יבמות נ׳-נ״א

these are the years of the generations, i.e., the allotted lifespan that is preordained for each individual before birth. If he is deserving, God completes his allotted lifespan. If he is not deserving, God reduces his lifespan; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Akiva assumes one cannot outlive one’s preordained allotted lifespan. The Rabbis say: If he is deserving, God adds years to his lifespan. If he is not deserving, God reduces his lifespan. According to the Rabbis, Isaiah’s prophecy is referring to one who deserved to have extra years added to his allotted lifespan, and the verse in the Torah is referring to one who deserved to merely complete his lifespan.,The Rabbis said to Rabbi Akiva: How can you claim that one cannot outlive one’s allotted lifespan when there is a verse that states that Isaiah prophesied to Hezekiah as Hezekiah lay on his deathbed: “And I will add unto your days fifteen years”? Rabbi Akiva said to them: Those additional years that God added to his lifespan are from his own allotted lifespan. When Hezekiah sinned God decreed that his lifespan be shortened, but when he repented God allowed him to live out those years. Know that this is so, as a prophet during the reign of King Jeroboam stood and prophesied: “Behold, a son shall be born unto the House of David, Josiah is his name” (I Kings 13:2). Josiah was the grandson of Manasseh, Hezekiah’s son, and at the time Hezekiah lay on his deathbed, Manasseh had not yet been born. Evidently, Hezekiah’s preordained allotted lifespan had still not been completed.,And what would the Rabbis respond to Rabbi Akiva’s proof? They could counter: Is it written that Josiah was to be born specifically from the descendants of Hezekiah? It is written only that he would be born “unto the House of David,” so he could be born either from the descendants of Hezekiah or from a different person of the House of David. Accordingly, no proof concerning Hezekiah’s allotted lifespan can be deduced from that verse.,§ The mishna details the prohibition with regard to one’s wife’s sister in various cases: If a man’s wife died, he is permitted to her sister; if his yevama died, he is permitted to her sister. Rav Yosef said: Here Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught an unnecessary mishna, since the prohibition with regard to one’s wife’s sister and the fact that the prohibition exists only in the lifetime of one’s wife is stated explicitly in the Torah, and there is no additional novelty in this mishna’s ruling.,,MISHNA: Rabban Gamliel says: A bill of divorce [get] is not effective when given after a bill of divorce was previously given to a yevama. Once a yevama receives a bill of divorce from a yavam, no bill of divorce given by that yavam to her rival wife or a bill of divorce given to her by a different yavam is of any effect. And levirate betrothal is not effective after a previous levirate betrothal was performed, and intercourse with a second yevama is not effective after intercourse with the first one, and ḥalitza is not effective after ḥalitza was previously performed. But the Rabbis say: A bill of divorce is effective when given after a bill of divorce, and levirate betrothal is effective after levirate betrothal, but nothing is effective after intercourse or after ḥalitza. If a yavam has relations with the yevama or performs ḥalitza with her, no other action performed afterward is effective, whether performed by that yavam toward a different yevama or by any yavam with the original yevama.,The mishna elaborates: How do these laws work in practice? If a yavam performed levirate betrothal with his yevama, and he later gave her a bill of divorce, she nevertheless requires ḥalitza from him. The bill of divorce does not fully exempt her from levirate marriage, as the levirate bond remains intact. If he performed levirate betrothal and then ḥalitza, she requires a bill of divorce from him in order to cancel the levirate betrothal. If the yavam performed levirate betrothal and then engaged in intercourse with the yevama, this is the way to perform levirate marriage in accordance with its mitzva, as the Sages instituted this as the proper procedure for a yavam to perform levirate marriage.,If the yavam gave the yevama a bill of divorce and afterward performed levirate betrothal with her, she requires another bill of divorce to cancel the levirate betrothal, as well as ḥalitza to nullify the levirate bond. If he gave her a bill of divorce and then engaged in intercourse with her, she requires a bill of divorce to cancel the betrothal that took place via intercourse, and ḥalitza to nullify the levirate bond; the intercourse did not affect the levirate bond because once he gave her a bill of divorce she was forbidden to him. If he gave her a bill of divorce and performed ḥalitza, nothing is effective after ḥalitza, as the levirate bond was completely nullified.,Similarly, if he performed ḥalitza with her and then either performed levirate betrothal, or gave a bill of divorce, or engaged in intercourse with her; alternatively, if he engaged in intercourse with her and then either performed levirate betrothal, or gave a bill of divorce, or performed ḥalitza after they engaged in relations, nothing is effective after ḥalitza or intercourse. Any action performed afterward is unrelated to the levirate bond. The above principles apply both in cases of one yevama to one yavam, as well as in cases of two yevamot to one yavam. How so? If he performed levirate betrothal with this yevama and levirate betrothal with that one, i.e., her rival wife, they require two bills of divorce, each for her own levirate betrothal, and ḥalitza with one of them, to release them both from the levirate bond. If he performed levirate betrothal with this one and gave a bill of divorce to that one, the first woman requires a bill of divorce to cancel the levirate betrothal, and one of them must receive ḥalitza. If he performed levirate betrothal with this one and engaged in intercourse with that one, they require two bills of divorce and he must perform ḥalitza with one of them. If the yavam performed levirate betrothal with this one and performed ḥalitza with that one, the first woman requires a bill of divorce.,If the yavam gave a bill of divorce to this yevama and a bill of divorce to that one, they require ḥalitza from him. If he gave a bill of divorce to this one and engaged in intercourse with that one, the latter requires a bill of divorce and ḥalitza. If he gave a bill of divorce to this one and performed levirate betrothal with that one, the latter requires a bill of divorce and he must perform ḥalitza with one of them. If the yavam gave a bill of divorce to this woman and performed ḥalitza with that one, nothing is effective after ḥalitza, and he cannot betroth the rival wife.,If he performed ḥalitza with one yevama and then performed ḥalitza with a second yevama, or he performed ḥalitza with one yevama and then proceeded to either perform levirate betrothal, give a bill of divorce, or engage in intercourse with a second; alternatively, he engaged in intercourse with one yevama and engaged in intercourse with the second yevama, or he engaged in intercourse with one yevama and proceeded to either perform levirate betrothal, give a bill of divorce, or perform ḥalitza with the second, nothing is effective after ḥalitza or intercourse. These halakhot apply both in cases of one yavam to two yevamot, as well as two yevamin to one yevama.,If he performed ḥalitza with one yevama and then proceeded to either perform levirate betrothal, give a bill of divorce, or engage in intercourse with a second yevama; alternatively, he engaged in intercourse with one yevama and then proceeded to perform levirate betrothal, or give a bill of divorce, or perform ḥalitza with a second yevama, nothing is effective after ḥalitza, whether the ḥalitza took place at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end. All of these halakhot accord with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who maintains betrothal does not take effect on a woman who is forbidden due to the prohibition against betrothing a yevama after ḥalitza.,But with regard to intercourse, when it is at the beginning, i.e., the first act the yavam performed with his yevama, nothing is effective after it and any subsequent action is void. However, if it was performed in the middle, and similarly if it was performed at the end, i.e., after some other action that impairs the validity of his intercourse, something is effective after it. Rabbi Neḥemya says: Both with regard to intercourse and ḥalitza, whether performed at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end, nothing is effective after it. If the yavam performed a valid action according to Torah law, any subsequent action is of no consequence according to halakha.,GEMARA: Rabban Gamliel and the Rabbis disagree only with regard to the efficacy of a bill of divorce performed after a bill of divorce and levirate betrothal performed after levirate betrothal, but one bill of divorce given to a single yevama, or one levirate betrothal performed with a single yevama, is effective. The bill of divorce prevents him from performing levirate marriage, and the levirate betrothal requires a bill of divorce to cancel it, in addition to ḥalitza.,The Gemara elaborates: What is the reason that the Sages said that a bill of divorce is effective for a yevama, despite the fact that she is not his wife? This is because it is effective in general in cases of married women. For if you say that it is not effective in the case of a yevama, there are some who might mistakenly say the following: A bill of divorce is given to a woman in order to remove her from her husband, and ḥalitza likewise serves to remove her from the yavam; since a bill of divorce is ineffective for this yevama, ḥalitza is also ineffective and does not sever their relationship completely. And perhaps the yavam will come to engage in intercourse after ḥalitza, which is forbidden by the Torah prohibition derived from the verse: “So shall it be done to the man who does not build his brother’s house” (Deuteronomy 25:9).,And what is the reason the Sages said that levirate betrothal is effective for a yevama? Because it is effective in general, as levirate betrothal is essentially an act of betrothal. For if you say that it is not effective, there are some who might mistakenly say: Levirate betrothal serves to acquire a woman and intercourse serves to acquire a woman in general, as women can be betrothed by intercourse; since levirate betrothal is ineffective in the case of a yevama, intercourse is also ineffective, i.e., it does not acquire a yevama completely. And he will therefore come to engage in intercourse with a rival wife after intercourse with the first yevama.,And what is the reason the Sages who disagree with Rabbi Neḥemya said that invalid intercourse, i.e., intercourse that follows any disqualifying action with the rival wife of a yevama, does not fully acquire the yevama, such that something is effective after it? In this case the invalid intercourse does not cancel the levirate bond, and therefore further action with the yevama is effective.,The Sages say: If this is intercourse performed after a bill of divorce, then it is considered invalid due to a rabbinic decree with regard to intercourse after a bill of divorce because of its potential confusion with a case of intercourse after ḥalitza. The Sages established that invalid intercourse of this kind should not cancel the levirate bond completely, for if it did, then people might come to engage in intercourse after ḥalitza, which would violate a Torah prohibition. And if this is intercourse performed after levirate betrothal, then it is considered invalid due to a rabbinic decree with regard to intercourse after levirate betrothal because of its potential confusion with a case of intercourse with the second yevama after intercourse with the first. If intercourse after levirate betrothal is effective, people might come to engage in intercourse with a second yevama after intercourse with a first, and this is forbidden as the woman is considered his brother’s wife who is not eligible for levirate marriage.,And what is the reason the Sages said with regard to this invalid ḥalitza that nothing is effective after it? For they say: What is the reason that we should issue a decree in that case? Should we issue a decree with regard to ḥalitza performed after a bill of divorce due to a concern for ḥalitza performed after ḥalitza? In this case there is no concern, as there is no prohibition involved in repeating ḥalitza. In any situation like these, let her continue performing ḥalitza, for no harm is done if ḥalitza is performed unnecessarily.,Alternatively, should we issue a decree stating that other actions are effective after ḥalitza is performed after levirate betrothal due to the concern for confusion with the case of ḥalitza performed after intercourse? In this case there is a concern that people will assume that no bill of divorce is required after intercourse so long as the yavam performed ḥalitza. The Gemara challenges this concern: Is that to say that in the case of ḥalitza after levirate betrothal she does not require a bill of divorce for his levirate betrothal, such that one would conclude the same for ḥalitza after intercourse? In the case of ḥalitza after levirate betrothal, the woman requires a bill of divorce, and similarly in the case of ḥalitza after intercourse she likewise requires a bill of divorce for his intercourse. Thus, the same action performed following ḥalitza after levirate betrothal is also performed following ḥalitza after intercourse, and therefore there is no need to issue a further decree.,§ Rava said: What is the reason for the ruling of Rabban Gamliel that a bill of divorce is not effective after a bill of divorce? It is because he is uncertain with regard to a bill of divorce whether it effectively precludes levirate marriage or whether it does not preclude levirate marriage. Similarly, he is uncertain with regard to levirate betrothal, whether it effectively acquires the yevama or does not acquire her at all. The Gemara clarifies: With regard to a bill of divorce, he is uncertain as to whether it precludes levirate marriage or does not preclude it. If the first bill of divorce precludes levirate marriage, what did he do by giving the latter bill of divorce, as it has no substance? Alternatively, if the first bill of divorce does not preclude levirate marriage, neither does the latter preclude levirate marriage.,Likewise, with regard to levirate betrothal, he is uncertain as to whether it acquires the yevama or does not acquire her. If the first levirate betrothal effectively acquires the yevama, what does the last one accomplish? And if the first one does not acquire her, the last one also does not acquire her. For this reason Rabban Gamliel maintains that a bill of divorce is not effective after a bill of divorce was given, and similarly levirate betrothal is not effective after levirate betrothal was performed.,Abaye raised an objection to his opinion from a baraita: And Rabban Gamliel concedes that a bill of divorce is effective after levirate betrothal and levirate betrothal is effective after a bill of divorce. If a yavam gave a bill of divorce to one yevama and then performed levirate betrothal with the other, or the reverse, both actions would be effective. And he also concedes that a bill of divorce is effective after intercourse and levirate betrothal such that if the yavam engaged in levirate betrothal with one yevama, engaged in intercourse with a second, and gave a bill of divorce to a third, the bill of divorce is effective and he is prohibited from marrying the relatives of the third yevama. And he concedes that levirate betrothal is effective after intercourse and a bill of divorce, such that if he gave a bill of divorce to one woman, engaged in intercourse with a second, and performed levirate betrothal with a third, the levirate betrothal is effective and the third woman requires a bill of divorce.,And if Rabban Gamliel is uncertain with regard to the efficacy of levirate betrothal or a bill of divorce, then the third action should never be effective. Either the initial levirate betrothal or bill of divorce was completely effective, in which case any subsequent action is not effective, or these actions are not effective at all and the intercourse that followed them should be like intercourse performed at the beginning, and it should serve to acquire the yevama completely, and any actions performed afterward with the rival wife should be of no account. For we learned in the mishna: With regard to intercourse, when it is at the beginning, nothing is effective after it. Consequently, Rabban Gamliel’s ruling is difficult.,Rather, Abaye said: Actually, it is obvious to Rabban Gamliel that a bill of divorce precludes levirate marriage, and that levirate betrothal acquires the yevama. Nevertheless, the Sages said that with regard to this yevama, in one respect a bill of divorce is effective for her, and in another respect levirate betrothal is effective for her, but they are not effective in the same manner. Therefore, a bill of divorce given after a bill of divorce does not preclude levirate marriage, as the first bill of divorce has already precluded it for him as much as he can preclude it by means of a bill of divorce. And levirate betrothal performed after levirate betrothal does not acquire her, as the first levirate betrothal has acquired her for him as much as possible. However, with regard to a bill of divorce after levirate betrothal, and levirate betrothal after a bill of divorce, this action precludes levirate marriage and that action acquires the yevama. Since the acquisition of levirate betrothal and the nullification of a bill of divorce work in different ways, there can be both an acquisition and a nullification, and therefore one can be effective after the other.,However, the Rabbis maintain that the Sages instituted for each and every one of the brothers-in-law both the nullification of a bill of divorce and the acquisition of levirate betrothal for a yevama, and they decreed that these should be effective for each of the yevamot. Therefore the strength of the first bill of divorce or levirate betrothal is equal to that of the second one, and both are effective.,Abaye proceeds to explain the rest of Rabban Gamliel’s teaching in the baraita: And this invalid intercourse, i.e., intercourse that was performed after a disqualifying action, such as levirate betrothal or a bill of divorce, is superior to levirate betrothal and also inferior to levirate betrothal: It is preferable to levirate betrothal in the following respect: whereas levirate betrothal after levirate betrothal is not effective at all, intercourse after levirate betrothal is effective, because intercourse acquires a yevama according to Torah law. And it is inferior to levirate betrothal, for whereas levirate betrothal after a bill of divorce according to Rabban Gamliel acquires the entire remainder of the woman left by the bill of divorce, such that any further levirate betrothal would be ineffective, intercourse after a bill of divorce does not acquire the entire remainder of the woman left by the bill of divorce, as it is not considered valid intercourse, and a subsequent levirate betrothal is effective.,§ The Sages taught: How, i.e., in what case, did Rabban Gamliel say that a bill of divorce is not effective after a bill of divorce? In the case of two yevamot who happened before one yavam and he gave a bill of divorce to this one and a bill of divorce to that one. Rabban Gamliel says: He performs ḥalitza with the first one and is forbidden to marry her relatives, as she is his ḥalutza, and he is permitted to marry the relatives of the second one. Because the bill of divorce he gave the second woman is of no consequence at all, she is merely the rival wife of his ḥalutza, and he is therefore permitted to marry her relatives.,But the Rabbis say: If he gave a bill of divorce to this one and a bill of divorce to that one, he is forbidden to marry the relatives of both of them, and he must perform ḥalitza with one of them. And you would say the same with regard to two yevamim and one yevama. If the two yevamin gave one yevama a bill of divorce, one after the other, Rabban Gamliel maintains that the bill of divorce of the second yavam is of no account, and he is therefore permitted to marry her relatives, whereas the Rabbis hold that it is effective in that it renders him forbidden to her relatives.,How, with regard to what circumstance, did Rabban Gamliel say that there is no levirate betrothal after levirate betrothal? In a case of two yevamot who happened before one yavam, and he performed levirate betrothal with this one and levirate betrothal with that one, Rabban Gamliel says: He gives a bill of divorce to the first one and performs ḥalitza with her, and is forbidden to her relatives, but he is permitted to the relatives of the second one, as the levirate betrothal performed with the rival wife is ineffective. But the Rabbis say: He gives a bill of divorce to both of them, as the levirate betrothal is effective for both women, and he is forbidden to the relatives of both of them; and as for ḥalitza, he must perform it with one of them. And you would say the same with regard to two yevamim and one yevama. If the first yavam performed levirate betrothal with the yevama, and the second yavam consequently performed levirate betrothal with her, they are both required to give her a bill of divorce and both are forbidden to marry her relatives.,The Master said above in the baraita: He gives a bill of divorce to this one and a bill of divorce to that one. Rabban Gamliel says: He performs ḥalitza with the first one and is forbidden to marry her relatives, and he is permitted to marry the relatives of the second one. The Gemara asks: Shall we say that this is a conclusive refutation of the statement of Shmuel? For Shmuel said: If he performed ḥalitza with the woman who received a bill of divorce, the rival wife is not exempted by this invalid ḥalitza. The yavam must therefore repeat the ḥalitza with the rival wife as well. This appears to contradict the baraita, where Rabban Gamliel rules that he has to perform ḥalitza with only one of the yevamot.,The Gemara answers: Shmuel could have said to you: When I said my above teaching, it was in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that the levirate bond is substantial, and he must therefore perform a valid ḥalitza in order to cancel this bond. A ḥalitza performed with a woman who received a bill of divorce is not powerful enough to completely cancel the bond of the rival wife who did not perform ḥalitza. But Rabban Gamliel holds that the levirate bond is not substantial, and therefore any ḥalitza that releases one of the women also serves to release the other.,The Gemara asks: But if so, from the fact that Rabban Gamliel holds that the levirate bond is not substantial, it can be inferred that the Rabbis hold that the levirate bond is substantial, as it is assumed that they disagree with Rabban Gamliel in this regard as well. And the latter clause of that baraita teaches: And you would say the same with regard to two yevamin and one yevama such that if the two yevamin gave one yevama a bill of divorce, she is exempted by the ḥalitza of one of them. If so, let us say that it is a conclusive refutation of the statement that Rabba bar Rav Huna said that Rav said. For Rabba bar Rav Huna said that Rav said: In cases of invalid ḥalitza, the yevama is required to repeat the ḥalitza with all the brothers. If the ḥalitza was invalid for some reason, all the brothers must perform ḥalitza with the yevama, as her bond with them is not canceled by an invalid ḥalitza.,The Gemara responds: Rabba bar Rav Huna could have said to you: Both Rabban Gamliel and the Rabbis hold that the levirate bond is not substantial, whereas my statement is in accordance with the opinion that the levirate bond is substantial. And here the dispute does not concern the topic of the levirate bond at all, but rather it only involves the explicitly mentioned issue: They disagree with regard to the efficacy of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce and levirate betrothal after levirate betrothal.,The Master said above in the baraita: If he performed levirate betrothal with this one and levirate betrothal with that one, Rabban Gamliel says: He gives a bill of divorce to the first one and performs ḥalitza with her and is forbidden to her relatives, but he is permitted to the relatives of the second one. The Gemara poses a question: Since Rabban Gamliel holds that levirate betrothal is not effective after levirate betrothal, and the second levirate betrothal is of no consequence, the first woman should also be permitted to enter into levirate marriage. Why must he perform ḥalitza with her? The Gemara answers: It is prohibited due to a rabbinic decree lest he perform levirate marriage with the second woman. The Sages were concerned that in cases where the yavam performed levirate betrothal with both women, if he were permitted to consummate the levirate marriage with the first woman, he might do so with the second woman as well.,§ Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Rabban Gamliel, and Beit Shammai, and Rabbi Shimon, and ben Azzai, and Rabbi Neḥemya, they all hold that levirate betrothal acquires the yevama as a full-fledged acquisition, like a regular betrothal. The source for Rabban Gamliel’s opinion is that which we said above, that levirate betrothal is not effective after levirate betrothal. Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that the second levirate betrothal is not effective because she was already fully acquired by the first one.,The source for the opinion of Beit Shammai is as we learned in a mishna: In the case of three brothers, two of whom were married to two sisters, and one who was single, the following occurred: The husband of one of the sisters died childless, leaving behind his wife, and the single brother performed levirate betrothal with this wife. Afterward, the second brother died, whereby the second brother’s wife, the sister of the betrothed, happened before him for levirate marriage as well. In this case, Beit Shammai say: His wife remains with him, i.e., the woman he betrothed is considered like his wife, and he is not required to divorce her. And this other leaves the yavam and is exempt from levirate marriage due to the fact that she is the sister of a wife. This indicates that Beit Shammai hold that the levirate betrothal performed with the first woman makes her fully betrothed, thereby nullifying the levirate bond with her sister.,The source for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon is based on the following case cited in a mishna (96b): In the case of a boy aged nine years and one day old who had relations with his yevama, and afterward his brother, who is also nine years and one day old, had relations with her, the second brother disqualifies her from performing levirate marriage with the first one. Rabbi Shimon says he does not disqualify her. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon said to the Rabbis: If the intercourse of the first brother is considered effective intercourse, the intercourse of the second brother is not considered effective intercourse such that it would disqualify her from performing levirate marriage with the first brother, as the first brother has already acquired her through his intercourse. If the intercourse of the first brother is not considered effective intercourse, the intercourse of the second brother is also not effective intercourse. And the Sages considered the intercourse of a nine-year-old boy to be like levirate betrothal, and Rabbi Shimon says that the intercourse of the second boy is not considered intercourse. This proves that in his opinion the intercourse of a nine-year-old fully acquires the yevama, and similarly, so does levirate betrothal.,This source for ben Azzai’s opinion is as it is taught in a baraita that ben Azzai says: Levirate betrothal is effective after levirate betrothal in the case of two yevamin and one yevama, but levirate betrothal is not effective after levirate betrothal in the case of two yevamot and one yavam. Because the latter case involves only one yavam, his levirate betrothal fully acquires the yevama, and therefore the levirate betrothal he performs with the second woman is of no account, as he is already betrothed to the first yevama. The source for Rabbi Neḥemya’s opinion is as we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Neḥemya says: With regard to both intercourse and ḥalitza, whether at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end, nothing is effective after it. And the Sages considered invalid intercourse to be like levirate betrothal, and Rabbi Neḥemya teaches that nothing is effective after it. This indicates that he maintains that no form of acquisition is effective after levirate betrothal, as levirate betrothal completely acquires the yevama.,§ The mishna states: How so? If he performed levirate betrothal with his yevama and gave her a bill of divorce, etc.