions occurred? Likewise, if it was done with the intent that uncircumcised individuals will partake of it, or that uncircumcised individuals will sacrifice it, would the offering itself be disqualified if this occurred? The Gemara presents another version of this question: Is it in his power to execute these actions that are contingent upon the will of others?,With regard to a case where one had intent to mix their blood with the blood of unfit offerings, where Rabbi Yehuda also does not disagree with the ruling of the mishna that the offering is valid, he conforms to his line of reasoning, as he says: Blood does not nullify blood. Therefore, even if one would actually mix the two types of blood, it would not be disqualified. Likewise, in cases where one had intent to place the blood that is to be placed above the red line below the red line, or those that are to be placed below the red line above the red line, Rabbi Yehuda conforms to his line of reasoning, as he says: Blood that was not placed in its proper place on the altar is also considered to be placed in its proper place, and it effects acceptance of the offering.,The Gemara suggests: And let him disagree with regard to a case of blood that is to be placed inside the Sanctuary that was placed outside, and blood that is to be placed outside the Sanctuary that was placed inside, as the verse explicitly states that an external sin offering whose blood was sprinkled inside is disqualified (see Leviticus 6:23).,The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yehuda holds that in order to disqualify an offering with the intent to perform a rite outside its designated area, we require that the intended place have threefold functionality, i.e., for the presenting of the blood, for the eating of the meat, and for the burning of the sacrificial portions on the altar, which is true only of the area outside the Temple courtyard, which was valid for these three activities during an era in which it was permitted to sacrifice offerings on private altars. Therefore, intent to present the blood in the Sanctuary, which lacks these three elements, does not disqualify the offering, as the meat and sacrificial portions are never eaten or burned there.,The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda accept this reasoning that it must be a place of threefold functionality? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says that the verse states: “You shall not sacrifice to the Lord your God an ox, or a sheep, that has a blemish, even any evil thing” (Deuteronomy 17:1). The verse included here a sin offering that one slaughtered in the south and not on the northern side of the Temple courtyard as required, and likewise a sin offering whose blood entered inside, i.e., it was slaughtered with the intent that its blood would be brought inside the Sanctuary, that they are disqualified. This indicates that an offering slaughtered with improper intent with regard to a place that lacks threefold functionality nevertheless renders the offering not valid.,The Gemara responds: And does Rabbi Yehuda not accept the requirement of a place of three functions? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (82a) that Rabbi Yehuda said: If he brought the blood into the Sanctuary unwittingly, the blood remains fit for presenting, from which it may be inferred: But if he brought it in intentionally, it is unfit. And we maintain that Rabbi Yehuda deems it unfit only where one actually effected atonement, i.e., he presented the blood on the inner altar.,Now, it stands to reason that if there, where one actually brought the blood inside, only if he effected atonement, yes, it is unfit, but if he did not effect atonement it is not unfit, then here, where he merely thought to bring it inside, all the more so is it not clear that it should be valid? The Gemara answers: There are two tanna’im, and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda concerning a place with threefold functionality.,The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda hold that with regard to a sin offering that one slaughtered in the south, the slaughterer would be liable to receive lashes?,But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: One might have thought that with regard to a sin offering that one slaughtered in the south, he would be liable for it. Therefore, the verse states: “You shall not sacrifice to the Lord your God an ox, or a sheep, that has a blemish, even any evil thing” (Deuteronomy 17:1), to teach that for slaughtering an evil thing, such as a blemished offering, you deem him liable to receive lashes, but you do not deem him liable for a sin offering that he slaughtered in the south. The Gemara answers: Here too, there are two tanna’im, and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.,§ Rabbi Abba says: Although Rabbi Yehuda says that an offering is rendered not valid if it was slaughtered with the intent that its blood would be left over until the next day, Rabbi Yehuda concedes that if the priest subsequently collected, conveyed, or presented the blood with the intent to sacrifice or partake of the offering beyond its designated time, he then establishes the offering as piggul. The intent to leave it overnight does not prevent it from being rendered piggul, in contrast to intent to sacrifice or partake of it outside its designated area, or performing a sacrificial rite of the Paschal offering or a sin offering not for its own sake, which do prevent the offering from subsequently being rendered piggul (see 29b).,Rava says: Know that this is so, as intent to sprinkle the blood the next day, which renders an offering piggul and which inherently includes the intent to leave the blood over until the next day so that he can then sprinkle it, is nothing before the sprinkling of the blood. And his intent during the slaughter to sprinkle the blood the next day does not render the offering piggul until the blood is sprinkled, and then the sprinkling of the blood comes and establishes the offering as piggul. Clearly, the intent to leave the blood over until the next day does not prevent the offering from subsequently being rendered piggul.,The Gemara rejects Rava’s proof: But it is not so that this is a valid proof, as there, with regard to standard piggul intent, it is one intent that is established with the sprinkling of the blood. By contrast, here, where he initially had intent to leave the blood until the next day and subsequently had intent to sprinkle it beyond its designated time, there are two separate intents. Therefore, since an improper intent already exists, the offering cannot thereafter be rendered piggul.,Rav Huna raised an objection to Rabbi Abba from a baraita: If one slaughtered an offering with the intent to place the blood that is to be placed above the red line below the red line, or to place the blood that is to be placed below the red line above the red line, and he had intent to do so immediately, i.e., on the same day, then it is valid, as such intent does not disqualify the offering. If he then had intent to sacrifice the offering outside its designated area, it is disqualified, but there is no liability to receive karet for it. If he had intent to sacrifice it beyond its designated time, then it is rendered piggul, and one is liable to receive karet for it.,The baraita continues: If one had intent to place the blood that is to be placed above the red line below the red line or vice versa the next day, then it is disqualified, due to his intent to leave it overnight, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. In this case, if he then had intent to sacrifice the same offering either beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, it is disqualified, and there is no liability to receive karet for it. Evidently, intent to leave it overnight prevents the offering from subsequently being rendered piggul. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Abba is indeed a conclusive refutation.,§ Rav Ḥisda says that Ravina bar Sila says: If one slaughtered an offering with intent that impure individuals would eat the meat of the offering the next day, one is liable to receive karet due the prohibition of piggul. Although impure individuals are not fit to partake of the meat, this is nevertheless considered intent to partake of it beyond its designated time. Rava says: Know that this is so, as meat prior to the sprinkling of the blood is not fit to be eaten, and when one has improper intent with regard to it, it is disqualified. Clearly, intent to partake of a forbidden item beyond its designated time renders the offering piggul.,The Gemara rejects Rava’s proof: But it is not so, as there, with regard to standard piggul intent, he sprinkles the blood, and the meat is rendered fit to be eaten the next day. By contrast, here, it is not rendered fit to be eaten by impure individuals at all. Therefore, such intent is not considered significant intent to consume the meat after its designated time.,Rav Ḥisda says that Rav Dimi bar Ḥinnana was wont to say the following halakha: With regard to the meat of a Paschal offering that was not roasted, and the loaves of a thanks offering from which the priests’ portion was not separated, although it is prohibited for them to be eaten, nevertheless one is liable to receive karet due to violating the prohibition against eating them in a state of impurity.,Rava said: Know that this is so, as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “But the soul that eats of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings that pertain to the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:20). The added words “that pertain to the Lord” serve to include the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity with regard to impurity, teaching that one who partakes of them while impure is liable to receive karet.,Apparently, even though they are not fit for consumption, one is liable to receive karet due to violating the prohibition against eating them in ritual impurity. Here too, with regard to the meat of a Paschal offering that was not roasted, and the loaves of a thanks offering from which the priests’ portion was not separated, even though they are not fit to be eaten, one is liable to receive karet due to violating the prohibition against eating them in impurity.,The Gemara rejects Rava’s proof: But it is not so, as there, the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that are burned on the altar are at least fit for the Most High, i.e., for the consumption of the altar, and therefore one is liable to receive karet for eating them while ritually impure. This is to the exclusion of the meat of a Paschal offering that was not roasted and the loaves of a thanks offering from which the priests’ portion was not separated, which are not fit at all, not for the Most High, and not for an ordinary person.,The Gemara presents another version of the proof and its rejection: But the sacrificial portions are not fit, and yet one is liable if he consumes them while impure. The Gemara responds: But it is not so, since these sacrificial portions are fit for their matters, and these, i.e., the meat of a Paschal offering that was not roasted and the loaves of a thanks offering from which the priests’ portion was not separated, are not fit at all.,,MISHNA: Beit Shammai say: With regard to all the offerings whose blood is to be placed on the external altar, even those that require that the blood be sprinkled on two opposite corners of the altar so that it will run down each of its four sides, in a case where the priest placed the blood on the altar with only one placement, he facilitated atonement. And in the case of a sin offering, which requires four placements, one on each of the four corners of the altar, at least two placements are necessary to facilitate atonement. And Beit Hillel say: Even with regard to a sin offering, in a case where the priest placed the blood with one placement, he facilitated atonement after the fact.,Therefore, since the priest facilitates atonement with one placement in all cases other than a sin offering according to Beit Shammai, and even in the case of a sin offering according to Beit Hillel, if he placed the first placement in its proper manner, and the second with the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time, he facilitated atonement. Since the second placement is not indispensable with regard to achieving atonement, improper intent while performing that rite does not invalidate the offering.,And based on the same reasoning, if he placed the first placement with the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time and he placed the second placement with the intent to eat the offering outside its designated area, the second of which does not render an offering piggul, the offering is piggul, an offering disqualified by improper intention, and one is liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [karet] for its consumption. This is because the intent that accompanied the second placement does not supersede the piggul status of the offering.,All this applies to those offerings whose blood is to be placed on the external altar. But with regard to all the offerings whose blood is to be placed on the inner altar, if the priest omitted even one of the placements, it is as though he did not facilitate atonement. Therefore, if he placed all the placements in their proper manner, and one placement in an improper manner, i.e., with the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time, the offering is disqualified, as it is lacking one placement; but there is no liability for karet for one who partakes of the offering, as the improper intention related to only part of the blood that renders the offering permitted for consumption, and an offering becomes piggul only when the improper intention relates to the entire portion of the offering that renders it permitted for consumption.,GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: From where is it derived with regard to those offerings whose blood is placed on the external altar, that if the priest placed the blood with one placement, he facilitated atonement? The verse states: “And the blood of your offerings shall be poured upon the altar of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:27), indicating that a single pouring of blood suffices. The Gemara asks: But does this verse come to teach this halakha? That verse is necessary for that which is taught in another baraita discussing a different matter: