תמורה ב׳ ב:י״א-ג׳ א:ב׳

And he derives the halakhot of the end of a consecrated animal from the initial consecration of the animal, as follows: Just as with regard to the initial state of consecration of the animal, an inheritor can effect substitution, so too, with regard to the end of the consecrated animal, an inheritor places his hands on its head.,The Gemara asks: According to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that an inheritor is not able to effect substitution, what does he do with this repetitive language in the verse: “And if he shall at all substitute”? How does he interpret it? The Gemara answers: It serves to include a woman as able to effect substitution and to incur the penalty of forty lashes for doing so. And this is as it is taught in a baraita: Since the verses concerning the entire matter of substitution speak only in the masculine, as it is stated: “He shall not exchange it, nor substitute it” (Leviticus 27:10), from where is it derived that a woman is included? The verse states: “And if he shall at all substitute,” to include a woman.,The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Meir, who derives a different halakha from that verse, from where does he derive that a woman is included? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the addition of the conjunction “and” in the verse: “And if he shall at all substitute.” And Rabbi Yehuda does not interpret the term “and if” as having any special significance.,The Gemara analyzes this dispute. And according to both the opinion of Rabbi Meir and the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, the reason why a woman is included is that the verse explicitly includes a woman, either by adding a conjunction or by repetition of the verb. The Gemara asks: Should one infer that if the verse did not include a woman, I would say that when a woman performs an act of substitution she is not flogged? But didn’t Rav Yehuda say that Rav says, and so too the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught, that when the verse states: “When a man or woman shall commit any sin that people commit” (Numbers 5:6), the verse equates a woman with a man with regard to all punishments of the Torah? Why, then, is there a need for the verse to include women in the prohibition against substitution?,The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the verse to include women specifically, lest you say that this statement that equates women with men in general refers only to a punishment that applies equally to an individual and to the public. But here, since it is a punishment that does not apply equally to all, as we learned in a mishna (13a): The public and partners do not render an animal a substitute, one could claim that a woman as well, when she performs an act of substitution, is not flogged. The verse therefore teaches us that she is in fact liable.,§ Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma: With regard to a minor, what is the halakha? Is he able to effect substitution or not? The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances where this question arises? If we say that it is referring to a minor who has yet to reach the age of responsibility for his vows, i.e., twelve years and one day, you should not raise the dilemma, as since he cannot consecrate an animal by means of a vow, can he effect substitution? Rather, when he raises this dilemma, it is with regard to a minor who has reached the age of responsibility for his vows.,The Gemara explains the dilemma: Do we say that a minor can effect substitution, since the Master said with regard to consecration: The verse states: “When a man shall clearly utter a vow” (Numbers 30:3). What is the meaning when the verse states the unusual formulation: Shall clearly utter [yafli] a vow, instead of the more conventional term: Shall take a vow [yiddor]? This serves to include a discriminating minor [mufla] on the brink of adulthood, teaching that his consecration takes effect. Perhaps, from the fact that he can consecrate an animal, he can also effect substitution. Or perhaps, since no minor is subject to punishments, he cannot apply sanctity to an animal by an act of substitution, which would incur a punishment.,And even if you say that a minor can perform substitution, as he will come to an age when he is subject to punishments, what is the halakha as to whether a gentile can effect substitution? Do you say that he can do so from the fact that his consecration takes effect, as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “Any man [ish ish]…that brings his offering.” What is the meaning when the verse states repetitively “ish ish”? This serves to include gentiles, teaching that they can take vows to bring vow offerings and gift offerings as a Jew can. Since the consecration of a gentile takes effect, perhaps he can effect substitution as well. Or perhaps, since he will not come to a time when he is subject to punishments, therefore when he performs an act of substitution, the animal is not consecrated.,Rava says: Come and hear, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Zevaḥim 5:6): With regard to animals consecrated by gentiles, one may not derive benefit from them ab initio, but if one derived benefit from them, he is not liable for misuse of consecrated property after the fact. And if one consumes them one is not liable for committing a transgression with regard to the prohibitions of piggul if they were sacrificed with the intent to consume them beyond their designated time, of notar if he consumed them beyond their designated time, and of consuming ritually impure offerings if he was impure. Gentiles cannot render a non-sacred animal a substitute for one they consecrate. And one does not bring libations for the offerings of a gentile as independent offerings, but his offering requires libations. This is the statement of Rabbi Shimon.,Rabbi Yosei said: With regard to all of them I see fit to be stringent. In what case is this statement, that Rabbi Shimon exempts animals consecrated by gentiles from liability for misuse, said? It is said with regard to animals consecrated for the altar, i.e., offerings; but with regard to animals consecrated for Temple maintenance, one who derives benefit from them is liable for misuse of consecrated property. Rava notes: In any event, the baraita teaches that gentiles cannot render an animal a substitute for his offering.,The Gemara responds: And Rami bar Ḥama can say: I do not raise a dilemma in a case where a gentile consecrated an animal as an offering for a gentile such as himself to achieve atonement. In this case the baraita rules explicitly that he cannot effect substitution. When I raise the dilemma, it is in a case where a gentile consecrated an animal as an offering and a Jew achieves atonement with it. In this situation, do we follow the one who consecrated it, in which case the gentile cannot effect substitution, or do we follow the one achieving atonement, in which case he can?,The Gemara suggests: Solve this dilemma by invoking a statement of Rabbi Abbahu, as Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one consecrates an animal as an offering to be brought by another, and the animal develops a blemish disqualifying it for sacrifice, if the one who consecrated it desires to redeem it, he adds one-fifth to its value, just as he would were it his own offering. By contrast, if the one achieving atonement with the offering desires to redeem it, he does not need to add one-fifth. But the one achieving atonement with the offering can render another animal a substitute for it as if he had consecrated it. And if one separates teruma, the portion of produce designated for a priest, from his own produce for the purpose of exempting the produce of another, the benefit of discretion as to which priest or Levite will receive it is his. Apparently, the halakhot of substitution follow the one achieving atonement.,Rami bar Ḥama could say to this: There, in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement, the offering comes on behalf of the Jew who consecrated it. Due to that reason, we follow the one atoning, and during both the initial consecration of the offering and its ultimate sacrifice the animal is in the possession of a Jew, who is able to effect substitution. But here, where a gentile consecrated the animal, this is how he raises the dilemma: Do we require that from the initial consecration of the offering until the ultimate act of sacrifice it must be in the possession of one who is able to effect substitution or not? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand [teiku] unresolved.,§ The Master said in the baraita cited on the previous amud: With regard to animals consecrated by gentiles, one may not derive benefit ab initio, but if one benefited from them after the fact, he is not liable for misusing consecrated property. The Gemara explains: The halakha that one may not benefit from them ab initio is by rabbinic law. And that halakha that if one benefited from them after the fact he is not liable for misusing consecrated property is by Torah law.,What is the reason that one is not liable for misuse? As it is written with regard to misuse of consecrated property: “If anyone commit a trespass, and sin through error, in the holy items of the Lord” (Leviticus 5:15). And we derive a verbal analogy from the use of the word “sin” in this verse and the word “sin” used in the context of teruma: “They shall therefore keep My charge, lest they bear sin for it” (Leviticus 22:9). And with regard to teruma it is written explicitly: “Even of all the hallowed items of the children of Israel” (Numbers 18:8), from which one can infer: But not of gentiles. The halakhot of misuse as well, therefore, do not apply to animals consecrated by gentiles.,The baraita continues: And if one consumes them, i.e., animals consecrated by gentiles, one is not liable for committing a transgression, with regard to the prohibitions of piggul, notar, or consuming offerings while ritually impure. The source for this is a verse, as it is written with regard to ritual impurity: “Speak to Aaron and to his sons, that they separate themselves from the holy items of the children of Israel, which they hallow unto Me, and that they profane not My holy name” (Leviticus 22:2). This verse explicitly mentions items consecrated by the children of Israel, to emphasize that the halakha of distancing oneself from consecrated items while in a state of ritual impurity does not include items consecrated by gentiles.,And one derives the exemption from notar by drawing a verbal analogy between the word “profane” used in the context of notar and the word “profane” used in the context of ritual impurity. As it is written in the verse cited above with regard to ritual impurity: “That they separate themselves from the holy items of the children of Israel, which they hallow unto Me, and that they profane not My holy name.” And it is written with regard to notar: “But every one that eats it shall bear his iniquity, because he has profaned the holy item of the Lord” (Leviticus 19:8). Since the prohibition against consuming consecrated items while impure does not apply to the offerings of gentiles, neither does the prohibition of notar.,And the tanna of the baraita derives the gentiles’ exemption from piggul by verbal analogy between the word “iniquity” used in the context of piggul and the word “iniquity” used in the context of notar, as it is written with regard to piggul: “And the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 7:18), and it is written with regard to notar: “But everyone that eats it shall bear his iniquity, because he has profaned the holy item of the Lord” (Leviticus 19:8). And based on these two verbal analogies, one concludes that with regard to all of them, i.e., piggul, notar, and ritually impure offerings, the prohibition against consumption applies only to offerings of the children of Israel, but not to those of gentiles.,The baraita continues: And a gentile cannot render a non-sacred animal a substitute for one he has consecrated. The Gemara cites the source for this halakha: As it is written with regard to substitutions: “He shall not exchange it, nor substitute it” (Leviticus 27:10), and it is written at the beginning of the matter: “Speak to the children of Israel, and say to them: When a man shall clearly utter a vow of persons to the Lord, according to your valuation” (Leviticus 27:2). Since the passage specifically addresses the children of Israel, the halakhot of substitution apply only to them, not to gentiles.,The Gemara presents another version of the source for this halakha: The baraita states: And a gentile cannot render a non-sacred animal a substitute for one he has consecrated. What is the reason? The reason is that the substitution of consecrated animals is juxtaposed with the animal tithe (see Leviticus 27:32), and the animal tithe is juxtaposed with the grain tithe. And with regard to the grain tithe it is written: “For the tithe of the children of Israel, which they set apart as a gift to the Lord, I have given to the Levites for an inheritance” (Numbers 18:24), indicating that the halakhot of the grain tithe apply only to the children of Israel, but not to gentiles. From the juxtapositions, one derives that the same holds for substitution.,The baraita continues: And one does not bring libations for a gentile as an independent offering, but his offering requires libations. This is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. The Gemara explains: From where are these matters derived? They are derived from a verse, as the Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to libations: “All that are homeborn shall do these after this manner, in presenting an offering made by fire, of a sweet savor to the Lord” (Numbers 15:13). One who is homeborn, i.e., a Jew, brings libations, but a gentile does not bring libations. One might have thought that a gentile’s burnt offering should not require libations; therefore, the verse states: “So shall it be done for each bull, or for each ram, or for each of the lambs, or of the goats” (Numbers 15:10–11). This teaches that every burnt offering, even that of a gentile, requires libations.,The baraita continues: Rabbi Yosei said: I see the logic of the opinion that in all of these cases it is correct to be stringent about the offerings of gentiles. The Gemara explains: What is the reason? With regard to the offering of a gentile, it is written: “Whosoever he be of the house of Israel, or of the strangers in Israel, that brings his offering, whether it be any of their vows, or any of their gift offerings, which are brought to the Lord for a burnt offering” (Leviticus 22:18). The verse equates the offerings of gentiles, “the strangers in Israel,” with those of Jews, and indicates that the consecrated status of the former is identical to that of the latter.,The baraita continues: In what case is this statement said? It is said with regard to animals consecrated for the altar, but with regard to animals consecrated for Temple maintenance, one who benefits from them is liable for misusing consecrated property. The Gemara explains: What is the reason? The reason is that when we learn that items consecrated by gentiles are not subject to liability for misuse by the verbal analogy between the word sin and another instance of the word sin from the context of teruma, this applies only to consecrated property that is similar to teruma, which is consecrated with inherent sanctity. But with regard to an item that has the sanctity of the Temple maintenance, whose sanctity inheres in its value, as it will ultimately be sold and the proceeds used for Temple maintenance, the analogy does not apply.,§ The mishna teaches that one who effects substitution receives lashes. Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: With regard to any prohibition in the Torah, if one performed an action to transgress it, he is liable to receive lashes. But if he did not perform an action to transgress it, he is exempt from receiving lashes.,The Gemara asks: But is it an established principle that one who transgresses a prohibition that does not involve an action is exempt? But there is the prohibition of substitution, which is a prohibition that does not involve an action, and one is flogged for transgressing it, as we learned in the mishna: That is not to say that it is permitted for a person to effect substitution; rather, it means that if one substituted a non-sacred animal for a consecrated animal, the substitution takes effect, and the one who substituted the non-sacred animal incurs the forty lashes.,The Gemara answers: Rav could have said to you: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna written? It is in accordance with that opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: With regard to a prohibition that does not involve an action, one is flogged for transgressing it. The Rabbis, however, disagree.,The Gemara counters: But can you establish the mishna as being in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? But we established the first clause of the mishna as not being in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as it teaches: Everyone substitutes a non-sacred animal for a consecrated animal, and the Gemara added (2a): What does the expansive term everyone serve to include? It serves to include an inheritor, and accordingly, this mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that an inheritor cannot effect substitution.,The Gemara answers: The tanna of this mishna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to one matter, that one is flogged for transgressing a prohibition that does not involve an action, and disagrees with him with regard to one other matter, as Rabbi Yehuda holds that an inheritor does not place his hands on the head of the offering when he sacrifices it, and an inheritor is not able to substitute a non-sacred animal for a consecrated one that he inherited; and the tanna of our mishna holds that an inheritor places his hands on the head of the offering when he sacrifices it, and an inheritor is able to substitute a non-sacred animal for a consecrated one that he inherited.,Rav Idi bar Avin says that Rav Amram says that Rabbi Yitzḥak says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: With regard to every prohibition in the Torah, if one performed an action to transgress it, he is flogged. But if he did not perform an action to transgress it, he is exempt from lashes, except for one who takes an oath, and one who effects substitution, and one who curses another using the name of God. For these three transgressions, even though he did not perform an action, he is liable to receive lashes. They said in the name of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina: Also one who separates teruma prior to designating the first fruits is flogged, even though teruma can be separated by intention alone, without an action.,The Gemara discusses the sources for these exceptions. From where do we derive that one who takes an oath using the name of God is flogged? Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Meir that the verse states: “For the Lord will not hold him guiltless that takes His name in vain” (Exodus 20:7). One can infer: The higher, i.e., heavenly, court