גיטין ל״ז ב:י״ט-ל״ח א:א׳
Gittin 37b:19-38a:1
Hebrew
הַמַּחֲזִיר חוֹב לַחֲבֵירוֹ בַּשְּׁבִיעִית – צָרִיךְ שֶׁיֹּאמַר לוֹ: ״מְשַׁמֵּט אֲנִי״; וְאִם אָמַר לוֹ: ״אַף עַל פִּי כֵן״, יְקַבֵּל הֵימֶנּוּ. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְזֶה דְּבַר הַשְּׁמִטָּה״.,אָמַר רַבָּה: וְתָלֵי לֵיהּ עַד דְּאָמַר הָכִי. אֵיתִיבֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: כְּשֶׁהוּא נוֹתֵן לוֹ, אַל יֹאמַר לוֹ: ״בְּחוֹבִי אֲנִי נוֹתֵן לָךְ״, אֶלָּא יֹאמַר לוֹ: ״שֶׁלִּי הֵן, וּבְמַתָּנָה אֲנִי נוֹתֵן לָךְ״! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: תָּלֵי לֵיהּ נָמֵי עַד דְּאָמַר הָכִי.,אַבָּא בַּר מָרְתָּא, דְּהוּא אַבָּא בַּר מִנְיוֹמֵי, הֲוָה מַסֵּיק בֵּיהּ רַבָּה זוּזֵי. אַיְיתִינְהוּ נִיהֲלֵיהּ בִּשְׁבִיעִית, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מְשַׁמֵּט אֲנִי. שַׁקְלִינְהוּ וַאֲזַל. אֲתָא אַבָּיֵי, אַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ דַּהֲוָה עֲצִיב, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַמַּאי עֲצִיב מָר? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָכִי הֲוָה מַעֲשֶׂה.,אֲזַל לְגַבֵּיהּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַמְטֵית לֵיהּ זוּזֵי לְמָר? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וּמַאי אֲמַר לָךְ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״מְשַׁמֵּט אֲנִי״. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וַאֲמַרְתְּ לֵיהּ ״אַף עַל פִּי כֵן״? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וְאִי אֲמַרְתְּ לֵיהּ ״אַף עַל פִּי כֵן״, הֲוָה שַׁקְלִינְהוּ מִינָּךְ; הַשְׁתָּא מִיהַת אַמְטִינְהוּ נִיהֲלֵיהּ, וְאֵימָא לֵיהּ ״אַף עַל פִּי כֵן״. אֲזַל אַמְטִינְהוּ נִיהֲלֵיהּ, וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ ״אַף עַל פִּי כֵן״. שַׁקְלִינְהוּ מִינֵּיהּ, אָמַר: לָא הֲוָה בֵּיהּ דַּעְתָּא בְּהַאי צוּרְבָּא מֵרַבָּנַן מֵעִיקָּרָא.,אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: נֶאֱמָן אָדָם לוֹמַר: ״פְּרוֹסְבּוּל הָיָה בְּיָדִי, וְאָבַד מִמֶּנִּי״. מַאי טַעְמָא? כֵּיוָן דְּתַקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן פְּרוֹסְבּוּל, לָא שָׁבֵיק הֶיתֵּירָא וְאָכֵיל אִיסּוּרָא.,כִּי אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִידֵּי פְּרוֹסְבּוּל הָיָה לְךָ וְאָבַד? כְּגוֹן זֶה, ״פְּתַח פִּיךָ לָאִלֵּם״ הוּא.,תְּנַן: וְכֵן בַּעַל חוֹב שֶׁמּוֹצִיא שְׁטַר חוֹב, וְאֵין עִמּוֹ פְּרוֹסְבּוּל – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ לֹא יִפָּרְעוּ.,תַּנָּאֵי הִיא – דְּתַנְיָא: הַמּוֹצִיא שְׁטַר חוֹב – צָרִיךְ שֶׁיְּהֵא עִמּוֹ פְּרוֹסְבּוּל. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ.,מַתְנִי׳ עֶבֶד שֶׁנִּשְׁבָּה וּפְדָאוּהוּ, אִם לְשׁוּם עֶבֶד – יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד; אִם לְשׁוּם בֶּן חוֹרִין – לֹא יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: בֵּין כָּךְ וּבֵין כָּךְ יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד.,גְּמָ׳ בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? אִילֵימָא לִפְנֵי יֵאוּשׁ, לְשׁוּם בֶּן חוֹרִין – אַמַּאי לָא יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד? אֶלָּא לְאַחַר יֵאוּשׁ, לְשׁוּם עֶבֶד – אַמַּאי יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד?,אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לְעוֹלָם לִפְנֵי יֵאוּשׁ, וּלְשׁוּם עֶבֶד – יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד לְרַבּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן, לְשׁוּם בֶּן חוֹרִין – לֹא יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד לֹא לְרַבּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן וְלֹא לְרַבּוֹ שֵׁנִי; לְרַבּוֹ שֵׁנִי לָא, דְּהָא לְשׁוּם בֶּן חוֹרִין פַּרְקֵיהּ, לְרַבּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן נָמֵי לָא, דִּילְמָא מִמַּנְעִי וְלָא פָּרְקִי.,רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: בֵּין כָּךְ וּבֵין כָּךְ יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד – קָסָבַר: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁמִּצְוָה לִפְדּוֹת אֶת בְּנֵי חוֹרִין, כָּךְ מִצְוָה לִפְדּוֹת אֶת הָעֲבָדִים.,רָבָא אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם לְאַחַר יֵאוּשׁ, וּלְשׁוּם עֶבֶד – יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד לְרַבּוֹ שֵׁנִי, לְשׁוּם בֶּן חוֹרִין – לֹא יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד לֹא לְרַבּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן וְלֹא לְרַבּוֹ שֵׁנִי; לְרַבּוֹ שֵׁנִי לָא, דְּהָא לְשׁוּם בֶּן חוֹרִין פַּרְקֵיהּ, לְרַבּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן נָמֵי לָא, דְּהָא לְאַחַר יֵאוּשׁ הֲוָה.,רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: בֵּין כָּךְ וּבֵין כָּךְ יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד – כִּדְחִזְקִיָּה, דְּאָמַר חִזְקִיָּה: מִפְּנֵי מָה אָמְרוּ בֵּין כָּךְ וּבֵין כָּךְ יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד? שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא כׇּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד הוֹלֵךְ וּמַפִּיל עַצְמוֹ לִגְיָיסוֹת, וּמַפְקִיעַ עַצְמוֹ מִיָּד רַבּוֹ.,מֵיתִיבִי, אָמַר לָהֶן רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁמִּצְוָה לִפְדּוֹת אֶת בְּנֵי חוֹרִין, כָּךְ מִצְוָה לִפְדּוֹת אֶת הָעֲבָדִים. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְאַבָּיֵי – דְּאָמַר לִפְנֵי יֵאוּשׁ, הַיְינוּ דְּקָאָמַר ״כְּשֵׁם״;,אֶלָּא לְרָבָא – דְּאָמַר לְאַחַר יֵאוּשׁ, הַאי ״כְּשֵׁם״?! מִשּׁוּם דְּחִזְקִיָּה הוּא!,אָמַר לָךְ רָבָא: רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל לָא הָוֵי יָדַע מַאי קָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר לְהוּ: אִי לִפְנֵי יֵאוּשׁ קָאָמְרִיתוּ – הַיְינוּ ״כְּשֵׁם״; אִי לְאַחַר יֵאוּשׁ קָאָמְרִיתוּ – כִּדְחִזְקִיָּה.,וּלְרָבָא – דְּאָמַר לְאַחַר יֵאוּשׁ, וּלְרַבּוֹ שֵׁנִי; רַבּוֹ שֵׁנִי מִמַּאן קָנֵי לֵיהּ – מִשַּׁבַּאי, שַׁבַּאי גּוּפֵיהּ מִי קָנֵי לֵיהּ?!,אִין; קָנֵי לֵיהּ לְמַעֲשֶׂה יָדָיו – דְּאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: מִנַּיִן לְגוֹי, שֶׁקָּנָה אֶת הַגּוֹי לְמַעֲשֵׂה יָדָיו? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְגַם מִבְּנֵי הַתּוֹשָׁבִים הַגָּרִים עִמָּכֶם מֵהֶם תִּקְנוּ״ – אַתֶּם קוֹנִים מֵהֶם, וְלֹא הֵם קוֹנִים מִכֶּם, וְלֹא הֵם קוֹנִים זֶה מִזֶּה. יָכוֹל לֹא יִקְנוּ זֶה אֶת זֶה? יָכוֹל לֹא יִקְנוּ זֶה אֶת זֶה?! הָאָמְרַתְּ: לֹא הֵם קוֹנִים זֶה מִזֶּה! הָכִי קָאָמַר: וְלֹא הֵם קוֹנִים זֶה מִזֶּה לְגוּפוֹ.,יָכוֹל לֹא יִקְנוּ זֶה אֶת זֶה לְמַעֲשֵׂה יָדָיו? אָמַרְתָּ קַל וָחוֹמֶר: גּוֹי – יִשְׂרָאֵל, קוֹנֶה; גּוֹי – גּוֹי, לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?!,וְאֵימָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי בְּכַסְפָּא, אֲבָל בַּחֲזָקָה – לָא! אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: עַמּוֹן וּמוֹאָב טָהֲרוּ בְּסִיחוֹן.,אַשְׁכְּחַן גּוֹי – גּוֹי; גּוֹי – יִשְׂרָאֵל, מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיִּשְׁבְּ מִמֶּנּוּ שֶׁבִי״.,אָמַר רַב שֶׁמֶן בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: עֶבֶד שֶׁבָּרַח מִבֵּית הָאֲסוּרִים – יָצָא לְחֵירוּת, וְלֹא עוֹד אֶלָּא שֶׁכּוֹפִין אֶת רַבּוֹ וְכוֹתֵב לוֹ גֵּט שִׁיחְרוּר.,תְּנַן, רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: בֵּין כָּךְ וּבֵין כָּךְ יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד; וְאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁשָּׁנָה רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל בְּמִשְׁנָתֵנוּ – הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ, חוּץ מֵעָרֵב וְצַיְדָן וּרְאָיָה אַחֲרוֹנָה.,בִּשְׁלָמָא לְאַבָּיֵי, מוֹקֵי לַהּ לְהַאי – לִפְנֵי יֵאוּשׁ, וְהַאי – לְאַחַר יֵאוּשׁ.,אֶלָּא לְרָבָא – דְּאָמַר לְאַחַר יֵאוּשׁ, קַשְׁיָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אַדְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן!,אָמַר לָךְ רָבָא: טַעְמָא מַאי – מִשּׁוּם דְּחִזְקִיָּה; בּוֹרֵחַ שָׁאנֵי – הַשְׁתָּא לִקְטָלָא מְסַר נַפְשֵׁיהּ, אַפּוֹלֵי אַפֵּיל נַפְשֵׁיהּ לִגְיָיסוֹת?!,אַמְתֵּיהּ דְּמָר שְׁמוּאֵל אִשְׁתְּבַאי. פַּרְקוּהָ לְשׁוּם אַמְהֻתָא, וְשַׁדְּרוּהָ לֵיהּ. שְׁלַחוּ לֵיהּ: אֲנַן – כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סְבִירָא לַן, אַתְּ – אִי נָמֵי כְּרַבָּנַן סְבִירָא לָךְ, אֲנַן לְשׁוּם אַמְהֻתָא פָּרְקִינַן לַהּ (נִיהֲלַהּ).,וְאִינְהוּ סְבוּר – לִפְנֵי יֵאוּשׁ הֲוָה, וְלָא הִיא – לְאַחַר יֵאוּשׁ הֲוָה, וּשְׁמוּאֵל – לָא מִיבַּעְיָא דְּאִשְׁתַּעְבּוֹדֵי לָא מִשְׁתַּעְבַּד בַּהּ, אֶלָּא גִּיטָּא דְחֵירוּתָא נָמֵי לָא אַצְרְכָה.,שְׁמוּאֵל לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הַמַּפְקִיר עַבְדּוֹ – יָצָא לְחֵירוּת, וְאֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ גֵּט שִׁיחְרוּר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְכׇל עֶבֶד אִישׁ מִקְנַת כָּסֶף״ – ״עֶבֶד אִישׁ״ וְלֹא ״עֶבֶד אִשָּׁה״?! אֶלָּא עֶבֶד שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ רְשׁוּת לְרַבּוֹ עָלָיו – קָרוּי עֶבֶד; שֶׁאֵין לוֹ רְשׁוּת לְרַבּוֹ עָלָיו – אֵין קָרוּי עֶבֶד.,אַמְתֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַבָּא בַּר זוּטְרָא אִישְׁתְּבַאי, פַּרְקַהּ הָהוּא תַּרְמוֹדָאָה לְשׁוּם אִיתְּתָא. שְׁלַחוּ לֵיהּ לְדִידֵיהּ: אִי יָאוּת עָבְדַתְּ, שַׁדַּר לַהּ גִּיטָּא דְחֵירוּתָא.,הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּמָצוּ פָּרְקִי לַהּ, לְמָה לִי גִּיטָּא דְחֵירוּתָא? אִי דְּלָא מָצוּ פָּרְקִי לַהּ, כִּי שַׁדַּר לַהּ גִּיטָּא דְחֵירוּתָא מַאי הָוֵי?,לְעוֹלָם דְּמָצוּ פָּרְקִי לַהּ; וְכֵיוָן דִּמְשַׁדַּר לָהּ גִּיטָּא דְחֵירוּתָא, חַבּוֹרֵי מִחַבְּרִי אַהֲדָדֵי, וּפָרְקִי לַהּ. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: לְעוֹלָם דְּלָא מָצוּ פָּרְקִי לַהּ, וְכֵיוָן דִּמְשַׁדַּר לַהּ גִּיטָּא דְחֵירוּתָא, מִיתַּזְלָא בְּאַפֵּיהּ, וּמְפָרֵיק לַהּ.,וְהָאָמַר מָר: חֲבִיבָה לָהֶן בְּהֶמְתָּן שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל יוֹתֵר מִנְּשׁוֹתֵיהֶן! הָנֵי מִילֵּי בְּצִינְעָא, אֲבָל בְּפַרְהֶסְיָא זִילָא בְּהוּ מִילְּתָא.,הָהִיא אַמְתָּא דַּהֲוָת בְּפוּמְבְּדִיתָא, דַּהֲווֹ קָא מְעַבְּדִי בַּהּ אִינָשֵׁי אִיסּוּרָא. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, אִי לָאו דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: כׇּל הַמְשַׁחְרֵר עַבְדּוֹ עוֹבֵר בַּעֲשֵׂה; הֲוָה כָּיֵיפְנָא לֵיהּ לְמָרַהּ, וְכָתֵיב לַהּ גִּיטָּא דְחֵירוּתָא. רָבִינָא אָמַר: כִּי הָא מוֹדֶה רַב יְהוּדָה, מִשּׁוּם מִילְּתָא דְאִיסּוּרָא.,וְאַבָּיֵי – מִשּׁוּם אִיסּוּרָא לָא?! הָאָמַר רַב חֲנִינָא בַּר רַב קַטִּינָא אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּאִשָּׁה אַחַת שֶׁחֶצְיָהּ שִׁפְחָה וְחֶצְיָהּ בַּת חוֹרִין,
English Translation
In the case of one who repays a debt to his friend during the Sabbatical Year, the creditor must say to him: I abrogate the debt, but if the debtor then said to him: Nevertheless, I want to repay you, he may accept it from him, as it is stated: “And this is the manner [devar] of the abrogation” (Deuteronomy 15:2). From the fact that the verse employed a term, devar, that can also mean: This is the statement of the cancellation, the Sages derived that the creditor must state that he cancels the debt, but he is allowed to accept the payment if the debtor insists on repaying.,Rabba said: And the creditor is permitted to lift up his eyes to him hopefully, demonstrating that he wishes to accept the payment, until the debtor says this, that he nevertheless wishes to repay him. Abaye raised an objection to Rabba’s statement from a baraita: When the debtor gives the creditor payment for a debt that has been canceled he should not say to him: I give this to you in payment of my debt; rather, he should say to him: This is my money and I give it to you as a gift. This indicates that the debt is repaid only by the initiative of the debtor. Rabba said to him: The creditor is permitted to lift up his eyes to him hopefully as well, until the debtor says this, that he gives it as a gift, but the initiative may come from the creditor.,The Gemara relates: There was a man by the name of Abba bar Marta, who is also known as Abba bar Minyumi, from whom Rabba was attempting to collect a debt. He brought it to him in the Sabbatical Year. Rabba said to him: I abrogate this debt. Abba bar Marta took the money and left. Abaye came before Rabba and found that he was sad. Abaye said to him: Why is the Master sad? Rabba said to him: This was the incident that occurred, explaining that Abba bar Marta understood his statement literally and did not repay the debt.,Abaye went to Abba bar Marta, and said to him: Did you bring the money to the Master? He said to him: Yes. Abaye said to him: And what did he say to you? He said to him that Rabba had responded: I abrogate this debt. Abaye said to him: And did you say to him: Nevertheless, I want to repay you? Abba bar Marta said to him: No. Abaye said to him: But if you had said to him: Nevertheless, I want to repay you, he would have taken it from you. Now, in any event, bring it to him and say to him: Nevertheless, I want to repay you. Abba bar Marta went and brought the money to Rabba and said to him: Nevertheless, I want to repay you, and Rabba took it from him. In the end, Rabba said: This Torah scholar was not knowledgeable from the beginning, as it was necessary to teach him how to react.,§ Rav Yehuda says that Rav Naḥman says: A person is deemed credible to say: I had a prosbol and I lost it, and collect payment of his debt. The Gemara explains: What is the reason for this? Since the Sages instituted the prosbol in a manner that allows anyone to write one without difficulty, in a situation such as this one does not leave aside a permitted item, i.e., collecting a debt after having written a prosbol, and eat a forbidden item, i.e., collecting a debt without having written a prosbol.,When they would come before Rav with a case where a creditor who did not have a prosbol was demanding payment of a debt after the Sabbatical Year, he would say to the creditor: Did you have any prosbol and it was lost? The Gemara explains that this is a case where the directive of the verse: “Open your mouth for the mute” (Proverbs 31:8) is applicable; this is not considered an intervention on behalf of one party, as it is only providing assistance for someone who was unaware of a claim that he should make.,The Gemara challenges: Didn’t we learn in a mishna (Ketubot 89a): And similarly, a creditor who presents a promissory note unaccompanied by a prosbol, these debts may not be collected. This demonstrates that even if a creditor himself claims that he had written a prosbol but it was lost, his claim is not accepted and the debt is canceled.,The Gemara answers: It is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who presents a promissory note after the Sabbatical Year, he must present a prosbol along with it in order to collect payment, and the Rabbis say: He does not need to present a prosbol, as it is assumed that he wrote one.,MISHNA: In the case of a Canaanite slave that was captured, and Jews who had not owned him redeemed him, if he was redeemed to be a slave then he will be a slave. If he was redeemed to be a freeman then he will not be a slave. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Both in this case and in that case he will be a slave.,GEMARA: With what are we dealing? If we say that the slave was redeemed before the first owner reached a state of despairing with regard to recovering the slave, then even if he was redeemed to be a freeman, he should still belong to his first owner; why would the mishna state that he will not be a slave? Rather, we might say that the slave was redeemed after the despairing of the first owner. Then, even if he was redeemed to be a slave, why will he be a slave? After his owner despairs of recovering him, he becomes ownerless property and consequently acquires his own freedom.,Abaye said: Actually, the mishna is referring to a case where the slave was redeemed before the despairing of the owner. Therefore, according to the unattributed opinion of the mishna, if he was redeemed to be a slave, he will be a slave to his first master. If he was redeemed to be a freeman, he will not be a slave, neither to his first master nor to his second master, i.e., the one who redeemed him. He will not be a slave to his second master because he redeemed him as a freeman and cannot now demand that he become a slave. He will also not be a slave to his first master lest people refrain from redeeming slaves. If they know that a redeemed slave remains a slave of his original owner, they will not see any reason to redeem them from captivity.,Abaye continues his explication of the mishna: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Both in this case and in that case he will be a slave to his first master. The Gemara explains: He holds that just as it is a mitzva to redeem freemen, so too, it is a mitzva to redeem slaves, and there is no concern that people will refrain from redeeming captured slaves.,Rava said: The mishna should be understood differently. Actually, the mishna is referring to a case where the slave was redeemed after the despairing of the owner. And therefore, according to the unattributed opinion in the mishna, if he was redeemed to be a slave then he will be a slave to his second master, as his original owner had despaired of recovering him. If he was redeemed to be a freeman then he will not be a slave, neither to his first master nor to his second master. He will not be a slave to his second master as he redeemed him as a freeman. He will also not be a slave to his first master, as he was freed after the despairing of the first master.,Rava continues his explication of the mishna: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Both in this case and in that case he will be a slave. This should be understood in accordance with the statement of Ḥizkiyya, as Ḥizkiyya said: For what reason did they say that both in this case and in that case he will be a slave? They said it so that each and every slave should not go and hand himself over to gentile troops, and in this manner release himself from the possession of his master.,The Gemara raises an objection to Rava’s explanation from a baraita: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said to them: Just as it is a mitzva to redeem freemen, so too, it is a mitzva to redeem slaves. Granted, according to Abaye this works out well as he said that the mishna is referring to a slave that was redeemed before the despairing of his owner, and the unattributed opinion of the mishna rules that he will not be a slave to his original owner due to a concern that people will refrain from redeeming slaves. This is the reason that he said: Just as, since he was explaining that this concern does not exist.,However, according to Rava, who said that the mishna is referring to a slave that was redeemed after the owner’s despairing, and the unattributed opinion of the mishna is not concerned that people will refrain from redeeming slaves, is this the rationale of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that just as it is a mitzva to redeem freemen, so too, it is a mitzva to redeem slaves? His reason is because of the statement of Ḥizkiyya.,The Gemara answers: Rava could have said to you: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel did not know what exactly the Rabbis said, and this is what he said to them: If you say this ruling with regard to a slave who was redeemed before his owner’s despairing, this is my response, that just as it is a mitzva to redeem freemen, so too, it is a mitzva to redeem slaves. If you say that this case was after his owner’s despairing, then the reason that I disagree is in accordance with the statement of Ḥizkiyya.,The Gemara asks: And according to Rava, who said that the mishna is referring to where the slave was redeemed after the despairing of the owner, and he will be a slave to his second master, one can ask: With regard to the second master, from whom did he acquire the slave? If you say that he acquired him from the captor, did the gentile captor himself acquire the slave? The ownership of the second master is contingent on his acquiring the slave from someone who himself had ownership over the slave.,The Gemara answers: Yes, he acquired ownership with regard to his labor, as Reish Lakish says: From where is it derived that a gentile can acquire another gentile as a slave with regard to his labor? As it is stated: “Moreover, of the children of the strangers who sojourn among you, of them you may acquire” (Leviticus 25:45). This indicates that you, Jews, can acquire slaves from them, but the gentiles cannot acquire one of you, as they do not have the ability to acquire a Jew as a slave, and they cannot acquire each other as slaves. The Gemara begins to introduce a question: One might have thought that they shall not be able to acquire each other. The Gemara immediately clarifies its question: Can it be that one might have thought that they shall not be able to acquire each other; but didn’t you already say that they cannot acquire each other? Rather, this is what he said: Gentiles cannot acquire each other with regard to the slave himself.,The Gemara now restates the question: One might have thought that they shall not be able to acquire each other as slaves even for the rights to his labor. The Gemara answers: You can say an a fortiori inference: If a gentile can acquire a Jew for the rights to his labor, as stated explicitly in the Torah (Leviticus 25:47), all the more so is it not clear that a gentile can acquire a gentile?,The Gemara challenges: But I could say that this halakha, that a gentile can acquire a gentile as a slave for the rights to his labor, applies only to acquisition via money. However, via an act of possession, by taking him captive, he does not acquire him. Rav Pappa says in response: The land of Ammon and Moab became purified through the conquest of Sihon. After the conquest of Sihon, the land that had belonged to Ammon and Moab was considered the property of Sihon, and it was permitted for the Jewish people to conquer it although they had not been permitted to conquer the land of Ammon and Moab. In the same manner, a gentile can acquire a slave by taking possession of him as a captive.,The Gemara asks: We found a source for a gentile acquiring a gentile through conquest, which is an act of taking possession; from where do we derive that a gentile can also acquire a Jew through the act of possession such as conquest? The Gemara answers: As it is written: “And the Canaanites, who dwelt in the South, heard tell that Israel came by the way of Atharim; and he fought against Israel, and took of them captive” (Numbers 21:1). This indicates that even a Jew is acquired by a gentile through the act of possession, in this case, conquest in war.,§ Rav Shemen bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: A slave who escaped from prison is emancipated. He is no longer subjugated to his owner, as it is assumed that his owner has despaired of retrieving him. And moreover, his master is forced to write him a bill of manumission so that he can marry a Jewish woman.,We learned in the mishna that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says with regard to a slave who was redeemed from captivity: Both in this case and in that case he will be a slave. And Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Every place where Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel taught a ruling in our mishna, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion, except for the following three cases: The responsibility of the guarantor, and the incident that occurred in the city of Tzaidan, and the dispute with regard to evidence in the final disagreement. Therefore, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in the mishna here, as it is not one of those three cases. This contradicts the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan cited above concerning a slave who escapes prison.,The Gemara clarifies: Granted, according to the opinion of Abaye, he establishes the mishna as referring to a slave who is redeemed before the owner’s despair. For this reason, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel rules that the redeemed slave is not emancipated, and the halakha is in accordance with his ruling. And this statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan, that a slave who escapes from prison goes free, applies after the owner’s despair. Therefore, there is no contradiction between the two statements of Rabbi Yoḥanan.,However, according to the opinion of Rava, who said that the mishna here is referring to a slave who is redeemed after the despair of the owner, there is a difficulty. The difficulty is due to the contradiction between the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan in which he rules against the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, as he holds that a slave who escapes prison is emancipated, and the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan in which he rules that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.,The Gemara answers: Rava could have said to you: What is the reason that a slave who was redeemed is not emancipated? It is because of the concern expressed by Ḥizkiyya, that perhaps slaves would allow themselves to be captured by foreign troops in the hope that they would be redeemed and consequently emancipated. However, the case of one who escapes from prison is different, as the concern raised by Ḥizkiyya is not applicable. If now it is apparent that he is willing to give himself over to death to escape captivity, as he would be put to death for attempting to escape prison, is there a concern that he will throw himself willingly into captivity by allowing himself to be captured by foreign troops?,The Gemara relates: The maidservant of Master Shmuel was taken captive. Some people redeemed her to be a maidservant and sent her to him. They sent him the following message: We hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and therefore we hold that in any case she remains your maidservant. Even if you hold in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis in the mishna, then you should know that we redeemed her to be a maidservant, and even the Rabbis would agree that she remains your maidservant.,The Gemara adds: And they thought that this was before his despair, but that is not so. It was after his despair, and when Shmuel received the maidservant, it is not necessary to say that he did not enslave her. But also, he did not require her to receive a bill of manumission, as he held that she was a free woman in every respect.,The Gemara comments: In this matter, Shmuel conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as Shmuel says: With regard to one who renounces ownership of his slave, the slave is emancipated, and he does not even require a bill of manumission. Shmuel cited a proof from that which is stated: “But every slave man that is bought for money” (Exodus 12:44). Does this apply only to a slave who is a man, and not to a woman slave? Rather, it means: The slave of a man, i.e., a slave whose master has authority and control over him, is called a slave, since he is the slave of a particular man. However, with regard to a slave whose master does not have authority over him, such as one who has been declared ownerless, he is not called a slave but a freeman. Therefore, once Shmuel despaired of retrieving his maidservant, she was no longer under his control and did not require a bill of manumission.,The Gemara relates: The maidservant of Rabbi Abba bar Zutra was taken captive. A certain gentile tarmoda’a redeemed her to be his wife. The Sages sent a message to Rabbi Abba bar Zutra: If you wish to act correctly, send her a bill of manumission.,The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If this is a situation where the Jews are able to redeem her, why do I need a bill of manumission? They should redeem her to be a maidservant. If this is a situation where they are unable to redeem her, when he sends her a bill of manumission, what of it? What effect will it have, as she is currently under the control of this gentile?,The Gemara answers: Actually, it is referring to a situation where they are able to redeem her but are not doing so. And since he sends her a bill of manumission, the residents of the city will join together and redeem her, as she is now a full-fledged Jew, whereas they would not have redeemed her to be a maidservant. And if you wish, say instead: Actually, it is referring to a case where they are unable to redeem her, as the ransom was too expensive. And once he sends her a bill of manumission, she will be disrespected in the eyes of the gentile who redeemed her to marry her, as he will find out that she is a maidservant of a Jew, and he will allow her to be redeemed.,The Gemara challenges this statement: Would it be easier to redeem the maidservant once the gentile discovered that she is the maidservant of a Jew? But didn’t the Master say: The animals of Jews are more beloved to gentiles than their own wives? Apparently, the gentiles held the Jews in high regard, and the fact that she was a Jewish maidservant would not lower her in the gentile’s estimation. The Gemara answers: This statement applies only concerning matters that take place in private; however, in public, the matter is disrespected, and a gentile would not marry the maidservant of a Jew.,§ The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain maidservant in Pumbedita with whom people were performing prohibited sexual acts, and her master was unable to prevent this. Abaye said: If not for the fact that Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says that anyone who emancipates his slave violates a positive mitzva, as it is written in the Torah: “Of them may you take your bondmen forever” (Leviticus 25:46), I would force her master, and he would write and give her a bill of manumission, enabling her to marry a Jew, which would ensure that she would cease her promiscuous behavior. Ravina said: In a case like that, Rav Yehuda concedes that it is permitted to emancipate her, due to the prohibited matter that others are violating.,The Gemara asks: And does Abaye hold that one cannot emancipate a slave even due to a prohibition that is being violated? Didn’t Rav Ḥanina bar Rav Ketina say that Rav Yitzḥak says: There was an incident involving a woman who was a half-maidservant half-free woman, as she had belonged to two masters and was emancipated by one of them,
About This Text
Source
Gittin
Category
Talmud
Reference
Gittin 37b:19-38a:1
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